MITIGATING AND MANAGING CONFLICT

CHAPTER 4

SINCE PEAKING IN THE EARLY 1990S, THE NUMBER of new internal conflicts has been declining around the world—reason for cautious optimism.[1] Although violence can always reappear or emerge along new lines in many parts of the world, the politics of violence appear to be slowly giving way to the politics of accommodation. Much can be learned from places where this change has occurred and from places where violence should have occurred but has not.

Consider the Russian Federation, where the central government has negotiated autonomy agreements with 40 of the country's regions. Though far from perfect, these agreements may have helped avert the kind of ethnic and religious violence seen in Kosovo and Chechnya. They should serve as models for other countries and regions grappling with ethnic diversity and secessionist bids.

A peaceful, stable world order is a top priority for U.S. foreign policy, as President Bush described in the National Security Strategy, and foreign assistance can help achieve it. But before assessing the many programs that might be effective in addressing this challenge, it is crucial to first understand the issues involved. Otherwise, responses risk being ineffective at best—and harmful at worst.

Conflict is complex. It does not happen just because people are unhappy or greedy, because a country has resources to sustain it, or because state and social institutions are weak or perverse. It happens when causes at multiple levels come together and reinforce one another. It is the product of deep grievances, political and economic competition, irresponsible leadership, weak and unaccountable institutions, and global and regional forces.

Thus interventions to contain conflict cannot focus on a single dimension of it, such as ethnic tension or political exclusion. Nor can they be based at a single level, such as the community level or national level, because gains in one area can easily be undermined by setbacks in another. It is important to think about how problems emerge at multiple levels—and how solutions can be developed or strengthened at each level.

Such efforts are not a task solely for foreign assistance. They require close collaboration between diplomacy, the military, international financial institutions, the international business community, and

donors. And to support the collective crafting of effective and sustainable solutions, there first needs to be common understanding of the problem.

CONFLICTS SINCE THE COLD WAR

During the 1990s there were 111 armed conflicts in 74 locations. Half of these were major conflicts, defined as involving more than 1,000 battle-related military deaths . All but three of the major conflicts were internal—driven by clashes over control of a state's government or territory.[2]

In recent decades internal conflicts have killed hundreds of thousands of people in direct fighting. Many more have been internally displaced or forced into refugee status. Moreover, these conflicts fuel religious and ethnic intolerance, creating hatred and fear that can take generations to overcome.

Civil conflicts have also blunted and reversed economic growth, destroyed investments, and slashed living standards. Violence takes a heavy economic toll not only on the countries that experience it but also on their neighbors. These wars also place a staggering financial burden on the international community. In the 1990s donors pledged more than $60 billion to support recovery in war-torn countries—with World Bank lending for this purpose increasing by almost 10 times.[3] International spending on peacekeeping jumped from $464 million in 1990 to a high of $3.6 billion in 1995. In 2001 such spending was estimated at $2.5 billion.[4]

Although most recent conflicts are internal, their causes and consequences are increasingly global. Recent events in Central Asia, Central Africa, and the Balkans show that internal conflicts can spill across borders, sparking regional wars. Among the most intractable and worrisome are conflicts that create failed states—anarchic, lawless countries such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan. The National Security Strategy has identified failing or failed states as a serious threat to U.S. security interests.

Such settings have enabled transnational criminal organizations, terrorist networks, and local warlords to amass enormous power and wealth, blurring the distinctions between criminal and politi-

cal violence. Indeed, many of these groups' activities—smuggling drugs, trafficking in humans, defending embattled ethnic and religious brethren, trading arms—require conflict to exist and to be profitable. Solving mass violence requires understanding that for these groups and individuals, violence is not a problem but a solution: a political and financial step up.

No single definition captures the many forms that deadly conflict has taken in recent decades. It can be explosive and short—in Rwanda genocide occurred in just a few months. Or it can drag on for years, as in Afghanistan, Angola, and Sudan. It can follow a traditional path, pitting military factions against each other as in Mozambique and Tajikistan. Or it can spill up from local or regional violence where institutions are weak and eroding, as it did in Somalia and threatens to do in Indonesia and Nigeria. Violence can take an explicit ethnic or religious form, as in Burundi and the Balkans. It can have a strong ideological component, as with the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. It can be nationalist or secessionist, as in Chechnya (Russia) and Aceh (Indonesia). Or it can be criminal violence on a new and devastating scale, as in Colombia and Sierra Leone.

UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT

Many in the development community believe that successful interventions in civil conflict, such as those in Mozambique and Namibia, have reflected better understanding of the underlying conflict dynamics than have unsuccessful ones, as in Angola and Somalia. Yet in many countries where the international community has intervened, careful attention to underlying causes has been missing.

Indeed, interventions by the development community are often criticized for addressing the symptoms of conflict—refugee flows, famines, ethnic riots—rather than the causes. This charge is exaggerated, not least because such factors often contribute to the resurgence or expansion of conflict. But it is true that development agencies have fallen short in their efforts to understand and address the issues that induce and sustain violence.

Understanding the mix of root causes in a country can yield important information about the potential for conflict, what conflict might look like if it

CIVIL CONFLICTS HAVE BLUNTED AND REVERSED ECONOMIC GROWTH, DESTROYED INVESTMENTS, AND SLASHED LIVING STANDARDS

emerges, and how its effects will linger once fighting ends. Motives for violence can indicate which types of groups might mobilize, along what lines of division, and in what numbers. They can also suggest the likely location, scope, and nature of violence. Attempts to capture and control areas containing alluvial diamonds, for example, will look different from attempts to capture and control a state, which will look different from attempts to secede by an ethnic group. Thus root causes can provide information about the goal of violence, which can provide information about the resources needed to achieve that goal (box 4.1).

But motives are not enough. While root causes can generate enormous suffering or ambition, they cannot tell the full story about conflict. As long as people motivated by grievance or greed do not organize and mobilize along lines of division, incentives for conflict will likely remain local or dormant.

Without resources to facilitate the mobilization and expansion of violence, motives for conflict cannot find expression—no matter how deeply felt the grievance or strong the desire for economic or political gain. And even if a nation has such resources , the number of places where these conditions are met far outstrips the number where conflict actually occurs.

State institutions can address tensions and be responsive to the needs of citizens—or they can fuel discontent through repression, poor governance, corruption, and inefficiency. Civil society groups can bridge lines of division—or they can exacerbate them by aligning with either side. Institutions can block access to resources for conflict by controlling the flow of arms or finding economic alternatives for potential recruits—or they can contribute to conflict by providing these resources to different factions. Perhaps most important, institutions can constrain the behavior of elites who see violence as a strategy for gaining power and wealth—or they can create conditions that foster their emergence, appeal, and room for maneuver.

In many ways it no longer makes sense to talk about internal conflicts using an exclusively state-based framework (box 4.2). National borders are extremely porous in most parts of the world, and many of the networks that sustain conflict—economic, ethnic, religious, political, criminal—are transnational.

A number of dynamics and trends have played critical and growing roles in recent violence:
- The politics of identity.
- The economics of violence.
- State and social (in)capacity.
- Predatory states and failed states.
- Regional and international causes.

THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY

The growing importance of ethnic and religious intolerance and extremism is one of the most dramatic features of conflict in the post–Cold War order. In the former Yugoslavia, throughout

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Box 4.1. Transmigration to spontaneous uprisings

In Indonesia the transmigration program launched by the Suharto government was one of the root causes driving recent massacres of migrant Madurese by local Dayaks. Traditionally the majority in Central and West Kalimantan, Dayaks have seen their political and economic position erode since the program was launched in the early 1980s. Although the massacres have been painted as "spontaneous" uprisings in many accounts, there is evidence to suggest that local Dayaks used anti-Madurese rhetoric to garner support for their political ambitions.

Source: Morris 2002.

Box 4.2. Coffee and conflict—forcing producers to sell at depressed prices

In eastern Congo, long-standing, informal trading routes between Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo have been brought under the control of various rebel factions. These groups have used their local monopoly on violence to intimidate trading rivals, such as the Nande in Eastern Congo, and to force local producers to sell at substantially depressed prices. In some rebel-held zones, coffee producers have been forced to sell only to the leadership of the Mouvement de Liberation du Congo (MLC) and designated Ugandan buyers.

Source: Morris 2002.

Africa, and in many parts of Asia and the Middle East, identity has become more salient, not less.

A number of observers have tried to explain the resurgence of violent identity politics by referring to ancient animosities or tribal hatreds.[5] This view, known as the primordialist view, holds that conflict between certain ethnic and religious groups is inevitable because of deep-seated, enduring historical antipathies. Essentially conflict was there all along—between Serbs and Croats, between Somali clans—but it exploded in the early 1990s because the lid was taken off ancient hatreds through the rollback of superpower control and the erosion of an artificial unity imposed during the Cold War.

Despite the devastating role of ethnic and religious hatred in recent conflict, most analysts reject the primordialist approach in favor of one that views identity as inherently flexible—something created by leaders and shaped by circumstance. These analysts point out that many groups who have fought recently, such as Muslims and Christians in Indonesia, have lived in relative peace for generations and that many others who have deeper histories of tension choose not to take up arms. They argue that even categories that seem as permanent as "Islamic" or "Serb" have changed over time and, critically from the perspective of understanding conflict, have adopted different definitions of threats and enemies. Finally, they point to the fact that while some ethnic myths used to justify violence are centuries old, others have been created in short order, often just before or after violence broke out.[6]

In trying to understand how and when identity turns violent, research has focused on competition, inequality, and discrimination between groups. If ethnic or religious differences overlap with other forms of real or perceived grievance, such as political or economic exclusion, it creates a volatile mix.[7] The existence of a large, distinct ethnic or religious group in a country also raises the risk of violence.

If the largest identity group accounts for 45–90 percent of the population, a country's risk of conflict doubles. Similarly, the higher is a country's ethnic or religious diversity, the lower is its risk of conflict.[8] Thus violence seems to be driven by the actual or potential dominance of one group over another rather than by difference alone.

Erosion of state authority and legitimacy also appears to increase the salience of identity. If state authority is weak or collapsing, many people turn to more immediate and local forms of legitimacy such as those based on clan, ethnicity, or religion. Moreover, membership in a group can provide benefits—food, protection, justice and order, social support—that become even more important when the state is no longer able or willing to provide them.[9]

If there is one dominant view on how identity becomes polarized and leads to widespread conflict, it is that elites foment ethnic or religious violence in an effort to gain, maintain, or increase their political or economic power.[10] In the former Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic exploited anti-Albanian sentiment and Serbian nationalism in his efforts to topple Ivan Stambolic, his former mentor and leader of the Serbian League of Communists. Ethnic or religious scapegoating and "playing the ethnic card" have become among the most lethal, effective tools for gaining power. This development highlights the complexity of the relationship between different incentives for violence, as ambitious elites tap into deep-seated frustrations to advance a political or economic agenda—one that often serves their ends more than those of the group they claim to represent.

One reason ethnic and religious conflicts are so common is that ethnic and religious groups are extremely effective at mobilizing violence, providing both motives and means (box 4.3). Such groups can not only forge a sense of solidarity and articulate group goals, they can also monitor group members. Participation in violence carries heavy physical, economic, and emotional costs. No matter how strong the incentives for it, most people would rather have others do the dirty work. People in the same ethnic, religious, or regional group know each other. They are embedded in dense social and economic networks in which behavior can be easily monitored, information quickly gathered and shared, and sanctions for not participating put in place.

For example, genocide in Rwanda appears to have been facilitated by the country's dense, hierarchical network of associations. Nearly every aspect of life, from the highest levels of government to hillside villages, is organized in a set of overlapping associations and voluntary groups. When Hutu extremists decided to launch the

Elites foment ethnic or religious violence in an effort to gain, maintain, or increase their political or economic power

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Box 4.3. Holding on to power at any price

In 1983 President Numeiri unilaterally abrogated the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement leading to a resumption of civil war. But conflict between northern factions rather than religious differences appears to be the main factor driving the resumption of civil conflict.

Because Numeiri had decimated the Communist party after its abortive coup in 1971, by the early 1980s radical Muslims were the only viable anti-government opposition. Young northern university students, together with other radical Muslims, formed the Muslim Brotherhood and became the principal threat to Numeiri's rule. While interviews among northerners showed that most supported Numeiri's moderate policy toward the south, he abandoned this moderate position as the power and strength of the Muslim Brotherhood grew, helped by generous financial support from Saudi Arabia.

Numeiri, under threat from his right flank and forced to negotiate, began to stress his Islamic credentials by dressing in Arab garb and pressing for the shari'a. Moderate Muslims who protested, such as the long-time leader of the Muslim Republican Brothers, were executed to appease the fundamentalist challenge to his rule. So, fear of his own radicals rather than the desire to Islamize the south initially drove Numeiri to intimidate the south, driving Sudan into its second civil war.

Source: Morris 2002.

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genocide, these groups made it easy to convey information about what was to be done and when, who was to be killed, and, most important, who was and was not participating in the killings. When the price for not participating was the threat of punishment by neighbors, officials, or, worse, roving gangs of Interahamwe (the Hutu extremists), many people had little real choice. This is not to excuse or justify what happened, but merely to point out the importance of local knowledge—that is, the ability to monitor and sanction behavior at the micro level.[11]

In turning away from simplistic notions of ethnic or religious rage, current research on identity presents a more optimistic assessment of the potential for conflict. By looking at the benefits that membership in an identity group provides and at how elites can use ethnic organizations to advance political and economic agendas, the research also points to a broad range of possible interventions for donors. It does not minimize the power and appeal of ethnic and religious extremism. It recognizes that once identity is activated or people are targeted for belonging to a certain ethnic or religious group, relationships become more rigid and antagonistic, leaving little room for moderation or compromise.

THE ECONOMICS OF VIOLENCE

Economic factors can help cause and sustain violence. New research is examining not only how factors such as economic decline and corruption fuel discontent, but also how violence and instability are used to gain access to scarce economic resources and how war economies sustain violence and undermine efforts to build peace long after the cessation of hostilities.

Among the strongest findings in recent research is that stagnant and negative economic growth are highly correlated with civil conflict. An economy growing by 5 percent a year is about 40 percent less likely to see conflict than an economy declining by 5 percent a year.[12] Several factors explain this link. Economic collapse and deep poverty, particularly when tied to severe economic inequality between groups, can feed into a strong sense of grievance. They also imply limited state capacity to make economic concessions to opposition groups and, on the coercive side, to exert military or police control over violent opposition or criminal elements. Among the most destabilizing effects of economic decline is that it can generate incentives—particularly among young unemployed people—to participate in violence for financial gain.

If corruption or patronage is added to the mix, particularly if corruption flows along ethnic or other group lines, economic decline and deep poverty also imply that competition for political and economic power will be increasingly zero-sum. If state power is the only route to wealth and exclusion from these institutions means abject poverty, competition for control of these institutions will likely be intense, protracted, and deadly.

Shadow economies, war economies, and greed. As countries slide closer to conflict, economic activities

emerge that feed into and sustain it. Often referred to as war economies or shadow economies, these include activities such as smuggling drugs, trafficking in humans, illegal logging and mining, looting and banditry, and providing security in an insecure environment (box 4.4).

At a minimum, these activities require weak or no state control over territory and economic activity. At a maximum, they require overt violence to be profitable. As noted, some individuals do extremely well from war. Between 1992 and 1996 President Charles Taylor made more than $400 million a year from the war in Liberia. Since the early 1990s UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and its network of local traders, middlemen, and regional commanders have controlled 70 percent of Angola's diamond trade, generating up to $3.7 billion in revenue.[13]

Apart from the high stakes associated with controlling valuable lootable commodities such as coca or diamonds, micro-level economic incentives are also critical components of conflict. Separate studies of the Balkans point to a common development in many recent conflicts: the participation of young men who, with few economic options, view the theft, smuggling, and banditry that accompany violence as a route to status and personal enrichment. These goals, far more than ardent beliefs in the nationalist appeals of ethnic demagogues, were the true motivation for much of the violence in the Balkans.[14]

Meanwhile, in Indonesia extremist Christian and Muslim militias quickly sprang up to defend their embattled brethren across the archipelago. But many of these groups have been implicated in predatory economic activity in conflict zones, from extorting money from refugees fleeing the violence to smuggling arms. Where the economy is no longer able or willing to provide legitimate economic opportunities, many ordinary people turn to such activities as a survival strategy.

While these activities can trigger violence as groups compete over valuable commodities or try to capture income from illegal businesses or corruption, they also play a powerful role in sustaining violence once it is under way. In many recent conflicts the income from these resources has been used to buy weapons, pay recruits, and bribe government officials. For example, the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) has collected substantial revenue by imposing taxes on coca producers operating in areas under its control. This revenue is then used to support the war effort.[15] It is also increasingly apparent that diamonds helped finance the Revolutionary United Front's bloody reign in Sierra Leone and have been a major source of income for Osama bin-Laden's al Qaeda network and other terrorist organizations.[16]

Financing also comes from diaspora communities—particularly those in the West, who are better off than their counterparts in developing countries.[17] One compelling example concerns the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka. The rebellion has been concentrated in the northern and eastern parts of the country, areas with few valuable natural resources. As a result the decades-old conflict has been sustained through an extensive network of Tamil communities in North America, Europe, and Asia who provide funds for weapons, communications equipment, and other supplies.[18]

Competition for and control of natural resources. Natural resources—renewable or not, degraded or not, scarce or not—represent an important source of wealth and power in developing countries. In looking at recent conflicts in Kenya, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, land represents a lucrative prize in an elite competition driven by political factors.[19] Land is also an important tool for elites seeking to mobilize support. It can be used to buy support,

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Box 4.4. Opium for conflict

Drug trafficking has proven to be a crucial source of revenue for rebel groups, terrorist networks, and governments in dire economic straits. In Afghanistan revenues from opium helped to finance the war against the Soviets in the 1980s. And opium has been identified as a main source of revenue for both the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Afghanistan is home to an elaborate global system of trade and production, making it the largest source of opium in the world. Although the ban led to an increase in opium prices within Afghanistan, the distribution of opium from stockpiles controlled by independent drug traffickers along the borders of Afghanistan ensured ready availability and low prices outside. This dynamic enabled the Taliban to continue to finance their control of the country and support terrorist activities through selling opium.

Source: Morris 2002.

as in Zimbabwe, or as a powerful psychological weapon, as in the hands of Milosevic, who gained strong support among Serbs for his stance on sacred Serb spaces in Kosovo.

Environmental scarcity has an indirect link to violence by heightening tensions between groups forced to compete over dwindling resources, causing chronic poverty and eroding the state's capacity to respond (box 4.5). But elites foment violence through their attempts to control access to natural resources.

Population, migration, and urbanization. There is little evidence that population growth is a cause of widespread violence. But several demographic shifts have clear links to conflict.[20] These include:
- An expanding agrarian population where land is scarce or controlled by large landholders.
- An expanding urban population in the context of economic stagnation or decline.
- Rapid increases in young, educated professionals who have no opportunities for political or economic advancement.
- The presence of a large youth cohort, or a disproportionate share of 15–25-year-olds in the population.
- The migration of distinct groups into regions already settled by groups with a strong sense of identity, or demographic shifts between these groups.

Common to all these shifts, and what makes them so destabilizing, is that population growth or demographic change is not matched by an increase in the absorptive capacity of the state, markets, or society. While this imbalance is likely to fuel anger among people denied access to political or economic opportunities, many of these demographic shifts also provide a ready pool of recruits—landless, jobless, young, and uprooted—to movements seeking to mobilize violence.

Widespread political upheaval is often preceded by a rapid increase in the number of young people with an advanced education but few opportunities for economic or political advancement.[21] A large portion of young people in a society, separate from the question of education, also appears to be a critical risk factor in terms of a country's vulnerability to conflict.[22] This demographic group appears to be a particularly easy target for religious, ethnic, or political ideologues seeking to mobilize violence—and the larger is the group with no hope for the future, the easier it will be to find recruits.

Another salient demographic shift is the rapid transfer of rural populations to urban areas. In 1950 less than 30 percent of the world's people lived in urban centers.[23] But by 2006 a critical threshold will be crossed, when half the world's people will reside in urban areas. Polluted air, filthy water, and inadequate sanitation affect hundreds of millions of the world's poorest urban inhabitants. Infant mortality rates are four or more times higher in poor or marginal urban areas than in more affluent neighborhoods.[24] A host of psychosocial ills also accompany rapid urbanization, including high crime and violence among young adults.

Whether rapid urbanization is linked to conflict depends on a state's ability or willingness to implement municipal policies that improve public welfare and economic growth. Where urban growth is not matched by an increase in economic growth, the risk of conflict increases. For example, Sub-Saharan African countries with high urbanization and below-average GDP growth are at twice the risk of political conflict as African countries with above-average per capita GDP growth. Particularly troubling from this

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Box 4.5. Cows and guns

It 2001 it took five cows to buy an AK-47 in northwest Kenya, down from 15 in 1986. This drop in price reflects a dramatic increase in the availability of small weapons worldwide, with massive surpluses in some bad neighborhoods, such as the Horn of Africa, the Balkans, and Central Asia. These weapons are changing the social and political fabric of many small communities.

Among the Pokot of northwest Kenya power used to be vested in village elders. It now belongs to young men with guns, and traditional rules of engagement no longer apply. For example, when a neighboring village used its new found guns to capture Pokot cattle, the Pokot, also heavily armed, retaliated by killing women and children, breaking a long-standing taboo. The lethal response has made it very difficult, if not impossible, to return to traditional and more peaceful ways of conflict resolution.

Source: Morris 2002.

perspective is the fact that the two megacities in Sub-Saharan Africa, Lagos and Kinshasa, are among the world's poorest—yet rank near the top of global megacities in their population growth.

The strength and health of political, economic, and social institutions are a critical—perhaps the most critical—factor in determining whether conflict will emerge. Institutions mediate internal and external pressures. They can either do so well, or they can fail spectacularly.

The institutions of healthy democracies are able to engage with many causes of violence, whether or not they are always able to find solutions to these problems. A robust and inclusive civil society can articulate group goals, monitor abuses of power, and propose effective solutions to many of the grievances discussed earlier. In a democracy, even if a particular ethnic or economic group is not able to immediately resolve its most pressing issues, political inclusion and effective participation guarantee that it can continue to engage in a political search for solutions. Finally, a strong and accountable security sector and an equitable and impartial rule of law can guarantee personal security and property rights, leaving little room for the opportunistic behavior favored by those focused on gaining from conflict.

These institutional features of democracies have a powerful dampening effect on civil conflict. They keep a country peaceful through more than the mere absence or elimination of causes; they are also promote nonviolent solutions to difficult problems. Conflict is a normal part of political life and social transformation. Maintaining a legitimate space for opposition and protest can help keep societies from resorting to violence.

Good governance is a critical component of this strength. Hugh Miall examines the relationship between good governance and the emergence of civil conflict.[25] Using measures of good governance derived by the World Bank for 113 countries, he finds that 70 percent of countries that score well in terms of good governance experience no violence—while just 37 percent of countries with bad governance remain free from conflict.

But even if consolidated democratic institutions are good at managing conflict, the path between authoritarian regimes and democracy can be dangerous.[26] A large and growing body of evidence shows a relationship between political change and conflict. Many of the internal conflicts that erupted at the end of the Cold War occurred in nations poised on the brink of moving away from authoritarian rule. In places from Rwanda to Tajikistan, opening the political system to new voices and demands led to violent backlashes from the elite and widespread conflict.

There are inherent political contradictions in most partial or transitional democracies: tensions between demands for more effective participation and the desire of political elites to maintain or enhance their control. Any change in the distribution of power creates new channels for competition, draws in new actors, creates new threats or heightens old ones, leads to new systems of incentives and rewards, opens up new possibilities for resource allocation and patronage, and often leads, at least in the short term, to the erosion of institutional constraints governing the behavior of powerful actors. In this fluid environment elites will often try to use violence to advance their political or economic agendas.

In the context of political transition, elites often view violence as the best strategy for achieving political or economic objectives—and in this sense it is a rational response to certain configurations of threat and opportunity. For example, there are strong reasons to believe that Milosevic viewed conflict as inherently useful. Violence directed against other ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia not only rallied faltering domestic support by deflecting attention from pressing political and economic issues, it also provided a "legitimate" pretext for suppressing the media and elements of the opposition. And it strengthened, at least temporarily, his base of support in his ruling coalition.

In addition to the political benefits of violence, conflict can also lead to financial benefits that can be used to buy the support of key participants in a conflict. For example, international sanctions made the control of illicit trade by a small circle around Milosevic extremely profitable.[27] Similarly, much of the motivation for the continued presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo of Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe is the need to buy off key elites with resources derived from the conflict.[28] The greater is a regime's vulnerability to political challenges from within the

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ruling coalition, the stronger is the incentive to contain, neutralize, or buy off these challenges.

PREDATORY STATES AND FAILED STATES

A special category of political change is the case of institutional erosion or collapse that manifests in weak or failed states. In much of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, internally divided states, often lacking political legitimacy, are unable or unwilling to provide even the most basic services and security for their citizens, let alone adhere to democratic principles.[29] These states are not transitional in the usual sense of moving from autocracy to democracy or the reverse. Instead, they are moving toward chaos—but chaos with its own peculiar logic and structure.

The erosion of institutions may be due to many different things, but—returning to the notion that instability can be a powerful tool in the hands of elites—there may be groups and individuals in a society that will deliberately undermine institutions if by so doing they strengthen their political or economic position. A key tactic of leaders in shadow states, with Nigeria's Sani Abacha a prime example, is to foster conflicts within and between local communities and factions.[30] These divisions, which consolidate elite power, can easily become the fault lines of future conflict.

The weakening of institutions that safeguard property rights, collect taxes, provide security, mobilize in response to natural disasters, and ensure economic growth not only feeds societal grievance, it also leaves room for the emergence of autonomous and competing centers of power and predatory economic dynamics. As discussed earlier, as the state retreats, people often turn to smaller, closer-knit groups—family, clan, religious, ethnic, or militia—for security and survival. These groups then become involved in conflict as they compete over access to scarce resources.

While many risk factors may be in place—ethnic or religious tension, poverty, environmental scarcity—whether violence emerges is largely a function of how well leaders and institutions deal with these risks. Ethnicity need not become polarized, but it will be if ethnic criteria are used as a basis for political or economic discrimination and if elites see ethnic outbidding as an effective tool for gaining or maintaining power. Environmental degradation or competition over land does not have to lead to poverty or destabilizing population transfers, but it probably will unless political institutions can provide economic alternatives that do not rely on the exploitation of scarce resources or can mediate between groups seeking to use the same resource. State structures can either be flexible enough to incorporate emerging elites or, through inflexibility and a narrow base of support, can turn these elites away from engagement with the political system and toward extrasystemic violence. And even if there are elites committed to overturning the existing system no matter its form, effective institutions can undercut their effectiveness and appeal.

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CAUSES

As noted, there are clear limits to using a purely state-centric framework, even when dealing with something traditionally defined as "internal" conflict. The past decade has seen an exponential increase in the number of transnational actors. Many pursue laudable goals of protecting human rights or monitoring environmental abuses. But many others are classic conflict entrepreneurs who feed on instability.

Hernando de Soto, in his most recent book, *The Mystery of Capital*, argues that, by not giving the majority access to expanded markets, a fertile field is being seeded with the potential for confrontation between the privileged few able to take advantage of globalization and those left in poverty.[31] Globalization certainly did not cause conflicts in places like Colombia and Sierra Leone, but it has made it easier for warring parties to establish the transborder economic networks they need to survive. War economies are rarely autarkic; they depend on global networks and markets. To the extent that globalization, intensification of transnational commerce, and information technology have made such access easier, they have also increased the ability of elites to derive economic benefits from violence and conflict. While a great deal of international attention has focused on how the global trade in illegal goods has fueled conflict, such as the drug trade in Afghanistan and Colombia, trade in legal commodities bears greater responsibility for sustaining conflict. In the early 1990s, for example, Liberian warlord Charles Taylor was supplying, among other things, a third of France's tropical hardwood requirements through French companies.[32]

Another factor linked to conflict is whether a state is in a "bad neighborhood," meaning one where other conflicts are occurring or have recently occurred. These regions—the Balkans, the Horn of Africa, and parts of Central Asia, for example—are awash in transboundary risk factors. These include refugee flows, small arms and light weapons, porous borders, and weak states that can provide sanctuary and serve as a base of operations for both military and economic activity. The easy availability of small arms has had a particularly devastating effect on the scope and lethality of recent conflict. The end of the Cold War freed up massive surplus arsenals in many states, and the black-market trade in weapons is thriving.[33]

Kosovo is a compelling example. While not dismissing the underlying causes of the conflict, one explanation for the timing of the violence is that during the 1997 riots in Albania a large number of armories were looted, dramatically increasing the availability of weapons in the region. The glut of weapons in the region made a massive buildup by the KLA much cheaper and easier than it otherwise would have been, and may have triggered the outbreak of a more substantial military effort.

In these war-torn regions refugee or exile populations can play an extremely destabilizing role. At a minimum, refugees pose heavy economic burdens on host countries. At the extreme, they can bring political, ethnic, or religious ideas with them that threaten the governments of their host nations. Their plight can inflame tensions between communities in host nations by radicalizing populations who share the same ethnicity or religion. The transboundary character of many of these problems requires a focus on solutions at the regional or even global level. Foreign assistance, as currently structured, is not well equipped to deal with these problems.

Windows of vulnerability and opportunity

If all these causes exist, there will be periods of vulnerability when certain events—elections, natural disasters, riots, assassinations—can trigger full-scale violent conflict in a region, country, or group of countries. Unlike, say, economic decline or ethnic outbidding, such events are not causes of conflict. Instead, they are moments when underlying causes can come together in a brief window, a window ideally suited for mobilizing

broader violence. But such events can also have extremely positive outcomes if the tensions that tend to emerge are recognized and handled well.

Many of these windows are random or unpredictable, such as economic shocks or natural disasters. Others, like elections, can be seen in advance. But while the international community may never be able to pinpoint the precise election or political assassination that finally tips a country over the threshold, it is certainly possible to tell that some places are ripe for conflict and that it is probably only a matter of time before it occurs. For example, if President Habyarimana's plane had not been shot down in Rwanda, Hutu extremists would probably have found another pretext to launch the genocide.

Many of the more predictable windows of vulnerability involve events, or anticipated events, that threaten to rapidly and fundamentally shift the balance of political or economic power. Elections are the most obvious example. By definition, elections are competitive events with unpredictable outcomes, and conflict is inherent to the process. So, under certain conditions elections may catalyze rather than prevent widespread conflict. This is particularly likely if political power is the only route to economic power or if demographic or other changes threaten to upset a monopoly on power at the local or national level.

While elections are the most obvious example, any policy change that threatens to alter established patterns of political or economic control in high-risk environments could lead elites to mobilize violence. Decentralization is an example, as are legislative changes that govern the power of key players such as the military, or anticorruption programs that that threaten to strip incumbent elites of their main source of income.

Other events that are less predictable but equally destabilizing are those that point out, in a dramatic fashion, the weakness, inefficiency, or corruption of the ruling regime. For example, political unrest often increases sharply after a large natural or human-made disaster, such as a hurricane, drought, flood, earthquake, or industrial accident that affects the environment.

What turns disasters into events triggering political unrest is the amount of blame that can be placed on the regime for causing a disaster or for

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AND STRAIN*

having a particularly weak or corrupt response to one.[34] For example, because Nicaragua's Anastasio Somoza regime treated international aid flowing into the country after the 1972 earthquake as personal income rather than as resources for reconstruction, key business elites withdrew their support from the regime—a critical factor in its demise. Economic shocks can serve much the same role, as the events leading to Suharto's overthrow in Indonesia make abundantly clear.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND CONFLICT MITIGATION

In thinking about how foreign assistance can influence the causes of conflict discussed above, it is useful to think about overt violence or open conflict as the middle part of a continuum dividing the stages of conflict, from before to after. At either end of the continuum is relative stability, not perfect harmony. Disagreements, divisions, and disputes still exist, but institutions can manage and channel them.

The closer a country moves toward conflict, the less able or willing leaders and institutions are to manage sources of tension and strain and the stronger those sources become. Factors that facilitate the mobilization and expansion of violence—large pools of unemployed young men, financial flows from diaspora communities, extremist ethnic militias, hate campaigns in the media—become more visible and important. In addition, elite manipulation of identity is likely to become more pronounced, as is opportunistic economic behavior.

The following activities show several ways that foreign assistance can break into the chain of events that fuel conflict.

YOUNG PEOPLE AND VIOLENCE

While research has shown a link between large youth cohorts and violence, large numbers of young people need not be destabilizing—and in fact, can be an extraordinary resource for positive change. At the heart of whether this group is an easy target for those seeking to mobilize violence is whether the existing system can offer them hope for a viable future. In this respect, working with local governments and business groups to

generate youth employment may be among the most important contributions that foreign assistance can make to conflict management and mitigation—particularly if these efforts are targeted to extremely vulnerable populations of young people, such as young men in urban areas.

Gearing education to available job opportunities and relevant skills training is another important intervention. And outside the economic realm there are a broad range of activities—sporting events, health programs, cultural events, environmental activities, democratic education, political participation—that can draw out the constructive rather than destructive potential of young people.

EDUCATION, TOLERANCE, AND CRITICAL THINKING

Recent events have brought home in a dramatic way how schools can be used to instill intolerance, ethnic and religious hatred, and blind obedience to authority. Curriculum reform and civic education programs geared to primary and secondary education can make an important contribution in this regard by teaching values such as tolerance and the importance of critical thinking. Innovative civic education programs in the Balkans and elsewhere have taught students the benefits of democratic participation by helping them identify pressing community problems, develop possible solutions, and take those solutions to local government officials. To the extent that these activities are explicitly designed to bring students from different groups together, they can help bridge lines of division by showing in a clear and direct way the benefits of cooperation in pursuit of common goals.

MEDIA PROGRAMS

If boundaries of group identity are flexible, then the way ethnicity and religion are portrayed by the media will shape how people view disagreements between groups. The Rwanda genocide shows how the media can fuel hatred and ethnic intolerance. But the media also have enormous power to bridge divides. For example, programs that train journalists to report on issues in ways that do not inflame intergroup tensions can be an essential component of assistance in high-risk settings, as is support to civil society groups that monitor the media for intolerant or exclusive rhetoric.

Model legal frameworks that address hate campaigns in the press can provide civil society groups, moderate political leaders, and international actors with the means to oppose inflammatory reporting on legal and ethical grounds. Finally, people in the midst of conflict have a pressing need for information, and the media can provide information about humanitarian assistance or disseminate accurate information to counteract the damaging rumor mills that inevitably start to churn during crises.

BRIDGING INSTITUTIONS

Deeply divided societies suffer from a dearth of institutions that transcend ethnic or other lines of division. But foreign assistance can strengthen organizations and associations that bridge—rather than reinforce—differences in a society. This can occur at many levels. For example, at the community level foreign assistance can strengthen cooperation by bringing ethnic groups together around shared goals, such as building a school. At regional and national levels donors can encourage the growth and reach of more formal institutions that cut across ethnic and religious lines, such as business associations, trade unions, or secular political parties.

Religious institutions can also do much to help in resolving conflict, the more so now that political lenders in developing countries hold less sway over their electorates. True, religious institutions can make conflicts worse. To be tapped, however, is their role as mediator and conciliator, as argued in the path-breaking work, *Religion: the Missing Dimension of Statecraft.*

BUSINESS PARTICIPATION

One underexplored but potentially important area for foreign assistance is the contribution that the business community can make to building peace. Legitimate business groups have a strong interest in maintaining stability and are often in a far better position than civil society groups to pressure actors in government or the security sector. Recent breakthrough in the decades-old conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tigers is a case in point, where the business community appears to have led the charge to bring the two groups back to the negotiating table.[35]

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR ENCOURAGING STABILITY

Several principles must guide donors' work in high-risk settings. The first is that there are limits to what the international community can do to encourage peace and discourage violence. In severely divided societies it may be possible to reduce or manage tensions, but it is not possible to eliminate them—and policymakers should not pretend that it is. A durable peace cannot be imposed from abroad. Outside actors can raise issues that internal actors might not be able to, they can monitor events, and they can exert diplomatic, financial, and military pressure on leaders walking down a dangerous path. But conflict is ultimately the product of deep grievance and ambition, reckless leadership, zero-sum competition over political and economic power, weak or unaccountable institutions, and regional and global pressures. What is required is a change in attitudes and power inside a country and the will to address these issues. The international community has a range of policy tools that might help, but most of its influence occurs at the margins and takes years to accomplish.

Still, donors should recognize that their efforts matter a lot. All aid is political, particularly in countries at high risk for conflict. Foreign assistance represents a valuable resource in a highly competitive environment. It feeds into complex internal dynamics and often produces explicitly political results. These results can be positive but—intended or not—they can just as easily be negative. Donors need to accept and manage the heightened risks encountered in these types of environments. To some extent this means being more aware of the political aspects of any project and understanding how its design, implementation, and aims interact with underlying conflict dynamics. It also means consciously attempting to minimize the potential negative consequences of any project. But doing no harm does not mean avoiding all action. Rather, it means adopting a strategic framework that has at its core an understanding of conflict, then taking considered risks within that framework.

Among the most important things that donors can do is develop a deeper, context-specific understanding of what drives conflict. This will require a significant investment in research and

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE CAN BREAK INTO THE CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT FUEL CONFLICT

analysis, both among donors and in countries where conflict programs are being considered. Much of foreign assistance's success in its work on health and population concerns, for example, stems from close collaboration between practitioners and researchers. But in conflict there is still a strong belief among many development practitioners that it is inherently random, driven by passion rather than calculation, and so not amenable to rigorous analysis or subject to outside influence. While there is still a long way to go on conflict research, since the mid-1990s scholars have made great strides in identifying the forces that cause and sustain widespread violence. If donors wish to emerge as leaders in this area and to expand the range of programs at their disposal, they need to base their work on the best available research.

As important as it is for donors to be aware of and use this research, it is even more critical that they invest in strengthening the capacity of local institutions to conduct research on conflict, and support local discussions on these issues. Unless all the major actors in a society are able to discuss what they believe to be the central causes of conflict, it will be extremely difficult to set priorities and devise effective solutions.

Many donors have programs that take this basic approach to identifying problems at the local level. While these local and subnational initiatives are an essential component of efforts to address conflict, national and regional efforts should be pursued as well, because local peace initiatives can easily be undermined by elites at higher levels.

Donors need to focus as much on engaging groups and individuals with incentives to engage in violence as on those committed to peace. Because of the difficulty of working in environments of conflict, donors tend to seek out like-minded groups: human rights organizations, religious groups, and women's groups committed to dialogue and peace. These groups have an important role to play in the search for solutions, but civil society groups have been asked to carry far too much of the burden in addressing conflict. Donors need to focus on the institutions and actors driving the violence, whether political elites and their followers, religious leaders, or the police. Arguing that most political elites are corrupt, for example, is not adequate justification for turning away from reformist elements in these institutions and working with them to find ways to constrain the behavior of

their colleagues—either by raising the costs of using violence or lowering the costs of nonviolent political participation.

Finally, a cross-sectoral, multidisciplinary perspective is crucial when designing programs in environments of conflict. Every major focus area in foreign assistance—from economic growth to agriculture to democracy and governance—has some bearing on the causes of conflict. A conflict lens should be applied to every active area in high-risk countries, rather than assuming that some areas are more relevant to conflict than others. This is probably the most important principle to keep in mind when designing a country program. Indeed, unless all the different sectors in a country work together, they often pursue programs that work at cross-purposes and undercut many of the important gains of recent decades.

NEW APPROACHES TO CONFLICT

New approaches to humanitarian aid have moved well beyond traditional "commodity-based" activities. Two such approaches are developmental relief and broader programming. In addition, the special requirements of pre- and post-conflict settings have resulted in a new form of transition assistance. These three approaches involve a broad array of activities, and debates on their merits are often limited by lack of common understanding of what they entail. Moreover, project implementation has been constrained by many obstacles, including:

- Limited donor resources for nontraditional programs.
- Insufficient staff with the skills and mindsets to conduct the more subtle political analysis that these approaches require.
- A tendency to rely on quick, high-visibility programming in emergency settings—neglecting the more far-reaching but less visible interventions that can flow from nontraditional analyses.

More research and detailed case studies are urgently needed to determine the effects of these new approaches.

Developmental relief. A 1995 workshop defined developmental relief as an effort to ease people's vulnerability to the cyclical effects of disasters and conflicts by providing aid in ways that build for the future. Focus areas include:

- Ensuring that relief strategies are tailored to the situation at hand, rather than relying on

standard approaches or ideas.
- Identifying the capacities and vulnerabilities of disaster survivors and using the capacities in the relief process.
- Sustaining the livelihoods of affected groups in addition to saving lives.
- Strengthening local institutions rather than undermining or overwhelming them.[36]

The concept of developmental relief has expanded dramatically since 1995. In a 2001 review of nine U.S. NGOs, the U.S.-based NGO consortium InterAction describes developmental relief as aid activities that "in addition to addressing immediate needs, also contribute to sustainable development *and peace*" (emphasis added).[37] With an expressed commitment to addressing the root causes of conflict, the NGOs interviewed describe a wide range of activities aimed at revitalizing economic and agricultural development, strengthening local participation, increasing the capacity of local partners and civil society organizations, and building peace and promoting reconciliation.

Developmental relief often involves improving understanding and making more creative use of market forces, ensuring that relief interventions are well timed (to avoid creating disincentives for harvesting or planting, for example), discouraging people from migrating away from their homes and livelihoods, distributing seeds and tools rather than food, providing cash for work activities that jumpstart the local economy and invigorate local markets, and supporting programs that build and expand on a community's self-help capabilities. Some of these approaches have been so well incorporated into agency programs that they are now considered sound relief practices.

Peacebuilding efforts range from direct stand-alone interventions (such as peace education, provision of meeting space to bring together parties in conflict, and psychosocial work to promote individual healing as a step toward reconciliation) to programs that indirectly strive for interaction, collaboration, and interdependence among groups in conflict. An example of such a program is the creation of farmers associations that bring together formerly warring ethnic groups to buy seed and fertilizer at cost and sell their products on the market.[38]

New program design tools involve "lenses" to better understand the local dynamics of conflict. Three of the largest U.S. NGOs (among others) are experimenting with a "local capacities for peace" framework developed by the Collaborative for Development Action. The framework helps aid workers strengthen existing connections in a society, bringing people together, and avoid reinforcing divisions that perpetuate conflict.[39]

Some critics consider developmental relief to be antihumanitarian in conflict settings. This criticism partly derives from concern that developmental relief places other objectives (such as capacity building) above lifesaving assistance and that its multifaceted programming approach undermines principles of neutrality and impartiality.[40] Capacity building and peacebuilding in conflict settings imply political (non-neutral) choices on whose capacity will be built and who will benefit from peace.

Though some aspects of developmental relief (such as stand-alone peacebuilding activities) may be more appropriately funded through nonhumanitarian accounts, rejecting this approach in conflict settings risks throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The seeds of many good ideas are still germinating under the rubric of developmental relief and bear continued nurturing and analysis.

Broader approaches. While great strides have been made in delivering material assistance under extraordinarily difficult conditions, little progress is evident on providing even the most rudimentary physical security for war-affected populations.[41] Many aid agencies have traditionally sidestepped human rights issues, out of fear that such involvement would interfere with the provision of urgently needed supplies. But many conflicts of the past decade have brought aid workers face to face with human rights abuses, forcing reconsideration. "Aid officials are now more willing to concede the limited utility of sustaining life only to have it jeopardized by repressive governments or renegade non-state actors. The imperative to assist, framed in isolation from the concomitant commitment to protect, is now understood to produce humanitarian action of a short-sighted and threadbare variety."[42]

Like developmental relief, the broader approaches come in many forms. They might include diplomatic intervention, advocacy with politicians, programs that evacuate people at risk, programs that use the presence of international staff to reduce local violence, programs that help

DONORS NEED TO FOCUS AS MUCH ON ENGAGING GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS WITH INCENTIVES TO ENGAGE IN VIOLENCE AS ON THOSE COMMITTED TO PEACE

protect women from sexual abuse and other forms of violence in refugee camps, and livestock programs that provide livelihood options to fighters who might otherwise engage in violence against civilians.[43]

Some major U.S. NGOs as well as UN agencies like the United Nations Children's Fund are reorganizing themselves to implement the new programming. Other humanitarian aid groups are forging partnerships with human rights groups to create strategies that draw on the strengths of each. This new collaboration reveals the asymmetry between the relief and human rights communities—with rights groups far fewer and less well funded.[44]

As with developmental relief, some fear that the broader approaches are antihumanitarian because they elevate rights over access and the immediate alleviation of human suffering.[45] Placing conditions on humanitarian aid (such as respect for human rights) can lead to the denial of aid if governing authorities do not respect human rights, as in Afghanistan under Taliban rule. Still, human rights and humanitarianism are two sides of the same coin, and ending the "false distinction between assistance and protection (relief and rights) within NGO practice must be one of the great challenges" of the future.[46]

Transition assistance. Transition assistance is directed toward countries that are either moving into or emerging from violence. In post-conflict settings transition assistance focuses on such key issues as:

- Improving security—for example, by reestablishing local police forces and reintegrating former combatants.
- Assisting with the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons.
- Improving food security through cash for work or agricultural programs.
- Restoring livelihoods and converting a war economy back to a peacetime profile.

In most cases no pretense is made that transition assistance is apolitical. Thus it is often disbursed through donor government contractors and local government entities rather than NGOs. It is designed to reinforce prospects for peace by raising people's confidence that peace will bring tangible benefits. USAID and World Bank documents indicate that the process of disbursing aid—and its potential for unifying and giving hope to destroyed

communities—is as important as the end product (say, the school built or well rehabilitated). For example, community-driven development funds that require individuals in war-torn communities to identify needs, allocate resources, and work together can shift people's mindsets away from revenge and toward a more hopeful future. Such an approach subtly but effectively facilitates "reconciliation through reconstruction."[47]

While transition assistance usually occurs after conflicts, there is growing interest and experimentation in delivering it to countries in the pre-conflict stage. Indeed, the World Bank has renamed its post-conflict unit the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, and the United Nations Development Programme's emergency office is now part of a bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.

Increasingly, relief, development, and transition assistance are being implemented simultaneously. This approach reflects the fact that progress from relief to development is not linear and that diverse strategies are required in different sectors and regions of affected countries to maintain progress toward peace. This welcome approach essentially dismisses the traditional concept of a continuum from relief to development, which suggests exclusive applications of different types of aid. The simultaneous provision of different kinds of assistance has created opportunities for integrated strategies in donor programs and with host governments.

NOTES

1. Current data on conflict trends can be found at the SIPRI Project on Armed Conflict website http://projects.sipri.se/conflictstudy/ or the Uppsala Conflict Data Project website. http://www.pcr.uu.se/. See also Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg 2001.
2. Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001.
3. Semerad and Hawkins 2001.
4. Figures are from the Global Policy Forum (2002). http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/tables/pko$$.htm
5. For an example see Kaplan (1993) and Huntington (1996).
6. A good summary of these two approaches can be found in Fearon and Laitin (2000). Also see King (2001).
7. Gurr 2000.
8. Collier and Hoeffler 2001.
9. Zartman, ed. 1995.
10. Brass 1997; Goldstone 1998.
11. Fearon and Laitin, 2000.
12. Collier and Hoeffler 2001.
13. Berdal and Malone 2000.
14. Mueller 2000; Woodward 1995.
15. Estimates are that the FARC makes at least $300m from

the drug trade every year, in addition to their income from kidnapping and extortion. McDermott, Jeremy 2002. "Colombia's Most Powerful Rebels." BBC World News. January 7.

16. Farah, Douglas. 2001. "Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade: Sale of Gems From Sierra Leone Rebels Raised Millions, Sources Say" Washington Post November 2.

17. Collier and Hoeffler 2001.

18. Rotberg 1999.

19. A good overview and discussion of these trends can be found in Goldstone (2001).

20. Goldstone 2001.

21. Goldstone 2001.

22. Esty and others 1998.

23. Brennan 1999.

24. Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996.

25. Miall 2001.

26. Håvard and others 2001.

27. Morris 2002.

28. Reno 2000.

29. Ayoob 1996.

30. Reno 2000.

31. De Soto 2000.

32. Duffield 2000.

33. Boutwell and Klare 1999.

34. Goldstone 2001.

35. Friedman, Thomas L. 2002. "Lessons From Sri Lanka." *New York Times.* 7 August.

36. Danish Red Cross 1995.

37. Mancino, Malley, and Cornejo 2001.

38. Mancino, Malley, and Cornejo 2001.

39. Anderson 1999.

40. Fox 2001.

41. Minear 2001.

42. Minear 2001, p. 72.

43. Minear 2001.

44. Minear 2001.

45. Fox 2001.

46. Slim 1997.

47. World Bank 2002.

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