[Federal Register: September 17, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 180)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 54402-54405]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr17se03-21]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
15 CFR Parts 764 and 766
[Docket No. 030909226-3226-01]
RIN 0694-AC92
Export Administration Regulations: Penalty Guidance in the
Settlement of Administrative Enforcement Cases
AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) proposes to amend
the Export Administration Regulations by incorporating guidance on how
BIS makes penalty determinations when settling administrative
enforcement cases under part 766 of the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR), 15 CFR 730-799 (2003). This guidance also addresses
related aspects of how BIS responds to violations of the EAR, such as
charging decisions. This rule also proposes to amend parts 764 and 766
of the EAR to conform to this guidance.
DATES: Comments must be received by November 17, 2003.
ADDRESSES: Written comments should be addressed to: Chief Counsel for
Industry and Security, Attention: Philip D. Golrick, Room H-3839,
United States Department of Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution
Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230. Please mark envelopes containing
comments with the words ``Settlement Guidance.''
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information regarding this
proposed rule, contact Philip D. Golrick, Office of Chief Counsel for
Industry and Security, United States Department of Commerce, at (202)
482-5301.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
As an essential part of its administration of the export control
system, BIS brings administrative enforcement actions for violations of
the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Many administrative
enforcement cases are resolved through settlements between BIS and the
respondent.
The rule proposes to incorporate guidance in the EAR on how BIS
determines what penalty is appropriate for the settlement of an
administrative enforcement case. This guidance would appear in a new
Supplement No. 1 to part 766 of the EAR. The proposed guidance
identifies both general factors, such as the destination for the export
and degree of willfulness involved in violations, and specific
mitigating and aggravating factors which BIS typically takes into
account in determining an appropriate penalty. The proposed guidance
also describes factors that BIS's Office of Export Enforcement (OEE)
typically considers in describing whether a violation should be
addressed in a warning letter, rather than in an administrative
enforcement case. The guidance would not apply to antiboycott matters
arising under part 760 of the EAR.
In part 764, the rule proposes to amend section 764.5(e) to state
that Supplement No. 1 to part 766 describes how BIS typically exercises
its discretion regarding whether to pursue an administrative
enforcement case regarding violations reported in a voluntary self-
disclosure under section 764.5, and what administrative sanctions to
seek in settling such a case.
In part 766, the rule proposes to amend section 766.3(a) to state
that Supplement No. 1 to part 766 describes how BIS typically exercises
its discretion regarding the issuance of charging letters, other than
in antiboycott matters under part 760. The rule proposes to amend
section 766.18 to add a new paragraph (f), stating that Supplement No.
1 to part 766 describes how BIS typically exercises its discretion
regarding the terms under which it is willing to settle particular
cases, other than antiboycott matters under part 760.
This guidance is consistent with the objectives of section 223 of
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (Title II, Pub.
L. 104-121).
Rulemaking Requirements
1. This proposed rule has been determined to be not significant for
purposes of E.O. 12866.
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person is
required to respond to, nor shall any person be subject to a penalty
for failure to comply with a collection of information, subject to the
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), unless that
collection of information displays a currently valid OMB Control
Number. This rule involves a collection of information subject to the
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et
seq.). This collection has been approved by the Office of Management
and Budget under Control Number 0694-0058, and carries an annual burden
hour estimate of 800 hours and a cost to the public of approximately
$32,000.
3. This rule does not contain policies with Federalism implications
as this term is defined in Executive Order 13132.
4. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A), the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act requiring a notice of proposed rulemaking
and the opportunity for public comment are waived, because this
regulation involves a general statement of policy and rule of agency
procedure. No other law requires that a notice of proposed rulemaking
and an opportunity for public comment be given for this rule. Because a
notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for public comment are
not required to be given for this rule under the Administrative
Procedure Act or by any other law, the analytical requirements of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) are not applicable.
However, in view of the importance of this proposed rule, which
represents the first comprehensive statement of BIS's approach toward
these issues, BIS is seeking public comments before the proposed rule
takes effect. The period for submission of comments will close November
17, 2003. BIS will consider all comments received before the close of
the comment period in developing a final rule. Comments received after
the end of the comment period will be considered if possible, but their
consideration cannot be assured. BIS will not accept public comments
accompanied by a request that a part or all of the material be treated
confidentially because of its business proprietary nature or for any
other reason. BIS will return such comments and materials to the
persons submitting the comments and will not consider them in the
development of the final rule. All public comments on this proposed
rule must be in writing (including fax or e-mail) and will be a matter
of public record, available for public inspection and copying. The
Office of Administration, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S.
Department of Commerce, displays these public comments on BIS's Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) Web site at http://www.bis.doc.gov/foia. This
office does not maintain a separate public inspection facility. If you
have technical difficulties accessing this web site, please call BIS's
Office of Administration at (202) 482-0637 for assistance.
List of Subjects
15 CFR Part 764
Administrative practice and procedure, Exports, Foreign trade, Law
enforcement, Penalties.
[[Page 54403]]
15 CFR Part 766
Administrative practice and procedure, Confidential business
information, Exports, Foreign trade.
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, this proposed rule would
amend Parts 764 and 766 of the EAR as follows:
1. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 764 is amended to read as
follows:
Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.;
E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR., 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of
August 7, 2003 (68 FR 47833, August 11, 2003).
PART 764--[AMENDED]
2. Section 764.5, paragraph (e) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 764.5 Voluntary self-disclosure.
* * * * *
(e) Criteria. Supplement No. 1 to part 766 describes how BIS
typically exercises its discretion regarding whether to pursue an
administrative enforcement case under part 766 and what administrative
sanctions to seek in settling such a case.
3. The authority citation for 15 CFR part 766 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.;
E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR., 2001 Comp., p. 783; Notice of
August 7, 2003 (68 FR 47833, August 11, 2003).
PART 766--[AMENDED]
4. Section 766.3, paragraph (a) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 766.3 Institution of administrative enforcement proceedings.
(a) Charging letters. The Director of the Office of Export
Enforcement (OEE) or the Director of the Office of Antiboycott
Compliance (OAC), as appropriate, or such other Department of Commerce
official as may be designated by the Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Export Enforcement, may begin administrative enforcement
proceedings under this part by issuing a charging letter in the name of
BIS. Supplement No. 1 to this part describes how BIS typically
exercises its discretion regarding the issuance of charging letters,
other than in antiboycott matters under part 760. The charging letter
shall constitute the formal complaint and will state that there is
reason to believe that a violation of the EAA, the EAR, or any order,
license or authorization issued thereunder, has occurred. It will set
forth the essential facts about the alleged violation, refer to the
specific regulatory or other provisions involved, and give notice of
the sanctions available under part 764 of the EAR. The charging letter
will inform the respondent that failure to answer the charges as
provided in Sec. 766.6 of this part will be treated as a default under
Sec. 766.7 of this part, that the respondent is entitled to a hearing
if a written demand for one is requested with the answer, and that the
respondent may be represented by counsel, or by other authorized
representative who has a power of attorney to represent the respondent.
A copy of the charging letter shall be filed with the administrative
law judge, which filing shall toll the running of the applicable
statute of limitations. Charging letters may be amended or supplemented
at any time before an answer is filed, or, with permission of the
administrative law judge, afterwards. BIS may unilaterally withdraw
charging letters at any time, by notifying the respondent and the
administrative law judge.
5. Section 766.18 is amended by adding paragraph (f) to read as
follows:
Sec. 766.18 Settlement.
* * * * *
(f) Supplement No. 1 to this part describes how BIS typically
exercises its discretion regarding the terms under which it is willing
to settle particular cases, other than antiboycott matters under Part
760.
6. Part 766 is amended by adding Supplement No. 1 to read as
follows:
Supplement No. 1 to Part 766-Guidance on Charging and Penalty
Determinations in Settlement of Administrative Enforcement Cases
Introduction
This supplement describes how BIS responds to violations of the
Export Administration Regulations (EAR), and specifically how BIS
makes penalty determinations in the settlement of civil
administrative enforcement cases under part 764 of the EAR. This
guidance does not apply to enforcement cases for antiboycott
violations under part 760 of the EAR.
Because many administrative enforcement cases are resolved
through settlement, the process of settling such cases is integral
to the enforcement program. BIS carefully considers each settlement
offer in light of the facts and circumstances of the case, relevant
precedent, and BIS's objective to achieve in each case an
appropriate level of penalty and deterrent effect. In settlement
negotiations, BIS encourages parties to provide, and will give
serious consideration to, information and evidence that parties
believe is relevant to the application of this guidance to their
cases, to whether a violation has in fact occurred, or to whether
they have an affirmative defense to potential charges.
This guidance does not confer any right or impose any obligation
regarding what penalties BIS may seek in litigating a case or what
posture BIS may take toward settling a case. Parties do not have a
right to a settlement offer, or particular settlement terms, from
BIS, regardless of settlement postures BIS has taken in other cases.
I. Responding to Violations
The Office of Export Enforcement (OEE), among other
responsibilities, investigates possible violations of the Export
Administration Act of 1979, as amended, the EAR, or any order,
license or authorization issued thereunder. When it appears that
such a violation has occurred, OEE investigations may lead to a
warning letter or a civil enforcement proceeding. A violation may
also be referred to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution. The type of enforcement action initiated by OEE will
depend primarily on the nature of the violation.
A. Issuing a warning letter: Warning letters represent OEE's
conclusion that an apparent violation has occurred. In the exercise
of its discretion, OEE may determine in certain instances that
issuing a warning letter, instead of bringing an administrative
enforcement proceeding, will achieve the appropriate enforcement
result. A warning letter will fully explain the apparent violation
and urge compliance. OEE often issues warning letters to first-time
offenders for an apparent violation based on technicalities; where
good faith efforts to comply with the law and cooperate with the
investigation are present; where the investigation commenced as a
result of a voluntary self-disclosure satisfying the requirements of
Sec. 764.5; and where no aggravating factors exist. A warning letter
does not constitute a final agency determination that a violation
has occurred.
B. Pursuing an administrative enforcement case: The issuance of
a charging letter under Sec. 766.3 initiates an administrative
enforcement proceeding. Charging letters may be issued when there is
reason to believe that a violation has occurred. Cases may be
settled before or after the issuance of a charging letter. See Sec.
766.18. BIS prepares a proposed charging letter when a case is
settled before issuance of an actual charging letter. See Sec.
766.18(a). In some cases, BIS also sends a proposed charging letter
to a party in the absence of a settlement agreement, thereby
informing the party of the violations that BIS has reason to believe
occurred and how BIS expects that those violations would be charged.
C. Referring for criminal prosecution: In appropriate cases, BIS
may refer a case to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution, in addition to pursuing an administrative enforcement
action.
II. Types of Administrative Sanctions
There are three types of administrative sanctions under section
764.3(a) of the EAR: a civil penalty, a denial of export privileges,
and an exclusion from practice before BIS. Administrative
enforcement cases are generally settled on terms that include one or
more of these sanctions.
A. Civil penalty: A monetary penalty may be assessed for each
violation. The maximum amount of such a penalty per violation is
stated in section 764.3(a)(1), subject to adjustments under the
Federal Civil Penalties
[[Page 54404]]
Adjustment Act of 1990 (28 U.S.C. 2461, note (2000)), which are
codified at 15 CFR 6.4.
B. Denial of export privileges: An order denying a party's
export privileges may be issued, as described in Sec. 764.3(a)(2).
Such a denial may extend to all export privileges, as set out in the
standard terms for denial orders in Supplement No. 1 to part 764, or
may be narrower in scope (e.g., limited to exports of specified
items or to specified destinations or customers).
C. Exclusion from practice: Under Sec. 764.3(a)(3), any person
acting as an attorney, accountant, consultant, freight forwarder or
other person who acts in a representative capacity in any matter
before BIS may be excluded from practicing before BIS.
III. How BIS Determines What Sanctions Are Appropriate in a
Settlement
A. General Factors: BIS usually looks to the following basic
factors in determining what administrative sanctions are appropriate
in each settlement:
Degree of Willfulness: Many violations involve no more than
simple negligence or carelessness. In most such cases, BIS typically
will seek a settlement for payment of a civil penalty (unless the
matter is resolved with a warning letter). In cases involving gross
negligence, willful blindness to the requirements of the EAR, or
knowing or willful violations, BIS is more likely to seek a denial
of export privileges or an exclusion from practice, and/or a greater
monetary penalty than BIS would otherwise typically seek. While some
violations of the EAR have a degree of knowledge or intent as an
element of the offense, see, e.g., Sec. 764.2(e) (acting with
knowledge of a violation) and Sec. 764.2(f) (possession with intent
to export illegally), BIS may regard a violation of any provision of
the EAR as knowing or willful if the facts and circumstances of the
case support that conclusion. In deciding whether a knowing
violation has occurred, BIS will consider, in accordance with
Supplement No. 3 to part 732, the presence of any red flags and the
nature and result of any inquiry made by the party. A denial or
exclusion order may also be considered even in matters involving
simple negligence or carelessness, particularly if the violations(s)
involved harm to national security or other essential interests
protected by the export control system, if the violations are of
such a nature and extent that a monetary fine alone represents an
insufficient penalty or if the nature and extent of the violation(s)
indicate that a denial or exclusion order is necessary to prevent
future violations of the EAR.
Destination Involved: BIS is more likely to seek a greater
monetary penalty and/or denial of export privileges or exclusion
from practice in cases involving:
(1) Exports or reexports to countries subject to anti-terrorism
controls, as described at Sec. 742.1(d).
(2) Exports or reexports to destinations particularly implicated
by the type of control that applies to the item in question--for
example, export of items subject to nuclear controls to a country
with a poor record of nuclear non-proliferation.
Violations involving exports or reexports to other destinations
may also warrant consideration of such sanctions, depending on
factors such as the degree of willfulness involved, the nature and
extent of harm to national security or other essential interests
protected by the export control system, and what level of sanctions
are determined to be necessary to deter or prevent future violations
of the EAR.
Related Violations: Frequently, a single export transaction can
give rise to multiple violations. For example, an exporter who mis-
classifies an item on the Commerce Control List may, as a result of
that error, export the item without the required export license and
submit a Shipper's Export Declaration (SED) that both misstates the
applicable Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) and
erroneously identifies the export as qualifying for the designation
``NLR'' (no license required). In so doing, the exporter committed
three violations: one violation of Sec. 764.2(a) for the
unauthorized export and two violations of Sec. 764.2(g) for the two
false statements on the SED. It is within the discretion of BIS to
charge three separate violations and settle the case for a penalty
that is less than would be appropriate for three unrelated
violations under otherwise similar circumstances, or to charge fewer
than three violations and pursue settlement in accordance with that
charging decision. In exercising such discretion, BIS typically
looks to factors such as whether the violations resulted from
knowing or willful conduct, willful blindness to the requirements of
the EAR, or gross negligence; whether they stemmed from the same
underlying error or omission; and whether they resulted in
distinguishable or separate harm.
Multiple Unrelated Violations: In cases involving multiple
unrelated violations, BIS is more likely to seek a denial of export
privileges, an exclusion from practice, and/or a greater monetary
penalty than BIS would otherwise typically seek. For example,
repeated unauthorized exports could warrant a denial order, even if
a single export of the same item to the same destination under
similar circumstances might warrant just a monetary penalty. BIS
takes this approach because multiple violations may indicate serious
compliance problems and a resulting risk of future violations. BIS
may consider whether a party has taken effective steps to address
compliance concerns in determining whether multiple violations
warrant a denial or exclusion order in a particular case.
Timing of Settlement: Under Sec. 766.18, settlement can occur
before a charging letter is served, while a case is before an
administrative law judge, or while a case is before the Under
Secretary for Industry and Security under Sec. 766.22. However,
early settlement--for example, before a charging letter has been
served--has the benefit of freeing resources for BIS to deploy in
other matters. In contrast, for example, the BIS resources saved by
settlement on the eve of an adversary hearing under Sec. 766.13 are
fewer, insofar as BIS has already expended significant resources on
discovery, motions practice, and trial preparation. Because the
effective implementation of the U.S. export control system depends
on the efficient use of BIS resources, BIS has an interest in
encouraging early settlement and may take this interest into account
in determining settlement terms.
Related Criminal or Civil Violations: Where an administrative
enforcement matter under the EAR involves conduct giving rise to
related criminal or civil charges, BIS may take into account the
related violations, and their resolution, in determining what
administrative sanctions are appropriate under part 766. A criminal
conviction indicates serious, willful misconduct and an accordingly
high risk of future violations, absent effective administrative
sanctions. However, entry of a guilty plea can be a sign that a
party accepts responsibility for complying with the EAR and will
take greater care to do so in the future. In appropriate cases where
a party is receiving substantial criminal penalties, BIS may find
that sufficient deterrence may be achieved by lesser administrative
sanctions than would be appropriate in the absence of criminal
penalties. Conversely, BIS might seek greater administrative
sanctions in an otherwise similar case where a party is not
subjected to criminal penalties. The presence of a related criminal
or civil disposition may distinguish settlements among civil penalty
cases that appear otherwise to be similar. As a result, the factors
set forth for consideration in civil penalty settlements will often
be applied differently in the context of a ``global settlement'' of
both civil and criminal cases, or multiple civil cases, and may
therefore be of limited utility as precedent for future cases,
particularly those not involving a global settlement.
B. Specific Mitigating and Aggravating Factors: In addition to
the general factors described above, BIS also generally looks to the
presence or absence of the following mitigating and aggravating
factors in determining what sanctions should apply in a given
settlement. Where a factor admits of degrees, it should accordingly
be given more or less weight. Thus, for example, one prior violation
should be given less weight than a history of multiple violations,
and a previous violation reported in a voluntary self disclosure by
an exporter whose overall export compliance efforts are of high
quality should be given less weight than previous violation(s) not
involving such mitigating factors.
Some of the factors listed below are designated as having
``great weight.'' When present, such a factor should ordinarily be
given considerably more weight than a factor that is not so
designated.
Mitigating Factors
1. The party made a voluntary self-disclosure of the violation,
satisfying the requirements of Sec. 764.5. (GREAT WEIGHT)
2. The party has an effective export compliance program and its
overall export compliance efforts have been of high quality. In
determining the presence of this factor, BIS will take account of
the extent to which a party complies with the principles set forth
in BIS's Export Management System (EMS) Guidelines. Information
about the EMS Guidelines can be accessed through the BIS Web site at
http://www.bis.doc.gov. In this context, BIS will also consider
whether a party's export compliance program
[[Page 54405]]
uncovered a problem, thereby preventing further violations. (GREAT
WEIGHT)
3. The violation was an isolated occurrence or the result of a
good-faith misinterpretation.
4. Based on the facts of a case and under the applicable
licensing policy, required authorization for the export transaction
in question would likely have been granted upon request.
5. Other than with respect to antiboycott matters under part
760:
a. The party has never been convicted of an export-related
criminal violation;
b. In the past five years, the party has not entered into a
settlement of an export-related administrative enforcement case with
BIS or another U.S. Government agency or been found liable in an
export-related administrative enforcement case brought by BIS or
another U.S. Government agency;
c. In the past three years, the party has not received a warning
letter from BIS; and
d. In the past five years, the party has not otherwise violated
the EAR.
Where necessary to effective enforcement, the prior involvement
in export violations of a party's owners, directors, officers,
partners, or other related persons may be imputed to a party in
determining whether these criteria are satisfied.
6. The party has cooperated to an exceptional degree with BIS
efforts to investigate the party's conduct.
7. The party has provided substantial assistance in BIS
investigation of another person who may have violated the EAR.
8. The violation was not likely to involve harm of the nature
that the applicable provisions of the EAA, EAR or other authority
(e.g., a license condition) were intended to protect against; for
example, a false statement on an SED that an export was ``NLR,''
when in fact a license requirement was applicable, but a license
exception was available.
9. At the time of the violation, the party: (1) Had little or no
previous export experience; and (2) was not familiar with export
practices and requirements. (Note: The presence of only one of these
elements will not generally be considered a mitigating factor.)
Aggravating Factors
1. The party made a deliberate effort to hide or conceal the
violation(s). (GREAT WEIGHT)
2. The party's conduct demonstrated a serious disregard for
export compliance responsibilities. (GREAT WEIGHT)
3. The violation was significant in view of the sensitivity of
the items involved and/or the reason for controlling them to the
destination in question. This factor would be present where the
conduct in question, in purpose or effect, substantially implicated
national security or other essential interests protected by the U.S.
export control system, in view of such factors as the destination
and sensitivity of the items involved. Such conduct might include,
for example, violations of controls based on nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapon proliferation, missile technology proliferation,
and national security concerns, and exports proscribed in part 744.
(GREAT WEIGHT)
4. The violation was likely to involve harm of the nature that
the applicable provisions of the EAA, EAR or other authority (e.g.,
a license condition) are principally intended to protect against,
e.g., a false statement on an SED that an export was destined for a
non-embargoed country, when in fact it was destined for an embargoed
country.
5. The quantity and/or value of the exports was high, such that
a greater penalty may be necessary to serve as an adequate penalty
for the violation or deterrence of future violations, or to make the
penalty proportionate to those for otherwise comparable violations
involving exports of lower quantity or value.
6. The presence in the same transaction of concurrent violations
of laws and regulations, other than those enforced by BIS.
7. Other than with respect to antiboycott matters under part
760:
a. The party has been convicted of an export-related criminal
violation;
b. In the past five years, the party has entered into a
settlement of an export-related administrative enforcement case with
BIS or another U.S. Government agency or has been found liable in an
export-related administrative enforcement case brought by BIS or
another U.S. Government agency;
c. In the past three years, the party has received a warning
letter from BIS; or
d. In the past five years, the party otherwise violated the EAR.
Where necessary to effective enforcement, the prior involvement in
export violations of a party's owners, directors, officers,
partners, or other related persons may be imputed to a party in
determining whether these criteria are satisfied.
8. The party exports as a regular part of the party's business,
but lacked a systematic export compliance effort.
In deciding whether and what scope of denial or exclusion order
is appropriate, the following factors are particularly relevant: the
presence of mitigating or aggravating factors of great weight; the
degree of willfulness involved; in a business context, the extent to
which senior management participated in or was aware of the conduct
in question; the number of violations; the existence and seriousness
of prior violations; the likelihood of future violations (taking
into account relevant export compliance efforts); and whether a
monetary penalty can be expected to have a sufficient deterrent
effect.
IV. How BIS Makes Suspension and Deferral Decisions
A. Civil Penalties: In appropriate cases, payment of a civil
monetary penalty may be deferred or suspended. See
Sec. 764.3(a)(iii). In determining whether suspension or deferral is
appropriate, BIS may consider, for example, whether the party has
demonstrated a limited ability to pay a penalty that would be
appropriate for such violations, so that suspended or deferred
payment can be expected to have sufficient deterrent value, and
whether, in light of all of the circumstances, such suspension or
deferral is necessary to make the impact of the penalty consistent
with the impact of BIS penalties on other parties who committed
similar violations.
B. Denial of Export Privileges and Exclusion from Practice: In
deciding whether a denial or exclusion order should be suspended,
BIS may consider, for example, the adverse economic consequences of
the order on the respondent, its employees, and other parties, as
well as on the national interest in the competitiveness of U.S.
businesses. An otherwise appropriate denial or exclusion order will
be suspended on the basis of adverse economic consequences only if
it is found that future export control violations are unlikely and
if there are adequate measures (usually a substantial civil penalty)
to achieve the necessary deterrent effect.
Dated: September 9, 2003.
Kenneth I. Juster,
Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security.
[FR Doc. 03-23499 Filed 9-16-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-33-P