[Federal Register: September 15, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 179)]
[Notices]
[Page 53286-53291]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr15se08-114]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2008-0497]
NRC Enforcement Policy Revision
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of availability of draft and request for comments.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is revising its
Enforcement Policy (Enforcement Policy or Policy) to more appropriately
address the various areas that the NRC regulates, providing a framework
that supports consistent implementation of the Enforcement Policy. A
notice was published on January 25, 2007, announcing that the NRC was
undertaking a major revision of the Enforcement Policy to clarify the
use of terms and update the Policy, removing outdated information and
adding information addressing enforcement issues in areas that are not
currently directly addressed in the Policy. The NRC is now soliciting
written comments from interested parties including public interest
groups, states, members of the public and the regulated industry, i.e.,
reactor and materials licensees, vendors, and contractors, on the
proposed revised Policy. This request is intended to assist the NRC in
revising the Enforcement Policy; NRC does not intend to modify its
emphasis on compliance with NRC requirements.
DATES: Submit comments on or before November 14, 2008. This time period
allows for the public to respond to this notice as well as the
opportunity to provide general comments on the revision of the Policy.
Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical
to do so, but the Commission is able to assure consideration only for
comments received on or before this date.
ADDRESSES: Comments will be made available to the public in their
entirety; personal information, such as your name, address, telephone
number, e-mail address, etc. will not be removed from your submission.
You may submit comments by any one of the following methods:
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov; search on
docket ID: NRC-2008-0497.
Mail comments to: Michael T. Lesar, Chief, Rulemaking, Directives,
and Editing Branch, Office of Administration, Mail Stop: T-6D59, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Hand-deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD
20852, between the hours of 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m., Federal workdays.
You can access publicly available documents related to this notice
using the following methods:
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: Documents related to this notice,
including public comments, are accessible at http://
www.regulations.gov, by searching on docket ID: NRC-2008-0497.
NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine and have
copied for a fee, publicly available documents at the NRC's PDR, Public
File Area O-1F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland.
NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS): The
draft Enforcement Policy is available electronically at the NRC's
Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html
under ADAMS Accession Number ML082520457. From this site, the public
can gain entry into ADAMS, which provides text and image files of the
NRC's public documents. In addition, the draft Enforcement Policy will
be available at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/
enforce-pol.html. If you do not have Internet access or if there are
problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the PDR
Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by e-mail to
pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Doug Starkey, Office of Enforcement,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555;
Doug.Starkey@nrc.gov, (301) 415-3456.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The NRC Enforcement Policy contains the enforcement policy and
procedures that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) uses to
consider potential enforcement actions in response to apparent
violations of NRC requirements. The primary purpose of the Enforcement
Policy is to support the NRC's overall safety mission, i.e., to ensure
adequate protection of public health and safety, promote the common
defense and security, and protect the environment. Because it is a
policy statement and not a regulation, the Commission may deviate from
this statement of policy as appropriate under the circumstances of a
particular case.
The Enforcement Policy was first published in the Federal Register
on October 7, 1980 (46 FR 66754), as an interim policy. The Commission
published a final version of the Policy on March 9, 1982 (47 FR 9987).
The Enforcement Policy has been modified on a number of occasions to
address changing requirements and additional experience and on June 30,
1995 (60 FR 34381), a major revision of the Policy was published. The
NRC maintains the Enforcement Policy on its Web site at http://
www.nrc.gov; select Public Meetings and Involvement, Enforcement, and
then Enforcement Policy.
The goal of the Policy is to support the NRC's safety and security
mission by emphasizing the importance of compliance with regulatory
requirements, and encouraging prompt identification, and prompt,
comprehensive correction of violations. Revisions to the Policy have
consistently reflected this commitment: for example, in 1998, the NRC
changed its inspection procedures to address the Reactor Oversight
Process (ROP) initiative. This has been reflected in the Policy's use
of risk insights to assess the significance of violations whenever
possible. While this may result in fewer Notices of Violation being
issued (because of a greater emphasis on the use of non-cited
violations), it has not reduced the agency's emphasis on the importance
of compliance with NRC requirements. Another example involves the NRC's
development of a pilot program in 2005 which focuses on the use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) for certain kinds of enforcement
cases. The NRC enforcement staff has used ADR to resolve reactor, fuel
facility, and materials enforcement cases. While the use of ADR in
enforcement raises unique issues, it emphasizes creative,
[[Page 53287]]
cooperative approaches to handling conflicts in lieu of adversarial
procedures.
The NRC is again proceeding with making a major revision to its
Enforcement Policy. As discussed above, since it was first published in
1980, sections of the Policy have been updated and additional sections
have been included. Terms used under conventional enforcement are now
associated with the significance determination process (SDP) performed
under the ROP as well; therefore, the use of these terms must be
clarified. In addition, there are areas that are not directly addressed
in the Supplements of the Enforcement Policy, such as the enforcement
issues associated with combined licenses for the proposed new reactors
and the construction phase of proposed fuel facilities as well as
recently promulgated requirements in the safeguards and security area.
These areas must be addressed either by adding them to the text of the
existing Policy and Supplements or by revising the Policy and
developing new Supplements. Finally, the format of the Enforcement
Policy is being reorganized to reflect the changes that have been made
to it.
II. Proposed Plan
The NRC envisions revising the Enforcement Policy so that the
policy statement follows the actual enforcement process. The NRC's
enforcement process has three basic steps: first, violations must be
identified; next, the NRC must assess the significance or severity of
the violation; and finally, the NRC must disposition the violation.
Throughout the process, an organization or individual subject to an NRC
enforcement action has multiple opportunities to provide input.
In order for the policy to follow the actual enforcement process
some of the material in the current Enforcement Policy has been either
removed entirely from the revised Policy or relocated to the NRC
Enforcement Manual. The intent is that this revised Policy more closely
reflects the Commission's statement of policy and that it not be a
guidance document or procedure which discusses every specific
implementation aspect of enforcement. Therefore, some of the
information in the current policy, which more closely resembles
procedural guidance rather than Commission policy, has been either
reworded, deleted, or moved to a guidance document, e.g., the NRC
Enforcement Manual. One example of such a deletion is found in Section
III, Responsibilities, of the current Policy. Specifically, information
regarding delegation of authority was removed because delegation of
authority is actually addressed in internal NRC memorandums. Another
example is found in Section V, Predecisional Enforcement Conferences
(PECs), of the current policy. In particular, the implementation
guidance in the current policy regarding conduct of PECs is being
relocated to the Enforcement Manual. As a final example, most of the
discussion regarding how the civil penalty assessment process is
implemented will be relocated to the Enforcement Manual.
The revised Enforcement Policy also includes a proposed revision to
a previous Federal Register notice, ``Base Civil Penalties for Loss,
Abandonment, or Improper Transfer or Disposal of Sources; Policy
Statement,'' published December 18, 2000 (65 FR 79139).
The Commission is aware that enforcement actions deliver regulatory
messages. Based on this tenet, the goals of this revision are to ensure
that the Enforcement Policy: (1) Continues to reflect the Commission's
focus on safety, e.g., the need for licensees to identify and correct
violations, to address root causes, and to be responsive to initial
opportunities to identify and prevent violations; (2) appropriately
addresses the various subject areas that the NRC regulates; and (3)
provides a framework that supports consistent implementation,
recognizing that each enforcement action is dependent on the specific
circumstances of the case.
The following draft Table of Contents is consistent with the
approach described above:
PREFACE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose of the Enforcement Policy
1.2 Applicability of the Enforcement Policy
1.3 Statutory Authority
1.4 Regulatory Framework
1.5 Adequate Protection Standard
2.0 NRC ENFORCEMENT PROCESS
2.1 Identification of Violations
2.2 Assessment of Violations
2.2.1 Factors Affecting Assessment of Violations
2.2.2 Severity Levels
2.2.3 Significance Determination Process
2.2.3.1 Exceptions to the Use of the SDP
2.3 Disposition of Violations
2.3.1 Minor Violations
2.3.2 More than Minor Violations
2.3.3 Reopening Closed Enforcement Actions
2.3.4 Enforcement Guidance Memorandum
2.3.5 Commission Notification and Consultation
2.4 Participation in the Enforcement Process
2.4.1 Predecisional Enforcement Conference
2.4.2 Regulatory Conference
2.4.3 Alternative Dispute Resolution
3.0 USE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
3.1 Violations Identified During Extended Shutdowns or Work
Stoppages
3.2 Violations Involving Old Design Issues
3.3 Violations Indentified Due to Previous Enforcement Actions
3.4 Violations Involving Certain Discrimination Issues
3.5 Violations Involving Special Circumstances
3.6 Use of Discretion in Determining the Amount of a Civil
Penalty
3.7 Exercise of Discretion to Issue Orders
3.8 Notices of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) for Reactor
Licensees
3.9 Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues
(10 CFR 50.48)
4.0 ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS
4.1 Circumstances When Enforcement Action Against an Individual
May Be Taken
4.2 NOVs and Orders to Individuals
4.2.1 Licensed Individuals
4.2.2 Non-Licensed Individuals
4.3 Civil Penalties to Individuals
4.4 Confirmatory Orders to Individuals
5.0 PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION REGARDING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
6.0 SUPPLEMENTS--VIOLATION EXAMPLES
6.1 Reactor Operations
6.2 Facility Construction
6.3 Information Security
6.4 Health Physics
6.5 Transportation
6.6 Materials Operations
6.7 Inaccurate and Incomplete Information and Reporting
6.8 Emergency Preparedness
6.9 Fuel Cycle Operations
6.10 Licensed Operator
6.11 Reactor and Fuel Facility Security
6.12 Discrimination
6.13 Materials Security
7.0 GLOSSARY OF TERMS
8.0 TABLE OF BASE CIVIL PENALTIES
III. Proposed Revisions to Table of Base Civil Penalties
Yucca Mountain High Level Waste Repository
Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1987 (NWPA) for
the purpose of establishing a comprehensive national program for the
safe, permanent disposal of high level waste (HLW). The NWPA directed
the Department of Energy (DOE) to study suitable sites for a deep,
underground repository. In 1987, Congress amended the NWPA and directed
the DOE to study only one site, Yucca Mountain, as a potential
repository.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended (ERA), and NWPA, as amended,
[[Page 53288]]
authorize the NRC to regulate the siting, development, construction,
and operation of the Yucca Mountain repository.
The NRC's authority to regulate the DOE's receipt and possession of
source, special nuclear, and byproduct material at Yucca Mountain has
been implemented through 10 CFR Part 63, Disposal of High-Level
Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain,
Nevada.
The NRC's enforcement authority is set forth in the AEA and the
ERA. This statutory authority is implemented through Subpart B of 10
CFR Part 2, which contains the procedures the NRC uses in exercising
its enforcement authority, primarily Notices of Violation (NOVs), Civil
Penalties, and Orders. Violations are subject to civil enforcement
action and may also be subject to criminal prosecution.
Regulatory requirements have varying degrees of safety, security,
or environmental significance. For that reason, the NRC imposes various
base civil penalties depending on the specific circumstances. The base
civil penalties for various reactor, fuel cycle, materials, and vendor
programs are set forth in this revised Enforcement Policy, Section 8,
Tables A and B.
The NRC uses a graded approach in assessing civil penalties based
on the severity level of the violation and the class of licensee,
vendor, or other person. Base civil penalties generally take into
account the significance of a violation as the primary consideration,
while the licensee's ability to pay is a secondary consideration. The
NRC reviews each proposed civil penalty on its own merits and, after
considering all relevant circumstances, may adjust the base civil
penalties in Table A for Severity Level I, II, and III violations as
reflected in Table B of the Enforcement Policy, i.e., 100 percent for
Severity Level I violations, 80% for Severity Level II violations, and
50 percent for Severity Level III violations. However, in no instance
would a civil penalty for any one violation exceed the current
statutory limit of $130,000 per day per violation.
The most viable enforcement option available to the NRC, in
addition to NOVs and orders, is the imposition of civil penalties.
Currently there are no provisions in Table A of the Enforcement Policy
that address DOE as a licensee. Therefore, the NRC is revising Table A
of the Policy to ensure that, if the need arises, the NRC has the
appropriate tools to take enforcement actions as prescribed in Subpart
J, Violations, of 10 CFR Part 63, during the application phase. DOE
submitted its construction license application for Yucca Mountain for
review on June 3, 2008. The NRC acknowledged receipt of the application
on June 10, 2008, at which time DOE became an NRC license applicant.
Based on the potential nuclear material inventory involved, i.e.,
at least 70 million metric tons of HLW, the corresponding safety
consequences that could arise at the site, specifically to occupational
employees, and the DOE's ability to pay, the staff recommends the
statutorily allowed maximum base civil penalty of $130,000 per day for
a Severity Level I violation. In determining the base civil penalty
that should be applied to the Yucca Mountain repository, the staff also
considered the fact that when 10 CFR Part 63 was developed, the
licensing criteria used in that part was comparable to the criteria
applied to reactors and spent fuel facilities. The staff also
recommends that this information be included in Table A under a generic
heading, i.e., ``Yucca Mountain High Level Waste Repository,'' to
address the possibility of any future engineered underground disposal
facilities used for the storage of HLW.
Because the DOE's activities during the construction application
would, most likely, lack direct safety consequences to the public
health and safety (i.e., waste will not have been transferred to the
site during the first phase), it is likely that many of the violations
during this phase could be either cited or non-cited Severity Level IV
violations. In addition, the staff expects that escalated enforcement
actions during the application review would seldom exceed a Severity
Level III. While the staff has the option to mitigate or escalate a
violation and/or monetary sanctions based on the circumstances
surrounding a violation, the staff believes that few, if any, of these
violations would escalate to a Severity Level I or II.
Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment Facilities
The current Enforcement Policy does not provide a base civil
penalty for enforcement actions at gas centrifuge uranium enrichment
facilities. For that reason, if a violation of NRC requirements were to
occur with a proposed civil penalty at this type of facility, the staff
would assess the civil penalty utilizing the agency's philosophy as
articulated in the Enforcement Policy, i.e., the civil penalty would be
based on the circumstances of the case, the type of licensee involved,
and the ability of the licensee to pay the civil penalty.
Currently, NRC staff is performing licensing reviews of two gas
centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities with enrichment levels of 5
weight percent uranium-235 (U235) in one case and 10 weight
percent U235 in the other. Therefore, it is appropriate to
provide enforcement guidance for this type of facility at this time.
In developing a base civil penalty for gas centrifuge uranium
enrichment facilities, NRC compared the radiological, chemical, and
security hazards with both the Gaseous Diffusion Plants (GDPs) and
Category III fuel fabricators and, through an overall comparison,
provide an appropriate base civil penalty.
To determine the appropriate base civil penalty for gas centrifuge
uranium enrichment facilities, the staff first compared the potential
impact of noncompliance on public health and safety and the common
defense and security with GDPs because both are enrichment facilities
utilizing the same kinds of materials and, in addition, both have
security implications associated with their operation. This comparison
indicates that the radiological and chemical hazards at gas centrifuge
uranium enrichment facilities are substantially less than these hazards
at GDPs based on the significantly lower quantities of liquid and
gaseous uranium hexafluoride (UF6) in the process systems
and the significantly lower potential for releases of large quantities
of UF6.
Gaseous diffusion cascades operate at pressures that are sub-
atmospheric to just above atmospheric pressure. In addition, the
current GDP utilizes feed, product withdrawal, and tails withdrawal
systems that handle large quantities of pressurized liquid
UF6. This results in the potential for releases of large
quantities of UF6. Since the GDP withdrawal stations involve
the handling and lifting of up to 14-ton cylinders of liquid
UF6, there is a significant potential for severe
consequences in the event that proper plant procedures are not
followed. GDPs have high criticality hazards due to the large size
(unsafe geometry) of cascade system piping and components, the large
UF6 inventories processed, and the potential for
accumulation of critical masses of UF6 within these system
piping and components. GDPs also handle large amounts of flammable
material such as lubricating oil and chemically hazardous material
other than UF6 such as chorine triflouride
(CIF3), fluorine (F2), and chorine
(CI2).
[[Page 53289]]
The radiological and chemical hazards at gas centrifuge uranium
enrichment facilities are, by comparison to the GDPs, substantially
reduced. Individual centrifuges and cascades contain much smaller
quantities of gaseous UF6. Although UF6 is
liquefied in the sampling and transfer systems, the cylinders
containing liquid UF6 are not moved. Centrifuge enrichment
cascades operate at near-vacuum conditions, minimizing the potential
for UF6 releases. These plant designs substantially reduce
the radiological and chemical hazards associated with releases of
radioactive and hazardous chemicals in comparison to gaseous diffusion
plants. Because of the small quantities of UF6 in the
cascades, a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility, limiting its
enrichments to less than 20 percent of U235 (special nuclear
material of low strategic significance, therefore, a Category III fuel
fabricator), will also have substantially reduced criticality hazards
relative to a GDP.
The staff also considered the security implications associated with
the operation of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities as
compared to the operation of GDPs and to Category III fuel fabricators.
That comparison indicates that the security measures necessary to
handle information at a gas centrifuge facility is more similar to the
GDPs as both types of facilities handle classified information up to
Secret Restricted Data and utilize classified components. Both types of
facilities are also required to have comparable materials control and
accounting programs and physical security programs, and both types of
facilities are expected to have programs for protection against
potential terrorist activities.
However, as the following comparison indicates, the overall
radiological, criticality, and chemical security implications for gas
centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities are more comparable to that of
Category III fuel fabricators. First, both gas centrifuge uranium
enrichment plants and Category III fuel fabricators have Category III
Special Nuclear Material, that is, these facilities are limited to
enrichments of less than 20 percent of U235 (special nuclear
material of low strategic significance). In addition, the radiological
and chemical risks of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities are
more similar to, and in fact even lower than, Category III fuel
fabricators due to the fact that fuel fabricators operate with the
greater quantities of licensed material in process components and at
higher pressures than gas centrifuge plants. Therefore, the necessary
physical protection requirements (based on the category of facility)
for a gas centrifuge facility are similar to those required for
Category III fuel fabricators.
The comparison of the security implications at gas centrifuge
uranium enrichment and Category III fuel fabrication facilities
indicates that:
1. Security of classified information and components: The security
of classified information and components at gas centrifuge facilities
will require higher levels of protection than Category III fuel
fabricators because classified information and components are not used
at Category III fuel fabricators. However, Category III fuel
fabricators have and are required to yprotect Safeguards Information.
2. Prevention of unauthorized production or diversion of special
nuclear material: The prevention of unauthorized production or
diversion of special nuclear material would require gas centrifuge
enrichment facilities to have materials accounting and control programs
similar to those at the GDPs or Category I fuel fabrication facilities.
Category III fuel fabricators also have materials accounting and
control programs, although the implications of unauthorized production
and diversion of special nuclear material would be less significant
than a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant.
3. Protection of special nuclear material: Due to the possession of
special nuclear material of low strategic significance at both types of
facilities, gas centrifuge enrichment facility physical protection
requirements for special nuclear material and protection requirements
against terrorists are similar to Category III fuel fabricators.
4. Protection against potential terrorist activities: Due to the
possession of special nuclear material of low strategic significance at
both types of facilities, gas centrifuge enrichment facility physical
protection requirements against terrorists are expected to be similar
to Category III fuel fabricators.
In conclusion, the comparison of the radiological, criticality, and
chemical risks of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities to GDPs
and Category III fuel fabricators indicates that these risks are lower
than the same risks at GDPs and are lower than the risks at Category
III fuel fabricators. In addition, two of the four security risk areas
at gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities are more comparable to
Category III fuel fabricators. Finally, the physical protection and
terrorist security risks are substantially less significant for gas
centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities than at GDPs, when examined in
the context of the radiological and chemical risks at gas centrifuge
uranium enrichment facilities. Therefore, after considering both safety
and security at gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities in terms
of their nuclear material inventories and potential for consequences to
the public and workers, the staff has concluded that gas centrifuge
uranium enrichment facilities are more similar to Category III fuel
fabricators than to GDPs. For that reason the staff believes that the
base civil penalty for Severity Level I violations at gas centrifuge
uranium enrichment facilities in Table A should be established at
$32,500, the amount already established for Category III fuel
fabricators.
The Enforcement Policy is also being modified to clarify that the
fuel fabricators in ``c'' of Table A refer to Category III fuel
fabricators.
Uranium Conversion Facilities
The staff proposes to raise the base penalty for enforcement
activities associated with uranium conversion facilities to a base
civil penalty of $32,500 from the current base civil penalty of
$13,000.
Currently, the only operating conversion plant in the United States
is the Honeywell facility located in Metropolis, IL. Honeywell
chemically processes the uranium source materials from triuranium
octoxide (U3O8) to UF6 prior to
shipping the product to enrichment plants. The three main bulk
chemicals used at Honeywell are ammonia (NH3, the source of
hydrogen), anhydrous hydrofluoric acid (HF), and flourine
(F2). Each is a highly hazardous chemical. Release of bulk
quantities of UF6, NH3, HF, or F2
could have off-site consequences due the hazardous nature of the
chemicals. NH3, HF, and F2 are regulated under
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Process Safety
Management Rule, 19 CFR 1910.119. The NRC only regulates those
chemicals when they come in contact with licensed material, evolve from
licensed material, as in HF from the UF6/water reaction, or
adversely impact the safe handling of licensed material.
Uranium conversion facilities such as Honeywell are licensed under
the requirements of 10 CFR Part 40, Domestic Licensing of Source
Material. Uranium source material is shipped from uranium mills as
``yellow cake'' in plastic-lined drums. In addition to
U3O8, yellowcake contains contaminants, including
radioactive decay daughter products and various rare earth and other
metals. The
[[Page 53290]]
yellowcake contains natural uranium, which has only 0.711 percent
(U235). Hence, a criticality accident is not possible at a
conversion facility. The greatest radiation exposure rates come from
processes that concentrate the radioactive decay daughter products in
waste streams. Soluble forms of uranium present the greatest health
risk from source material at conversion facilities. The health risk is
due to the toxic nature of uranium, which is similar to other heavy
metals. The radioactive risk is small.
Specifically, the chemical and radiological hazards associated with
uranium conversion facilities are as follows:
Chemical Hazards--Uranium is handled in many different chemical
forms in UF6 conversion plants, but UF6 is the
only chemical form of uranium that can be readily dispersed off-site.
UF6 will react with water to form HF and uranium
difluorodioxo (UO2F2). Because airborne moisture
is generally available, the reaction can be expected to occur if
UF6 is released to the atmosphere. Both the HF and the
UO2F2 produced at a uranium conversion plant are
hazardous chemicals. HF is a corrosive acid vapor that can severely
harm the lungs and exposed portions of the body.
UO2F2, formed as particulate material, produces
radioactive and chemical effects when taken into the body, and its
chemical effect is the most important because much of the uranium is
present in soluble form. UF6 in the liquid form is the most
hazardous.
The Honeywell facility produces UF6 by fluorination of
UF4. The UF6, which is produced in a gaseous state, is
collected in cold traps, where it is solidified by refrigerant cooling.
Subsequent heating of the cold traps liquefies the UF6 for
transfer to cylinders, where the UF6 cools to ambient
temperature and again solidifies. The cold traps and the cylinders
represent the largest accumulation of heated UF6 and
therefore pose the greatest risk of a significant release of
UF6. The filled cylinders represent the greater risk because
of their temporary use in the process, the large numbers of individual
cylinders utilized, their typically larger inventories of
UF6, and their routine movement within the facilities before
solidification. While the filled cylinders are considered to be the
greater risk, these risks are also applicable to filled cold traps.
Radiological Hazards--Chemical conversion processes tend to
concentrate uranium decay products in the waste streams. Alpha
particles resulting from the primary disintegration of uranium present
no external radiation problem because they do not penetrate the skin.
However, the uranium decay products include isotopes that emit mildly
penetrating beta rays and highly penetrating gamma rays. Beta radiation
levels as high as 200 mrad/hr may be found at the surface of
UF6. When UF6 is vaporized from a cylinder, the
decay products usually remain behind. Thus, the internal surface of an
empty cylinder may have beta radiation levels up to several rad/hr.
Similarly, the gamma radiation from an empty cylinder will be much
higher than from a filled cylinder and may range up to 200 mrad/hr.
The chemical characteristics of these contaminants will cause
significant exposure levels of beta and gamma radiation from the
uranium decay product activity in certain sections of the process. The
risk of radiation exposure increases during maintenance of process
equipment, transfer of product, and handling of UF6
cylinders.
In raising the base civil penalty for uranium conversion
facilities, the staff has analyzed the associated radiological,
chemical, and security hazards with that of Gaseous Diffusion Plants
(GDPs), Category III fuel fabricators, and test reactors and industrial
radiographers. Currently, uranium conversion facilities are in the same
base civil penalty category as test reactors and industrial
radiographers with the base penalty amount of $13,000.
To determine the appropriate base civil penalty for uranium
conversion facilities, the staff first compared the potential impact of
noncompliance on public health and safety and the common defense and
security with Gaseous Diffusion Plants (GDPs). Gaseous diffusion
cascades operate at pressures that are sub-atmospheric to just above
atmospheric pressure. In addition, the current GDP utilizes feed,
product withdrawal, and tails withdrawal systems that handle large
quantities of pressurized liquid UF6. This results in the
potential for releases of large quantities of UF6. Since the
GDP withdrawal stations involve the handling and lifting of up to 14-
ton cylinders of liquid UF6, there is a significant
potential for severe consequences in the event that proper plant
procedures are not followed. GDPs have high criticality hazards due to
the large size (unsafe geometry) of cascade system piping and
components, the large UF6 inventories processed, and the
potential for accumulation of critical masses of UF6 within
these system piping and components. GDPs also handle large amounts of
flammable material such as lubricating oil and chemically hazardous
material other than UF6 such as CIF3,
F2, and CI2.
The radiological and chemical hazards at uranium conversion
facilities are similar in comparison to the GDPs. At a uranium
conversion facility such as Honeywell, all UF6 filled
cylinders when initially filled must be allowed to cool for 5 days to
ensure that all UF6 has solidified. The UF6
solidifies and volume drops from about 95 percent to about 60 percent
full. Only ``solid'' cylinders are allowed to be shipped off-site.
UF6 is in solid form under ambient temperature and pressure
conditions. Any cylinder breach with UF6 in the solid form
will have a limited release. Uranium conversion facilities are designed
to process natural uranium, thus, there is no criticality concerns like
there are at GDPs. However, the only major risk factor that a
conversion facility does not have that is present at a GDP is the
criticality risk.
The staff also considered the security implications associated with
the operation of uranium conversion facilities as compared to the
operation of GDPs and to Category III fuel fabricators. That comparison
indicates that the security measures necessary at a uranium conversion
facility are similar to that of a Category III fuel fabricators and
GDPs. However, because of the large number of potential chemical
hazards and certain radiological hazards, protection against potential
terrorist activities is required to protect worker and public health
and safety.
In comparison, the overall radiological and chemical hazards
implications for uranium conversion facilities are much more
significant than those of test reactors and industrial radiographer,
but just somewhat less than that of GDPs. As delineated in the NRC
Enforcement Policy, operations involving greater nuclear material
inventories and greater potential consequences to the public and
licensee employees receive higher civil penalties. For the reasons
stated above the staff believes that the base civil penalty for
violations at uranium conversion facilities in Table A should be
established at $32,500, the same amount established for Category III
fuel fabricators.
IV. Deletion of Interim Enforcement Policies
The following interim enforcement policies located in the current
Enforcement Policy have either been deleted from the revised Policy,
for the reasons stated below, or relocated into the revised Enforcement
Policy.
[[Page 53291]]
Interim Enforcement Policy for Generally Licensed Devices Containing
Byproduct Material (10 CFR 31.5)
This interim policy addressed violations that persons licensed
pursuant to 10 CFR 31.5 discovered and reported before, as well as
during, the initial cycle of a notice and response program related to
the revision of 10 CFR 31.5. This interim policy was expected to remain
in effect through completion of one cycle of the licensee notice and
response program. Since one cycle is complete, this interim policy is
no longer in effect.
Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain
Fitness-for-Duty Issues (10 CFR Part 26)
10 CFR Part 26, Fitness for Duty Programs, has been amended. The
final rule became effective on April 30, 2008 (73 FR 16966). The
amended rule addressed the issues covered by the interim enforcement
discretion policy. Therefore, this interim policy has been deleted from
the revised Enforcement Policy.
Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding the Use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution
This interim policy addressed the use of a pilot program for
testing the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in the
enforcement program. On May 5, 2006, in SECY-06-0102, ``Evaluation of
the Pilot Program on the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the
Allegation and Enforcement Program'', the staff provided the Commission
with the results of the evaluation of the ADR pilot program. The Office
of Enforcement concluded that the program was successful and the staff
intends to continue using the ADR program for discrimination and other
wrongdoing cases. The ADR program has been incorporated into the
revised Enforcement Policy.
Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain
Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48)
This interim policy was moved in its entirety into section 3.9 of
the revised Enforcement Policy.
V. Procedural Requirements
Paperwork Reduction Act
This policy statement does not contain new or amended information
collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) Existing requirements were approved by the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), approval number 3150-0136.
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a request for information or an information collection
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid
OMB control number.
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has determined that this action is not a
''major'' rule and has verified this determination with the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget.
Dated at Rockville, MD, this 9th day of September 2008.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Cynthia A. Carpenter,
Director, Office of Enforcement.
[FR Doc. E8-21433 Filed 9-12-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P