Summary

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which operates under Multi-National Forces-Iraq, leads the Coalition effort to train, equip, and organize the ISF. Previously, once Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) units were trained and equipped, operational responsibility for their employment was turned over to Multi-National Corps-Iraq. As of June 2007, the Iraqi Ground Forces Command has assumed operational control of 8 of the 10 extant Iraqi Army divisions, and the Ministry of Interior has assumed operational control of the National Police. Overall, the number of Iraqi military and police personnel the Coalition has trained and equipped increased from over 171,000 in July 2005 to about 359,600 in September 2007. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense forces consist of the Joint Headquarters; the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, which commands the Army and the Iraqi Special Operations Forces; the Air Force; and the Navy (including Marines). The Iraqi Ministry of Interior forces consist of the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police, the Directorate of Border Enforcement, and other, smaller forces. According to the September 2007 Department of Defense (DOD) report to Congress, as of September 3, 2007, the Coalition has trained approximately 165,400 Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) personnel and 194,200 Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) personnel, although there is currently no reliable data concerning how many of these personnel are still serving with the MOI. Moreover, in 2006 the Iraqi Prime Minister, with Coalition support, decided to expand the size of Iraq's security forces by possibly as much as 62,500 by the end of 2007. This expansion includes an increase in the size of extant Iraqi Army units that will bring them to 120 percent of authorized strength, an initiative to expand the overall size of the Iraqi Army from 10 to 13 divisions, and an initiative to increase the number of Iraqi police.

The MOD and MOI face significant challenges in developing their logistic, command and control, and intelligence capabilities. Two factors, in particular, have thwarted their development--the persistence of high levels of violence and sectarianism and a lack of ministerial capacity. As a result, the ability of both ministries to maintain and sustain their forces, provide effective command and control of their forces, and provide their forces with intelligence is undermined and cannot be accomplished without Coalition support. Furthermore, since these support capabilities have yet to be fully developed, DOD claims that ISF units are either "independent" or "fully independent" are confusing and misleading. Although we are not discounting DOD reports that there are some ISF units that are more capable than others from an operational standpoint, we do not find sufficient evidence for an assessment of "independent" or "fully independent" for any ISF unit. Moreover, without clarity regarding the criteria according to which ISF units are assessed as independent, especially with regard to their logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities, Congress cannot have clear visibility over DOD's role in assisting the ISF in becoming independent of Coalition support.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Implemented" or "Not implemented" based on our follow up work.

Recommendations for Executive Action