

Sixth District are required by the statutory and regulatory definitions of "check-processing region." Because there is no substantive change on which to seek public input and because delaying the amendments may impede affected banks' ability to comply with Regulation CC, the Board has determined that the § 553(b) notice and comment procedures are unnecessary.

Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

Pursuant to section 605(b) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the Board certifies that the final rule will not have a significantly adverse economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. These amendments are technical, and the routing number changes are required by law. Moreover, these amendments apply to all banks regardless of their size. Many small banks generally provide next-day availability for all checks and will not be affected by this amendment. For the subset of small banks that does distinguish between checks subject to next-day availability and those subject to longer holds, the final rule should necessitate only minimal programming changes. Some of these affected banks might also have to modify their funds availability disclosures and notify both new and existing customers of the modified funds availability schedules.

Paperwork Reduction Act

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3506; 5 CFR part 1320 Appendix A.1), the Board has reviewed the final rule under authority delegated to the Board by the Office of Management and Budget. This technical amendment to appendix A of Regulation CC will delete the reference to the New Orleans branch office of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and reassign the routing symbols listed under that office to the head office of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. The depository institutions that are located in the affected check processing regions and that include the routing numbers in their disclosure statements would be required to notify customers of the resulting change in availability under § 229.18(e). However, all paperwork collection procedures associated with Regulation CC already are in place, and the Board accordingly anticipates that no additional burden will be imposed as a result of this rulemaking. The Board is also correcting typographical errors in the routing symbol list under the Helena branch office of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota. The Board anticipates that

these corrections will not impose any burden.

List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 229

Banks, Banking, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Authority and Issuance

■ For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Board is amending 12 CFR part 229 to read as follows:

PART 229—AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS AND COLLECTION OF CHECKS (REGULATION CC)

■ 1. The authority citation for part 229 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 12 U.S.C. 4001–4010, 12 U.S.C. 5001–5018.

■ 2. The Sixth and Ninth Federal Reserve District routing symbol lists in appendix A are revised to read as follows:

Appendix A to Part 229—Routing Number Guide to Next-Day Availability Checks and Local Checks

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Sixth Federal Reserve District

[Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta]

Head Office

0610	2610
0611	2611
0612	2612
0613	2613
0620	2620
0621	2621
0622	2622
0650	2650
0651	2651
0652	2652
0653	2653
0654	2654
0655	2655

Jacksonville Branch

0630	2630
0631	2631
0632	2632
0660	2660
0670	2670

Nashville Branch

0640	2640
0641	2641
0642	2642

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Ninth Federal Reserve District

[Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis]

Head Office

0910	2910
0911	2911
0912	2912
0913	2913
0914	2914
0915	2915
0918	2918

0919	2919
0960	2960

Helena Branch

0920	2920
0921	2921
0929	2929

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By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, acting through the Secretary of the Board under delegated authority, December 13, 2005.

Jennifer J. Johnson,

Secretary of the Board.

[FR Doc. E5–7462 Filed 12–16–05; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 23

[Docket No. CE236, Special Condition 23–176–SC]

Special Conditions; Envoy Aerospace; EFIS on the Raytheon Model B200, B200C, 300, B300, and B300C; Protection of Systems for High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.

SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued to Envoy Aerospace, 5027 Switch Grass Lane, Naperville, Illinois 60564–5368, for a Supplemental Type Certificate for the Raytheon B200, B200C, 300, B300, and B300C models. These models will have novel and unusual design features when compared to the state of technology envisaged in the applicable airworthiness standards. These novel and unusual design features include the installation of an electronic flight instrument system (EFIS) and a navigation display. The EFIS consists of the Universal Avionics, Inc. EFI–890R system for which the applicable regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate airworthiness standards for the protection of these systems from the effects of high intensity radiated fields (HIRF). The installation includes three EFI–890R Flat Panel Displays (two Primary Flight Displays Pilot/Copilot and one Navigational Display), and supporting equipment. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to the airworthiness standards applicable to these airplanes.

DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is December 5, 2005. Comments must be received on or before January 18, 2006.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed in duplicate to: Federal Aviation Administration, Regional Counsel, ACE-7, Attention: Rules Docket Clerk, Docket No. CE236, Room 506, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. All comments must be marked: Docket No. CE236. Comments may be inspected in the Rules Docket weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wes Ryan, Aerospace Engineer, Standards Office (ACE-110), Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone (816) 329-4127.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA has determined that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are impracticable because these procedures would significantly delay issuance of the design approval and thus delivery of the affected aircraft. In addition, the substance of these special conditions has been subject to the public comment process in several prior instances with no substantive comments received. The FAA, therefore, finds that good cause exists for making these special conditions effective upon issuance.

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to submit such written data, views, or arguments, as they may desire. Communications should identify the regulatory docket or notice number and be submitted in duplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments will be considered by the Administrator. The special conditions may be changed in light of the comments received. All comments received will be available in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons, both before and after the closing date for comments. A report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this rulemaking will be filed in the docket. Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must include a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket No. CE236." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Background

Envoy Aerospace made application to the FAA for a new Supplemental Type Certificate for several Raytheon King Air Models. The Raytheon Model B200, B200C, 300, B300, and B300C are currently approved under TC No. A24CE. The proposed modification incorporates a novel or unusual design features, such as a digital Primary Flight Display, that may be vulnerable to HIRF external to the airplane.

Type Certification Basis

Under the provisions of 14 CFR part 21, § 21.101, Envoy Aerospace must show that the modified aircraft meet the original certification basis for the airplane, as listed on Type Data Sheet A24CE, additional certification requirements added for the Universal Avionics EFI-890R system, exemptions, if any; and the special conditions adopted by this rulemaking action. The rules that were applied at Part 23 Amendment 54 for the EFI-890R installation include §§ 23.1301, 23.1311, 23.1309, 23.1321, 23.1322, 23.1325, and 23.1543.

Discussion

If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness standards do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards because of novel or unusual design features of an airplane, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of § 21.16.

Special conditions, as appropriate, as defined in § 11.19, are issued in accordance with § 11.38 after public notice and become part of the type certification basis in accordance with § 21.101.

Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the applicant apply for a supplemental type certificate to modify any other model already included on the same type certificate to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under the provisions of § 21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

Envoy Aerospace plans to incorporate certain novel and unusual design features into the Raytheon King Air Models for which the airworthiness standards do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for protection from the effects of HIRF. These features include EFIS, which are susceptible to the HIRF environment, that were not envisaged by the existing regulations for this type of airplane.

Protection of Systems From High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)

Recent advances in technology have given rise to the application in aircraft designs of advanced electrical and electronic systems that perform functions required for continued safe flight and landing. Due to the use of sensitive solid-state advanced components in analog and digital electronics circuits, these advanced systems are readily responsive to the transient effects of induced electrical current and voltage caused by the HIRF. The HIRF can degrade electronic systems performance by damaging components or upsetting system functions.

Furthermore, the HIRF environment has undergone a transformation that was not foreseen when the current requirements were developed. Higher energy levels are radiated from transmitters that are used for radar, radio, and television. Also, the number of transmitters has increased significantly. There is also uncertainty concerning the effectiveness of airframe shielding for HIRF. Furthermore, coupling to cockpit-installed equipment through the cockpit window apertures is undefined.

The combined effect of the technological advances in airplane design and the changing environment has resulted in an increased level of vulnerability of electrical and electronic systems required for the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane. Effective measures against the effects of exposure to HIRF must be provided by the design and installation of these systems. The accepted maximum energy levels in which civilian airplane system installations must be capable of operating safely are based on surveys and analysis of existing radio frequency emitters. These special conditions require that the airplane be evaluated under these energy levels for the protection of the electronic system and its associated wiring harness. These external threat levels, which are lower than previous required values, are believed to represent the worst case to which an airplane would be exposed in the operating environment.

These special conditions require qualification of systems that perform critical functions, as installed in aircraft, to the defined HIRF environment in paragraph 1 or, as an option to a fixed value using laboratory tests, in paragraph 2, as follows:

(1) The applicant may demonstrate that the operation and operational capability of the installed electrical and electronic systems that perform critical

functions are not adversely affected when the aircraft is exposed to the HIRF environment defined below:

Frequency	Field strength (volts per meter)	
	Peak	Average
10 kHz–100 kHz	50	50
100 kHz–500 kHz	50	50
500 kHz–2 MHz	50	50
2 MHz–30 MHz	100	100
30 MHz–70 MHz	50	50
70 MHz–100 MHz	50	50
100 MHz–200 MHz	100	100
200 MHz–400 MHz	100	100
400 MHz–700 MHz	700	50
700 MHz–1 GHz	700	100
1 GHz–2 GHz	2000	200
2 GHz–4 GHz	3000	200
4 GHz–6 GHz	3000	200
6 GHz–8 GHz	1000	200
8 GHz–12 GHz	3000	300
12 GHz–18 GHz	2000	200
18 GHz–40 GHz	600	200

The field strengths are expressed in terms of peak root-mean-square (rms) values.

or,

(2) The applicant may demonstrate by a system test and analysis that the electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions can withstand a minimum threat of 100 volts per meter, electrical field strength, from 10 kHz to 18 GHz. When using this test to show compliance with the HIRF requirements, no credit is given for signal attenuation due to installation.

A preliminary hazard analysis must be performed by the applicant for approval by the FAA to identify either electrical or electronic systems that perform critical functions. The term “critical” means those functions, whose failure would contribute to, or cause, a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane. The systems identified by the hazard analysis that perform critical functions are candidates for the application of HIRF requirements. A system may perform both critical and non-critical functions. Primary electronic flight display systems, and their associated components, perform critical functions such as attitude, altitude, and airspeed indication. The HIRF requirements apply only to critical functions.

Compliance with HIRF requirements may be demonstrated by tests, analysis, models, similarity with existing systems, or any combination of these. Service experience alone is not acceptable since normal flight operations may not include an exposure to the HIRF environment. Reliance on a system with similar design features for redundancy as a means of protection

against the effects of external HIRF is generally insufficient since all elements of a redundant system are likely to be exposed to the fields concurrently.

Applicability

As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Raytheon Model B200, B200C, 300, B300, and B300C. Should Envoy Aerospace apply at a later date for a supplemental type certificate to modify any other model on the same type certificate to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that model as well under the provisions of § 21.101.

Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on one model of airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the airplane.

The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the notice and comment period in several prior instances and has been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. For this reason, and because a delay would significantly affect the certification of the airplane, which is imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment described above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and symbols.

Citation

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113 and 44701; 14 CFR 21.16 and 21.101; and 14 CFR 11.38 and 11.19.

The Special Conditions

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for the Raytheon Model B200, B200C, 300, B300, and B300C airplanes modified by Envoy

Aerospace to add the Universal Avionics EFI–890R system.

1. *Protection of Electrical and Electronic Systems from High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)*. Each system that performs critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operations, and operational capabilities of these systems to perform critical functions, are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to high intensity radiated electromagnetic fields external to the airplane.

2. For the purpose of these special conditions, the following definition applies: *Critical Functions*: Functions whose failure would contribute to, or cause, a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri on December 5, 2005.

James E. Jackson,

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. NM337; Special Conditions No. 25–310–SC]

Special Conditions: Raytheon Aircraft Company Model HS.125 Airplanes; High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.

SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for a Raytheon Aircraft Company Model HS.125 airplane modified by AeroMech Incorporated. This modified airplane will have a novel or unusual design feature when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. The modification incorporates the installation of Innovative Solutions and Support air data display units (ADDU). These systems perform critical functions. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the protection of these systems from the effects of high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF). These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to