Summary

The Milstar system is intended to provide the President, the Secretary of Defense, and military commanders with a highly protected and survivable means of communications that would be operable worldwide and throughout all levels of military conflict. However, several limitations are associated with the Milstar system's capabilities to support strategic missions. First, operational testing showed that military commanders could not communicate by voice in a timely and intelligible manner when using the low data rate capabilities. Second, operational testing of the missile warning teletype network was planned, but not done, to verify that accurate and timely ballistic missile alert messages could be sent from the North American Aerospace Defense Command to other strategic command centers. Third, operational testing revealed a Milstar system endurance issue, associated with the nuclear bomber force, that must be resolved because of the requirement for continuous communications capabilities if the bomber force needed to be recalled or redirected. Fourth, testing showed that the configuration of peripheral equipment and its accompanying software have not been effectively controlled or fully certified to ensure communications interoperability with the Milstar system. The Defense Department (DOD) has identified corrective measures for these limitations, but final resolutions depend on approval of requirements, verification through testing, a certification process, or obtaining necessary funds. Regarding tactical missions, the Air Force has encountered schedule delays related to software development for a critical Milstar component that could adversely affect Milstar II's timely support to tactical forces. DOD has not provided assurance that the continuity of protected medium data rate satellite communications capabilities will be maintained for tactical forces after the four Milstar II satellites are launched.

GAO noted that: (1) there are several limitations associated with the Milstar system's capabilities to support strategic missions; (2) although the Milstar I system has been deployed for over 2 years, a May 1998 draft operational test report revealed that system support could be limited in some critical strategic mission areas; (3) operational testing showed that military commanders could not communicate by voice in a timely and intelligible manner, when using the low data rate capabilities; (4) this limitation was attributable to inherent characteristics of Milstar's low data rate technology and associated peripheral equipment; (5) operational testing of the missile warning teletype network was planned, but not performed, to verify that accurate and timely ballistic missile alert messages could be transmitted from North American Aerospace Defense Command to other strategic command centers; (6) a subsequent Air Force test of this teletype network determined that a required redundancy check for data accuracy could not be performed without software modifications; (7) operational testing revealed a Milstar system endurance issue, associated with the nuclear bomber force, that must be resolved because of the requirement for continuous communication capabilities if the bomber force needed to be recalled or redirected; (8) testing showed that the configuration of peripheral equipment and its accompanying software has not been effectively controlled or fully certified to ensure communications interoperability with the Milstar system; (9) DOD has identified corrective actions for the limitations in these four areas; (10) final resolutions are dependent on approval of requirements, verification through testing, a certification process, or obtaining necessary funds; (11) DOD has not provided assurance that the continuity of protected medium data rate satellite communication capabilities will be maintained for tactical forces after the four Milstar II satellites are launched; (12) the satellite constellation's communication capabilities are predicted to degrade below a minimally acceptable level in fiscal year (FY) 2003, before the advanced satellite system is expected to be available in FY 2006; (13) the deployment of Milstar II tactical terminals is expected to be completed by 2003, and tactical forces will have become dependent on the Milstar II system; (14) this situation could result in users not having the communications capacity they require to execute their missions; and (15) DOD has not fully assessed the associated operational risks to tactical forces.