[Federal Register: September 19, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 182)]
[Presidential Documents]
[Page 54973-54976]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr19se03-124]
Presidential Documents
[[Page 54973]]
Presidential Determination No. 2003-38 of September 15,
2003
Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit
or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for 2004
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
Consistent with section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-
228) (the ``FRAA''), I hereby identify the following
countries as major drug-transit or major illicit drug
producing countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Bolivia,
Brazil, Burma, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Laos,
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam.
The Majors List applies by its terms to ``countries''.
The United States Government interprets the term
broadly to include entities that exercise autonomy over
actions or omissions that could lead to a decision to
place them on the list and, subsequently, to determine
their eligibility for certification. A country's
presence on the Majors List is not necessarily an
adverse reflection of its government's counternarcotics
efforts or level of cooperation with the United States.
Consistent with the statutory definition of a major
drug-transit or drug-producing country set forth in
section 481(e)(5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended (the ``FAA''), one of the reasons that
major drug-transit or drug producing countries are
placed on the list is the combination of geographical,
commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs to
transit or be produced despite the concerned
government's most assiduous enforcement measures.
Consistent with section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, I hereby
designate Burma and Haiti as countries that have failed
demonstrably during the previous 12 months to adhere to
their obligations under international counternarcotics
agreements and take the measures set forth in section
489(a)(1) of the FAA. Attached to this report are
justifications (statements of explanation) for each of
the countries so designated, as required by section
706(2)(B).
I have also determined, in accordance with provisions
of section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that provision of
U.S. assistance to Haiti in FY 2004 is vital to the
national interests of the United States.
Combating the threat of synthetic drugs remains a
priority, particularly the threat from club drugs,
including MDMA (Ecstasy). Since January, we have
redoubled our efforts with The Netherlands, from which
the majority of U.S. MDMA seizures originate. I commend
the Government of The Netherlands for its efforts to
address this scourge, including increased enforcement,
improved risk assessment and targeting capabilities of
passenger aircraft and cargo, and international
cooperation to control precursor chemicals. I urge the
Government of The Netherlands to focus its efforts on
dismantling the significant criminal organizations
responsible for this illicit trade, using all tools
available to law enforcement. Continued progress in
implementing our joint action plan, developed in March,
should have a significant impact on the production and
transit of MDMA from The Netherlands to the United
States. Although we have seen a stabilization of MDMA
use rates domestically, there is an increase in the
number of countries in which MDMA is produced and
trafficked. We will continue to monitor the threat from
synthetic drugs and the emerging trends.
[[Page 54974]]
The United States and Canada are both targeted by
international trafficking organizations. We continue to
work closely with the Government of Canada to stem the
flow of illicit drugs to our countries and across our
common borders. The United States remains concerned
about the diversion of large quantities of precursor
chemicals from Canada into the United States for use in
producing methamphetamines. We hope that Canada's newly
implemented control regulations will disrupt that flow.
The United States is also concerned about widespread
Canadian cultivation of high-potency marijuana,
significant amounts of which are smuggled into the
United States from Canada. We will work with the
Government of Canada in the coming year to combat these
shared threats to the security and health of our
citizens.
In the 8 months since my January determination that
Guatemala had failed demonstrably in regard to its
counternarcotics responsibilities, the Government of
Guatemala has made efforts to improve its institutional
capabilities, adhere to its obligations under
international counternarcotics agreements, and take
measures set forth in U.S. law. These initial steps
show Guatemala's willingness to better its
counternarcotics practices, but the permanence of these
improvements has yet to be demonstrated. I expect
Guatemala to continue its efforts and to demonstrate
further progress in the coming year.
We are deeply concerned about heroin and
methamphetamine linked to North Korea being trafficked
to East Asian countries, and are increasingly convinced
that state agents and enterprises in the DPRK are
involved in the narcotics trade. While we suspect opium
poppy is cultivated in the DPRK, reliable information
confirming the extent of opium production is currently
lacking. There are also clear indications that North
Koreans traffic in, and probably manufacture,
methamphetamine. In recent years, authorities in the
region have routinely seized shipments of
methamphetamine and/or heroin that had been transferred
to traffickers' ships from North Korean vessels. The
April 2003 seizure of 125 kilograms of heroin smuggled
to Australia aboard the North Korean-owned vessel
``Pong Su'' is the latest and largest seizure of heroin
pointing to North Korean complicity in the drug trade.
Although there is no evidence that narcotics
originating in or transiting North Korea reach the
United States, the United States is intensifying its
effort to stop North Korean involvement in illicit
narcotics production and trafficking and to enhance
law-enforcement cooperation with affected countries in
the region to achieve that objective.
You are hereby authorized and directed to submit this
report under section 706 of the FRAA, transmit it to
the Congress, and publish it in the Federal Register.
(Presidential Sig.)B
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, September 15, 2003.
Billing code 4710-10-P
[[Page 54975]]
Statement of Explanation
Burma
The United States has determined that Burma failed
demonstrably to make sufficient efforts during the last
12 months to meet its obligations under international
counternarcotics agreements and the counternarcotics
requirements set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
Burma remains among the world's largest producers and
traffickers of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), and
the world's second largest producer of illicit opium.
Although precise figures are hard to come by,
production and trafficking of methamphetamine from
Burma continues to be one of the most serious problems
facing Southeast Asia. Neighboring countries seized
tens of millions of ATS tablets produced in Burma with
precursor chemicals imported from other countries, and
the explosion of synthetic drugs remained a major
threat to national security and public health
throughout the region.
The Government of Burma did little to hinder activities
of drug gangs that operate freely along its borders
with China, Thailand and Laos. Burma also failed to
restrict involvement in illicit narcotics by the
largest, most powerful, and most important trafficking
organization in Burma, the United Wa State Army (UWSA).
Major UWSA traffickers continue to operate with
apparent impunity in areas outside government control,
and UWSA involvement in methamphetamine production and
trafficking remains a serious concern.
Implementation of money laundering legislation, enacted
in 2002, faltered in 2003. Despite opening a few cases,
the Government of Burma has undertaken no prosecutions,
and a February banking crisis appeared to have halted
further efforts to implement the law. Burma continued
to permit UWSA and other trafficking organizations to
own commercial banks and invest in other economic
activities.
While the magnitude of the above issues resulted in a
determination not to certify, Burma's counternarcotics
performance over the past 12 months registered some
positive aspects. Although Burma remains the world's
second largest producer of illicit opium, opium
cultivation declined a further 24 percent, according to
the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime. While the return of
good weather brought much higher yields, overall
production still declined for the sixth consecutive
year.
The Government of Burma cooperated with regional and
international counternarcotics agencies and
organizations, resulting in several cases against
traffickers and their organizations in cooperation with
the United States, Australia, Thailand, China, and
others. Burma also signed agreements in 2003 with China
and India on the control of precursor chemicals.
We urge the Government of Burma to address those areas
where its efforts have fallen far short, and to treat
its counternarcotics obligations with the utmost
seriousness.
Statement of Explanation
Haiti
The United States has determined that Haiti has failed
demonstrably to make sufficient efforts during the last
12 months on counternarcotics issues, including its
obligations under international counternarcotics
agreements and counternarcotics requirements set forth
in section 489(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (as amended). Haiti remains a transshipment point
for drugs moving towards the United States, and the
Government of Haiti (GOH) has done little to cooperate
with the United States to interdict the flow of drugs
destined for the United States or to honor its
commitments as a party to the 1988 U.N. Drug
Convention.
[[Page 54976]]
With the notable and praiseworthy exceptions of
expelling notorious drug trafficker Jacques Ketant,
establishing a trusted unit of anti-drug agents, and
increasing the number of anti-drug police including
coast guardsmen, the GOH has not met all of the
objectives or obtained the results laid out by the
United States Government in its demarche to the GOH
this past year.
The GOH did not: 1) deposit an instrument of
ratification of the OAS anti-corruption convention; 2)
draft and introduce anti-corruption legislation; 3)
enforce existing anti-money-laundering legislation; 4)
increase budgetary support for the Haitian Coast Guard;
5) ensure that asset forfeiture is an integral part of
criminal prosecutions; 6) provide comprehensive
training to judges, prosecutors and law enforcement
personnel; 7) waive the right to exercise prosecutorial
jurisdiction in cases of non-Haitian vessels
interdicted by U.S. Coast Guard, and authorize
enforcement of U.S. law against the vessels, cargo and
persons on board; or 8) ratify the 1971 U.N. Convention
on Psychotropic Substances.
While Haiti has demonstrably failed, according to the
President's standards for counternarcotics performance,
the U.S. vital national interests require that U.S.
assistance to Haiti continue. As the hemisphere's
poorest country, Haiti has a continued need for
assistance to programs that increase access to
education, combat environmental degradation, fight the
spread of HIV/AIDS, reduce trafficking of women and
children, and foster the creation of legitimate
business and employment opportunities. In the long
term, these programs can contribute to democratic
development in Haiti and a reduction in illegal
migration. Continuing these types of programs will also
address the root causes of poverty and hopelessness,
factors that contribute to Haitian involvement in the
international drug trade. Suspension of assistance to
Haiti could hamper U.S. efforts to ensure
implementation of OAS Resolution 822, which commits the
Government of Haiti to a series of actions that would
promote a climate of security and confidence for free
and fair legislative elections to be held in 2003.
[FR Doc. 03-24111 Filed 9-18-03; 8:45 am]
Billing code 4710-10-P