Summary

Because of personnel and workload reductions, the Army's depots and arsenals, which reported fiscal year 1998 employment at about 13,600 and revenues of about $1,620 million, have faced greater uncertainty about workloads, funding, and staffing levels. This report examines workforce issues at Army depots and manufacturing arsenals, focusing on the depot in Corpus Christi, Texas. GAO discusses (1) the Army's basis for personnel reductions planned at its depots during fiscal years 1998-99; (2) the Army's progress in developing an automated system for making maintenance depot staffing decisions on the basis of workload estimates; (3) factors that may affect the Army's ability to improve the cost-effectiveness of its maintenance depot's programs and operations; and (4) workload trends, staffing, and productivity issues at the Army's manufacturing arsenals.

GAO noted that: (1) the Army did not have a sound basis for identifying the number of positions to be eliminated from the Corpus Christi Depot; (2) this was particularly the case in determining the number of direct labor personnel needed to support depot workload requirements; (3) Army efforts to develop an automated workload and performance system for use in its depots have proceeded to the point that required certification to Congress of the system's operational capability is expected soon; (4) however, system improvements that are under way would enhance the system's capabilities for determining indirect and overhead personnel requirements in Army depots; (5) other issues and factors affecting the Army's basis for workload forecasting or the cost-effectiveness of its depot maintenance programs and activities are: (a) an increased reliance on the use of regional repair activities and contractors for work that otherwise might be done in maintenance depots; (b) declining productivity; (c) difficulties in effectively using depot personnel; and (d) nonavailability of repair parts; (6) use of the arsenals has declined significantly over the years as the private sector has assumed an increasingly larger share of their work; (7) according to Army officials, as of mid-1998, the Army's two weapons manufacturing arsenals used less than 24 percent of their industrial capacity, compared to more than 80 percent 10 years ago; and (8) the Army's depots and arsenals face multiple challenges and uncertainties, and the Army has inadequate long-range plans to guide its actions regarding its industrial infrastructure.