[Federal Register: January 6, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 3)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 471-473]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr06ja03-5]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 2002-NM-53-AD; Amendment 39-12996; AD 2002-26-08]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-10, DC-9-
20, DC-9-30, DC-9-40, and DC-9-50 Series Airplanes; and Model DC-9-81
(MD-81), DC-9-82 (MD-82), DC-9-83 (MD-83), DC-9-87 (MD-87), and MD-88
Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD),
applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas DC-9-10, DC-9-20, DC-9-30, DC-
9-40, and DC-9-50 series airplanes; and Model DC-9-81 (MD-81), DC-9-82
(MD-82), DC-9-83 (MD-83), DC-9-87 (MD-87), and MD-88 airplanes. This
amendment requires replacement of the emergency power switch knob on
the overhead switch panel in the flight compartment with a new,
improved knob made of non-conductive material. The actions specified by
this AD are intended to prevent the knob from conducting electricity,
which could result in delivery of an electrical shock and consequent
injury to flightcrew or maintenance personnel. This action is intended
to address the identified unsafe condition.
DATES: Effective February 10, 2003.
The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in
the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as
of February 10, 2003.
ADDRESSES: The service information referenced in this AD may be
obtained from Boeing Commercial Aircraft Group, Long Beach Division,
3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data
and Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024). This information may
be examined at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport
Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington; or at the FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office,
3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California; or at the Office of the
Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington,
DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elvin K. Wheeler, Aerospace Engineer,
Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft
Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California
90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5344; fax (562) 627-5210.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness
directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model
DC-9-10, DC-9-20, DC-9-30, DC-9-40, and DC-9-50 series airplanes; and
Model DC-9-81 (MD-81), DC-9-82 (MD-82), DC-9-83 (MD-83), DC-9-87 (MD-
87), and MD-88 airplanes was published in the Federal Register on
August 16, 2002 (67 FR 53527). That action proposed to require
replacement of the emergency power switch knob on the overhead switch
panel in the flight compartment with a new, improved knob made of non-
conductive material.
Comments
Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate
in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to
the comments received.
Request To Withdraw Proposed AD or Extend Compliance Time
One commenter asks the FAA to withdraw the proposed AD for the
following reasons:
[sbull] The proposed AD states that one mechanic received a shock
during maintenance, and the commenter notes that it is not likely that
the problem exists or will develop in other switches. The commenter
operates 74 Model DC-9 series airplanes, and over the past 21 years in
service there have been no reported incidents by pilots or mechanics
while operating the emergency power switch. The pilots and mechanics
have operated the emergency power switches over half a million times.
[sbull] Receiving a shock from the power switch does not pose a
substantial hazard to the continued airworthiness of the aircraft. The
reason for this is that 99 percent of power switch operations are
performed while the airplane is parked at the gate, when the pilot
performs a pre-flight check, or when a mechanic performs a maintenance
service check. If the pilot or mechanic did receive a shock from the
power switch, a discrepancy form would be filled out and the switch
would be replaced.
The same commenter asks that, as an alternative to withdrawing the
proposed AD, the compliance time for replacement of the switch be
extended from 6 months to 24 months, using the lead-time of the parts
and scheduled maintenance interval criteria, as follows:
[sbull] In the proposed AD the FAA estimates that 1,079 airplanes
of U.S.-registry are affected. At the time the proposed AD was issued,
the manufacturer had no knobs in stock, and 374 on order, with a due
date near the end of 2002. There is a 160-day lead time on orders for
the power switch knob; therefore, the fleet cannot be outfitted until
the knobs are received.
[sbull] Because the commenter's C-check is performed at 20-month
intervals, it would have less impact on operations if the knobs could
be changed during a C-check. This would eliminate special routing of
airplanes or special distribution of the knobs. In addition, as stated
in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC9-24A189 (referenced in the proposed
AD as the appropriate source of service information for accomplishment
of the actions), the opening of the forward overhead switch panel would
not be required, ``based on knowledge of mechanic performing
replacement of knob assembly on emergency power switch.'' This would
allow one set of mechanics to replace the knobs and would eliminate
unnecessary steps.
We partially agree with the commenter, as follows:
[[Page 472]]
[sbull] We do not agree to withdraw the proposed AD. As specified
in the Discussion section of the proposed AD, ``Investigation revealed
that terminals within the switch had shorted to the switch shaft. Due
to the design of the emergency power system, this switch is not
grounded. The capacity of the emergency power switch knob to conduct
electricity, if not corrected, could result in delivery of an
electrical shock and consequent injury to flightcrew or maintenance
personnel.'' Further, the existing power switch must be replaced with a
non-conductive material in order to preclude the possibility of an
electrical shock to personnel, which could happen either in flight or
before takeoff. The final rule will be issued accordingly.
[sbull] We do agree to extend the compliance time somewhat for the
replacement of the switch. We have reviewed and approved Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin DC9-24A189, Revision 01, dated August 5, 2002,
excluding Evaluation Form; and Revision 02, dated October 8, 2002,
excluding Evaluation Form; as additional sources of service information
for accomplishment of the actions. Revision 02 extends the compliance
time recommended in the original issue of the service bulletin from 6
to 12 months, as parts will be available within that timeframe. The
changes in Revisions 01 and 02 are not substantive, meaning that
airplanes modified per those service bulletins are not subject to any
additional work. However, we have changed paragraph (a) of this final
rule to refer to Revision 02 of the service bulletin as the appropriate
source of service information for the actions in that paragraph. In
addition, we have added a new paragraph (b) to the final rule (and
reordered subsequent paragraphs accordingly) to give credit for
replacements done before the effective date of this AD according to the
original issue and Revision 01 of the service bulletin. To follow the
compliance time specified in Revision 02 of the service bulletin, we
have extended the compliance time for the replacement to within 12
months after the effective date of this AD. Paragraph (a) of this final
rule has been changed accordingly.
Request To Extend Compliance Time
Two commenters ask that the compliance time specified in the
proposed AD be extended from 6 to 12 months. A third commenter states
that, although there are concerns about parts availability, if Boeing
can provide an adequate supply of parts to meet the overnight
inspection schedule, a compliance time of 6 months can be met. The two
commenters note that although Revision 01 of the referenced service
bulletin was released on August 5, 2002, to reset the start date of the
original issue of the service bulletin, only 300 parts were available
at that time. One commenter adds that the FAA is currently reviewing
Revision 02 of the service bulletin which extends the compliance time
to 12 months to accommodate availability of parts. Both commenters
state that the proposed AD should be changed to reflect the latest
revision of the service bulletin with the extended compliance time,
which allows time for Boeing to produce an adequate number of parts.
As described previously, we have reviewed and approved Revision 02
of the service bulletin and agree to extend the compliance time for the
replacement required by this final rule to within 12 months after the
effective date of this AD.
Explanation of Editorial Change
We have changed the service bulletin citation throughout this final
rule to exclude the Evaluation Form. (The form is intended to be
completed by operators and submitted to the manufacturer to provide
input on the quality of the service bulletin; however, this AD does not
include such a requirement.)
Conclusion
After careful review of the available data, including the comments
noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public
interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes previously
described. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither
increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of
the AD.
Cost Impact
There are approximately 1,904 airplanes of the affected design in
the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 1,079 airplanes of U.S.
registry will be affected by this AD, that it will take approximately 1
work hour per airplane to accomplish the required replacement, and that
the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Required parts will cost
approximately $250 per airplane. Based on these figures, the cost
impact of the AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $334,490, or $310
per airplane.
The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that
no operator has yet accomplished any of the requirements of this AD
action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the
future if this AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed
in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform
the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures
typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to
gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other
administrative actions.
Regulatory Impact
The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it
is determined that this final rule does not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866;
(2) is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a
significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial
number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action
and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained
from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption
ADDRESSES.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new
airworthiness directive:
2002-26-08 McDonnell Douglas: Amendment 39-12996. Docket 2002-NM-53-
AD.
Applicability: Model DC-9-11, DC-9-12, DC-9-13, DC-9-14, DC-9-
15, DC-9-15F,
[[Page 473]]
DC-9-21, DC-9-31, DC-9-32, DC-9-32 (VC-9C), DC-9-32F, DC-9-33F, DC-
9-34, DC-9-34F, DC-9-32F (C-9A, C-9B), DC-9-41, DC-9-51, DC-9-81
(MD-81), DC-9-82 (MD-82), DC-9-83 (MD-83), DC-9-87 (MD-87), and MD-
88 airplanes; as listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC9-24A189,
dated December 12, 2001; certificated in any category.
Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the
preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been
modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the
requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified,
altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of
this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an
alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (d) of
this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of
the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition
addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been
eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to
address it.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished
previously.
To prevent the emergency power switch knob from conducting
electricity, which could result in delivery of an electrical shock
and consequent injury to flightcrew or maintenance personnel,
accomplish the following:
Replacement
(a) Within 12 months after the effective date of this AD,
replace the emergency power switch knob on the overhead switch panel
in the flight compartment with a new, improved knob, having part
number 4957249-9, made of non-conductive material, according to the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC9-
24A189, Revision 02, dated October 8, 2002; excluding Evaluation
Form.
(b) Replacements done before the effective date of this AD
according to Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC9-24A189, dated
December 12, 2001; or Revision 01, dated August 5, 2002; both
excluding Evaluation Form, are acceptable for compliance with the
replacement required by paragraph (a) of this AD.
Part Installation
(c) As of the effective date of this AD, no person shall install
an emergency power switch knob having part number 4957249-1,
4957249-501, or 4957249-503, on the overhead switch panel in the
flight compartment of any airplane.
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification
Office (ACO), FAA. Operators shall submit their requests through an
appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add
comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.
Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved
alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be
obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.
Special Flight Permits
(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with
sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14
CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where
the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
Incorporation by Reference
(f) The replacement shall be done in accordance with Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin DC9-24A189, Revision 02, dated October 8,
2002, excluding Evaluation Form. This incorporation by reference was
approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with
5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from
Boeing Commercial Aircraft Group, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood
Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and Service
Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024). Copies may be inspected at the
FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington; or at the FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification
Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California; or at the
Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite
700, Washington, DC.
Effective Date
(g) This amendment becomes effective on February 10, 2003.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 24, 2002.
Vi L. Lipski,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 03-30 Filed 1-3-03; 8:45 am]
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