

1 significant benefit to millions of people
2 living with pain, and an important step in
3 protecting public health.

4 I thank you.

5 DR. WATKINS: Our next presenter
6 is Larry Golbom.

7 DR. GOLBOM: I am Larry Golbom.
8 I'm a practicing pharmacist representing
9 myself. I do a self-funded radio show called
10 The Prescription Addiction Radio Show,
11 breaking the silence for one hour a week in
12 the Tampa Bay area of Florida. On a regular
13 basis, I hear the damage and destruction
14 Oxycodone is presently doing to individuals
15 and families in our country.

16 I want to direct your attention to
17 the overhead. It is the molecular structure
18 of Oxycodone, the active ingredient of
19 OxyContin next to the molecular structure of
20 heroin. Oxycodone has been part of killing
21 thousands of people and addicting thousands
22 more.

1 Oxycodone has brought devastation
2 and heartache to an untold number of people
3 and families. Oxycodone has helped kill way
4 too many of our loved ones and children. In
5 all due respect, I am in this room with some
6 of the brightest minds in America, and these
7 facts appear to have been ignored by the FDA.

8 Every narcotics police officer,
9 every addiction specialist, and every addict
10 knows that Oxycodone and heroin are
11 interchangeable. How is it that every
12 professional who interacts with the disease of
13 addiction clearly knows that Oxycodone and
14 heroin are interchangeable, and the FDA has
15 for over 12 years ignored that fact?

16 I am very pleased to tell you that
17 the American people are finally learning about
18 the hoax of OxyContin, and today I am asking
19 the Committee members to respond to it.

20 The side effects of heroin -- the
21 side effects of heroin include possible
22 euphoria, respiratory depression, constricted

1 pupils, nausea, slow and shallow breathing,
2 clammy skin, convulsions, coma, and possible
3 death. The side effects of OxyContin -- the
4 side effects of OxyContin include possible
5 euphoria, respiratory depression, constricted
6 pupils, nausea, slow and shallow breathing,
7 clammy skin, convulsions, coma, and possible
8 death.

9 When you look at the heroin
10 molecule next to the Oxycodone molecule, I
11 hope your decisions concerning OxyContin will
12 be put in the proper perspective. In a
13 moment, I will address the weaknesses of the
14 actual formulation Purdue is presenting before
15 you, but before I do I hope that this
16 presentation will bring to light the
17 convoluted logic of possibly putting more of
18 this dangerous drug out onto our streets.

19 Oxycodone, the active ingredient
20 of OxyContin, has reportedly killed more
21 people than any other prescription drug, and
22 I hope that today will be the beginning to

1 dramatically curtail the use and indications
2 of Oxycodone. Our forefathers had the good
3 sense to ban heroin in 1924, and the medical
4 use of heroin around the world is very
5 limited.

6 When we discuss OxyContin, we are
7 discussing the biggest medical hoax since
8 heroin was introduced as a cough remedy over
9 100 years ago. The only difference is that
10 OxyContin has been marketed and sold as a pain
11 remedy, but its effects are no different than
12 heroin. It remains -- it remains difficult to
13 believe that an entire medical profession has
14 been misled for so many years.

15 I do remain concerned about the
16 information the Division of Anesthetics,
17 Critical Care, and Addiction Drug Products
18 Committee may be presenting to the Committee
19 members. This is an August 12, 2003,
20 memorandum from the Director of the Committee
21 presenting information that can clearly be
22 challenged using information we have available

1 today.

2 I use this memorandum from almost
3 five years ago to refer to the Director's
4 opinion concerning the proper use of Oxycodone
5 and the opiates for chronic pain therapy.

6 Since 2003, I hope that the Director presents
7 -- the Director present realizes that there is
8 no proof that infers that tens of millions of
9 people who are in chronic pain are in need of
10 opiate therapy.

11 Earlier we heard Purdue mention
12 50 million. This young lady before me
13 mentioned 76 million. There is no proof of
14 those numbers.

15 In fact, the recent studies
16 available indicate that the treatment of
17 chronic pain with opiates for far too many
18 people have had poor outcomes. OxyContin
19 should be saved for the most tragic of medical
20 situations. For thousands, the results of too
21 many excessive and unnecessary prescriptions
22 have resulted in death and addiction.

1 OxyContin has been a part of way too many of
2 those negative outcomes.

3 As a pharmacist, I see the sunken
4 eyes and hopeless look from far too many
5 people who have been mismanaged with opiate
6 therapy. If I was a medical examiner or a
7 coroner, I would be sharing with you the
8 deaths and family members I have faced after
9 people have taken OxyContin.

10 I hope the information coming from
11 the Director of the Anesthetics Committee for
12 this meeting has been updated since this memo
13 was written in 2003. If it has not, the
14 Anesthetics Committee has done a tremendous
15 disservice to the Committee members here.

16 Also, the meeting background
17 material -- it was just published Thursday or
18 Friday, very late. This entire meeting is
19 talking about the formulation that, at best,
20 only addresses two to three percent of the
21 final deaths. The reality is that it's
22 estimated that 97 percent of the people who

1 die from -- with OxyContin in their system
2 took it whole.

3 So you are listening to addressing
4 possibly two or three percent of this problem
5 that we have right now.

6 Even if the FDA members decided to
7 put all logic aside after today's comments, I
8 believe there are some points that must be
9 researched before the new OxyContin
10 formulation is considered further. My letter
11 sent to the Committee members dated April 17th
12 covered these points.

13 And for review, "Have you been
14 presented the standards for time-release
15 Oxycodone products?" There are reports that
16 people have died after taking one OxyContin.
17 What standards does the FDA have that allows
18 a formulation to be so dangerous? Who decides
19 the appropriate testing procedures for the new
20 products?

21 I encourage you to ask for the FDA
22 guidelines on the new formulations. It is my

1 assumption that there might not be any.

2 In due respect, only a foolish
3 person would believe that any product
4 containing Oxycodone could be tamper-resistant
5 or abuse-resistant, whatever terminology you
6 want to use. In 1995, the FDA was aware of
7 being able to crush the present formulation,
8 and the damage done since the introduction of
9 OxyContin in 1995 is legendary. Somebody will
10 figure out a way to inhale this product or
11 extract the active ingredient. Only a naive
12 person would believe otherwise.

13 Smoking is not mentioned in this
14 article. After you dissolve it in water,
15 drinking it with alcohol is not mentioned in
16 these studies. More studies have to be done
17 on this product.

18 This is a complex product with no
19 proof that it can be duplicated a billion
20 times over without any flaws. It's a polymer.
21 This formulation you are discussing contains
22 a chemical that is deadly. Have you

1 thoroughly examined the manufacturing process
2 that will ensure safety a billion times over?

3 This drug has clearly been fast-
4 tracked by the FDA powers. Has long-term
5 stability of the new formulation been assured?
6 Did the testing for the new formulation follow
7 FDA protocol? I have not been able to find
8 any FDA protocol. If the protocol for the
9 testing came from Purdue, then the test
10 results must be questioned closely.

11 Finally, has the FDA verified and
12 duplicated the tests Purdue has presented?
13 This company has already been convicted in
14 federal court for lying, and to believe the
15 test results solely based on Purdue's word
16 should question the Advisory Committee
17 members' logic.

18 Have you asked the question if all
19 of the laboratories and testing areas Purdue
20 used at the time of the test were FDA approved
21 or licensed by the FDA? If the proper
22 licensing did not take place prior to the

1 testing of the new formulation, the members of
2 the FDA responsible for this meeting have
3 wasted everybody's time.

4 If I have given you a number of
5 reasons -- I hope I have given you a number of
6 reasons to prevent more Oxycodone from getting
7 out onto our streets today. But the most
8 important reason I can give you, the most
9 important reason, children do stupid things.
10 Children do stupid things. Locking the
11 medicine cabinet is only part of the solution.

12 Parents needs support from the
13 FDA. The medical hoax of OxyContin, the FDA
14 has remained silent on for too long, has to
15 stop. I hope it is not one of your children
16 or grandchildren who because of your decision
17 after today gets hold of the new formulation
18 of OxyContin.

19 I can promise you it will be a
20 decision that you will regret for the rest of
21 your life, and I pray -- I pray the FDA
22 Advisory Committees do the right thing after

1 today.

2 You know, I still have a minute
3 left. I want to mention just one sentence
4 concerning fentanyl tomorrow, the Fentora
5 product. This is also a formulation that has
6 proven deadly in the wrong hands.

7 For the FDA to be considering a
8 sublingual fentanyl product for chronic pain
9 is as equally ludicrous as the underregulated
10 release of OxyContin 12 years ago.

11 Thank you for the courtesy.

12 DR. WATKINS: Thank you.

13 Our next speaker is Beatrice
14 Setnik, please.

15 DR. SETNIK: Good afternoon. My
16 name is Beatrice Setnik. I am a scientific
17 consultant and Director of Scientific Business
18 Development at DecisionLine Clinical Research
19 Corporation in Toronto, Canada.

20 DecisionLine provides consulting
21 services and conducts numerous clinical trials
22 in the fields of abuse liability and tamper

1 resistance. My presence here today is not
2 supported by any sponsor.

3 The main concern that generally
4 comes up with any types of controlled release
5 formulations is the effect with alcohol,
6 particularly with tampering. And more
7 importantly so because alcohol is not a benign
8 substance. It's not only used as a solvent,
9 but it also has centrally acting effects. And
10 a careful assessment of this interaction is
11 critical.

12 The term "dose dumping" we have
13 seen in various different applications to
14 various different degrees as a term that is
15 generally applied to accelerated drug release.
16 Now, this has been historically termed and not
17 always paired with something that is of
18 clinical importance.

19 It has been based on in vitro
20 dissolution data and pharmacokinetic data,
21 which has been oftentimes limiting in the
22 types of information on clinical relevance.

1 The pharmacokinetic data that is often
2 presented has -- does not predict with ease
3 any types of safety implications,
4 pharmacodynamic effects, what happens with
5 somebody takes -- ingests alcohol with an
6 opiate and gets into a car, and the efficacy
7 issue is not explained.

8 What happens when somebody who is
9 a legitimate patient consumes alcohol and may
10 have not only safety implications but
11 compromised efficacy over a controlled release
12 substance that is supposed to be releasing
13 over an extended period of time.

14 Now, historically, due to safety
15 reasons, a lot of these studies in a clinical
16 setting have been used with a Naltrexone
17 cover. The use of the Naltrexone, obviously
18 an antagonist, does block many of the critical
19 questions. It not only manipulates the
20 pharmacokinetics, but can often prevent you
21 from getting critical data on safety and
22 pharmacodynamics that can be important in

1 determining clinical relevance of drug
2 interactions.

3 There are ways of designing safe
4 clinical trials, which need to be more
5 prevalent nowadays. And the importance of the
6 pharmacodynamic and safety are critical
7 assessments in determining the relevance.

8 The issues with the in vitro data,
9 although in vitro data does provide to you
10 limited information about the physical and
11 chemical properties, it tells you a story
12 about solubility. But it's inexpensive, it's
13 a fairly quick method, but it's not always
14 correlated to clinical trial data.

15 And we have had recent case
16 examples where in vitro dissolution data has
17 come up with negative results in various
18 different ethanol mediums, and different as
19 outcomes in clinical trial data.

20 So it's very different information
21 that is being put out by in vitro data,
22 because in clinical studies you do not address

1 -- you address issues such as first-pass
2 metabolism and a variety of different effects
3 when these drugs are put together with alcohol
4 in an in vivo environment.

5 So clinical studies are an
6 integral piece of determining that clinical
7 relevance. And not only from a
8 pharmacokinetic standpoint, but from a
9 pharmacodynamic and safety perspective, to
10 determine relevance.

11 Oftentimes -- and it has been
12 mentioned quite a few times today -- is really
13 the terminology in these types -- in
14 describing these types of formulations,
15 particularly with abuse deterrence and often
16 the interchangeable "tamper resistance."

17 Tamper resistance really would be
18 best described as formulations that have a
19 controlled release caption that is not really
20 easily accessible by the common methods that
21 have been described today, and, of course,
22 also by smoking, which is also an important

1 route of administration, and/or may have
2 tampered or physical chemical properties that
3 may be less appealing for administration, such
4 as a chemical aversion or an antagonist on
5 board.

6 However, it's important to
7 understand that these types of tamper-
8 resistant formulations also have immediate
9 release captions, which if taken intact may
10 also have a degree of abuse associated with
11 these types of formulation.

12 So, however, the true form of an
13 abuse deterrent formulation really would be --
14 and it was mentioned earlier -- a manipulation
15 of the pharmacokinetics, a decrease in the
16 Cmax. But in order for this to be really
17 truly affected, there has to be really an
18 abuse deterrent factor with these types of
19 formulations. So it's really comparing the
20 two.

21 And this is really only assessed
22 through very well-designed clinical trials,

1 and then the epidemiological data to support
2 an abuse deterrent claim.

3 So, in summary, the human studies
4 and epidemiological safety data are really
5 needed to address not only the issues of
6 alcohol-drug interactions but also the abuse
7 potential that these formulations will be --
8 and the claims that can be made as such.

9 The determination of clinical
10 importance or relevance is -- really requires
11 information that is beyond in vitro data and
12 beyond pharmacokinetic data in human clinical
13 trials. This really needs to address
14 important safety and pharmacodynamic
15 implications.

16 Dose dumping, because the degree
17 of dose dumping can vary within formulations,
18 really needs to be describing a situation
19 where there is a clinically relevant effect
20 occurring. And the criteria for the clinical
21 importance really should be developed, and it
22 needs to be developed for the drug classes, as

1 there will probably be many more different
2 types of abuse deterrent, controlled release
3 formulations for drug classes outside of
4 opiates. So this will be an important issue
5 to address.

6 And the appropriate terminology
7 and evidence that is required to make claims
8 on labels needs to be really well defined, so
9 that some -- going forward drug companies can
10 continue to make these types of formulations,
11 which are very important, and will have, then,
12 the knowledge of what to -- they can be
13 putting into labels in order to support any
14 types of explicit claims.

15 And that's it. Thank you very
16 much.

17 DR. WATKINS: Thank you. Our next
18 speaker is Art Van Zee.

19 DR. VAN ZEE: Yes. My name is Dr.
20 Art Van Zee. I am a general internist in a
21 small coal mining town, St. Charles, Virginia.
22 I have no financial disclosures.

1 My interest in pain and addiction
2 dates back eight to ten years when OxyContin
3 came to the coal fields. It would be very
4 hard to overstate the tragedy that has been
5 OxyContin in our region, and then perhaps we
6 were the canary in the coal mines as the
7 OxyContin problem spread -- became a national
8 one.

9 I am not anti-opioid. I use
10 opioids generously and liberally in my
11 patients with cancer, terminal pain. I treat
12 patients with chronic non-cancer pain
13 selectively for a subgroup of chronic pain
14 patients. And then, for the last five years,
15 I have used buprenorphine in treatment of
16 opioid-addicted individuals.

17 I want to just add one little
18 indicator to all of the indicators that has
19 been discussed about the national prescription
20 opioid problem, kind of go over efficacy and
21 safety of OxyContin in relation to other
22 available opioids, as I think that is very

1 germane to the discussion, and then of review
2 what I see as risk and benefits of an abuse-
3 resistant OxyContin and what possible
4 responses can be made to this.

5 These next three slides really
6 come from Dr. Len Paulozzi's work at the CDC
7 on unintentional drug overdose deaths. And it
8 has been very clear over the last several
9 years prescription opioid deaths rising fairly
10 dramatically, now exceeding cocaine and
11 heroin.

12 Again, another graphic
13 demonstration of this same point.

14 And then, this slide really
15 correlates the drug overdose deaths rate and
16 the total sales of prescription opioid
17 painkillers in the United States over the last
18 several years. Clear correlation.

19 Now, all prescription opioids have
20 been prescribed, much more available over the
21 last decade, but clearly OxyContin has been a
22 leader of that. And in this 2004 study, the

1 OxyContin abuse problem had gone from a local
2 and regional problem to be a national problem.
3 And in at least this one study it had become
4 the most prevalent drug of abuse at that time.
5 so availability is the key with prescription
6 drug abuse.

7 This is just some data from DEA on
8 their production quotas and showing a rise --
9 significant rise in all prescription opioids
10 -- fentanyl, 16-fold; oxycodone, 14-fold, over
11 the 12 years it has been surveyed there.

12 Now, this is a little bit
13 different depiction of the data you saw
14 earlier today, which was mostly number of
15 prescriptions. Now, this is ARCOS data on the
16 millions of grams -- in millions of grams of
17 the opioids out there. And I'm afraid if I
18 used a pointer I'd probably put somebody's eye
19 out there, so we'll have to go on the graph.

20 But you've had a dramatic increase
21 in all of the opioids. Oxycodone, which is on
22 the very top of your slide, was a 580 percent

1 increase as opposed to morphine, which was a
2 150 percent increase in millions of grams.

3 This slide -- I want to thank
4 Cathy Gallagher at the DEA and INS Health for
5 allowing us to share this data. But this is
6 the quantity of controlled substances in the
7 supply chain, total dispensed prescriptions.
8 And in 2007, it's about 190 million
9 prescriptions of opioids available in the
10 country.

11 This is the total dosage units in
12 2006/2007, and it's about 12.4 billion units
13 of prescription opioids out there. A lot of
14 availability. And, of course, that is
15 reflected in this very familiar slide where
16 most patients report -- or most people report
17 the illicit pain reliever use as either from
18 a doctor or a friend or relative.

19 So I think it is germane to look
20 at OxyContin in comparison to efficacy and
21 safety issues in regard to other available
22 opioids, Oxycodone itself comparable in

1 analgesia and addiction potential to morphine.

2 And then Dr. Curtis Wright was
3 medical review officer of the OxyContin new
4 drug application in 1995. His conclusion was
5 that OxyContin was equivalent to QID immediate
6 release Oxycodone. I would not allow a better
7 claim.

8 He also concluded that -- you
9 know, that OxyContin was just a BID
10 alternative to conventional QID Oxycodone.
11 Care should be taken to limit competitive
12 promotion. This product has not been shown to
13 have a significant advantage beyond reduction
14 in frequency of dosing.

15 And in back pain and cancer pain,
16 immediate release Oxycodone versus controlled
17 release Oxycodone -- comparable efficacy and
18 safety. Sustained release morphine and
19 oxycodone are comparable in treating cancer
20 pain.

21 And then, Dr. Chou and his
22 colleagues at the University Virginia reviewed

1 all of the opioid preparations and concluded
2 that there was not sufficient evidence to
3 indicate that one preparation was any better
4 than any other, either in the long-activity
5 class, sustained release, or between the long-
6 acting and immediate release classes.

7 So what are the risks and benefits
8 of an abuse-resistant OxyContin? Of course,
9 the benefit we all want is some major
10 deterrence for abuse, primary from altered
11 route of use, reduced snorting, reduced
12 injection. You know, whether this preparation
13 proposed today does have the safety and
14 efficacy to do that will be the Committee's
15 decision, but that's, of course, what all of
16 us want in this room.

17 What are some of the potential
18 risks of an abuse-resistant Oxycontin, or at
19 least from the looks of this preparation you
20 would have to label it more a tamper reduction
21 preparation. But certainly there would be the
22 risk of iatrogenic addiction in chronic non-

1 cancer pain patients when they take it exactly
2 as prescribed.

3 And the irony of much of the
4 debate about chronic non-cancer pain is we
5 really don't know what the risk of addiction
6 is when patients -- iatrogenic addiction
7 taking opioids over long periods of time. We
8 don't know if it's one percent, five percent,
9 eight percent.

10 There is the increased risk of
11 addiction when the preparation is chewed
12 rather than swallowed, the risk of inadvertent
13 overdose and death.

14 Patrick Stewart, a 24-year old man
15 who died in California, pictured with his
16 mother here, Barbara Van Rooyan, bright and
17 promising future, college student, actually
18 the grandson of a physician, one of the
19 physician founders of U.C. Medical School at
20 Davis, not a regular drug user, had taken one
21 OxyContin and drunk a beer at a party and died
22 from that. And I'm afraid this -- there are

1 many bereaved families around the country that
2 have been in a similar situation.

3 I'm real concerned about the risk
4 of a false sense of security about an "abuse-
5 resistant" preparation fueling increased
6 opioid prescribing, increased availability,
7 and increased public health problems.

8 I am concerned about the risk of
9 the manner in which this drug could be
10 marketed and promoted. Purdue Pharma took a
11 drug that was basically comparable in efficacy
12 and safety to other available opioid
13 preparations, and in the most aggressive and
14 heavily financed opioid promotion campaign in
15 the history of the industry made it a
16 blockbuster drug.

17 I think this is very notable. In
18 1990, six years before the marketing of
19 OxyContin, it was reported in a mainstream
20 medical journal that Purdue's MS-Contin had
21 been abused in the very same fashion OxyContin
22 later to be abused, meaning being crushed and

1 injected, and had in a major metropolitan area
2 become the drug of choice, surpassing the
3 perennial favorite, Dilaudid.

4 And, of course, this was shown in
5 the new drug application that this was -- you
6 know, 70 percent could be recovered.

7 So we had -- some of these slides
8 were prepared before I saw what we had today,
9 and I do think abuse resistant is in quotes,
10 should be in quotes. It may be tamper
11 reduction is more appropriate to what we've
12 seen. I'm concerned about how much can still
13 be extracted in the studies.

14 I'm concerned about the 60 and 80
15 milligrams not being covered with a tamper
16 reduction. I'm concerned about the fact that
17 we need to have much enhanced oversight over
18 the marketing, and the biggest thing -- we
19 need to replace, rather than supplement, the
20 current preparation, and perhaps this can --

21 DR. WATKINS: Thank you.

22 Our next presentation is a group

1 presentation by Ellen and Peter Jackson.

2 MR. JACKSON: My name is Pete
3 Jackson. I have no financial disclosures.

4 I am a biologist with the U.S.
5 Environmental Protection Agency in Chicago.
6 My wife, who is here with me, and I reside in
7 Arlington Heights, Illinois, where we have
8 raised two children.

9 The picture you see on the screen
10 is our wonderful daughter Emily. This picture
11 was taken in 2006 when she was 18 years old.
12 A few months later, three days before she was
13 to begin college, Emily was dead from
14 OxyContin. Tragically, when Emily accepted
15 this drug from a trusted relative, she was not
16 told that it was as dangerous as heroin.

17 She was blind-sided. It was her
18 only encounter with this killer drug
19 OxyContin. One pill swallowed whole. What
20 other drug can kill you with one pill?

21 For those of you on the ALSD
22 Advisory Committee, she should look familiar.

1 I showed you this picture on March 29th of
2 last year when I came to call on the FDA to
3 schedule a special public meeting to
4 explicitly address the national epidemic that
5 OxyContin has created. I begged you in my
6 daughter's name that day to address this
7 issue.

8 FDA still has not responded to my
9 request. So I am back here with my wife to
10 remind you and the FDA that we are still
11 waiting. In fact, many thousands of American
12 families are still waiting.

13 The FDA's approval of OxyContin in
14 1995 began a dramatic increase in the
15 production and sale of prescription opioids in
16 this country, as Mr. Zee just mentioned.
17 Statistics indicate that the increase in the
18 prescription of opioids is behind the rising
19 mortality trend with prescription drugs, which
20 are now the second-largest cause of
21 unintentional deaths in the U.S. behind motor
22 vehicle crashes.

1 From 1992 to 2003, new abuse of
2 all prescription opioids among teens was up an
3 astounding 542 percent. And by the way, any
4 statistics I give you are fully referenced and
5 documented in my written statement.

6 It would be naive to believe that
7 OxyContin was not the catalyst for this trend.
8 Ten percent of teens have abused OxyContin.
9 In 2005, an estimated 22,400 people died in
10 this country from drug overdoses -- a toll
11 largely attributed to opioid analgesics, which
12 now cause more deaths than heroin and cocaine
13 combined.

14 Again, the Joint Committee must
15 recognize the introduction of OxyContin
16 coinciding with the increasing number of
17 deaths.

18 In Florida alone, prescription
19 opioids caused 1,972 deaths in 2006. This is
20 more than twice the number of U.S. soldiers
21 who died in Iraq that year; 496 of these
22 deaths were due to Oxycodone as the primary

1 cause of -- suspected cause of death. And
2 Oxycodone, as you know, is the active
3 ingredient in OxyContin.

4 Oxycodone is the single most
5 commonly reported suspect drug in mortality
6 reports to the FDA -- the number one
7 prescription drug killer, by your own FDA
8 statistics, and you're considering releasing
9 more of the product that killed my daughter.

10 My daughter is one of those
11 statistics, and I am asking you not to turn
12 your back on her.

13 The existence of this well-
14 documented explosion of prescription opioid
15 drug abuse since the introduction of OxyContin
16 is proof that the drug control policies in
17 this country have been an utter failure. FDA
18 has taken a hands-off approach to the problem.

19 Regarding OxyContin, despite a
20 variety of drug education programs, despite a
21 risk management plan implemented by Purdue,
22 despite ineffective FDA warning letters and

1 labeling changes, and, incredibly, despite
2 Purdue Pharma's guilty plea to a felony charge
3 of illegally misbranding OxyContin "in an
4 effort to mislead and defraud physicians and
5 consumers" -- those are the words of U.S.
6 Attorney John Brownlee -- FDA allows Purdue to
7 continue to market OxyContin for a wide
8 variety of moderate pain indications.

9 With the blessing of the FDA,
10 Oxycodone production levels are even higher
11 than last year. OxyContin pills continue to
12 flood our nation's medicine cabinets and
13 school lockers, and people continue to die in
14 increasing numbers.

15 Meanwhile, a number of prominent
16 reviews and studies have cited a lack of
17 evidence on the long-term efficacy and safety
18 of opioid therapy for chronic non-cancer pain.

19 Will someone please explain to me
20 why the FDA continues to ignore all of these
21 deaths and those who suffer the adverse
22 consequences of OxyContin being so widely

1 distributed in our country, like aspirin? How
2 many more people need to die before the FDA
3 will do something to stop this epidemic?

4 FDA plays a crucial role in the
5 solution to this problem. After all, it was
6 FDA that approved this drug. FDA has the
7 authority to withdraw the approval of a drug,
8 restrict its distribution, or negotiate
9 labeling changes, and passage of Public Law
10 110-85 last year significantly enhances the
11 agency's authority to effectively regulate
12 drug safety, including drugs that are already
13 on the market.

14 The official purpose of today's
15 meeting -- at least in my opinion it is
16 secondary -- the primary issue should be:
17 what do we do with the existing products that
18 are on the market? But the official purpose
19 of today's meeting is to consider a new drug
20 application for OxyContin that is purportedly
21 tamper-proof, or make that tamper-resistant.

22 The FDA needs to be very leery of

1 approving a new formulation that, upon
2 approval, would be heavily marketed as tamper-
3 resistant by the same company that pleaded
4 guilty to a felony charge of lying to doctors
5 about the safety of the original formulation.

6 It defies logic and reason that
7 Purdue -- convicted, corporate felon -- is
8 still in business selling the same drug, given
9 this legacy of death and deceit.

10 I have been thinking very hard
11 about this since I submitted my written
12 statement. And I am unable to reconcile FDA's
13 review of this NDA with this company's felony
14 conviction. I do not understand how the FDA,
15 an agency of the Federal Government, can even
16 entertain an application from a company
17 convicted of a felony by that same government
18 when the company is still on probation for its
19 crime.

20 FDA must realize that OxyContin is
21 not only a dangerous drug, the legacy of death
22 of OxyContin is also attributable to the

1 reprehensible and unethical marketing
2 practices of Purdue Pharma. Purdue's conduct
3 in making false representations about its drug
4 to doctors is well documented. In light of
5 the company's recent felony conviction for
6 lying to doctors, I believe that the FDA
7 should not approve the new drug application.

8 I also believe that the FDA must
9 restrict all existing formulations of
10 OxyContin to severe pain cases only.

11 Finally, the FDA needs to hold a
12 special public meeting to address the much
13 broader opioid problem.

14 You have yet another opportunity
15 to reign in this killer drug and save many
16 lives. In my daughter Emily's name, I ask
17 that you advise the FDA to reject the NDA and
18 properly restrict the existing formulations.
19 If FDA cannot effectively regulate OxyContin
20 in a manner consistent with its mission to
21 ensure the safety of drugs for the U.S.
22 market, then it should be removed from the

1 market all together.

2 OxyContin is interchangeable with
3 heroin, and is its chemical equivalent. It is
4 time that our drug policies reflected these
5 facts.

6 In closing, I would like to show
7 you some pictures of young people who we have
8 lost to OxyContin, including several who died
9 since we were here last time to ask for your
10 help.

11 (Whereupon, several pictures were
12 shown.)

13 Thank you.

14 MS. JACKSON: My name is Ellen
15 Jackson. I'm a licensed clinical social
16 worker, and I work as a school social worker
17 in Illinois. I'm also the parent of a child
18 who died after taking one OxyContin pill after
19 she had been drinking alcohol.

20 This was the first time she had
21 ever taken the drug. She was not a drug
22 addict, just an 18-1/2 year old kid who had

1 just graduated from high school.

2 My daughter Emily suffered from
3 anxiety disorder. This was diagnosed after
4 she learned at age 15 that she had thyroid
5 cancer which had spread to her lymph nodes.
6 Emily spent the summer of her freshman,
7 sophomore, and junior years of high school
8 having surgeries to remove the cancer and the
9 lymph nodes.

10 At her last visit to Mayo Clinic
11 in May, before her high school graduation, it
12 looked like Emily may have been cured. There
13 was still a dark spot on her ultrasound, and
14 she was due to go back to Mayo in November of
15 2006 for follow up.

16 We never found out if she beat her
17 cancer because she died that August. I tell
18 you her story because Emily was a victim of
19 this drug OxyContin. Of course, she shouldn't
20 have taken this drug, which was given to her
21 by a trusted relative. I believe she took it
22 because she thought it could relieve her

1 anxiety.

2 Emily did a stupid thing.

3 Eighteen-year olds do stupid things all the
4 time. Most of them get to learn from their
5 mistakes. Emily paid for her mistake with her
6 life.

7 This morning we heard numerous
8 statistics about emergency department visits
9 regarding those who had taken opiates and were
10 treated. Where were the mortality statistics?
11 How many others like my daughter have died?

12 It's my understanding that there's
13 thousands of people who have died after taking
14 OxyContin. Why doesn't FDA do something about
15 this dangerous drug? Other drugs have been
16 pulled from the market due to safety concerns,
17 like Vioxx, drugs with nowhere near the
18 mortality track record of OxyContin, yet FDA
19 sits by year after year allowing OxyContin to
20 stay on the market when it can cause many to
21 -- cause death to many who take it.

22 FDA seems to care more about food

1 that is toxic to pets than it does pills that
2 kill people.

3 I ask that you look very seriously
4 at OxyContin, which has caused so much pain to
5 those who have lost loved ones who took it and
6 died. This drug needs to be treated
7 differently than all other drugs, because it
8 can kill when only one pill is consumed.

9 If cigarette packages have
10 warnings that say smoking can kill you, then
11 OxyContin prescription bottles should have had
12 the same warning on them. Smoking cigarettes
13 can kill you, but only after you use them
14 repeatedly for many years. OxyContin can kill
15 you after you take it only one time.

16 I lost a beautiful child just
17 beginning her adult life to this drug. I used
18 the money saved for her college to bury her.
19 I speak for all the other parents who have
20 lost children to this dangerous drug. We will
21 never see our children get married, have
22 children, have a career, have a future. I

1 will never get to have another Mother's Day
2 with my daughter.

3 FDA, you need to take steps to
4 make this drug safer. And until you can
5 guarantee that one pill won't kill someone,
6 you should be taking OxyContin off the market,
7 not approving new formulations.

8 DR. WATKINS: Thank you.

9 CHAIR FARRAR: The open public
10 hearing portion of this meeting is now
11 concluded, and we will no longer take comment
12 from the audience.

13 The Committee will now turn its
14 attention to addressing the task at hand, the
15 careful consideration of the data before the
16 Committee as well as the public comments.

17 In moving forward, the next step
18 is the Committee's opportunity to ask
19 questions of the various presenters. And I
20 believe, Dr. Haddox, you are moderating for
21 the Purdue folk, and questions can also be
22 asked of the FDA presentations as well.

1 In a similar manner as before,
2 please indicate your interest in speaking. We
3 will try and write your name down and call you
4 in the order in which you have indicated you
5 want to speak. If we seem to miss you, I
6 apologize up front, but just let us know and
7 we'll try and indicate that.

8 Does that mean you want to speak?
9 Okay. Dr. Burlington?

10 DR. BURLINGTON: Yes. I'd like to
11 start with Dr. Haddox. Clearly, you are
12 advocating that your product's tamper-
13 resistant features, or some words to that
14 effect, be included in the labeling. And
15 could you go over for us what were your key
16 considerations in reaching that conclusion?
17 And also, how would you label the
18 unreformulated 80 milligram tablet?

19 DR. HADDOX: We have given a lot
20 of thought, as I mentioned earlier, about the
21 language proposed -- that we proposed to the
22 FDA, and we have -- I could bring that up

1 again if we need to.

2 But I think it was pretty obvious
3 what we were proposing, that we want to
4 include information in the label about the 10
5 through 40 milligram that distinguishes it
6 from the 60 and 80 milligram, so that
7 physicians know the difference between those
8 two formulations, and that they can make their
9 -- having accurate medicine about -- accurate
10 information about the medicine, can make
11 appropriate prescribing decisions.

12 It's important to realize when you
13 are caring for patients, as the prescribers
14 here on the panel know, you are dealing with
15 individuals, and it's a tenet of pain care
16 that you individualize therapy in every single
17 case.

18 And as a physician, I want to know
19 what the advantages/disadvantages, pros and
20 cons, of a particular formulation are. When
21 I was in practice, I did that all the time --
22 comparing one anti-depressant to another anti-

1 depressant, for instance, in a given
2 individual to try and decide which was the
3 best one for that person.

4 The other thing that you know is
5 we have had a tremendous amount of
6 misconceptions already. Confusion is
7 reigning. Even though this drug has not even
8 been subject to an approval decision yet by
9 the FDA, there are people out there who are
10 saying it's abuse-proof, which it's clearly
11 not. There are people who are seeing it's
12 abuse-resistant, which it may be, but we don't
13 know that yet, and we won't know that until
14 the end of the studies that we do.

15 What we can demonstrate is that to
16 certain forms of tampering it does have more
17 resistance than the original formulation, and
18 we think health care professionals need to
19 know that information.

20 DR. WATKINS: Dr. Soriano?

21 DR. SORIANO: Sul Soriano. This
22 is a question for the sponsor as well as

1 SAMHSA. I think this application is built on
2 the premise that by decreasing the yield of
3 the drug from this preparation will result in
4 decreased abuse.

5 Now, is there any epidemiological
6 data that show that indeed this approach
7 actually has some public health benefits at
8 all?

9 DR. HADDOX: Well, I don't think
10 there are data now, which is why we proposed
11 the epidemiological study as part of our
12 RiskMAP, to find out what the effect of this
13 formulation is once it is actually available
14 and assuming that the 60 and 80 are also
15 approved in the new formulation once the
16 supply pipeline has sort of been transitioned
17 over to where the only OxyContin available is
18 in the OTR formulation, and then look at it
19 systematically and see if it makes a
20 difference.

21 This has not really been tried on
22 a large scale, to my knowledge, in the past.

1 There have been a few attempts here and there
2 but nothing of this magnitude. So I don't
3 think there are data, which is why we proposed
4 a study, and it's part of the RiskMAP to find
5 out.

6 I would welcome any comments from
7 the SAMHSA folks, too, though.

8 DR. SORIANO: Well, if someone
9 from SAMHSA can come up. But the other -- the
10 follow up to that is that, certainly, if you
11 break down two pills of 80 milligrams each, if
12 you do the same thing to 100 pills of 10
13 milligrams each, you will still get the same
14 amount of yield. So that's why I posed the
15 question of whether or not there is any
16 efficacy in this new formulation.

17 DR. HADDOX: Well, if there is --
18 I'll let Nick -- are you going to come up?
19 I'll talk until you get up here.

20 PARTICIPANT: Just that we don't
21 have the data to answer that question right
22 now.

1 DR. HADDOX: Okay. And if that
2 question does get answered in a positive way,
3 I think it will do with what Dr. Henningfield
4 talked about, the response cost. What we
5 don't know is what is a sufficient enough
6 barrier, an impediment, to drive an individual
7 away from abusing one formulation and doing
8 something else instead of perhaps not abusing
9 at all? That's an unanswered question.

10 In a laboratory setting, in a
11 given individual, you can build in paradigms
12 with increasing effort, so you can sort of get
13 a behavioral economic study. But that's one
14 individual. And even if you do a bunch of
15 them, you'll find a big range, as he said,
16 that the break point varies so much between
17 people.

18 So we don't really know what that
19 answer is, and that's why we want to do the
20 study.

21 CHAIR FARRAR: Dr. Gardner?

22 DR. GARDNER: I have a question

1 also for the sponsor. I haven't heard
2 anything today about a clinical program for
3 this formulation, and I wondered if clinical
4 trials are scheduled or in progress or
5 planned. And along with that, are children or
6 youth to be included in clinical trials with
7 this formulation?

8 And the second thing -- question
9 while you're there, I wondered if you have a
10 projection for how far behind the 60 to 80s
11 are in the trajectory for the other strengths
12 that we have seen today?

13 DR. HADDOX: Well, one of my
14 clinical research colleagues can help me
15 answer the first part. I will address the
16 second part.

17 We will be ready to submit the
18 SNDA, assuming the NDA for the 10 through 40
19 gets approved, within about 30 days of that
20 approval. And then it will take the FDA -- I
21 think the regulatory time is somewhere in the
22 four-month range to approve it.

1 We anticipate that the turnover in
2 the marketplace will actually be relatively
3 rapid, because once we get approval we will
4 start filling all new orders with the OTR
5 formulation, regardless of what strength it is
6 for, assuming we have an approved formulation
7 in that strength.

8 And the people who know that part
9 of the business a lot better than I do tell me
10 that's a matter of months, that it will sort
11 of change out in the marketplace.

12 DR. GARDNER: Excuse me. Will you
13 withdraw all of the existing non-tamper-proof
14 product that is on the market now?

15 DR. HADDOX: We do not have a
16 recall planned, because, apparently the --
17 again, this is the business part that I just
18 confess, as a doctor, I don't really
19 understand it that well.

20 But what my commercial colleagues
21 tell me is that the suppliers are managing
22 their inventory for commercial reasons on

1 their end at a fairly low level, so that once
2 we start filling new orders with the OTR it
3 will change over in the marketplace fairly
4 quickly, in a matter of months.

5 The concern about a recall program
6 is, do we create artificial shortages for
7 patients who need this medication? And,
8 remember, you know, one of the concerns here
9 is not so much what patients are doing with
10 the medicine. It's what non-patients are
11 doing with the medicine.

12 And as our research objectives,
13 you know, were based on, the first thing is
14 we don't want to cause new problems for
15 patients if we can possibly avoid that.

16 Can someone help me about the
17 clinical trials? I know we did bioequivalency
18 trials. Obviously, that's the data we're
19 submitting. Dr. Harris in our clinical
20 research -- does he need to come to the
21 microphone?

22 CHAIR FARRAR: Yes, please.

1 DR. HADDOX: Okay.

2 DR. HARRIS: Yes, I can address
3 that question. I'm Steve Harris, Head of
4 Clinical Pharmacology with Purdue. And as far
5 as the clinical work that we have conducted
6 with the new formulation, we have completed
7 and submitted the results of a series of
8 bioequivalence trials, comparing the new
9 formulation, OTR as we call it internally, to
10 the initial formulation of OxyContin.

11 We have examined healthy subjects
12 dosed with both formulations in cross-over
13 fashion, in the fasting state, in a set of
14 studies, as well as in the fed state in a set
15 of studies. So we have established to the
16 standards that are specified in FDA guidance
17 documents for the comparison of formulations,
18 that the formulations are what is termed
19 "bioequivalent," which is a surrogate for
20 therapeutic equivalence.

21 We have also conducted studies
22 across the range -- the full range of the new

1 formulation dosage strengths to show that they
2 are what is called "dose proportional," so
3 that the exposure that results from a 20
4 milligram new formulation product is twice
5 that from a 10 milligram formulation product.
6 And we examined that across the full range of
7 doses.

8 CHAIR FARRAR: So just to make
9 sure, the answer was no, you are not planning
10 any more clinical research.

11 (Laughter.)

12 DR. HARRIS: Oh, I didn't -- was
13 that -- yes, that's true. The submission is
14 based on the bioequivalence studies.

15 CHAIR FARRAR: Dr. Bickel?

16 DR. BICKEL: I have a couple of
17 questions for the sponsors. I was wondering
18 what the rationale for maintaining the
19 physical appearance of the new product -- you
20 said you wanted to make sure that the
21 physicians were able to discriminate the old
22 product from the new product. Wouldn't it be

1 helpful if others could discriminate it as
2 well?

3 DR. HADDOX: Well, the -- you
4 know, as a prescriber, a former prescriber, I
5 think it's very important to -- when I had
6 patients who got changed to a new formulation,
7 if it didn't look very much like the old one,
8 that was a problem for them. They had a lot
9 of questions. They caused -- it caused a lot
10 of unnecessary anxiety.

11 The physicians and the patients
12 who are taking this medicine know what these
13 tablets look like, and our goal was to sort of
14 emulate that, to the degree possible. But as
15 you saw from the slides, these are a little
16 chunkier tablets, little fatter tablets, so
17 there will be some questions I think. But the
18 goal was to try to -- since the idea is a
19 replacement strategy, is to make this look
20 like OxyContin.

21 DR. BICKEL: The other question I
22 have is about the availability of the lower

1 doses with this new formulation, while
2 maintaining the higher doses, even for some
3 period of time, without that formulation. If
4 we take a strictly behavioral economic view,
5 the higher dose tablets, then, would have a
6 lower unit price. They would be cheaper.
7 They wouldn't take any effort to manipulate in
8 order to produce the drug.

9 I would expect, all things being
10 equal, that there would be a shift away from
11 the lower concentration and to the higher
12 concentration for that period of time that the
13 higher concentration is not formulated in this
14 new way.

15 Any comments?

16 DR. HADDOX: Well, I think that's
17 one plausible outcome during the transition
18 period. Remember that 83 percent of the
19 prescriptions for the current formulations --
20 all of them, generics included -- are in that
21 10 to 40 milligram tablet range. So we'd be
22 replacing a substantial portion of those.

1 But you're right. If the 60 and
2 80 milligrams still have vulnerability, then
3 that may become a more enhanced target for the
4 very reasons you cite. That's why we spend so
5 much time with educating physicians about how
6 to address proper patient management, how to
7 identify abuse, how to prevent diversion, how
8 to interpret urine drug tests, and why we have
9 the other elements of the risk management
10 program.

11 DR. BICKEL: One last question.
12 Although I appreciate your epidemiology study,
13 we saw, you know, such a wonderful array of
14 data, and I was wondering if it may be
15 possible to think about a more multi-modal
16 assessment of the impact of this medication
17 than merely looking at the outpatient
18 treatment programs, given that, you know, we
19 saw from the presentation earlier a lot of
20 different ways of looking at the impact of
21 this medication, looking to see whether it has
22 a favorable outcome, and it could be looked at

1 in several different dimensions that are not
2 equivalent to each other.

3 So I guess the real question I'm
4 asking is, you know, why that one? Why not
5 others? Why not a more multi-modal approach?

6 DR. HADDOX: Well, actually, we
7 agree with you. And what I focused on during
8 the presentation was the long-term
9 epidemiologic study, because FDA's position
10 has been that they would not allow an abuse-
11 resistant, as opposed to a tamper-resistant
12 claim, until it was proven on that basis. And
13 that's why I focused on that.

14 In fact, we will continue to
15 monitor the databases, as you've heard here
16 today mentioned -- TEDS, the Monitoring the
17 Future, the National Survey on Drug Use and
18 Health, DAWN, both the medical examiner and
19 the emergency department components.

20 The RADARS system, we will
21 continue to monitor that, because that will
22 also include Oxycodone controlled release

1 products. In addition, there are two other
2 assays or assessments that we have planned.
3 One is using a vendor to -- who frequents
4 these drug abuse chat sites that we talked
5 about, and there is a fairly active community
6 of people who create what we refer to as
7 Internet chatter about drugs and drugs of
8 abuse and how they are abused.

9 We think that may have us some
10 early indications, based on the content of
11 those chatters, about this particular
12 formulation compared to the original
13 formulation or other comparators in the
14 marketplace.

15 In addition, we also plan, using
16 those drug abuse sites as portals, to push out
17 a pre/post survey of people who are admitted
18 drug abusers who are willing to take a survey
19 on their behaviors. And we plan to do that as
20 well, so we are planning a multi-modal
21 approach. Hopefully, what we will see is all
22 of these will sort of converge in the same

1 direction, but we will see what the data tell
2 us.

3 CHAIR FARRAR: We're interested in
4 an ongoing conversation here, but the number
5 of people that have asked to speak here is
6 very large. So if folks could keep their
7 questions short and concise and the answers as
8 well, it might help us move along. But I
9 don't want to cut off conversation.

10 Dr. Wolfe.

11 DR. WOLFE: In your slide 45 which
12 is physically manipulated followed by extended
13 extraction time at room temperature, we've
14 just heard from your pharmacologist that you
15 have worked it so there's a proportion amount
16 of drug available in proportion to what the
17 dose is supposed to be. But just the upper
18 part of this slide, if you can get it up
19 there, that would be fine.

20 There's a quite predictable and
21 narrow range of how much is released from the
22 old formulation, 91 to 107 percent, 96 to 101,

1 and so forth. But then when you get to the
2 new formulation, as you pointed out, this is
3 different as a function of whether it's the 10
4 mg or 80 mg, but the ranges are enormous, 32
5 percent up to 78 percent, 22 percent up to 66
6 percent. So they are one and a half to
7 threefold variations in the percent of the
8 drug that's released as presumably a function
9 of different sized pills.

10 I mean, how is this possible given
11 that you claim you got this technology down?
12 Why is this happening? Is it happening
13 because it's not a good sampling or what? And
14 these are variations, which for me have a huge
15 public health worry because at the abuser
16 level if you think that it's only going to
17 half available, you may use a certain amount.
18 But if it turns out that 100 percent is
19 available, you may wind up killing yourself.
20 So could you just answer the question why
21 there are these huge ranges with the new
22 formulation milled and then extended

1 extraction time at room temperature?

2 DR. HADDOX: Is this the slide to
3 which you're referring, sir?

4 DR. WOLFE: It is and we're
5 talking about really the first line in the
6 slide on the upper part, new formulation 32 to
7 78 -- Why is that going on?

8 DR. HADDOX: Okay. I'll let Dr.
9 Mannion who is the pharmaceutical expert
10 address that.

11 DR. MANNION: First, let me start
12 by reiterating that there are no standardized
13 methods for doing these tests and the way in
14 which the tablets are treated in preparation
15 for doing these tests is we first treat the
16 tablets in a mechanical mill and that
17 mechanical mill has a slightly different
18 effect on every strand. It's not so much a
19 matter of the individual strands, but more the
20 way that the test is done.

21 Sorry. I'm losing my voice here.
22 I've been talking too much. So the

1 variability is not necessarily -- is partly
2 the result of the test being done in a way
3 which there's no real standard way and this is
4 not the same as testing, for example, a
5 pharmaceutical product as a release test where
6 you would expect to get a consistent number
7 each time.

8 Thank you.

9 I could also say that part of the
10 reason why you get great consistency for the
11 current OxyContin product is because the
12 numbers are pretty much a case of all the drug
13 coming out for most of these tests. As you
14 can see, when you do the same test on
15 formulations when you do tests where the
16 product doesn't release its entire contents,
17 for example, those on the bottom row, you tend
18 to get similar variability in the current
19 OxyContin product.

20 DR. WOLFE: So what you're saying
21 is that the kind of a variability you have
22 depending on whether you press for three or

1 five seconds or a minute on the coffee
2 grinder, but that was done to try and simulate
3 the circumstances in which they're abused.

4 So my question and problem is
5 still at the abuser level which is you're
6 trying to reduce abuse unlike your claim that
7 you had reduced it back when you had put this
8 drug on the market is how is abuse going to be
9 reduced if you have these huge variations in
10 your no standardized protocol and, certainly
11 at the drug abuser level, there is also no
12 standardized protocol.

13 DR. MANNION: Let me clarify a few
14 misconceptions. Firstly, I think you made a
15 slip of the tongue. Sorry, Dr. Wolfe. You
16 mentioned something that was confidential.

17 DR. WOLFE: What did I mention?

18 DR. MANNION: You mentioned the
19 method of milling.

20 DR. WOLFE: You said a grinder
21 there. You said that yourself.

22 DR. MANNION: No, sorry. Well,

1 I'll go back and answer your question. Your
2 question was how does this formulation reduce
3 in part time for resistance and I think you're
4 looking at the data -- You need to look at the
5 data across multiple levels.

6 Firstly, you have to look at these
7 two rows in their entirety. You have to look
8 and think the top row has been milled. The
9 bottom row has been crushed. The amount of
10 pretreatment in order to even get to this
11 stage is significantly greater than the amount
12 of pretreatment to get to here. A potential
13 abuser has to go through an extra step even to
14 get to this stage where they can start to see
15 that variability.

16 Now when they do a standardized
17 test, the test is not done in a variable way.
18 The test is done in a way where the tablets
19 are exposed to an equal amount of stress. But
20 clearly when you're looking at small numbers
21 of tablets and tests which are not industry
22 standard tests, you can get some variability

1 in the results of those tests. But I think
2 it's important to take into consideration.
3 But even to get there, the tablets have been
4 manipulated in ways --

5 DR. WOLFE: How small is the
6 number of tablets?

7 DR. MANNION: For each of these,
8 we were looking at a -- Now I need to go into
9 some clarification of the data that you see in
10 here. The data here are arranged from 10 mg
11 to 80 mg.

12 DR. WOLFE: Right.

13 DR. MANNION: So that's seven
14 different strands. Then each test is repeated
15 twice. So effectively, the -- is 14 for each
16 of these rows.

17 DR. WOLFE: Okay.

18 CHAIR FARRAR: I think in the
19 interest of -- there are lots of other
20 questions that we need to move on.

21 Dr. Maxwell.

22 DR. MAXWELL: Yes, sir. I have a

1 few questions about the epidemiological study.
2 Your handout refers -- One handout refers to
3 and you referred to as a long-term study. I'm
4 a little concerned that four quarters pre and
5 four quarters post is long-term. It doesn't
6 meet the criteria I don't think.

7 However, some other questions very
8 quickly and we could just yes and no but some
9 of my concerns, you're going to use 68
10 methadone programs. You'll get very different
11 results with the methadone programs and long-
12 established heroin markets versus new
13 methadone programs in areas where OxyContin is
14 the major reason for these programs.

15 The methodology, are you going to
16 take just any patient that walks in? Will
17 these only be brand new patients? Will these
18 be repeat patients? Will these be patients
19 who have been in treatment eight years and you
20 just happen to ask them?

21 I'm getting very concerned about
22 risk surveillance and do the methodologies,

1 will they meet the criteria of a peer-reviewed
2 journal article? How are you going to choose
3 these patients that are going -- And given the
4 questions about coloring and formulation new
5 or old drugs?

6 DR. HADDOX: Yes. Okay. A lot of
7 questions. Let me see if I can sort of boil
8 it down. First off, the RADARS Study Opioid
9 Treatment Program has 68 sites distributed
10 around the country and we know from the 15,000
11 admissions or so we've tracked to date that a
12 significant number of them are abusing
13 OxyContin as well as other prescription
14 opioids. So I think that addresses one of
15 your points.

16 The second point I think about the
17 new formulation looking like the old
18 formulation, was that one of your questions?

19 DR. MAXWELL: Yes.

20 DR. HADDOX: We will asking that
21 particular question. We have done some pilot
22 data to show that the people are actually

1 reasonably good at picking out what they say
2 they're taking and actually picking out a
3 photograph of what they're abusing in this
4 particular program.

5 Secondly, we are going to analyze
6 the OxyContin data together. So if there is,
7 let's say, I'll just pick a number, 10 percent
8 of the people abusing the old formulation and
9 90 percent are abusing the new formulation or
10 visa versa, we're just going to consider that
11 as one number at each site. So we're going to
12 compare the pre/post value at each site as
13 well as at the aggregate.

14 The issue about the long-term, if
15 we had a graphic that it's the four quarters
16 prior to approval of the first, the 10-40, the
17 NDA that's being considered today and then
18 four quarters after the availability of all
19 strengths in OTR and time for the supply
20 pipeline to have filled up with the new
21 formulation. We won't wait until every last
22 tablet of the original formulation is

1 exhausted in the marketplace. But we think as
2 I said this is a matter of months not years.
3 So we have some period of time between
4 approval of 10-40 actual marketability in the
5 retail sector, then approval of 60-80,
6 availability of that, time to sort of flush
7 out the supply pipeline and then those four
8 quarters. So it's not four quarters and then
9 four quarters right on top of it. It is going
10 to be stretched out probably over a few years
11 to actually do this properly.

12 Did that get all your questions?

13 DR. MAXWELL: One more question.

14 Let me go back again. Just the concern about
15 your response earlier that you want the pill
16 to look about the same so that there's not a
17 question. Clearly, DAWN won't be able to pick
18 it up if the patients are coming in and they
19 were taking a pink pill.

20 DR. HADDOX: Right.

21 DR. MAXWELL: So, I mean,
22 either/or, which is it?

1 DR. HADDOX: In the methadone
2 program, we're going to put all that together
3 so it won't -- I mean, we're going to ask them
4 to distinguish, if they know, between if it's
5 a new formulation or an old formulation. But
6 we're going to sum that data. So we're going
7 to look at the use of OxyContin in the past
8 month to get high in the four quarters prior
9 and those four quarters, some number of a
10 determinant quarters later. So, if anything,
11 if there is a original formulation still out
12 there, it will sort of dilute the positive
13 aspect of the results.

14 The other question you asked, I
15 think, was how do we pick the enrollee. It's
16 offered to every new admission and it's this
17 one page questionnaire and those that complete
18 it, complete it. So it is possible that we,
19 in fact, have picked up some people who are
20 coming back. But we should not be picking up
21 people or RADARS shouldn't be picking up
22 people who are in ongoing treatment. These

1 are only new admissions.

2 CHAIR FARRAR: Dr. Day.

3 DR. HADDOX: And the other
4 question is we have published some information
5 on this. The RADARS system has published some
6 data and Dr. Rosenbloom has it. So we think
7 it is publishable. Okay.

8 DR. DAY: This question is for the
9 sponsor. So much of what we're doing today is
10 deciding the first question and that is do the
11 data convince us that the new formulation will
12 decrease the chances of abuse, misuse and
13 diversion. So I want to make sure we
14 understand where the numbers came from.

15 In the laboratory, there are
16 various manual means. There are hammer
17 strikes and spoon crushings and so on. Were
18 the laboratory testers blind with respect to
19 which formulation they were testing at a given
20 point in time, whether it was the original or
21 the new formulation?

22 DR. HADDOX: No. It would be very

1 difficult to blind it particularly with spoons
2 because you functionally cannot fracture the -
3 -

4 DR. DAY: I'm saying once you put
5 the pill on the spoon or you put the pill on
6 the table and you take the hammer. There is
7 a way with the -- At least, one of the tablets
8 that you showed us says OC or OP. You could
9 put it, say, face down so a person might know
10 as easily. I'm just wondering whether the
11 tester was blinded with respect to which
12 formulation.

13 DR. HADDOX: No.

14 DR. DAY: No. And then the second
15 question is did they have a fixed amount of
16 time to apply whatever method they were using
17 or they just did it until they --

18 DR. HADDOX: Let me ask Dr.
19 Mannion whose is the expert on the tamper
20 protocol to address that.

21 DR. DAY: I mean, that would
22 include like the number of hammer strikes. I

1 mean, was there a fixed protocol that was
2 applied to all of the tests?

3 DR. MANNION: Let me go back and
4 address the question that David just responded
5 to with regard to blinding. It would actually
6 be very difficult to maintain that blinding
7 for any significant length of time just
8 because of the dramatic differences they're
9 seeing when the tests are carried out.

10 Now let's go back again to your
11 question about standardization. The tests can
12 be divided into two different categories here.
13 I showed images of hammer strikes and the
14 spoons tests. The hammer strikes and the
15 spoons test aren't part of the standardization
16 testing protocol. So these are really just
17 empirical tests that we did to determine
18 whether we had achieved the right physical
19 properties of the product. Did it have the
20 plastic type makeup that we were trying to
21 see?

22 Now you come onto the second type

1 of tests which are the tests which are part of
2 the protocol and those tests were
3 standardized. Those tests are carried out for
4 a fixed time period. They are carried out in
5 a fixed volume. They are carried out for a
6 fixed time at a fixed temperature. So the
7 tests in the standardized protocol are as they
8 sound. They are standardized tests.

9 The tests in terms of like the
10 hammer strike and the spoons are not
11 standardized tests and if you remember, I just
12 showed visuals. So it just shows that the
13 hammer flattens the tablet. The spoons crush
14 the current formulation. It is able to break
15 the new formulation. But then take those
16 samples and test them in any way.

17 DR. DAY: At slide 37, it does say
18 that the percent of the product released
19 following manual crushing.

20 DR. MANNION: Okay. I have
21 addressed that.

22 CHAIR FARRAR: I think question

1 has actually been answered.

2 Dr. Cortinovis.

3 DR. CORTINOVIS: We've heard from
4 the epidemiologist today that the intravenous
5 route is a recognized method of abuse of
6 OxyContin. This is directed to the sponsor.
7 You have presented us with data today saying
8 that the new proposed agent, the new
9 formulation, is not likely to be utilized via
10 the IV route because using current street
11 preparatory methods the material turns into a
12 gel that's readily difficult or is not readily
13 easy to inject. I've worked on a professional
14 basis with intravenous drug users and they are
15 very creative.

16 What I'd like to know is have
17 tried injecting this gelatinous substance into
18 animals. Have you tried just squirting this
19 gel into a beaker of human blood? If so, if
20 you've done any animal studies, is this
21 gelatinous material pharmacologically active?
22 If you've tried putting it into a beaker of

1 human blood, does this rapidly or readily
2 dissolve the substance?

3 DR. HADDOX: Richard, do you want
4 to address that?

5 (Off the record discussion.)

6 DR. MANNION: We haven't done any
7 such tests.

8 DR. HADDOX: The concern that
9 we're trying to address here is this sort of
10 rapid, impulsive point of acquisition type of
11 abuse and while I don't doubt that there could
12 be with multiple stage extraction methods a
13 way someone could extract the oxycodone with
14 or without some of the occipients, we think
15 that the fact that you can't aspire this
16 through a 16 gauge needle is going to dissuade
17 a significant fraction of those people who
18 would try to inject.

19 CHAIR FARRAR: Dr. Nelson.

20 DR. CORTINOVIS: May I have just
21 one follow-up on that? Trying to -- The way
22 you presented the information to us trying to

1 inject through a 16 gauge needle on a TB
2 syringe is far more difficult than trying to
3 aspire the same stuff through a 16 gauge
4 needle in, say, a five or 10 cc syringe or the
5 syringe itself.

6 CHAIR FARRAR: But my
7 understanding is the testing was not done.

8 DR. HADDOX: Yes, the animal
9 testing was not.

10 CHAIR FARRAR: Dr. Nelson.

11 DR. NELSON: Yes. I realize we're
12 talking simply now about abuse potential.
13 We're not talking about all the other factors
14 associated with inappropriate drug use,
15 inadvertent and otherwise kind of -- not for
16 this type of abuse potential.

17 But I guess my question comes down
18 to the fact that a lot of what you're
19 proposing with your epidemiologic study and
20 the blog surfing and these other types of work
21 are really post marketing surveillance studies
22 which I think for the most part have proven to

1 be fairly poor in many other past endeavors.
2 I think that they typically take a long time.
3 They don't provide the data you'd like them to
4 provide.

5 So I kind of have two questions.

6 One question is given this work that you're
7 going to be doing that's going to take several
8 years and the blog surfing, are there
9 benchmarks or endpoints and are there fixes?
10 When are you going to say this is a success
11 and much more pointedly, when are you going to
12 say this is a failure and we have to do
13 something about it?

14 And I'll just ask my other
15 question. In other words, you're going to see
16 on the blog somebody says, "Hey, you can mix
17 this and that together and, boy, this is great
18 stuff." Are you going to then say, "You know,
19 we were wrong and we're going to pull this
20 stuff off the market because it's totally
21 abusable." In other words, is there a point
22 at which there's going to be something that

1 gets done based on all of this work that
2 you're doing with the methadone clinics and
3 the other clinics? What's going to be the fix
4 that's put in place once you recognize the
5 problem and what's the problem going to be?
6 What's going to be the benchmark to say there
7 is, in fact, a problem?

8 I'll let you answer that, but my
9 other question is since post marketing
10 surveillances, I think it's what we do, but
11 it's probably not really the best way to
12 handle a problem like this which I think we
13 could probably predict is going to turn out to
14 be a problem. I mean, street pharmacologists
15 are very smart and they will clearly figure
16 out a way to get around this problem. Is
17 there perhaps a role for very good pre-
18 marketing work, more than what you're done
19 already but, for example, focus groups.
20 Instead of waiting for the blogs to tell you
21 what's going on, find a bunch of these people
22 out there who are the street pharmacologists

1 and ask them how they'd manipulate this in
2 order to get this to work and then fix it
3 before it gets out there or don't put it out
4 there. I'll let you answer.

5 DR. HADDOX: Okay. Well, the
6 second question first I guess. We have not
7 planned any focus groups. There have been
8 other academic groups who have done similar
9 things with formulations that share some of
10 the features and they have suggested that, in
11 fact, this may dissuade some fraction of
12 abusers. So without having to repeat that,
13 there are people who have done exactly what
14 you've said, brought in groups of addicts who
15 say, "Yes, I abuse this, this and this in the
16 following methods" and let them play around
17 for a while with something and see what they
18 think.

19 DR. NELSON: But what do you do
20 about it when they find out, so if you brought
21 in this -- the people in the focus group?

22 DR. HADDOX: The main -- I think

1 we need to remember that this is a drug
2 primarily for patients, not to stop abusers.
3 I mean, we hope it will dissuade abusers. But
4 we're trying to make sure patients get what
5 they need and the primary goal in the research
6 was to make sure this was bioequivalent to
7 OxyContin for patients. And so if, you know,
8 OxyContin has been safe and effective, used
9 appropriately for years now, the FDA has kept
10 it on the market, I see no reason why that's
11 going to change any time soon. It is a
12 definite problem with the nonmedical use of
13 OxyContin as with all the other opioids as
14 well as the other medicines people often abuse
15 with those, licit and illicit.

16 So to get back to your question
17 about the internet surfing, it turns out that
18 there is a growing body of evidence in this
19 area, that, in fact, this is a fairly good,
20 sentinel tool. So we may not have to wait
21 that long to find something out. But the key
22 here is, I think, implicit in the way you

1 phrase your question, and if I misunderstood
2 you please correct me, but I think you were
3 addressing this issue of whether the tamper
4 resistant qualities which we have demonstrated
5 will actually translate into abuse resistance
6 and we don't know that. Nobody does.

7 And that's why FDA has
8 appropriately said do a long-term study and
9 let's see if this actually works. That's the
10 way to find out in terms of dissuading
11 abusers. So no matter what the internet says
12 unless there's something horrific that none of
13 us saw coming, we have to play out the study
14 and see what it actually tells us in the
15 abusing population.

16 DR. NELSON: I understand that
17 except I guess my question is we've recognized
18 that this is going to be a potential problem
19 and maybe we could be more proactive about it
20 and rather than try to do a two-year follow-up
21 study, if we found the problem ahead of time,
22 maybe that would eliminate. We may wind up at

1 the same point ultimately in two years and at
2 which it said that this is not a viable
3 alternative because it's still very abusable
4 and I assume that bioequivalence is not here
5 nor there at this meeting, I think, because
6 we're not really deciding -- I think we're
7 really talking about whether or not this is a
8 tamper resistant, the term we're using.

9 CHAIR FARRAR: Yes, I think we
10 can't solve this problem now. I think the
11 company has been clear that they're not
12 planning to do any of that. So you can make
13 that as part of your recommendation.

14 Before we move on, we're at the
15 time of the break and there are lots of
16 questions still to be had and lots of
17 discussion. I would like to ask the panel
18 whether it would be okay to skip the break.
19 If you have clear needs, then please go. It
20 may actually make it quicker since there won't
21 be long lines.

22 But let's move on. Dr. Lesar.

1 DR. LESAR: I actually have a
2 question that's related to the AB rating for
3 a product like this. Assuming there will be
4 a generic compound that has similar
5 bioequivalence, will this be given exclusivity
6 based on the purported imparting of "tamper
7 proof" or "tamper resistant" characteristics
8 to this product?

9 DR. HADDOX: I'm not sure I'm the
10 best person to answer the AB rating question.
11 Can one of my other colleagues address that
12 for us?

13 (Off the record comment.)

14 DR. HADDOX: The FDA, I guess.
15 Okay. Our regulatory guy says the FDA will
16 answer that question. I don't really know
17 what the answer is.

18 DR. ROSEBRAUGH: Neither do we.

19 (Laughter.)

20 CHAIR FARRAR: I would remind the
21 panel that --

22 DR. ROSEBRAUGH: It's a concern.

1 It's something that we'll talk to the lawyers
2 about, but I can't give you an answer right
3 now.

4 CHAIR FARRAR: Dr. Sang.

5 DR. SANG: So I appreciate the
6 extensive bioavailability/bioequivalence/PK
7 work that you've done. But just going back to
8 the clinical research question, I wonder given
9 the context why you haven't considered
10 performing liking studies in select
11 populations. They're quick to perform. They
12 would help us understand some of the more
13 clinical questions and the potential for, you
14 know, really the potential that we're all
15 concerned about actually.

16 And then as a corollary, since
17 there are some PK parameters that we think may
18 co-vary with likeability such as Cmax and
19 Tmax, is there as much variability in your
20 studies with Cmax and Tmax as there is with
21 percent of the drug released with the OTR
22 formulation as -- I mean, this really makes me

1 wonder why you haven't presented some of the
2 other PK data.

3 DR. HADDOX: Well, the PK data was
4 done in the bioequivalency studies to assert
5 that this is bioequivalent to OxyContin and
6 therefore it meets AUC and Tmax bioequivalence
7 regulatory criteria with appropriate
8 competence intervals and so forth.

9 As far as the other question that
10 you asked about liking studies, Steve, could
11 you address that? We've had the discussion
12 about it. There are a number of issues that
13 we've gone over and I think Steve can talk
14 about that.

15 DR. HARRIS: Yes. The issue of
16 liking, I think, as I mentioned earlier, we've
17 demonstrated bioequivalence and to us that
18 means that the pharmacokinetic profiles of the
19 new formulation and the old formulation for
20 the same strengths meet the statistical and
21 regulatory and therefore clinical definition
22 of presumed therapeutic equivalence. So I'm

1 not sure we would predict that in the liking
2 study of the intact dosage forms that the two
3 formulations would even be distinguishable.

4 The focus of the charge to the
5 formulators for the new formulation was to
6 make the controlled, released mechanism more
7 durable, more resistant, to physical and
8 chemical attempts to defeat it and so it would
9 be only in the manipulated dosage form where
10 I would anticipate seeing a difference if you
11 were to do an in vivo study.

12 DR. SANG: Well, perhaps in
13 different populations, you'll have the
14 opportunity -- you would potentially have the
15 opportunity to see how else the drug could be
16 manipulated and perhaps then you could see how
17 there may be differences in "likeability"
18 given some of the innovative techniques that
19 could arise from something like this.

20 DR. HARRIS: Yes. I guess those
21 would address other methods of tampering and
22 we'll have to see. That's obviously something

1 we'll be looking at closely.

2 CHAIR FARRAR: Dr. Zuppa.

3 DR. ZUPPA: Just with -- I'm
4 sorry. Just with regards to the
5 bioequivalence studies, I just would -- if you
6 could comment on the number of pediatric
7 patients that were in that trial.

8 DR. HARRIS: The studies are all
9 done in healthy adult volunteers. So it's 18
10 to 45 or 50. We've not done any studies in
11 the pediatric population with the new
12 formulation. That's not indicated for that
13 formulation.

14 DR. HADDOX: It's also not
15 indicated for the original formulation.

16 DR. HARRIS: Yes.

17 DR. HADDOX: That's why one
18 element of the risk map is to monitor exposure
19 to people under the age of 18, whether that's
20 intentional or unintentional. That was in
21 response to a specific request from FDA
22 because we have not done pediatric studies on

1 OxyContin. We are doing, I think, some of
2 oxycodone now. Is that correct?

3 DR. HARRIS: Yes.

4 DR. HADDOX: But we are not -- We
5 have not done them on OxyContin, the original
6 formulation. We don't have an indication for
7 childhood use.

8 CHAIR FARRAR: Okay, and Dr.
9 Yesenko.

10 DR. YESENKO: This question is for
11 the sponsor. My first question -- these are
12 quick questions. The first question is when
13 does the patent for OxyContin end.

14 DR. HADDOX: One of our attorneys
15 maybe can help us with that. I'm getting a --

16 PARTICIPANT: 2013.

17 DR. HADDOX: Thank you. 2013 is
18 the answer.

19 DR. YESENKO: The next question is
20 the new formulation is less -- has the ability
21 to less likely be abused. Some would say it's
22 tamper resistant. Then what information

1 should be included in the packaging or the
2 labeling?

3 And then the last question is the
4 formulated 10 and 40 will be on the market
5 sooner than the 60 and 80. Will the original
6 OxyContin still be on the market until the
7 reformulated OTR is introduced?

8 DR. HADDOX: Okay. Well, let me
9 answer that question because that takes a
10 little more than a slide. There -- Right now,
11 even though there are no generic companies
12 that are shipping generic OxyContin because of
13 the court resolution you saw FDA present
14 earlier, there are still warehouses and
15 perhaps retail outlets that have stocks of the
16 generic OxyContin in various strengths. So
17 that's going to be out there for some
18 indeterminate period of time. I don't know
19 exactly how long. I've heard estimates of
20 maybe a year before that is totally drained
21 out of the marketplace. So there's that that
22 will be there regardless of what happens with

1 the approval of the 10-40 OTR.

2 If the 10-40 OTR are approved,
3 then there will be a transition period of
4 several months where both of those are out
5 there. So you would have 10 in the original
6 and then 10 in the OTR formulation right
7 through the 40. Then if the 60-80 get
8 approved, then we would have another
9 transition period.

10 What I'm told by people who
11 understand the actual commercial supply chain
12 much better than I do is that this is a matter
13 of months during each of these transition
14 periods with the wild card being the generics
15 because we don't know if some of the
16 wholesalers bought up large stocks of the
17 generics when they heard we'd settled with one
18 company, for instances, to keep their
19 acquisition costs down. So we don't know
20 what's sitting out there in warehouses. I
21 can't give you a good prediction on how long
22 it will take for the generics to sort of

1 dwindle out.

2 In regards to the question about
3 the language, this is what we have proposed in
4 our NDA. This is part of it. There's another
5 sentence or two that's in your background, but
6 this is sort of the relevant piece here that
7 would apply only to the 10-40 mg to
8 distinguish in the package insert or the full
9 prescribing information from the 60-80 which
10 would not initially have these features.

11 CHAIR FARRAR: Dr. Passik.

12 DR. PASSIK: We've heard a number
13 of people comment about the concerns about a
14 false sense of security if this comes on the
15 market as the only tamper resistant opioid out
16 there at that point and then a lot of the
17 conversation has been sort of as if pain
18 patients and abusers are distinct populations
19 and, of course, they aren't completely
20 distinct. And so I'm particularly concerned
21 about the higher risk group, the patients that
22 have a history of substance abuse.

1 Now there may have been
2 prescribers who have moved away from OxyContin
3 in their high risk patients because they know
4 something about the use, the abuse, of it and
5 abuse potential who may now say to themselves,
6 "Maybe I should come back to it because it's
7 the only tamper resistant opioid out there."

8 So what I'd like you to comment on
9 if you could is what specifically planned in
10 terms of educational efforts to avoid a false
11 sense of security so that the thought is that,
12 you know, anyone can be treated with this,
13 even a high risk patient.

14 DR. HADDOX: In my remarks, I made
15 a reference a couple times to the fact that we
16 need clear, concise, accurate language in the
17 FPI because that forms the basis of our
18 communication to the healthcare community.
19 You know, the academics can say what they feel
20 the data show but we are limited by what the
21 FDA allows us to say and that's one of the
22 reasons we're here today to talk about what is

1 that box that we can operate within because it
2 will be very important for the reasons you
3 cite and a few others that we can -- what we
4 can tell the prescribing, dispensing community
5 and the other ancillary healthcare
6 professionals who are involved in patients who
7 are taking these medications.

8 I think it's critical that we be
9 able to tell them (a) this is no guarantee of
10 abuse resistance, we won't say that, we won't
11 know that, obviously, it can't be studied
12 until the drug is available, (b) that it does
13 have these tamper quality and (c) we've
14 analyzed this much like MIC levels in
15 antibiotic package inserts where they say
16 these are the MICs in laboratory settings, but
17 we don't really know if this translates to
18 clinical practice.

19 We want to be very, very precise,
20 very clear, so that we don't miscommunicate
21 and yet we can address the miscommunication or
22 misconceptions that are happening as we sit

1 here today before FDA has even made a decision
2 on the approval. So I think it's critical
3 that we get some language that gives us that
4 box that FDA has said, "Okay. This is what
5 you can say." Yes, I think that's the answer.

6 CHAIR FARRAR: Dr. Kweder.

7 DR. KWEDER: Yes. Thank you. I
8 have a follow-up on that. On the slide there
9 you have the point that you just made. It's
10 in the second sub-bullet including "precise
11 information in the FPI is better than
12 providing no information." If you go back to
13 slide 27, I just want to be clear that this is
14 an example of what you would call precise, a
15 precise version of what your data showed. Is
16 that --

17 DR. HADDOX: This is what we
18 submitted in our NDA. We think this is an
19 accurate representation of what the data
20 showed. But, of course, you get to make the
21 final call on that.

22 DR. KWEDER: Okay. Thank you. I

1 just wanted -- just for clarification. Thank
2 you.

3 CHAIR FARRAR: Dr. Fleming.

4 DR. FLEMING: I think Dr. Nelson a
5 bit earlier hit the nail on the head when he
6 was talking about the challenges and
7 limitations of post marketing evaluation of
8 benefit/risk. It's already incredibly
9 difficult to do so for safety, but we are
10 looking at in essence both benefit and risk
11 being assessed post marketing and it's a bit
12 reminiscent of Subpart H where there has
13 certainly been a checkered history there where
14 it's been extremely difficult to get the
15 validation trials done in a timely way and
16 achieving proper regulatory changes when the
17 validation trials are negative is also
18 extremely difficult.

19 I would actually like to follow up
20 on the issue relating to the false sense of
21 security and how that impacts the proper
22 scientific design of the epi study. But if my

1 time is limited, I'd want to start with what
2 I think is an even more important key
3 question. Our materials pointed out in 1986
4 the WHO recognized the significant unmet need
5 in nociceptive chronic cancer pain and they
6 defined three steps, aspirin and ibuprofen
7 type agents, codeine type agents and opioids,
8 and Dr. Trunzo in her presentation talking
9 about admissions to substance abuse treatment
10 centers for abuse of opioid analgesics showed
11 a striking over representation there of
12 oxycodone users providing substantial evidence
13 of a relative excess in serious safety risks
14 for OxyContin even relative to other opioids.

15 So my question, possibly a two-
16 part question, is are you currently or will
17 you plan to limit competitive promotion of
18 this reformulation specifically restricting to
19 the setting of severe chronic pain and, if
20 not, in view of the excess in serious safety
21 risks, what's the scientific clinical data on
22 benefit to risk that would justify broader

1 promotion?

2 DR. HADDOX: Well, I think your
3 first question actually asked if we intend to
4 change the indication. Did I hear you
5 correctly?

6 DR. FLEMING: That is part of what
7 I'm asking. So the specific question is in
8 view of what is available on benefit to risk
9 including clear evidence of excess safety
10 risks would you specifically restrict your
11 promotion to the setting of severe chronic
12 pain and, if not, what's that scientific data
13 that would indicate from a benefit to risk
14 perspective that broader promotion is
15 appropriate.

16 DR. HADDOX: Okay. I think I can
17 address that. Step one is, of course, that
18 the FDA determines the indication based on the
19 evidence we've presented to them. Step two is
20 that our indication is really three parts.
21 It's not just moderate to severe pain. It's
22 moderate to severe pain in patients where a

1 continuous, around-the-clock, analgesic is
2 needed for an extended period of time and I
3 can tell you from personal experience and I
4 think the literature would support that if
5 your pain is moderate but it is around the
6 clock requiring continuous analgesia for an
7 extended period of time that is a significant
8 impact on quality of life.

9 DR. FLEMING: We're not debating
10 whether pain meds are needed. We're talking
11 about whether the evidence is sufficient to
12 justify your marketing this product in a
13 broader sense than simply the setting of
14 severe chronic pain, for example, when other
15 opioids may not be adequate.

16 DR. HADDOX: Well, I -- I mean, I
17 don't think there would be any different
18 marketing than what we're doing right now. We
19 market it for that indication that FDA has
20 approved.

21 DR. FLEMING: And in view of the
22 evidence such as what Dr. Trunzo has put

1 forward that does show an over representation
2 in oxycodone-related serious risks, what's the
3 justification from a benefit perspective that
4 would say your intervention has a comparable
5 benefit to risk of other alternatives?

6 DR. HADDOX: Well, that's a
7 complex question because it's really getting
8 at who are those people who are showing up in
9 TEDS. Are those patients for whom the drug
10 was appropriately prescribed and monitored?
11 Or are those non patients? I don't know the
12 answer to that. I'm not sure if TEDS actually
13 knows the answer to that, although I think she
14 made some reference to that that it was
15 probably more non-medical use.

16 The other issue is that while
17 there is evidence that oxycodone-containing
18 products stand out there are lots of
19 oxycodone-containing products as the DAWN data
20 showed that are being non medically used that
21 are not OxyContin or, in fact, are not even in
22 that long-acting oxycodone class. And lastly,

1 the data from that and from other data in the
2 literature suggest these people are often non
3 medically using multiple substances which
4 clearly increases the --

5 DR. FLEMING: Could I try one last
6 time?

7 DR. HADDOX: Yes.

8 DR. FLEMING: Is there scientific
9 evidence you can put forward from a benefit to
10 risk perspective that would argue that your
11 product should be a choice over, for example,
12 other opioids when someone has a severe unmet
13 need?

14 DR. HADDOX: I think that
15 physicians are in the best position to make an
16 individual prescribing decision for that
17 patient that's sitting in front of them right
18 there at the time.

19 CHAIR FARRAR: I think the answer
20 and non answer is there.

21 DR. HADDOX: Yes.

22 CHAIR FARRAR: Dr. Nussmeier.

1 DR. NUSSMEIER: Yes. This is a
2 fairly simple question. If the tamper-
3 resistant OTR formulation is approved and your
4 plan is to get the supply line transferred
5 over as soon as possible, why would it be
6 necessary to leave the 80 mg original
7 formulation on the market even temporarily?

8 DR. HADDOX: The reason for that
9 has to do with a couple of things. One is
10 that there are people who take the 80 mg who
11 are in a payment situation where just adding
12 multiples of smaller tablets will not work.
13 We've actually done that analysis and there's
14 a substantial number of people who have an
15 artificial limit on the number of tablets they
16 can actually have dispensed at any given
17 period, usually a 30-day period, by their
18 payer and so to just say, "Let's just take the
19 80s off the market and let's just give them
20 twice as many 40s if they need that," that is
21 a solution that would negatively impact a
22 significant number of patients according to