
Mode 5 Safety Culture Assessment and Independent Safety Culture Survey



Lew Myers
Chief Operating Officer - FENOC


Desired Outcome

Demonstrate recent actions:

- Status safety culture review for Mode 5
- Independent review correlation
- Review safety conscious work environment survey results

Methodology

- Business practice critique
- Two day meeting with all managers
- Criteria for groups/graded as groups
- Management team consensus
- Refined the criteria to be more objective



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INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA

CRITERIA RELATED TO QUESTONING ATTITUDE

Challenges are welcomed

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN	
Quality of pre-job briefs	Management observations and QA field observations show that most pre-job briefs are not acceptable.	Management observations and QA field observations show that most pre-job briefs are acceptable.	Management observations and QA field observations show that, with some exceptions, pre-job briefs are acceptable.	Management observations and QA field observations show that pre-job briefs in general are acceptable.	
Percent of CRs per person per group	Less than 13% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.	Between 13-15% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.	Between 15-17% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.	More than 17% of individuals wrote CRs during the past month.	
Number of programmatic CRs	The number of programmatic CRs indicates that individuals in general are reluctant to write CRs on programmatic and management issues.	The number of programmatic CRs indicates that most individuals are willing to write CRs on programmatic and management issues.	The number of programmatic CRs indicates that a large majority of individuals are willing to write CRs on programmatic and management issues.	The number of programmatic CRs indicates that individuals in general are willing to write CRs on programmatic and management issues.	
Program and process error rate	>0.48 program and process errors per 10,000 hours worked.	<0.48 program and process errors per 10,000 hours worked.		<0.27 program and process errors per 10,000 hours worked.	
Raising problems	Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are not raising problems encountered in the field.	Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are raising problems encountered in the field.	Management observations and NQA field observations show that a large majority of individuals are raising problems encountered in the field.	Management observations and NQA field observations show that individuals in general are raising problems encountered in the field.	

49

Policy or Corporate Commitment Area	Yellow
 Policies on Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment clearly state that safety is a core value and are understood by the organization 	White
 Management values are clearly reflected in the Business Plan and are understood by the organization 	Yellow
 Resources are available or can be obtained to ensure safe, reliable operations 	Yellow
 Self-assessment is a tool used to monitor, assess and improve our performance 	White
 Independent Oversight is a tool used to validate acceptable performance and identify areas for improvement or corrective action 	White

Policy or Corporate Commitment Area

- Basis for Overall Rating of Yellow
 - The 2003 FENOC Business Plan is not approved and distributed to employees
 - Employees are unaware of the Nuclear Performance Index Incentive for 2003
 - Maintenance, Radiation Protection/Chemistry, and Design Engineering are yellow based on resources availability
 - Lack of appropriate section performance indicators

•	Plant Management Commitment Area	Yellow (improving)
	 There is visible commitment to safety: nuclear, industrial, radiological, and environmental 	White
	 Goals and roles are clear and teamwork is reinforced 	White
	 Ownership and accountability is evident 	Yellow
	 Training and qualification is valued 	White
	 Commitment to continuous improvement is evident 	Yellow
	 Cross-functional work management and communication 	Yellow
	 Creating and environment of engagement and commitment 	White

Plant Management Commitment Area


- Basis for Overall Rating of Yellow Improving
 - Until recently the site accepted the continual delay of corrective actions
 - Identified lack of trust in several departments due to changes in organization and work hours
 - Almost all employee development plans are overdue
 - Contractor training qualifications are a concern

•	Individual Commitment Area	Yellow
	 Drive for excellence-nuclear assets of people and plant are continuously improved to enhance margins of safety 	Yellow
	 Questioning attitude - challenges are welcomed 	Green
	 Rigorous work control and prudent approach - performing activities in a quality manner is the standard 	Yellow
	 Open communications - associates are comfortable in voicing opinions, issues and concerns 	White
	 Nuclear Professionalism - persistence and urgency in identification and resolution of problems is prevalent 	Yellow


Individual Commitment Area

- Basis for Overall Rating of Yellow
 - Overall quality of pre-job briefs is white; green for critical evolutions, yellow for lower significance work
 - We are putting resources on Procedure Change Request backlog
 - Rotating equipment is a major rework challenge for Maintenance
 - 72 Preventive Maintenance tasks are past their due date and awaiting deferral
 - Personal initiative and ownership are yellow

Correlation of Independent Safety Culture Assessment



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Bill Pearce Vice President - FENOC Oversight

• Employee Survey:

- Conducted March 26 28, 2003
- FENOC employees and contract employees
- 1,138 responses from target population of ∼1,448 (~79%)
- 36 questions
 - 26 same as August 2002 survey
- Survey structured to assess four pillars

FOUR PILLARS OF A SAFETY CONSCIOUS WORK ENVIRONMENT



18 Questions

MANAGEMENT SUPPORT



WORKER CONFIDENCE



RAISE
CONCERNS
WITHOUT
FEAR
OF
RETALIATION

7 Questions

NORMAL PROBLEM RESOLUTION PROCESSES

CAP

Cornective Action Process

6 Questions

ALTERNATE PROBLEM RESOLUTION PROCESSES

ECP

Employee Concern Process

5 Questions

METHODS TO DETECT AND PREVENT RETALIATION

SCWERT

SCHE Region Team.


BASIC PRINCIPLES

- Focus on situation, issue, or behavior not on person
- Main tain self-confidence and self-exteem of others.
- Main tain constructive relation ships.
- Take initiative to make things better
- Lead by example.





Pillar 1: Willingness to Raise Concerns




As a nuclear worker, I am responsible for identifying problems and adverse conditions. 1

Pillar 1: Willingness to Raise Concerns




If I had a nuclear safety or quality concern, I would raise it. 3

Pillar 1: Willingness to Raise Concerns




Pillar 1: Willingness to Raise Concerns



My first line supervisor/foreman addresses concerns brought to his/her attention. 8

Management is willing to listen to your problems. 13

Pillar 1: Willingness to Raise Concerns




Constructive criticism is encouraged. 14

I believe my management cares more about identifying and resolving nuclear safety, quality and compliance issues than cost and schedule. 18

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
Pillar 1: Willingness to Raise Concerns



I feel free to approach management regarding any nuclear safety or quality concern 5

I believe I can raise any nuclear safety or quality concern without fear of retaliation. 7


Pillar 2: Normal Problem Resolution Processes



I know how to write a Condition Report and get it into the system or know who to contact to get help in initiating a Condition Report. 19 If I identified a potential nuclear safety or nuclear quality issue I would ensure that a Condition Report was written to address the issue. 20

66


Pillar 2: Normal Problem Resolution Processes



Identification of potential nuclear safety/nuclear quality issues through the Condition Report process is effective in our organization. 21


Resolution of potential nuclear safety and nuclear quality issues, including root cause and broader implications, through the Condition Report process is effective in our organization. 23 67

Pillar 2: Normal Problem Resolution Processes




I feel free to raise nuclear safety/nuclear quality concerns through the Condition Report process without fear of reprisal. 25

Pillar 3: Employee Concerns Program




I am aware of the Employee Concerns Program and its purpose. 26 If I had a nuclear safety or quality concern I would raise it through the Employee Concerns Program if I was uncomfortable raising the concern through my chain of command or in a Condition Report. 27 69

Pillar 3: Employee Concerns Program



I believe issues reported through the Employee Concerns Program will be thoroughly investigated and objectively dispositioned. 28 I believe that the Employee Concerns Program will keep my identity confidential at my request. 31

Pillar 3: Employee Concerns Program



I believe that upper management supports the Employee Concerns Program. 29


Pillar 4: Detect and Prevent Retaliation



I am aware of the FENOC Safety Conscious Work Environment Policy. 32 I am aware of the Safety Conscious Work Environment Review Team and its purpose. 34

72

Pillar 4: Detect and Prevent Retaliation



I believe my work environment is free of harassment, intimidation, retaliation and discrimination (HIRD). 11

73

Pillar 4: Detect and Prevent Retaliation



Within the last six months, I have been subjected to HIRD for raising nuclear safety, quality or compliance concerns while working at Davis-Besse. 35



I am aware of instances that occurred within the last six months in which workers in my work group have been subjected to HIRD for raising nuclear safety, quality or compliance concerns while working at Davis-Besse. 36

Pillar 4: Detect and Prevent Retaliation




Within the last six months, I have been subjected to HIRD for raising nuclear safety, quality or compliance concerns while working at Davis-Besse. 35

I am aware of instances that occurred within the last six months in which workers in my work group have been subjected to HIRD for raising nuclear safety, quality or compliance concerns while working at Davis-Besse. 36

- Results Show Improvement from August 2002 Survey
 - Significant improvement on 24 of 26 questions
- Additional Work Required
 - Demonstrating management commitment to Safety
 Conscious Work Environment
 - Improving Confidence in Corrective Action Program
 - Improving Confidence in Employee Concerns Program

Milestone Progress/Bulk Work



Mike Stevens
Director - Maintenance

Restart Progress

Major Milestones

- Making progress
- Preparing for Mode 4 and Mode 3 pressure test

Integrated Schedule

- Includes all Building Block activities
- Potential schedule impact
 - High Pressure Injection Pump
 - Bulk Work

Performance Indicators

- Schedule vs. forecasts
- Bulk work
- Emergent workscope

Integrated Schedule

Making Progress


- Completed Reactor Coolant System Valve Maintenance
- Restored Containment Air Cooler #2 and #3
- Completed Reactor Coolant Pump Maintenance
- Completed Emergency Sump installation
- Decay Heat Valve Tank Modification near completion
- Filled Reactor Coolant System
- Completed FLUS Installation
- Completed Containment Pressure Test (ILRT)

Next Milestone


Mode 4 and Mode 3 Pressure Test


79


DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION TOTAL RESTART Activites




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









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85

Summary


- Making Progress
- Moving Toward Restart
 - High Pressure Injection (HPI) Pump
 - Electrical distribution
 - Readiness meetings
 - Mode 4 pressure test mid to late May
 - Startup approximately one month later
 - Working options to resolve HPI Pump within this timeframe



Clark Price
Owner - Restart Action Plan


Measuring Our Progress

- Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 0350 Checklist
- Overall Restart Actions




Item No.	0350 Item Description	Discovery	Implementation
1	Adequacy of Root Cause		
а	Penetration cracking and Reactor Pressure Vessel corrosion	Technical Root Cause 02-0891	
b	Organizational, Programmatic and Human Performance Issues	90	
2	Adequacy of Safety Significant Structures, Systems and Components		
а	Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Replacement		97
b	Containment Vessel Restoration following RPV Head Replacement		99
С	Structures, Systems and Components Inside Containment	100	86
c.1	Containment Emergency Sump	100	98
d	EOC of Boric Acid in Systems Outside of Containment	100	83









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








Closing Comments



Lew Myers
Chief Operating Officer - FENOC