

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE  
WASHINGTON, DC

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# FSIS DIRECTIVE

5420.4,  
Revision 2

1/26/2005

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**HOMELAND SECURITY THREAT CONDITION RESPONSE -  
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR THE OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
IMPORT INSPECTION DIVISION**

## I. PURPOSE

A. This directive details the procedures that Food Safety and Inspection Service, Office of International Affairs, Import Inspection Division (FSIS, OIA, IID) field personnel will follow in the event that a Threat Condition Elevated (Yellow), High (Orange) or Severe (Red) is declared by the Department of Homeland Security. In that event, Import inspection personnel are to follow the instructions in this directive for the duration of the declared heightened threat condition.

B. This directive establishes:

- how threat conditions will be communicated to import inspection personnel,
- specific instructions to import inspection personnel on how to respond to threat conditions,
- a mechanism to communicate food security breaches, concerns and events that are observed to import establishment management, border agency personnel, and FSIS' Office of International Affairs, Office of Food Security and Emergency Preparedness (OFSEP),
- direction for sharing information with establishment management and border personnel in other agencies to effectively resolve food security concerns and protect public health, and

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**DISTRIBUTION:** Inspection Offices; T/A Inspectors;  
Plant Mgt; T/A Plant Mgt; TRA; ABB; TSC; Import Offices

**OPI:** OPPED

- procedures to effectively address and resolve noted security concerns in order to ensure food security and protect public health.

C. This directive does not address procedures to be followed in the event of an actual terrorist attack on a port of entry (POE). Should such an attack occur, measures should be taken immediately by import personnel to ensure the safety of inspection program personnel and to notify the Regional Import Field Office (RIFO). Subsequently, the RIFO will notify the appropriate local authorities. Also, the RIFO may request the activation of the FSIS Emergency Management Committee (EMC), if necessary, through the senior executive leadership in OFO (See FSIS Directive 6500.1 Emergency Incidence Response).

## **II. CANCELLATION**

FSIS Directive 5420.4, Rev. 1, dated 7/2/04

## **III. REASON FOR REISSUANCE**

This directive is reissued in its entirety to provide additional clarification under a Threat Condition Elevated Yellow and to provide Food Security Verification Procedures (ISP Codes 08S04 through 08S13).

## **IV. REFERENCES**

9 CFR parts 300 to end

FSIS Directive 5000.1 Rev. 1, Verifying an Establishments Food Safety System

FSIS Directive 5420.1, Rev. 1, Homeland Security Threat Condition Response – Food Security Verification Procedures

FSIS Directive 6500.1, Emergency Incident Response

## **V. BACKGROUND**

In 2002, the White House Office of Homeland Security established a Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) based on color to provide a more comprehensive and effective means to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to Federal, State, and local authorities and to the American people. A declaration of a Threat Condition Yellow by the Department of Homeland Security indicates that there is an elevated risk of terrorist attacks. A declaration of a Threat Condition Orange by the Department of Homeland Security indicates that there is a high risk of terrorist attacks. A declaration of a Threat Condition Red reflects a severe risk of terrorist attacks. While the threat declaration may or may not involve the nation's food and agricultural sector specifically, it is imperative that any such declarations be communicated effectively and rapidly to all program areas within FSIS so that appropriate actions can be taken to respond to the threats and ensure the security of meat, poultry, and egg products.

## VI. NOTIFICATION

A. In the event of a declaration of any Threat Condition:

- Elevated (Yellow), when there is a significant risk of terrorist attacks,
- High (Orange), when there is a high risk of terrorist attacks, or
- Severe (Red) which reflects a severe risk of terrorist attacks,

by the Department of Homeland Security, the OFSEP will inform the FSIS Administrator and senior executive leadership of all FSIS program areas. The Office of the Administrator will issue an e-mail letter to all employees notifying them of the heightened threat condition.

B. The RIFO will notify import personnel (Import Surveillance Liaison Officers (ISLO) and import inspectors) at high risk POE (sectors that encompass a designated area of the country) and import facilities at the time of declaration to conduct Food Security Verification Procedures for the threat condition according to the activities set forth in Paragraph VIII of this directive. The import inspector will notify the import facility management of the threat condition and the implementation of the Food Security Verification Procedures.

C. ISLOs will maintain communications with the Department of Homeland Security (Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Animal Plant and Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and other FSIS agencies at POE and will initiate the appropriate Food Security Verification Procedures.

D. Downgrading of Threat Condition

Downgrading of a threat condition will be communicated by OFSEP to RIFO through the senior executive leadership in OIA.

The RIFO is to maintain a record of all verbal and written food security-related reports received during all heightened threat conditions.

## VII. SPECIFIC THREAT CONDITION ACTIVITIES

The following are the actions to be taken in the event of a declaration of:

**A. Threat Condition Elevated (Yellow), High (Orange), or Severe (Red) with no specific threat to the food and agriculture sector.**

1. RIFOs will:

a. Immediately confirm that import inspection program personnel are aware of the declaration, and that they have conveyed the declaration to the management of import establishments.

b. Verify that import inspection program personnel perform emergency Food Security Verification Procedures (see Section VIII).

c. Monitor import establishment and border activity.

2. ISLOs will:

a. Coordinate food security activity with other border agencies, including but not limited to, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and Department of Homeland Security (CBP and Coast Guard).

b. Report any irregularities, including suspicious behavior, or alerts conveyed by other border agencies at the port covered by the ISLO to OIA through the supervisory chain of command.

c. Coordinate verification activity at POE where an ISLO is not present.

3. Import inspector's will:

a. Continue to consult the Automated Import Information System (AIIS) for reinspection assignments to be performed during a heightened threat condition declaration. Should the AIIS become inaccessible during a Threat Condition Elevated (Yellow), High (Orange), or Severe (Red) with no specific threat to the food and agriculture sector, import inspectors should follow the AIIS System Down (Contingency Plan) in the Import Manual of Procedures, Part 1, Section 1, until receiving alternative instruction through proper channels.

Import inspectors will initiate Food Security Verification Procedures through PBIS. Inspectors will refer to paragraph VIII of this directive for further guidance including:

b. Notification of the establishment of the alert status.

c. Performing two of the Food Security Verification Tasks from the following list: 08S03, 08S07, 08S10, or 08S13 at active I-houses for the duration of the threat condition. Import inspectors are to perform the Food Security Verification Procedures as UNSCHEDULED procedures within the established tour of duty and after all food safety procedures are performed.

d Monitoring establishment operations for any unusual activity that may be related to food security.

e. Reporting any observations or suspicious activity related to food security to their supervisor, the establishment, and the ISLO.

f. Using radiation detectors, when available, to detect radiological contamination of product in suspect shipments.

**B. Threat Condition High (Orange) with a specific threat to the food and agriculture sector.**

1. RIFOs will:

a. Communicate heightened alert status and updates to all import personnel at POE.

b. Conduct regular briefings with headquarters and field personnel.

c. Ensure import field personnel receive and implement special instructions from OIA regarding the reinspection of suspect shipments from designated foreign countries.

2. ISLOs will:

a. Coordinate Homeland Security activities as directed by OIA in coordination with other border agencies and other FSIS activities. These activities may include reviewing any high-risk product/shipments identified at POE as suspicious, including the use of radiation detectors to detect radiological contamination of product in suspect shipments.

b. Verify food security activity at POE where ISLO's are not located.

c. Report all activity to the RIFO and headquarters through IID food security reports.

3. Import inspectors will:

a. Perform four of the Food Security Verification Tasks listed in paragraph VIII, B. (tasks 08S03, 08S07, 08S10, 08S13) daily for the duration of the threat condition. Import inspectors are to perform the Food Security Verification Procedures

as UNSCHEDULED procedures within the established tour of duty and after all food safety procedures are performed.

b. Review shipments and documentation for evidence of tampering or falsification.

c. Notify the RIFO or ISLO if the AIIS is down and that the contingency plan is being used.

d. Sample ready-to-eat (RTE) and other high-risk product shipments as directed by the AIIS, Import Inspection Division Contingency Plan, or instruction received through supervisory channels. Focus activities on high risk products as directed by OIA at the time of the declaration. This includes utilizing radiation detectors to detect radiological contamination of product in suspect shipments.

e. Follow any special instructions provided by the RIFO regarding the reinspection of suspect shipments from designated foreign countries.

f. Report suspicious activities, as related to Homeland Security, to the RIFO.

**C. Threat Condition Severe (Red) with a specific threat to the food and agriculture sector.**

1. RIFO will:

a. Conduct regular briefings with headquarters and field personnel.

b. Implement increased sampling in certain POE or import establishments for all or targeted (e.g., high-risk products) shipments as directed by the senior executive leadership in OIA.

c. In the event of a border closing, hold all products that have been presented to FSIS at the import facility.

d. In the event of an imminent threat to the safety of import inspection program personnel verify that all import inspection program personnel have been removed from the threatening situation and notify OFSEP through the senior executive leadership in OIA using the procedures as listed in FSIS Directive 6500.1, Emergency Incident Response.

e. Provide on-site support to law enforcement personnel, other POE agencies, and emergency first responders.

f. If necessary, deploy additional personnel to POE where the high-risk products are being presented for reinspection.

2. ISLOs will:

- a. Continue surveillance at the ports and I-houses. Work closely with the Department of Homeland Security, APHIS, and other FSIS divisions regarding POE activity.
- b. Maintain communication with other POE and agencies in their area of coverage.
- c. In response to a specific incident within their jurisdiction, initiate and coordinate emergency response activities through the RIFO across all jurisdictions.
- d. Coordinate any targeted shipment verification activities with FSIS/IID import inspection personnel and the Department of Homeland Security at POE where ISLOs are not available.
- e. Use radiation detectors, when available, to detect radiological contamination of product in suspect shipments.
- f. Prepare to respond to site specific requests for assistance from import supervisor.

3. Import inspectors will:

- a. Perform all applicable Food Security Verification Procedures listed in paragraph VIII, B. 08S03 – 08S13 at operational plants for the duration of the threat condition. Import inspectors are to perform the Food Security Verification Procedures as UNSCHEDULED procedures within the established tour of duty and after all food safety procedures are performed.
- b. Increase scrutiny of all shipments. Hold shipments as directed by the RIFO at the time of the declaration, pending further instructions in the likely event of a border and POE closure.
- c. Follow sampling instructions through AIIS. If the AIIS is non-operational, 100 percent reinspection is to be activated for all products. If radiation pagers are available, scan shipments for possible radiation adulteration.
- d. Report any suspicious activity to the RIFO.

#### D. Imported Egg Products

All imported egg shipments will be directed to an import facility by IID headquarters during Threat Condition High (Orange), or Severe (Red), with a specific threat to the food and agriculture sector. Import inspectors will follow procedures as stated in Paragraph VII including:

1. Reviewing shipment documentation
2. Observing shipment condition from shipping dock
3. Contacting RIFO and holding all suspicious shipments

#### E. Targeted shipments

Shipments that are targeted as a food security risk must be reinspected as per OIA regardless of the alert conditions. Import inspectors should maintain communication with the RIFO or headquarters. Reinspection may include:

1. Review of shipment documentation
2. Food Security Lab Sampling
3. Reinspection for tampering or adulteration
4. Radiation scanning
5. Use of sensory equipment to detect biological or chemical contamination.

### **VIII. FOOD SECURITY VERIFICATION PROCEDURES**

The purpose of the following food security verification procedures is to identify possible weaknesses in security on imported meat, poultry and egg products that could lead to the deliberate contamination of product. A potential food security breach can be any measure identified at the import facility or POE (or that should be implemented to protect facility or POE operations) that is found or observed to be missing or not in place. Examples include suspicious activity in reinspection areas, port areas, or evidence of tampering (holes or cuts in packages) in imported products from the POE into the United States until the marks of inspection are applied.

A. The RIFO will summarize all activities and observations during the heightened threat condition and submit a report to OIA. All immediate concerns should be communicated to headquarters at once during Threat Condition High (Orange), or Severe (Red), with a specific threat to the food and agriculture sector.

B. The ISLO will:

1. Maintain vigilance to detect suspicious activity, including observing port activity, movement of people at border, movement of people at dock, and surrounding areas.
2. Control the movement of targeted or suspicious shipments.
3. Observe conveyances for possible tampering or suspicious activity.
4. Maintain communication with the Department of Homeland Security, Brokers, Importers, APHIS, and other FSIS personnel.
5. Coordinate all border activities.
6. Prepare and distribute OIA food security reports through the weekly reporting system advising the Import Regional Field Office of Homeland Security of compliance issues.
7. Immediately communicate concerns to the RIFO and headquarters.

C. Import inspectors are to notify the facility management immediately of any observation or concern. Program personnel should take immediate action any time product adulteration is observed. In the event product is adulterated, inspection program personnel are to take immediate action as per established policy for adulterated product.

D. At a minimum, import inspectors will:

**1. 08S03 – Outside Premises**

Observe the outer perimeter of the establishment to verify that fences and gates (if any) are intact. Verify that entrances to the establishment are secured against unauthorized entry. Special attention should be paid to truck entrance and parking areas, any trucks used to provide onsite dry and cold storage of processing ingredients, and the external portion of silo tanks used to store liquid egg products.

SUGGESTED ACTIVITIES:

- Select one or more areas and observe entrances, windows, storage tanks or storage containers to see if they are secured or if there is evidence of tampering.

- Examples of properly secured to the extent possible include use of locks, jimmy plates, seals, alarms, intruder detection sensors, guards, monitored video surveillance, security patrols, adequate interior and exterior lighting, authorized parking system, metal doors, and accounting of keys for doors. **NOTE:** Fire locks should not be locked on the inside.

## **2. 08S04 – Control/Use of Hazardous Chemicals**

Observe the use and storage of any hazardous materials in the establishment and verify that entry into such storage areas is controlled, and that usage logs are maintained and current. Special attention should be paid to cleaning materials, particularly those used in clean-in-place systems, or where there is mixing of bulk products (e.g., storage silos). In addition, the control of laboratory reagents and cultures should be verified.

### **SUGGESTED ACTIVITIES:**

- Observe one or more hazardous materials (non-food) to determine whether they are handled and stored in a manner that demonstrates control and limited access to those hazardous materials.
- For example, check that stored hazardous materials are properly identified, stored away from edible products, and that entry logs are on file, accurate, and complete.
- If an import facility maintains inventory records or logs, compare those records to the hazardous materials on hand for accuracy.

## **3. 08S05 - Office of Field Operations Task Code Only**

## **4. 08S06 - Equipment Calibration**

Verify the proper calibration of equipment.

### **SUGGESTED ACTIVITIES:**

- Review equipment guidance material and calibration logs to determine if items are operating as determined by manufacturer.
- Verify the calibration of equipment with known sources.
- Verify security, procedures, and location surrounding alternative equipment sources (e.g., X-ray equipment, radiation equipment).

## **5. 08S07 - Loading Dock/Shipping**

Observe loading dock areas and vehicular traffic in and out of the establishment. Report all unattended deliveries on loading docks and unmarked vehicles parked on the premises to establishment management immediately. Make facility management aware of the importance of ensuring that truck drivers do not have unsupervised access to product receiving and storage areas. Suggest that facility management ensure dry and cold products stored in on-site trailers are secured; that trailers are parked in a restricted access area of the facility; and that facility security staff routinely checks the trailers. Pay special attention to deliveries of liquid egg products to storage silos and of combo bins of meat trim and dry ingredients.

#### SUGGESTED ACTIVITIES:

- Check to determine if the facility has a system to report and verify unattended activities or suspicious deliveries on loading docks (e.g., plant maintains a log of scheduled deliveries and that all unscheduled deliveries are held outside of the premises until shipper is verified).
- Check to determine whether plant has controlled parking to keep vehicles and guests at a safe distance from the main facility and follows procedures to maintain that control.
- Check to determine that the facility has control of container unloading and that all container activity at the loading dock doors is scheduled with the facility.
- Observe access to the dock area to verify exclusion of unauthorized or suspicious personnel. This may include observing other non-routine incidents in the area such as exports, repackaging, and other Agency procedures being conducted at the facility.
- Pay attention to the possibility of sabotage or tampering with products.
- Observe personnel conducting the work for suspicious activity.

#### **6. 08S08 - Incoming Raw Materials**

Observe incoming raw materials to verify that deliveries are checked against shipping documents. Special attention should be paid to tanker trucks and totes of liquid egg products; dry ingredients; combo bins of fresh meat trim and poultry parts; and boxes of frozen trim that will be further processed.

#### SUGGESTED ACTIVITIES:

- Observe one or more incoming shipments to determine if shipping documents or bills of lading are accurate and being verified by the facility.
- Verify that the facility has a record system for controlling all scheduled and unscheduled deliveries.
- Observe incoming shipments for evidence of tampering or suspicious activity.

### **7. 08S09 – Maintenance**

Observe maintenance, construction, and repair activity at the establishment to verify personnel performing such activities are properly identified and authorized to perform such activities. Pay attention to whether construction personnel (or any other unauthorized personnel) are denied access to sensitive processing operations where bulk products will be mixed (e.g., grinding, emulsification, dry and cold storage areas, silo tanks, and solution preparation areas). In addition, verify whether contract maintenance or third shift personnel undergo background screening or are checked by facility security staff, and if not, what impact that has on plant security.

#### **SUGGESTED ACTIVITIES:**

- Check that the facility has a procedure to control the entry of all persons, such as an ID system that restricts people's movement.
- Check records, if available, to verify that they are accurate, complete, and indicative of the plant meeting procedures for identifying personnel (e.g., rosters for shifts).

### **8. 08S10 – Product Storage Areas**

Observe products in cold and dry storage areas for evidence of tampering. Special attention should be paid to bulk product ingredients that will undergo mixing, such as combo bins of meat trim and poultry parts used for grinding or emulsification. Dry ingredients, including spices, breading materials, and those used in injection solution preparations, should also be checked for indication of tampering.

#### **SUGGESTED ACTIVITIES:**

- Observe one or more product storage locations to ensure whether product is stored in a proper manner.
- Pay special attention to the possibility of sabotage or tampering with products.
- Monitor import facility for suspicious activity.

## **9. 08S11 – Water Systems**

Observe the security of the plant's water systems, especially water storage facilities and reuse systems. Check the plant's potable water supply and report any change in the appearance, taste, or odor to the establishment. Special attention should be paid to water used to prepare injection solutions and to water and ice used in emulsification (deli meats and hot dogs). To a lesser extent, check water used to prepare surfactant and antimicrobial agent sprays and water used as chill tank recharge.

### **SUGGESTED ACTIVITIES:**

- Observe whether access to private wells is controlled.
- Check whether potable water tanks and ice storage are secured.
- Check whether potable water lines in the facility are inspected for tampering (e.g., backflow devices are installed and operational).
- Ask if the facility has a plan to notify local health authorities if a possible tampering or compromised water supply situation occurs.

## **10. 08S12 - Office of Field Operations Task Code Only**

## **11. 08S13 - Employee Behavior**

Observe the behavior and in-plant movement of establishment employees, especially those who suddenly appear in areas where they are not assigned to work. Encourage establishment management to control employee access to sensitive processing operations (e.g., where bulk products are being mixed). Further, discuss with facility management the importance of raising food security awareness through employee training programs.

### **SUGGESTED ACTIVITIES:**

- Check to determine whether the plant has a system to restrict employee access to appropriate areas.
- Observe and report to plant management employees that do not seem like they belong in the facility or area, or in some way seem out of place or perform inappropriate activities.

- Observe activities of other parties who are authorized to enter the facility (e.g., truck drivers).
- Check to determine whether the plant has a system to restrict other people's access to waiting rooms or driver's lounges.
- Verify that the facility has a system for verifying scheduled and unscheduled deliveries.

**NOTE:** Import inspectors should refer establishment management to FSIS Food Security Guidelines for Food Processors for additional security measures at [http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Food\\_Security\\_&\\_Emergency\\_Preparedness/index.asp](http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Food_Security_&_Emergency_Preparedness/index.asp) that they may want to incorporate in Food Security Plans during the weekly meetings. Import inspectors should discuss with establishment management the content of any developed (Maritime, Department of Homeland Security, etc.) Food Security Plans.

## **IX. PROCEDURES FOR DOCUMENTING IMPORT INSPECTOR FOOD SECURITY VERIFICATION**

Import inspectors are to record the performance of the ISP code list in paragraph VIII and document findings, in the following manner.

### A. Import inspectors

1. When import inspectors perform an 08S procedure and do not find a food security breach or concern, they are to record the procedure as performed and record trend indicator "A".

2. When import inspectors perform an 08S procedure and do find a breach or food security concern, and there is no evidence of product adulteration, they are to:

i. record the procedure as performed using trend indicator "S".

ii. immediately notify the establishment management and discuss the findings.

iii. prepare a memorandum of interview that describes the findings and the discussions with facility management. At the top of the memorandum, import inspectors are to write "Sensitive Security Information". Verify that previous findings have been addressed on a weekly basis. Send all documentation to the RIFO.

3. When import inspectors perform an 08S procedure and do find a breach or food security concern, and there is evidence of product adulteration, they are to:

- i. record the procedure as performed using trend indicator “T”.
- ii. immediately notify the establishment management and discuss the findings.
- iii. complete a Non-Compliance Report (NR) using trend indicator “T” and synchronize the computer and notify immediate supervisor. At the top of the NR, import inspectors are to write “Sensitive Security Information”.
- iv. take the appropriate action as set out in FSIS Directive 5000.1, Revision 1.
- v. verify control of all potentially adulterated products.

B. Import inspectors are to maintain a record of all verbal and written food security-related memorandums and forward copies of records related to food security breaches/concerns to the RIFO.

Direct all questions related to this directive through supervisory channels.

*/s/ Philip S. Derfler*

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