

1 have been proactive, and they've given me some issues both
2 in public and in private. I won't say any of them are
3 safety issues right now.

4 We've also brought Randy in, and he has a lot of
5 experience in this area, to be independent. He reports to
6 Bill. And we put a team of independent investigators with
7 Randy already, and we've communicated that to our site
8 personnel.

9 So, once again, the approach has been a strategy,
10 rather than sitting back in the office and being active and
11 proactive, out in the people looking for issues; whether
12 they be, whether it be contractors, our own employees.

13 Initially, you know, when we trained all the
14 supervisors for, we just spent four hours with each
15 supervisor, and both contractors and our own supervisor,
16 make sure that they were sensitive to addressing employee
17 issues. So, the strategy is to really be proactive in this
18 area.

19 Are we successful yet? I think it's quite too
20 early to tell, but we have a lot of things in place
21 already.

22 MR. COLLINS: Do you have
23 majors in place with this interim program? Majors of
24 effectiveness, have you defined success of the program?

25 MR. MYERS: I don't think so,

1 no.

2 We're working that out. Do we have that yet, Bill?

3 MR. PEARCE: No, we don't. Let

4 me say something.

5 I think what we've worked on, what we prioritized

6 first was this; it's more important that if there are

7 issues out there, that our folks feel that they're able to

8 raise the issue. So, that's what we prioritize is the

9 first thing. That's why we did the Safety Conscious Work

10 Environment training with the supervisors and made sure

11 that there is no, that there is no harassment or

12 intimidation issues and that kind of thing.

13 So, that, you know, what we really want is safety

14 issues to make sure we get those captured. And whether

15 it's captured in your program or our program is, I guess,

16 somewhat of it's more painful to collect it in your

17 program, but as long as they get captured, that's the main

18 issue in what we focused on first.

19 And we brought Randy in and the group of contractors

20 in to do independent investigation, because when we did the

21 survey, one of the issues as you might remember that was

22 brought up in the survey, was the fact that the management

23 when somebody brought up an issue, before they do it, the

24 management folks were hearing about it and going and doing

25 an investigation.

1 Well, we countered that by doing independent
2 investigations. That's the idea, to make sure we didn't
3 lose issues, safety issues that needed to be brought
4 forward. And so, I think that was the right priority to
5 take on the issues.

6 Now, we're moving out from that issue and putting in
7 place a longer term program to make sure that we, within
8 our own house that we collect the majority of the issues
9 and get them investigated in-house. So, that's kind of the
10 sequence that we're going through.

11 And we've got more things we haven't talked about.
12 We've got a team put together that looks at all the
13 employment issues that we're having; HR issues, and all
14 that kind of thing. And so we're collecting and being
15 proactive, as Lew talked about. The Four C's Meetings are
16 a part of it. So, there is a wide range of issues we're
17 dealing with there.

18 But I think that more accurately portrays overall
19 what we're doing, rather than just focus on the, you know,
20 which issues are going where.

21 MR. MYERS: The actions we're
22 taking are a direct reflection of our survey. We're taking
23 actions that solve issues addressed in our survey. You
24 think that's fair?

25 MR. PEARCE: Yes.

1 MR. MYERS: The first thing I
2 want to go to is first line supervisors, and that's where
3 we thought the issue was, and that's what we attacked
4 first. Okay?

5 Another thing we've done is we have implemented our
6 Management Observation Program that we brought over from
7 our Perry Plant and Beaver Valley Plant. It's
8 computerized, and I've seen Randy use it personally. It's,
9 we think it's an excellent program.

10 And, I think you like it.

11 But, it allows us to take issues and review issues
12 from an implementation standpoint. We've talked to, we
13 don't think we're at the point yet where we can make any
14 determination. We have five hundred observations now. We
15 know that we've seen some issues with supervisors were not
16 coaching and counseling like they should in the field.

17 So, it's too early to tell. The problem is
18 implementing, and we'll give you more information on that.

19 MR. GROBE: Lew, five hundred
20 observations is a lot of observations and if I remember
21 your program correctly, you've got a number of attributes
22 that are listed that people are evaluating in the field.

23 Have you done any tracking or trending of these
24 issues, and do you have any performance indicators or
25 evaluation of criteria for success?

1 MR. MYERS: Yes. And, you
2 know, a month or so ago I went through the various areas,
3 and picked out performance areas that I think we need to go
4 look at. I haven't used any of that yet. And I'd probably
5 be willing to tell you about that at the next meeting. I
6 think it's just too new.

7 MR. GROBE: I would be
8 interested once you get these performance indicators and
9 measures in place in receiving them, as well as the other
10 performance indicators on productivity.

11 MR. MYERS: You like to hear
12 that at the next meeting, we'll give you information on
13 that.

14 MR. GROBE: That would be
15 great.

16 MR. MYERS: Okay. Another
17 thing is we're physically scheduling two of our managers
18 for observation. So, we're building the managers into the
19 schedule for these observations.

20 I would like to talk a few minutes about a case
21 study, to tell you I think how that went. That was a
22 major, I don't want to use the word production for us, but
23 a major happening.

24 The case study, which took an entire day with
25 everyone on site. Took an entire day. All the managers,

1 including Mr. Saunders, Gary Leidich, were involved in
2 this, what we call a case study. It was four hours long.

3 It really was not just a case study. It was, first
4 of all, we went over and over what happened in this event.
5 What are the issues that we saw in the event, the
6 timeline.

7 We then went to each department. We didn't do this
8 with multiple groups; we did it with individual groups.
9 Then, we took each group and we looked at how they could
10 have helped prevent this event. How they could
11 contribute.

12 We looked at their standards, talked about the
13 problems, and we talked about the standards of senior
14 management that we just rolled out. And each and every
15 group and each and every person took tests. Passing was
16 80. We completed 864 people.

17 We received feedback from 76 percent of the people
18 that took the test, and the course. The overall ratings
19 were that 96 percent of the people said it met
20 expectations. One hundred percent -- 15 percent indicated
21 that it was one hundred percent successful in their minds.
22 In fact, comments were, why didn't we do it quicker. Well,
23 the reason was, we weren't ready quicker.

24 The population across the board was pretty uniform.
25 You look at craft versus noncraft. And if you look at

1 technical factors versus nontechnical factors. Uniform
2 population.

3 Here's some of the things we got out of that.

4 First, to be successful in the future, they liked what we
5 did here, but we have to walk our talk and be effective.

6 This is just a beginning. We must follow through.

7 It's nice we gave them all this stuff, but we have to
8 follow through at every level.

9 They talked about Bob Saunders coming down and
10 spending his day with them was very positive, as well as
11 Gary Leidich.

12 It was important that we get this out to everyone,
13 but we should have done sooner.

14 And the overall, we think that the feedback received
15 about the presenters, were they did an excellent job on the
16 presentation. And, the presentation consisted of a
17 videotape, so we have that timeline consistent with each
18 department. Then the departmental managers, you know,
19 reflecting how this affects their own department.

20 Another area of concern was management's production
21 versus quality and safety priorities. What we're trying to
22 do, what we're trying to prioritize, I know Randy has too,
23 is to demonstrate that we're willing to stop and take the
24 time we need to address problems.

25 We have done that on the feedwater heater.

1 We've done that on containment, containment closure,
2 which we talked about awhile ago.

3 Fuel movement stop work.

4 The polar crane work we stopped. We did two weeks
5 there. We took a hard two-week hit in or schedule there.

6 And finally the other day we had problems with
7 moving RCP motors, and we didn't go forward with that until
8 we felt confident that everyone was safe and reliable to
9 move those motors. That's the message we're trying to put
10 out.

11 There's still some skepticism in our groups about
12 raising issues and fear of reprisal. And we talked about
13 that. That's what we've got Randy working on. That's the
14 atmosphere. I can say here that I want to create an
15 atmosphere where people bring up and tell us their issues.
16 And if we can create that atmosphere, we'll be successful.

17 On the test results --

18 MR. GROBE: Lew, could I do a
19 quick time check? I would like to try to end this portion
20 of the meeting at five, so we have time for the public.
21 You've got two additional sections. Mike was going to talk
22 about -- two Mikes. Mike Ross was going to talk about
23 Operations, Mike Stevens was going to talk about Schedule.

24 MR. MYERS: I suggest we skip
25 Schedule.

1 MR. GROBE: Well, I think
2 that's pretty self-explanatory, so I think folks can get
3 that and you've talked about it already. I definitely want
4 to get to Operations.

5 MR. MYERS: Okay. I'll
6 finish up now.

7 MR. GROBE: Good.

8 MR. MYERS: From a case study
9 standpoint, the average grade was 93 percent. We had one
10 failure of a past criteria, 80 percent. We remediated that
11 person immediately. And 45 percent of the people made up
12 on the test.

13 So, I feel like I can look the public and you in the
14 eyes now and tell you that we have rebaselined and clearly
15 documented. We understand our departmental standards. We
16 understand with each group how this event happened, and
17 we're ready to go forward.

18 With that, I would like to have Mike talk to you
19 about Operations Excellence Plan.

20 MR. ROSS: Good afternoon.
21 My name is Mike Ross and I'm the Manager of Operations
22 Effectiveness at Davis-Besse.

23 A little about my background. I've worked in
24 commercial nuclear power for more than 30 years.
25 Additionally, I spent time in the United States Navy in the

1 Nuclear Submarine Program and also had a tour of duty
2 assigned to Naval Reactors Branch.

3 I have held management positions as Operations
4 Manager, Maintenance Manager and Plant Manager at the Three
5 Mile Island Nuclear Facility for more than 20 years. All
6 but four of my commercial experience years have been in
7 nuclear power plant environment. Two of those four years I
8 spent as an instructor at a test facility, and two years I
9 spent in the corporate office of the Exelon MidAtlantic
10 Regional Group. I held a senior reactor license for more
11 than 25 years.

12 Next slide.

13 I was brought to Davis-Besse to assess the
14 operations staff, and prepare for restart. And above all,
15 assure after restart they had a sustainable level of
16 performance.

17 The RHR group has completed an assessment, as Lew
18 said, for all operations supervisory personnel.
19 Additionally, the first line supervisors were completed.
20 RHR find no or found no individuals that they deemed did
21 not have the ability to go forth and represent the FENOC
22 standards and values, that we're really clearly interested
23 in having in the Operations Department.

24 Several personnel, and that's very key personnel,
25 were deemed to be in need of some additional improvement

1 actions, and those plans are under way now for those
2 individuals.

3 My assessment of the Operations staff, actually
4 centered on the leadership team in Operations. As they
5 will definitely set the standards for health and progress
6 in operation as we set for restart and after restart.

7 We've got a fairly new team of people involved in
8 operations; the Plant Manager, Operations Manager,
9 Operations Superintendent, and Operations Support
10 Superintendent have all been new within this year. That's
11 since January of this year.

12 Two shift managers are relatively new to their
13 position; one has been new this year and the other within
14 two years.

15 Plant Manager, while new to Davis-Besse, has many
16 years of nuclear experience and he is a proven manager.

17 The Operations Manager has been a licensed operator
18 at Davis-Besse and has experience in maintenance. He has
19 very good standards and excellent people skills.

20 The Operations Superintendent has an active, I said
21 active SRO license, and is a very knowledgeable and
22 respected long time employee of Davis-Besse.

23 The Operations Support Superintendent also holds an
24 active SRO license, and he's very knowledgeable and is
25 actually sought out for his expertise and source of

1 knowledge and logical approach to doing business.

2 The Shift Managers are all very experienced, and are
3 respected and supported by their groups. This is a very
4 experienced operation leadership team as well. They have
5 good standards and values; and the Operations, Operations
6 Staff is very supportive of this team. They're very happy
7 to have this group leading them, and they have confidence
8 that this group will position them in the right direction.

9 Next slide.

10 Recognizing that needed improvements were necessary
11 in Operations, the Leadership Team led by the Shift
12 Managers putting together a Leadership Plan. Purpose of
13 the plan was to prepare operations for restart and ensure a
14 sustained high level after restart.

15 Next slide.

16 Vision plan is very important and underlines the
17 attributes necessary for an operations group. I want to go
18 through that rather slowly.

19 The Operations Department is recognized as the lead
20 organization at Davis-Besse. Very important item.

21 Continuous improvement is expected, demonstrated and
22 embraced by operations personnel.

23 Operations ownership of equipment deficiencies,
24 nuclear fuel performance and plant chemistry is strong.

25 Operation management communicates, demonstrates and

1 reinforces desired performance standards.

2 Shift management consistently demonstrates
3 leadership.

4 And, I'm losing my voice, so bear with me. Next
5 slide. A little bit about the plan.

6 MR. THOMAS: Mike, could I ask
7 a quick question. In your opinion, what is the status of
8 bullet one?

9 MR. ROSS: I didn't hear the
10 question.

11 MR. THOMAS: I said, in your
12 opinion, what is the status of bullet one?

13 MR. ROSS: I think there is
14 some -- the question, what's the status of bullet one. I
15 think there is some work to be done there. I think this
16 has been internalized in Operations and they're trying to
17 step forward and we're working on bringing the staff
18 together to ensure, or our agency step forward. It's not
19 done yet, working.

20 MR. THOMAS: Okay.

21 MR. GROBE: Along that same
22 line, is the Operations' Organization Root Cause, I'm not
23 sure exactly what the title is of that document; is that
24 completed?

25 MR. FAST: It's in review.

1 The draft has been produced. It's in review. In fact, the
2 author is in the audience.

3 MR. GROBE: I received a copy
4 of the first version of that document, and then that was
5 pulled back, then you initiated a second effort. That
6 activity is curbed within the last eight weeks. Could you
7 give me your assessment of the first effort and what that
8 tells you about operations leadership and what changes have
9 occurred in the last eight weeks?

10 MR. FAST: The first, the
11 first report that was put out was focused more internally,
12 rather than looking at the organizational impact. The
13 human dynamics associated with operations leadership have
14 degraded over the years. And the quality of the root cause
15 we did was, I would say it's superficial.

16 We dug deeper, we've gotten more feedback from
17 across the organization. It substantiates more direct
18 linkage to our 000891, that's the root cause of our
19 management performance for our head case.

20 So, we see direct linkage. So, this is, I'll say, a
21 full body stout report that focuses on the human dynamics
22 associated with the organization. It's a much improved
23 version and I believe it will be more successful in really
24 identifying what the root cause is and the actions that we
25 will be taking going forward.

1 MR. GROBE: Randy, when do
2 you think we're going to be seeing that?

3 MR. FAST: Soon. Let me
4 just, let me comment. One of the things that Lew did, is
5 Steve was the team lead from day one. We will take all the
6 time necessary to ensure we have a quality product. And
7 what we have in the review and comment cycle right now are
8 some individual facts that need to be either substantiated,
9 or they need to be withdrawn. And that was some of the
10 comment that we had for this past weekend. I read that
11 report in great detail.

12 And, we want to make sure that all of the facts that
13 are provided are substantiated. And so, that's a level of
14 effort that's going on right now. But, I'm going to allow
15 that team all the time necessary to ensure we get a quality
16 product.

17 MR. GROBE: I appreciate
18 that. I wouldn't suggest that you do anything otherwise.

19 The case study, are all of the issues that are
20 captured in your draft report on Root Cause for Operations,
21 were they captured in the case study? Because it seemed
22 to be case study was already completed, you hadn't yet
23 completed this root cause report.

24 MR. FAST: I would say there
25 are some additional elements, more organizational elements,

1 outside involvement, the focus on operational standards;
2 those will be addressed in more detail that really talk
3 about organizationally how do we provide support and
4 acknowledgement to the operations leadership role. That
5 will be evaluated more in depth.

6 And I believe as well there will be some corrective
7 actions that extend organizationally to ensure that we have
8 the right level support of the operations staff.

9 MR. MYERS: Okay, Mike.

10 MR. THOMAS: One more question
11 on that slide, please. This is open to anyone, whoever,
12 probably Randy or Lew, if you could answer this question.
13 I'm real interested in bullet one. And I'm curious what
14 your assessment is of the, the other organizations on site;
15 are they embracing that vision as well?

16 MR. FAST: Let me tell you.

17 You know, we're not the lead right now. What's happened
18 is, I will use the term that there has been a dilution over
19 time of operations having that leadership responsibility.
20 It's a two-fold responsibility. Organizationally, we need
21 to focus on that, but also we need to stand up and take
22 responsibility. That ~~delusion~~ dilution has occurred over many
23 years, just as the head degradation occurred over many
24 years.

25 So, the reality is, that's not a step chain. We can

1 not stand up and say Ops is now the leader of the site and
2 everybody will rally around. Operations has to demonstrate
3 their leadership and demand that, and the rest of the
4 organization has to respond to that. Will that happen
5 overnight? The answer is absolutely not. That will be our
6 focus.

7 MR. MYERS: We know of
8 several times, we're, just sit down and try to take the
9 lead on something, it's not had the proper response. So,
10 we have to have senior management support, and you'll see
11 us doing that.

12 MR. THOMAS: Okay.

13 MR. GROBE: Your supervisor
14 observations and your manager observations, this seems like
15 an area that should be fairly easy to develop some
16 performance indicators, track progress, and I would be
17 interested in that.

18 MR. ROSS: Okay.

19 Next slide.

20 As to the content of the plan, I'll give you an idea
21 of the size. There are 67 items total, 42 for restart,
22 and benchmarking, training and other improvements.

23 Next slide.

24 One of the real important items within the plan was
25 benchmarking. We took benchmarking very serious and we

1 benchmarked with teams. The teams were led either by the
2 Operations Manager or one of the Operating Superintendents;
3 and they had an SRO Shift Manager, Equipment Operator, a
4 Reactor Operator and Staff person on them.

5 We benchmarked three facilities. We purposely
6 picked three operators of multiple units, Excelon, Intergy
7 and Progress Energy. From that three, we compiled the
8 improvements we wanted to make, and as of now we have
9 written new standards, expectations and how they align with
10 the reactor.

11 Shift Manager has been moved out of the work control
12 center, so he be more visible and involved in other plant
13 activities and interact with the people more readily.

14 As to training that's in that plan, we did complete
15 a case study training. That was very well received in the
16 Operations. Conducted an INPO first line supervisors
17 course. That course was aimed at the sharpening the human
18 performance and prevention tools of the supervisor, and
19 sharpening his general skills.

20 Boric acid program requirements were completed and
21 made part of the core program for operations.

22 Safety Conscious Work Environment training for all
23 supervisory personnel is completed.

24 We did additional training on Operability
25 Determinations.

1 Next slide.

2 One of the things the staff did do at Davis-Besse is
3 they kept the operator Requal Program intact. Presently
4 the Requal Program is at the stage where they're taking
5 tests in simulator, taking written tests and taking job
6 performance tests. That will give us a good idea where we
7 are in skills and how well we're prepared for restart.

8 As part of our planning for restart, included in our
9 Leadership Plan, there is additional training scheduled.
10 The standards and expectations that we just talked about
11 are brand new. There will be training going on with
12 written tests.

13 Decision-making training, restart test plan training
14 with a simulator evaluation of that training, plant
15 modifications, licensed operator responsibility training
16 and ombudsman responsibilities and procedures.

17 As to other activities, just looking a little bit
18 ahead, an additional INPO assist visit will be scheduled
19 for sometime in April. The thrust of that INPO assist
20 visit will be check and evaluation. I want to take the
21 word evaluation out there. It's an assist visit. They'll
22 give us an assist visit of our simulator performance.
23 Additionally, they'll do a check in the field of our
24 standards and how well we're going on.

25 That concludes what I was going to say about the

1 Operations Leadership Plan.

2 MS. LIPA: Okay, thank you.

3 Do you have any closing remarks, Lew?

4 MR. MYERS: Well, we had some

5 Desired Outcomes today. That was to demonstrate that we're

6 making progress.

7 I think that the reactor vessel head, we're ready

8 for testing there. The containment sump, we're done. We

9 removed the old covering and putting new bolts in now, and

10 have the sump being manufactured. I think the painting is

11 going well, and paint removal.

12 Decon efforts also are doing well in containment.

13 We've taken one reactor coolant pump apart, already removed

14 the rotating assembly. Working on the second as we speak.

15 System readiness reviews are being completed.

16 We status on some of the actions that we've taken;

17 very timely, time consuming and timely; and Management

18 Human Performance Plan.

19 We are getting ready now to prepare for what we call

20 deep drain. That's a place that a plant very seldom goes,

21 couple times in the lifetime of the plant. There is no

22 fuel in the vessel now. So, we're going to drain it down

23 below the nozzles. And it's tight; it's 11 inches, or

24 something.

25 And, anyway, we would drain it down, we will go down

1 and take, work on like 76 valves, 79 valves. The first
2 valve on all Reactor Coolant System. So, it gives us an
3 opportunity to do some serious maintenance on those
4 valves.

5 It would have been easy for us not to do a lot of
6 the maintenance we're doing, but we decided to go change
7 some things out. We're repacking the valves. We want to
8 bring the plant up to quality condition. So, we're
9 preparing for that deep drain now.

10 After that, we'll be preparing for fuel load,
11 pressurization of the containment, pressurization of the
12 reactor to ensure we have good integrity.

13 That's all I have. Thank you.

14 MS. LIPA: Okay, thanks,
15 Lew.

16 I'll check to see if there is anybody who has some
17 comments, but I want to thank you for the information that
18 you shared today, and we then look forward to the next
19 public meeting, which will be December 10th at Camp Perry.

20 We talked already today about a couple of things we
21 would like to hear about next time; performance indicators
22 on management observations, for one. And then, root class,
23 talk about root cause. Hopefully that will be ready, but
24 as Randy said, it will be done when it's done properly.
25 But, we're eager to see that document.

1 And then, do you have any comments?

2 MR. GROBE: Any final
3 questions?

4 Yeah, I just wanted to summarize the meeting. It
5 was a long meeting, and I appreciate the candor and all the
6 information that was shared. Christine and Marty opened
7 the meeting summarizing the results of some recent
8 inspections. And several of those inspections have had
9 positive results; and, by and large, went a great distance
10 toward closure of some of those issues; reactor head,
11 containment restoration, the issues that Christine
12 discussed earlier and presented in our newsletter, Marty's
13 inspection, and to a certain extent the resident
14 inspections identified some issues that require some
15 continuing work.

16 I think we've talked about most of the issues today
17 that I think are several of the key issues that you're
18 actively working on, but warrant a great deal of attention
19 on your part. One is the lower reactor pressurized
20 penetrations, resolving that issue; and we're looking
21 forward to the meeting on the 26th to discuss that
22 further.

23 Second, is the design issues and getting assessment
24 of those, and as soon as you're ready to talk about that
25 we're ready to meet.

1 The third is Safety Conscious Work Environment, and
2 Human Performance. In this area, our inspection on
3 Management/Human Performance is currently suspended. We're
4 evaluating how to proceed on that. You have initiated a
5 significant amount of activity in that area, but there is
6 still activity that is yet to be completed; and that's an
7 area that we're particularly focusing on.

8 And then, of course, the final one we didn't talk
9 about today is just getting work done, what I refer to as
10 bulk work. But I think the outcome is that there is
11 progress. Our inspections are confirming in several areas
12 the accuracy of work that's been done. In some areas, we
13 still have work to do. Okay. Thanks a lot.

14 Why don't we take a very short break?

15 MR. MYERS: Could I give you
16 one other thing?

17 MR. GROBE: Sure.

18 MR. MYERS: We had a question
19 earlier about Management/Human Performance. To ensure that
20 we're moving forward and making progress that we wanted to,
21 I've got three of our RRP members coming in during the next
22 month at different times; and what they're doing is getting
23 out and meeting with our employees. We have a lot of
24 confidence that they're independent and then giving us
25 feedback.

1 MR. GROBE: Okay, good.

2 MR. MYERS: Thank you.

3 MR. GROBE: Thank you.

4 Let's take a very short break and reconvene in three
5 minutes. So, stand up and then sit down. Don't walk out.
6 (Off the record.)

7 MS. LIPA: Well, this is
8 the, we finished the formal meeting with FirstEnergy.
9 Before we adjourn the rest of the meeting, we want to offer
10 an opportunity for members of the public or anybody who has
11 a comment to come up and talk to us. And what we would
12 like to do is start with local members of the public first
13 and then speaking clearly into the microphone for the
14 transcription, and then give us your comment or question
15 and try to take three to five minutes.

16 MR. GROBE: Let me comment.
17 Before we get started, we have a very special person here
18 today, Sam Collins. Sam is a Director of the Office of
19 Nuclear Reactor Regulation in Headquarters. He has overall
20 responsibility for the safety of nuclear power plants in
21 the United States. And I think Sam wants to make, did I
22 make that too big?

23 MR. COLLINS: You made it too
24 big.

25 MR. GROBE: Sam wants to make

1 a couple of comments, and then we can take public
2 comments.

3 MR. COLLINS: I'm not that
4 special, but I am here. My name is Sam Collins. I'm the
5 Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. And,
6 before we get started, I wanted to acknowledge that people
7 in Oak Harbor and Catawba Island had an occasion over the
8 weekend to, of course, be affected by tornados. So, we
9 know this probably isn't on the top of your mind as far as
10 this meeting is concerned for many of those local
11 individuals. So, we want to acknowledge that.

12 Having said that, we are available. I'm here
13 particularly to address the decision-making and the
14 processes that went on in regards to the reactor vessel
15 head and the degradation of the head, and the continuation
16 of the operation of the unit beyond December 31st.

17 So, to the best of my ability, and recognizing I
18 don't have my technical staff with me that usually keeps me
19 out of trouble when we get into those type of details, I
20 can acknowledge the processes that we use and the
21 decision-making process, so I will be available for that.

22 Thank you, Jack.

23 MR. GROBE: We're now open
24 for any questions. As Christine indicated, we prefer to
25 limit it to 3 to 5 minutes. And we would like to start

1 with any local, public representatives or members of the
2 local community.

3 HOWARD WHITCOMB: My name is Howard
4 Whitcomb.

5 Welcome, Mr. Collins.

6 I think there is a young gentleman, I don't see him
7 here, or this afternoon; I think might want to ask some
8 questions. I hope you're here for the evening session.

9 MR. GROBE: Howard, pull the
10 microphone down a little bit. There you go.

11 HOWARD WHITCOMB: In keeping with
12 the spirit of being short, I have a very, well, I have a
13 comment, quick comment. Mr. Ross, I think you're right on
14 target with your vision statements. I think you have a
15 magnificent challenge ahead of you to get Engineering to
16 subscribe to the notion that Operations is the boss.
17 That's been a problem at Davis-Besse for as long as I know
18 Davis-Besse people, and I think that's, it's going to be a
19 big hurdle to overcome.

20 In looking at the FirstEnergy, I guess it was the
21 handout on July 16th, in looking at the Restart Overview
22 Panel, which was specifically page 5 of that handout, I had
23 a question. There is a Mr. Jack Martin, who is identified
24 as the Company Nuclear Review Board Representative. I
25 guess he's on the Restart Overview Panel.

1 My question is, is this the same Jack Martin who was
2 the Regional Administrator in Region III of the Nuclear
3 Regulatory Commission in the mid 90's?

4 MR. GROBE: I think I can
5 answer that question. That is correct. Jack retired from
6 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission a number of years ago,
7 and is providing services to the industry. There is also
8 other former members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission;
9 Mr. Joe Callan, the former Executive Director for
10 Operations. I guess that's it, Jack and Joe are the only
11 two former NRC executives.

12 HOWARD WHITCOMB: Okay. That's all
13 I needed to know. Thank you, Jack.

14 MR. GROBE: Thanks.

15 Other questions or comments from the local
16 community?

17 Okay. I would like to open it up to the floor
18 then. Any questions or comments from anyone else?

19 AMY RYDER: Amy Ryder. Like
20 the truck.

21 I have just a couple of quick questions. My first
22 is regarding the testing of the reactor looking for the
23 leakage at the bottom. It raises a little bit of a red
24 flag that they want to put fuel in the reactor. They want
25 to put fuel in the reactor when they test it. And it seems

1 like there is an alternative way to do it.

2 Does the NRC have the authority to tell them, no,
3 you can't put fuel in the reactor?

4 MR. GROBE: What alternative
5 were you thinking of?

6 AMY RYDER: Well --

7 MR. COLLINS: Without fuel.

8 AMY RYDER: Without fuel.

9 MR. GROBE: Thanks, Sam. You
10 clarified that.

11 There is two issues that precipitate the need to
12 have the fuel in the reactor. The way, the way you heat
13 up, if you're not using the fuel, which you're not going to
14 use the fuel, the power from the fuel to heat up, is with
15 pump heat, and you have to run the pumps; and that
16 circulates a huge amount of water through the reactor; on
17 the order of probably half a million pounds, something of
18 that order. A lot of water.

19 That causes two concerns. One is that if you're
20 not, if you don't have the equipment inside the reactor
21 vessel itself appropriately supported, it can move around
22 and damage itself. And, the fuel provides some of that
23 structural support for the equipment inside the reactor.

24 The second issue, I think that this issue was
25 discussed by FirstEnergy a little bit, but just to make

1 sure you're clear. The pumps would damage themselves if
2 they're not pushing against enough force. They're going to
3 be circulating water. And they're designed to circulate
4 that water with the fuel in there. And that fuel
5 represents a significant burden to push water through.

6 So, if the fuel isn't there, the pumps would go into
7 what's called runout. What that means is, they run too
8 fast and they can damage themselves. So, FirstEnergy has
9 concluded that they need to have the fuel in the vessel to
10 do the test.

11 Now, that precipitates a number of different
12 things. If you're going to heat up the reactor to normal
13 operating temperature and pressure with the fuel in the
14 reactor vessel itself, you are entering one of the modes in
15 the technical specifications that require a variety of
16 systems, safety systems to be in service.

17 So, there is a large number of work activities that
18 have to occur to put all those safety systems, including
19 the containment structure itself back in service and other
20 emergency systems, including the sump; the sump has to be
21 operable; various emergency systems have to be operably in
22 service, containment has to be in place.

23 So, there is a lot of work that has to occur to make
24 sure that doing the test in that configuration is in
25 accordance with our requirements and done safely.

1 In addition to that, there is a rule, that's
2 10-CR-50.65A4. And what that specifically talks about is
3 whenever you do something unusual, maintenance activities,
4 testing activities, that you assess the risk of that work,
5 and then if it is risky work, take compensatory actions.
6 And that is also something that the company would need to
7 consider, whether this is an unusually risk significant
8 activity and what type of compensatory actions.

9 So, we would be looking at all of these various
10 valuations that they would have to do, as well as we would
11 be thoroughly inspecting the Return to Service and
12 Containment Integrated Leak Test would have to be completed
13 before that would occur.

14 AMY RYDER: When you asked the
15 question this afternoon, why do you want to put the fuel in
16 the reactor when you heat it up. And their response,
17 simplified, was that certain equipment doesn't exist
18 anymore, so we have to put the fuel in versus equipment
19 that is no longer produced.

20 MR. GROBE: Yeah. They
21 referred to hot functional testing. Back when plants were
22 being built in the United States, one of the first, excuse
23 me, one of the final tests that's done before a plant is
24 put into operation is what's referred to as hot functional
25 testing. As you construct equipment, you test it as you

1 build it, and then final tests are integrated tests that
2 are done at normal temperature and pressure.

3 There was a special piece of equipment, for lack of
4 a better term, an orifice that provided that back
5 pressure. And that equipment just doesn't exist anymore.
6 So that the pumps would not damage themselves.

7 AMY RYDER: Can't they just
8 make them?

9 MR. GROBE: There is two
10 issues. You can probably manufacture a piece of equipment,
11 but installing it is not, as an operating reactor, reactor
12 vessel would react from the neutrons from the fuel. So,
13 it's not the kind of thing that is reasonable to do. And,
14 I'm not sure it's unreasonable to put fuel to run this
15 test. I think it's something that insistent with test tech
16 specification, the operating license, and we would provide
17 appropriate oversight inspection.

18 AMY RYDER: I'd probably never
19 put the fuel back in.

20 MR. GROBE: I understand.

21 AMY RYDER: But let's skip
22 that.

23 My next question is for Sam Collins. What was the
24 reasoning behind you not issuing, allowing to operate until
25 February 16th without allowing the shutdown to take place?

1 MR. COLLINS: Thanks for the
2 question. I'm going to start a little bit in time, if I
3 may, and kind of march through the process.

4 AMY RYDER: Okay.

5 MR. COLLINS: The NRC issued a
6 bulletin back in 2001, it's Bulletin 2001-01. And what we
7 did with that bulletin was alert licensees to the
8 phenomenon of the cracking of the reactor vessel head. It
9 had been observed for a period of time, particularly in the
10 French plants. They were the first plants to discover it.
11 They replaced their heads.

12 And, subsequent to the initial type of cracking,
13 which we recall axial, which is straight up and down, there
14 was a secondary type of cracking, which is circumferential,
15 which goes around. And the circumferential cracking was of
16 more concern, because it was not initially well understood
17 for crack rules rates and how and when it happened.

18 We knew plants had been inspecting for cracks since
19 the 90's, quite awhile, including Davis-Besse. And what we
20 challenged the plants with in the Bulletin 01-01 was to
21 indicate to the NRC why those inspections had been
22 satisfactory. And, if the inspections had not been
23 satisfactory, we wanted them to shut down before December
24 31st in order to perform what we determined would be an
25 appropriate type of inspection.

1 So, we were receiving information from all 60 some
2 odd pressurized water reactors in the United States, but
3 there was a group of plants that were what we call high
4 susceptibility plants, particularly the B and W type of
5 reactors of which Davis-Besse is one, that we were more
6 sensitive to the information and had them on an accelerated
7 schedule, if you will.

8 The information that Davis-Besse submitted to us in
9 December, the initial response to the bulletin, we
10 determined was unsatisfactory. It did not contain enough
11 information for us to make a determination that the
12 inspections that had been performed prior to that time were
13 satisfactory, given the new circumferential cracking
14 phenomenon.

15 So, we had a series of meetings with them. I
16 believe there were, if I have this right, five letters back
17 and forth; there were perhaps four public meetings that
18 went on with the Licensee to glean information and to try
19 to have a better understanding of the plant.

20 The plant was originally to run until the end of
21 March. That was when the next outage would be for them.
22 The normal shutdown, if you will, for them to do the
23 inspection.

24 AMY RYDER: Right.

25 MR. COLLINS: Some plants did

1 shut down to do the inspection. Some plants provided us
2 enough information to provide them to run until the next
3 cycle. Davis-Besse was kind of in between.

4 On, if I get my dates right, on November 28th or so,
5 the final meeting with the Licensee, where they provided us
6 information to substantiate their inspection scope,
7 including compensatory measures that they would take in the
8 event that they did have a problem, that had leaks or
9 catastrophic failure. I can go into those, but those are
10 probably detail at this point.

11 The staff then made two types of determinations.
12 Made one of, do we believe that the past inspections are
13 adequate. And based on the information that was provided
14 to us, we did. We did not know about the erosion on the
15 head. Had we known of the erosion on the head, clearly we
16 would have made a different decision.

17 Did we have opportunities to do, to review the head
18 and to discover the erosion? The answer to that is yes.
19 We missed opportunities to do that. But at that point, we
20 made the decision, we did not know.

21 AMY RYDER: I think the
22 confusion is, the decision that you were ultimately
23 responsible for differed from what your staff had decided.
24 That your staff had decided that those inspections were not
25 adequate, that they needed to shut down by December 31st to

1 look for those cracks. And, on the 28th, FirstEnergy made
2 their final plea, and it was ultimately your decision to
3 allow them to continue to reopen, and that differed from
4 the staff that had done all the investigative work.

5 MR. COLLINS: Yeah, I understand
6 why you say that, based on the information as provided from
7 the FOIA, of course, Freedom of Information Act, process of
8 information action, emails, letters, notes; and perhaps
9 what you may have read or may have heard. Let me try to
10 clarify that if I can.

11 The staff made a decision at the end of November,
12 and the staff consensus at that point was that it was
13 acceptable for Davis-Besse to operate halfway through their
14 normal cycle, as it extended beyond December 31st. So,
15 they ran to the middle of February.

16 The staff was specifically asked if they had any
17 reservations about that? And the answer was no. There
18 were two individuals who indicated that they would have
19 made a different decision, but that they would go along
20 with the consensus and they didn't believe there was an
21 immediate safety concern.

22 I asked the manager, who was at that meeting, if I
23 could talk to those two individuals. And I personally
24 talked to those two individuals to ensure that they in fact
25 did not have any safety concerns with the continuation of

1 the operations of the Plant. And they expressed to me that
2 they did not.

3 They had different views, if you will, of some of
4 the technical information. They might have done
5 calculations differently, but they did not disagree with
6 the consensus of the staff.

7 So, in fact, what the emails depict is a process
8 that's building towards a resolution. And, we had, and I
9 tried to find out if we issued it today, I apologize I
10 don't have the answer. But there is a safety evaluation
11 that we're issuing to Davis-Besse that will outline that
12 process and the basis of that process, and that information
13 will be contained in it. If it's not issued today, it will
14 be issued by the end of the week.

15 AMY RYDER: Did Mr. Saunders
16 make a plea to you to postpone the shutdown order based on
17 public perception based on fuel and financial markets?

18 MR. COLLINS: To the extent that
19 you express it, no.

20 AMY RYDER: Okay.

21 MR. COLLINS: However, as in any
22 decision that has to be made, there are a number of
23 ramifications of those decisions, which I've discussed.
24 The NRC makes decisions based on safety. They have four
25 performance goals; maintain safety, we want to do our work

1 efficiently and effectively, we want to reduce unnecessary
2 burden, when it's appropriate, and we want to have public
3 confidence to the extent that it's public confidence in a
4 strong credible regulator. Not nuclear power, but nuclear
5 regulator.

6 This was strictly a maintain safety decision. What
7 was discussed over lengths of time was when it is
8 appropriate for the plant to shut down for an outage, and
9 what are the ramifications of the different dates as they
10 were proposed. Clearly, I won't speak for the Licensee,
11 but clearly I think the Licensee, everything being equal,
12 would like to run to the end of their cycle. The NRC had a
13 question of, tell us why your inspections are adequate and
14 why they support operation beyond December 31st.

15 For this plant, the staff determined that it was
16 acceptable to run beyond December 31st. So, the question
17 comes, what is the most opportune time for the plant to
18 shut down, given that the end of the cycle, which is,
19 perhaps increases the probability of cracking, although
20 minuscule, you're talking 45 days of extra operation, but
21 if you could minimize that, you want to.

22 So, the discussion became, when is the new fuel
23 available? When will the modification packages for the
24 outage, as originally proposed for the end of March, be
25 finalized, so that they could be performed on a sooner

1 schedule?

2 What is the amount of mainline exposure, which is a
3 real maintained safety issue, because there are
4 individuals, many in this community, who work at the plant,
5 who have to be concerned about the limits of radiation
6 exposure; and if job's unplanned, if equipment isn't ready,
7 if training isn't done, extra exposure can be increased.

8 And then there is the issue of the accelerated
9 inspection itself, which the determination being that the
10 plant did need to do different types of inspection. When
11 is the training of individuals available? When is the
12 equipment available? And what is the impact of all of
13 this?

14 Those are resources, is time, people and money. Is
15 that financial, yes? Does it deal with maintaining
16 safety, yes. So, the optimum date that was determined to
17 be, halfway between, if you will, December 31st, and the end
18 of the cycle. That was the earliest date by which we
19 determined the risk of doing an outage on a short term
20 basis is negated by the risk of continuing to operate.
21 And, FirstEnergy would be prepared to perform an efficient
22 and effective outage.

23 So, in a long-winded way, and I kind of excuse
24 myself for that, if you will.

25 AMY RYDER: Okay.

1 MR. COLLINS: That kind of gives
2 you background of how the finances or how the schedule of
3 resources were discussed in the manner that it takes to
4 support accelerated outage.

5 AMY RYDER: I appreciate what
6 you're saying, but from somebody who lives in Ohio, and I
7 believe I could be -- I live in Cleveland -- I believe I
8 could be affected if there was an accident at this
9 facility. It does seem a little arbitrary. And I would
10 rather the NRC err much more on the side of caution, than
11 to base these decisions on a cost-benefit analysis, because
12 that's the decisions that FirstEnergy has been making for
13 quite sometime now and we see what happened when they do
14 that, so.

15 MR. COLLINS: And that's an
16 appropriate comment.

17 If I can, the cost-benefit analysis is only gone to
18 after the maintain safety question is answered. And we
19 have processes that provide for that.

20 You mentioned the order perhaps, in your first
21 question, if I could just answer that also, take the
22 opportunity.

23 We had prepared an order for Davis-Besse, like we
24 would with any plant that we felt it was necessary to shut
25 down in order to do the inspections on the maintain safety

1 basis. That order was predicated on establishing the
2 condition by which we felt like there was an undue hazard,
3 if you will, where a plant either did not meet the license
4 or we had conclusive evidence, that's kind of a legal term,
5 but conclusive evidence that there was a condition that
6 placed the public and environment in an undue hazard.

7 That order was, in fact, available to be issued if
8 it was necessary. And it went through me, went through the
9 Executive Director, it went to the Commission for
10 Information, the Commission of Technical Assistance were
11 briefed on it. I am the individual who would have signed
12 it out.

13 Based on discussions with FirstEnergy, if the NRC
14 had decided that the plant needed to shut down on December
15 31st, I had the commitment of Mr. Saunders that he would
16 shut the plant down. And we would not have to issue an
17 order, although we had it available; if we came to that
18 decision that it was necessary to maintain safety. We did
19 not come to that decision, based on the consensus of the
20 staff, so the order was not necessary to issue.

21 AMY RYDER: Wasn't there also
22 a press release written along with the order?

23 MR. COLLINS: Yes. Any time--
24 that's a good observation. Any time that we propose a
25 significant regulatory action, we have what we call a

1 communication plan that goes with it. That's not only a
2 press release, but it's notification of elected officials,
3 notification of Congress; it's all of those areas that help
4 us in the public confidence.

5 AMY RYDER: Thank you.

6 JAMES DOUGLAS: I have not met you
7 before, sir. I'm one of the neighbors. I live down the
8 street from Davis-Besse. And I'm also a retired chemical
9 engineer. Okay.

10 MS. FRESCH: Excuse me, sir.
11 Could you state your name, please?

12 JAMES DOUGLAS: My name is James
13 T. Douglas. I live on Duff-Washa Road. I'm a retired
14 plant engineer and chemical engineer by trade. I've got a
15 couple of questions.

16 How does Davis-Besse justify their gross negligence
17 of not inspecting the reactor and letting it get so far, as
18 paper thin stainless steel? Now, how do they justify
19 this?

20 This to me is absolutely, I could almost vomit. I
21 have run the biggest acid plant in the world. Now, let me
22 tell you, I can't get by that statement, that question. I
23 can't get by it.

24 MR. GROBE: I don't want to
25 speak for the company, but what I can share with you is

1 they met with us on August 15th, and submitted what they
2 believed was their root cause, and there was no
3 justification or, I guess there was no justification of how
4 it would have been acceptable for this to have occurred.

5 There was a lot of reasons that it occurred. No
6 justification. And --

7 JAMES DOUGLAS: Okay.

8 MR. GROBE: And they're in
9 the process of trying to address those reasons. We call
10 them root causes. And we're in the process --

11 JAMES DOUGLAS: Well, they have a
12 horrible problem. They have the biggest plant problem I
13 could ever imagine. They're all brand new, the employees.
14 The other guys were kicked out by the Board of Directors.
15 They have the Board of Directors looking over their
16 shoulders at them, every single action that they take.

17 Their employees, and all of the hourly employees
18 that worked under them, when they take a look at the head
19 of the vessel head, how badly it was deteriorated, they
20 have a reason to sit down and almost hate the supervisors
21 that sent them in to almost get them killed. Nobody can
22 justify in my mind how paper thin stainless steel can
23 retain two thousand pounds of pressure.

24 MR. GROBE: I understand your
25 comment. And I think it's a very appropriate comment.

1 Sam, do you want --

2 JAMES DOUGLAS: I mean, they've
3 got pressure from the top. They've got pressure from the
4 bottom. And all I hear is gobbledygook from the stage.

5 MR. COLLINS: Mr. Douglas, let
6 me tell you what we know about the inspection of the head,
7 if that would be helpful for you. I don't think it's going
8 to answer all of your questions, but it can perhaps give
9 you a perspective of the information that we have and what
10 the ongoing reviews are. If that's okay.

11 In response to the bulletin I mentioned earlier in
12 response to the young lady's question, FirstEnergy came and
13 presented to us their inspection plans that they had been
14 conducting over a period of time in response to the concern
15 about cracking.

16 There was Boron that was found on the head. It's
17 not unlike other plants when you look at it on the surface,
18 because of the mechanical leakage, not because of the
19 pressure primary leakage, but because of mechanical
20 leakage.

21 FirstEnergy presented to us their inspection plans,
22 if I have the dates right, it's '96, '98 and 2000. I think
23 I have that correct. And, indicated to us that those
24 inspections had been complete; that the head had been
25 inspected; the head was relatively clean. But there was a

1 group of control rod drive mechanisms, if I remember the
2 numbers, four or so, on the top area of the head that had
3 not been inspected.

4 JAMES DOUGLAS: Can I interrupt
5 you here for a second?

6 MR. COLLINS: Sure.

7 JAMES DOUGLAS: How can they
8 inspect in behind that big steel false wall without cutting
9 holes in it; and they never did that to take a look. Now,
10 when they did, what did they see? Enough crap and
11 corrosion to make you sick to your stomach.

12 MR. COLLINS: I don't disagree
13 with that at all. In fact, the NRC was at the head also.
14 We had an opportunity to identify this. We had inspectors
15 at the head. We observed the cleaning of the head. We
16 observed the in-service inspection of the head. And we
17 ourselves did not recognize the phenomenon that was going
18 on with the Boron.

19 We knew there was Boron there, but we didn't
20 understand completely the phenomenon, as chemical
21 engineering probably do, but we did not jump to that. That
22 was a missed opportunity.

23 JAMES DOUGLAS: What are they
24 going to do to prevent this in the future? They have a
25 bunch of mouse holes. Okay?

1 MR. COLLINS: Mouse holes.

2 JAMES DOUGLAS: They cut a whole
3 bunch of mouse holes, they said, and it showed them on the
4 picture on the paper, all the way around the head, so they
5 can at least get in there with some kind of cameras and
6 look.

7 MR. COLLINS: There is a number
8 of issues, I guess, in a different form perhaps FirstEnergy
9 could speak for themselves. But, as a regulator, what we
10 understand; one, they're replacing the head, of course.
11 So, there is a new head. There are additional inspection
12 requirements on the head itself. There is new types of
13 insulation on the head, so that the insulation could be
14 readily removed to provide for more --

15 JAMES DOUGLAS: Engineering never
16 stands still, sir.

17 MR. COLLINS: There is a new
18 type of mouse holes and doghouse, as you refer to them,
19 called access ports, which other plants have done, other
20 ports have modified that access house, so they could
21 visually see what was going on. That's been done.
22 They're proposing also in addition to the more
23 frequent inspections new types of leak detection systems,
24 which I'm not sure if you were here on the presentation,
25 but that would be a first of a kind in this country. They

1 are used in some plants in Europe to monitor the upper head
2 and the lower head for leakage.

3 Other plants are doing these types of things too.

4 There are a number of plants that are replacing their
5 reactor vessel heads. Eventually all plants that want to
6 continue to operate under this condition, not because of
7 Boron degradation, but because of the stress corrosion
8 cracking of the Alloy 600 stainless steel.

9 JAMES DOUGLAS: Let me present one
10 scenario to you. Let us say in 2007, they do not get their
11 new head. Okay? It gets delayed. All right?

12 MR. COLLINS: They have it now.

13 JAMES DOUGLAS: No, no, no, they
14 have the new one from Michigan now. They have another one
15 on order to be delivered 2007. Am I correct in that?

16 MR. GROBE: I believe that's
17 correct. Yeah.

18 JAMES DOUGLAS: Okay. Now, I
19 don't care if it's a year off, I don't give a rat's-- okay.

20 Let us say that they do not get this new head in
21 2007, because everybody in the nuclear industry is
22 absolutely shook up. They're all going to order new heads.
23 And only those that are real bad are going to get them,
24 because you can only make them so fast. They're
25 fantastically complicated. Okay? All right.

1 At least Davis-Besse is going to be told, you're not
2 going to get your head, your new head, you're going to have
3 to go with the Michigan head. Okay?

4 MR. GROBE: Let's just make
5 sure the premises are correct. It's my understanding the
6 company plans on replacing their steam generators in 2012.
7 Is that it? And --

8 JAMES DOUGLAS: The whole thing?

9 MR. GROBE: The steam
10 generators. It's a component inside containment.

11 JAMES DOUGLAS: Oh, okay. All
12 right.

13 MR. GROBE: And at the same
14 time, they would be installing the redesigned head. That
15 head is on order, and I know of no reason it wouldn't be
16 received. Each plant has to order their head if they
17 desire a new one. And again --

18 JAMES DOUGLAS: Okay. Let me
19 finish my scenario just for a second, because my point is a
20 little different than you think.

21 MR. GROBE: Okay.

22 JAMES DOUGLAS: Suppose they don't
23 get the head. It gets delayed. They have to wait ten more
24 years to get the head. They have to make this head last,
25 because it will only be seven years old then. They at

1 least got 25 years or so out of the first head, okay. So,
2 they are not in dire need of that new head. Whereas, some
3 other plants might and the government may just take it away
4 from them. Okay.

5 Now, what can they do?

6 MR. GROBE: We issued a
7 bulletin, recently, which described augmented testing for
8 reactor pressure vessel heads. And, that testing is,
9 increases in its comprehensiveness, based on the age of the
10 head, and the amount of degradation that might be present
11 in the parts of the head.

12 Given the fact that the head that Davis-Besse is
13 installing is not used, it's not been exposed to service
14 conditions, there are very well little inspection
15 requirements, other than visual inspections. As this head
16 gets older, based on our current bulletin to all
17 pressurized water reactors, there would be augmented
18 inspections requiring required nondestructive examination
19 of the penetrations.

20 JAMES DOUGLAS: Okay, my point is
21 this. If you assume and think about that they are not
22 going to get the head, and they have to make the head go,
23 wouldn't it be a marvelous scenario if they had a whole
24 series, thousands of photographs of all of the square
25 inches of weld on that head that they have? This is what

1 it looked like before our last, right after our last annual
2 refeuling. And, there it is, a nice smooth bald
3 head, clean as can be.

4 Wouldn't that make them, the Board of Directors
5 happy? Wouldn't that make John Q. Public happy? Wouldn't
6 that make their employees happy?

7 MR. COLLINS: Mr. Douglas, I
8 think you're on to something.

9 JAMES DOUGLAS: Well, I wish to
10 hell they would listen.

11 MR. COLLINS: Let me clarify a
12 few things and then agree with you.

13 The government, meaning me, doesn't decide whether
14 FirstEnergy procures a new head for Davis-Besse or not.
15 They have one on order. They can decide to trade it, which
16 they might and I agree with that.

17 JAMES DOUGLAS: Mr. Bush might
18 disagree with you, I don't know. (laughing)

19 MR. COLLINS: Well, I'll take
20 that.

21 This head is Alloy 600, so it is the old type of
22 material.

23 JAMES DOUGLAS: Yes, it is.

24 MR. COLLINS: The new heads are
25 a different type of alloy that are perhaps less

1 susceptible. The amount of age on the head is really
2 effective full power years. It's not the age in dog years,
3 so to speak, it's the age that the plant has been operating
4 at full power. So, that will be tracked.

5 This plant will remain a high susceptibility plant,
6 so it will have enhanced inspections. We're also going
7 back as a lessons learned at the NRC to the National Codes
8 and Standards, and working with the National Codes and
9 Standards Group to create generic as-need type of standards
10 for the inspection of the head. Those will continue at
11 this plant for this type of head and potentially even for
12 the new upgraded type of head.

13 In fact, the inspections you've been asking for,
14 they've been done.

15 JAMES DOUGLAS: Okay. I'm very
16 happy about it. I'm talking about a photographic
17 preventative maintenance program. They keep the
18 photographs on file; and any, they can of course leave it
19 open to the public, but certainly any of your people that
20 want to look at them, and they can see they are in good
21 shape; and this is exactly what we need is a good strong
22 head to operate that bloody machine.

23 MR. COLLINS: In addition to
24 that, it's also what you would know as nondestructive
25 examination of the head, which means that they have done a

1 mapping of the head and metallurgy. The heads are forged.

2 So, there are welds in the area of the CRDN I believe on

3 the old style heads, and that's susceptibility area, but

4 the majority of the head is forged.

5 JAMES DOUGLAS: But I sure wish as

6 long as you guys stayed, I sure wish you would think about

7 a good photographic PM program and keep it on file.

8 MR. MYERS: That will do it.

9 JAMES DOUGLAS: Everybody. It

10 would make everybody in the whole damned place happy as can

11 be. And I would sleep much better at night, I'll tell

12 you.

13 MR. COLLINS: I'm hearing there

14 is a videotape that exists of the head.

15 JAMES DOUGLAS: I thank you for

16 staying and listening. Okay.

17 MR. COLLINS: Thank you for your

18 comments.

19 MR. MYERS: We'll show it to

20 you, if you want to see it.

21 JAMES DOUGLAS: I would love to

22 see it.

23 MR. MYERS: We'll show it to

24 you.

25 MR. COLLINS: Maybe we can link

1 you up with Mr. Myers here.

2 MR. GROBE: When they're
3 showing you the videotape of the head, why don't you ask
4 them also to bring the case study, and they can share that
5 with you too.

6 JAMES DOUGLAS: I'll listen to
7 your advice, thank you.

8 MR. GROBE: Any other
9 questions?

10 Okay. I think that's it. We'll be back here at
11 7:00. If any of you want to rejoin us, you're welcome.

12 Thank you very much.

13 (Off the record.)

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1 CERTIFICATE

2 I, Marie B. Fresch, Registered Merit Reporter and
3 Notary Public in and for the State of Ohio, duly
4 commissioned and qualified therein, do hereby certify that
5 the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the
6 proceedings as taken by me and that I was present during
7 all of said proceedings.

8 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
9 affixed my seal of office at Norwalk, Ohio, on this 23rd
10 day of November, 2002.

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Marie B. Fresch, RMR

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NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF OHIO
My Commission Expires 10-9-03.

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