- B. Reports.1. Introductory Remarks.
- 2 Staff Dapart
- Staff Report.
 Congressional Report.
- A Deadarst Demonst
- 4. Budget Report.
- 5. Reports on Policy and General Matters.
 - a. Challenge Grants.
 - b. Education Programs.
 - c. Preservation and Access.
 - d. Research Programs.
 - e. Heroes of History Lecture.

The remainder of the proposed meeting will be given to the consideration of specific applications and closed to the public for the reasons stated above.

Further information about this meeting can be obtained from Daniel Schneider, Advisory Committee Management Officer, National Endowment for the Humanities, 1100 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20506, or by calling (202) 606–8322, TDD (202) 606–8282. Advance notice of any special needs or accommodations is appreciated.

Michael McDonald,

Acting Advisory Committee, Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 04–24699 Filed 11–4–04; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7536–01–P

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

President's Committee on the National Medal of Science; Notice of Meeting

In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92– 463, as amended), the National Science Foundation announces the following meeting:

Name: President's Committee on the National Medal of Science (1182).

Date and Time: Tuesday, November 23, 2004, 8:30 a.m.–2 p.m.

Place: Room 1235, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Blvd, Arlington, VA.

Type of Meeting: Closed.

Contact Person: Mrs. Susan E. Fannoney, Program Manager, Room 1220, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Blvd, Arlington, VA 22230. Telephone: 703/292– 8096.

Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice and recommendations to the President in the selection of the 2004 National Medal of Science recipients.

Agenda: To review and evaluate nominations as part of the selection process for awards.

Reason for Closing: The nominations being reviewed include information of a personal nature where disclosure would constitute unwarranted invasions of personal privacy. These matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(6) of the Government in the Sunshine Act. Dated: November 2, 2004. **Susanne Bolton,** *Committee Management Officer.* [FR Doc. 04–24734 Filed 11–4–04; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7555–01–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-390]

Tennessee Valley Authority; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF– 90, issued to Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee), Docket No. 50– 390, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rhea County, Tennessee.

The proposed amendment would provide a one-time change to Function 4a, "Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hot Leg Temperature Indication," of Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.3.4–1. The proposed amendment would allow Watts Bar Unit 1 to continue operating until the next refueling outage (scheduled for the spring of 2005) with one out of four RCS hot leg temperature indications inoperable in the Auxiliary Control Room.

The reason for the exigency is the unanticipated failure of Temperature Indicator (TI) 1–TI–68–65C that provides indication in the Auxiliary Control Room (ACR) for the hot leg temperature of RCS Loop 4. Upon discovery of this condition, TVA entered Action A of TS 3.3.4. The 30day allowed outage time for Action A of TS 3.3.4 will expire on November 20, 2004, at approximately 2:27 p.m. e.s.t. Based on the actions taken, the problem most likely exists in the instrumentation (transmitter or thermocouple) located within the Reactor Building's Polar Crane Wall. While the plant is operating, the radiological conditions in this area prohibit access by plant personnel. Therefore, the repairs cannot be safely implemented until the unit is shut down. If the proposed amendment is not granted, TS 3.3.4 would require that plant to be shut down by November 20, 2004, as repairs to the Loop 4 TI cannot be made while operating. The shutdown of the plant would result in an unnecessary operational transient since the indication parameters that remain available in the ACR are

adequate to safely shut down the plant should an emergency arise.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for amendments to be granted under exigent circumstances, the NRC staff must determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

No. The proposed TS change to allow operation with only 3 of 4 loop remote shutdown indications for Reactor Coolant System hot leg temperature until the Spring 2005 refueling outage is only applicable to the following conditions:

- 1. Fire or smoke in the Main Control Room (MCR),
- 2 An evacuation of the MCR due to some other (non-fire) unspecified reason, and
- 3. The design basis flood.

The inoperability of the one T(hot) indicator does not change the probability of occurrence for these events since it is not an accident initiator. The T(hot) indicators on the four loops are non-safety related equipment. During safe shutdown for a MCR evacuation event, design basis flood or fire related event, no fuel damage is postulated to occur, nor is the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or containment barriers postulated to be lost. Sufficient redundancy exists with the operational instrumentation to ensure that decay heat removal functions are not adversely impacted by this change. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

No. The proposed TS change does not alter the function of the Remote Shutdown System which is to achieve and maintain safe reactor shutdown from outside the MCR. The TS instrumentation and controls required will be such that sufficient capability is retained for