Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons

Active Nonproliferation Diplomacy

The U.S. must work with friends and allies to dissuade supplier states from cooperating with proliferant states, and induce proliferant states to end their chemical and biological weapons (CBW) programs. The U.S. will hold countries responsible for complying with their commitments, and build coalitions to support its efforts.

• The U.S. routinely cooperates with other governments in identifying and stopping shipments of equipment, materials, and technology destined for CBW programs. There have been many such successful interdictions, including some in 2003.
  
  
• Such interdiction efforts are overseen by the Bureau of Nonproliferation’s Office of Chemical, Biological and Missile Nonproliferation.
  
  
• In 2003, the U.S. worked with the UK to obtain pledges from Libya to:
  
  
  • Eliminate all elements of its chemical weapons programs;
  • Eliminate all chemical weapons stocks and munitions and accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention;
  • Allow immediate inspections and monitoring to verify all of these actions.
    
    
• Further such cooperation will result from the President’s Proliferation Security Initiative.

Multilateral Regimes

The U.S. must work towards the effective functioning of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which implements and verifies compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

The U.S. will identify and promote constructive and realistic measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and thereby to help meet the biological weapons threat.

The U.S. will also work to strengthen the Australia Group (AG) chemical and biological export control regime.

The BWC and CWC are overseen by State’s Bureau of Arms Control, while the Bureau of Nonproliferation’s Office of Chemical, Biological and Missile Nonproliferation oversees implementation of the AG.

• In 2002, the U.S. worked with the CWC States Parties to overhaul the OPCW leadership, paving the way for better operations and management.
  
  
• In 2002, the Australia Group tightened the control parameters on chemical equipment to prevent terrorist acquisition, and added 8 toxins to its biological control lists.
  
  
• In 2002, the Australia Group made it a regime requirement for all members to have “catch-all” export controls (which cover items not on the AG lists, when destined for CBW programs) and controls on AG technology in “intangible” form (e.g., when transmitted via phone, fax, or e-mail).
  
  
• In 2003, the Australia Group undertook new initiatives related to the Asia-Pacific region, and improved transparency of members’ implementation of export controls.
  
  
• In 2003, the Australia Group added 14 human and two animal pathogens to its biological control lists.

Threat Reduction Programs

The United States continues to pursue a wide range of programs designed to address the proliferation threat stemming from the large quantities of Soviet-legacy WMD, and from the presence of WMD-related materials and expertise worldwide. In the realm of chemical and biological weapons, these include:

• Through the Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR, or "Nunn-Lugar") program, the U.S. is supporting the construction of a nerve agent destruction facility located in Shchuch’ye, Russia, along with demilitarizing former Russian chemical weapons production facilities.
  
  
• In 2003, the U.S. used the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) to destroy a former chemical weapons production facility in one Central European state and chemical agent production equipment in another. It also began work on a project to destroy a chemical agent stockpile in a third state.
  
  
• The growing global threat to U.S. national security from available WMD-relevant expertise prompted Congress to broaden to countries beyond the Former Soviet Union the State Department's legislative authorities for WMD redirection efforts. The new program name, "Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Expertise (NWMDE)," encompasses the programs formerly referred to as "Science Centers/Bio Redirection" and reflects this broader authority.

Export Controls

The United States seeks to update and strengthen its own export control system in order to inhibit the export of sensitive materials to countries of concern, proliferators, and terrorists while also removing unnecessary barriers in the global marketplace. The United States also works to harmonize multilateral controls and domestic export policy to the greatest possible extent, while streamlining the implementation of export controls and strengthening and updating existing legislation and authorities. In addition to strengthening Australia Group controls as noted above, the State Department, through the Bureau of Nonproliferation’s Office of Export Control Cooperation, administers the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program that assists other countries in enacting, implementing, and enforcing export controls -- including those relevant to CBW.

Sanctions

Nonproliferation standards are too often ignored and flagrantly violated by those who view WMD as a means of enhancing their security and international influence, or making commercial profit, many of whom are resistant to conventional diplomacy. While the U.S. pursues the diplomatic track whenever possible, the U.S. and its allies must be willing to employ more robust techniques, such as economic sanctions, as well as interdiction and seizure, or other means. The Bureau of Nonproliferation’s Office of Chemical, Biological and Missile Nonproliferation oversees implementation of U.S. CBW sanctions authorities.

CBW sanctions determinations were made in 2003 against:

• NEC Engineers Private, Ltd. (an Indian company originally based in India, but also operating in the Middle East and Eurasia); Hans Raj Shiv (an Indian citizen previously residing in India and believed to be in the Middle East); and Mohammed Al-Khatib (Jordanian national).

Iran Nonproliferation Act sanctions determinations related to CBW were made in 2003 against:

• Taian Foreign General Trade Corporation (China); Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant (China); and Liyang Yunlong Chemical Equipment Group Company (China)

Iran-Iraq Act Non-Proliferation Act sanctions determinations related to CBW were made in 2003 against:

• Protech Consultants Private, Ltd. (India); and Mohammed Al-Khatib (Jordanian national).