

including Appendix A, dated September 15, 2005, except as required by paragraph (j) of this AD. Repeat the test at intervals not to exceed 100 flight hours. Accomplishing the initial functional test terminates the requirements of paragraph (f) of this AD and the repetitive functional checks of the PFS pilot input lever, Task R27-31-A024-01, as specified in the AWL section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness of CL-600-2B19 Canadair Regional Jet Maintenance Requirements Manual.

(h) If any lever is found to be disconnected during any functional test required by paragraph (g) of this AD, do the actions specified in paragraphs (h)(1) and (h)(2) of this AD in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier Alert Service Bulletin A601R-27-144, Revision A, dated February 14, 2006, including Appendix A, dated September 15, 2005, except as required by paragraph (j) of this AD.

(1) Before further flight, replace the defective PFS with a serviceable PFS in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of the alert service bulletin; and

(2) Within 30 days after removing the defective PFS, submit a test report to the manufacturer in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of the alert service bulletin. Under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements contained in this AD and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056.

#### Previously Accomplished Actions

(i) Actions done before March 27, 2006, in accordance with Bombardier Alert Service Bulletin A601R-27-144, including Appendix A, dated September 15, 2005, are acceptable for compliance with the requirements of paragraph (g) of this AD.

#### New Requirements of This AD

##### New Service Bulletin for Functional Tests

(j) As of the effective date of this AD, Bombardier Alert Service Bulletin A601R-27-144, Revision B, dated December 20, 2006, including Appendix A, Revision A, dated December 20, 2006, must be used for the actions required by paragraphs (g) and (h) of this AD.

##### Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(k)(1) The Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

#### Related Information

(l) Canadian airworthiness directive CF-2005-41, dated December 22, 2005, also addresses the subject of this AD.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 14, 2008.

**Stephen P. Boyd,**

*Assistant Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. E8-1167 Filed 1-23-08; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

**[Docket No. FAA-2008-0055; Directorate Identifier 2007-CE-099-AD]**

**RIN 2120-AA64**

#### **Airworthiness Directives; Pacific Aerospace Limited Models FU24-954 and FU24A-954 Airplanes**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

This AD is prompted by reports of loosening rivets securing the threaded inserts in the ends of the aileron control pushrods P/N 08-24015-1. Aileron push-pull rods P/N 08-24015-1 have been installed on aircraft embodying PAC/FU/0340.

The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by February 25, 2008.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- *Federal eRulemaking Portal:* Go to <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
- *Fax:* (202) 493-2251.
- *Mail:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

- *Hand Delivery:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,

Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

#### Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov>; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Karl Schletzbaum, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone: (816) 329-4146; fax: (816) 329-4090.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

##### Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include "Docket No. FAA-2008-0055; Directorate Identifier 2007-CE-099-AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD because of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://www.regulations.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

#### Discussion

The Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand (CAA), which is the aviation authority for New Zealand, has issued DCA/FU24/177, dated November 28, 2007, to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

This AD is prompted by reports of loosening rivets securing the threaded inserts in the ends of the aileron control pushrods P/N 08-24015-1. Aileron push-pull rods P/N 08-24015-1 have been installed on aircraft embodying PAC/FU/0340.

The MCAI requires an initial and repetitive inspection of the aileron and elevator control push-rods and requires corrective action as necessary.

You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

### Relevant Service Information

Pacific Aerospace Limited has issued PACSB/FU/091, Issue 2, dated November 12, 2007. The actions described in this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

### FAA's Determination and Requirements of the Proposed AD

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, they have notified us of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all information and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

### Differences Between This Proposed AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.

We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are highlighted in a NOTE within the proposed AD.

### Costs of Compliance

Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD would affect about 2 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it would take about 1 work-hour per product to comply with the basic requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is \$80 per work-hour.

Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to be \$160, or \$80 per product.

In addition, we estimate that any necessary follow-on actions would take about 5 work-hours and require parts costing \$100, for a cost of \$500 per product. We have no way of determining the number of products that may need these actions.

### Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

### Regulatory Findings

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:

1. Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

### The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

### PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

### § 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

**Pacific Aerospace Limited:** Docket No. FAA-2008-0055; Directorate Identifier 2007-CE-099-AD.

### Comments Due Date

(a) We must receive comments by February 25, 2008.

### Affected ADs

(b) None.

### Applicability

(c) This AD applies to models FU24-954 and FU24A-954 airplanes, all serial numbers, certificated in any category.

### Subject

(d) Air Transport Association of America (ATA) Code 27: Flight Controls.

### Reason

(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states:

This AD is prompted by reports of loosening rivets securing the threaded inserts in the ends of the aileron control pushrods P/N 08-24015-1. Aileron push-pull rods P/N 08-24015-1 have been installed on aircraft embodying PAC/FU/0340.

The MCAI requires an initial and repetitive inspection of the aileron and elevator control push-rods and requires corrective action as necessary.

### Actions and Compliance

(f) Unless already done, do the following actions:

(1) Within the next 50 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date of this AD, inspect the pushrod ends on the aileron and elevator control pushrods part number (P/N) 08-24015-1 following Pacific Aerospace Limited Service Bulletin No. PACSB/FU/091, Issue 2, dated November 12, 2007. Repetitively inspect thereafter at intervals not to exceed 150 hours TIS.

(2) Before further flight after any inspection where any rivets are found on aileron and elevator control pushrods P/N 08-24015-1 that have detectable play between the pushrod and the insert or evidence of working rivets, replace the rivets following Pacific Aerospace Limited Service Bulletin No. PACSB/FU/091, Issue 2, dated November 12, 2007.

### FAA AD Differences

**Note:** This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information as follows: No differences.

### Other FAA AD Provisions

(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) *Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs):* The Manager, Standards Office, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Karl Schletzbaum, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri

64106; telephone: (816) 329-4146; fax: (816) 329-4090. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(2) *Airworthy Product*: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(3) *Reporting Requirements*: For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et. seq.), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056.

#### Related Information

(h) Refer to MCAI Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand (CAA), which is the aviation authority for New Zealand, DCA/FU24/177, dated November 28, 2007; and Pacific Aerospace Limited Service Bulletin No. PACSB/FU/091, Issue 2, dated November 12, 2007, for related information.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on January 16, 2008.

**James E. Jackson,**

*Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. E8-1137 Filed 1-23-08; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2008-0046; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-270-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

#### **Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 Series Airplanes Equipped With Certain Northrop Grumman (Formerly Litton) Air Data Inertial Reference Units**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** The FAA proposes to supersede an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Airbus Model A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes equipped with certain Litton air data inertial reference units (ADIRUs). The existing AD currently requires modifying the shelf (floor panel) above ADIRU 3, modifying the

polycarbonate guard that covers the ADIRUs for certain airplanes, and modifying the ladder located in the avionics compartment for certain airplanes. This proposed AD would require those modifications on additional airplanes. This proposed AD would also require replacing all three ADIRUs with improved ADIRUs. This proposed AD also adds Model A318 series airplanes to the applicability. This proposed AD results from reports that "NAV IR FAULT" messages have occurred during takeoff due to failure of an ADIRU and subsequent analysis showing that the shelf modification has not sufficiently addressed failure of an ADIRU. We are proposing this AD to prevent failure of an ADIRU during flight, which could result in loss of one source of critical attitude and airspeed data and reduce the ability of the flightcrew to control the airplane.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by February 25, 2008.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- *Federal eRulemaking Portal*: Go to <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
- *Fax*: 202-493-2251.
- *Mail*: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
- *Hand Delivery*: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

For service information identified in this AD, contact Airbus, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France.

#### Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov>; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Tim Dulin, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,

Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-2141; fax (425) 227-1149.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

##### Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include "Docket No. FAA-2008-0046; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-270-AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD because of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://www.regulations.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

##### Discussion

On December 12, 2003, we issued AD 2003-26-03, amendment 39-13399 (68 FR 74172, December 23, 2003), for certain Airbus Model A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes equipped with certain Litton air data inertial reference units (ADIRUs). That AD requires modifying the shelf (floor panel) above ADIRU 3, and, for certain airplanes, modifying the polycarbonate guard that covers the ADIRUs, and the ladder located in the avionics compartment, as applicable. That AD resulted from reports that "NAV IR FAULT" messages have occurred during takeoff due to failure of ADIRU 3 on several Model A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. We issued that AD to prevent failure of ADIRU 3 during flight, which could result in loss of one source of critical attitude and airspeed data and reduce the ability of the flightcrew to control the airplane.

##### Actions Since Existing AD Was Issued

Since we issued AD 2003-26-03, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, notified us that further analysis has shown that modifying the ADIRU shelf has not sufficiently addressed the unsafe condition. The clearance between the shelf and ADIRUs is still too small. Consequently, vibration during takeoff could cause the shelf to hit the top of an ADIRU, leading to loss of parameters (attitude, vertical speed, ground speed, etc.). The EASA has determined that, in addition to