electronics and electrical systems to command and control airplanes have made it necessary to provide adequate protection.

To ensure that a level of safety is achieved equivalent to that intended by the regulations incorporated by reference, special conditions are needed for the Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation Model G–1159, G–1159A, and G–1159B series airplanes. These special conditions require that new avionics/electronics and electrical systems that perform critical functions be designed and installed to preclude component damage and interruption of function due to both the direct and indirect effects of HIRF.

#### High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)

With the trend toward increased power levels from ground-based transmitters, and the advent of space and satellite communications coupled with electronic command and control of the airplane, the immunity of critical digital avionics/electronics and electrical systems to HIRF must be established.

It is not possible to precisely define the HIRF to which the airplane will be exposed in service. There is also uncertainty concerning the effectiveness of airframe shielding for HIRF. Furthermore, coupling of electromagnetic energy to cockpitinstalled equipment through the cockpit window apertures is undefined. Based on surveys and analysis of existing HIRF emitters, an adequate level of protection exists when compliance with the HIRF protection special condition is shown with either paragraph 1 or 2 below:

1. A minimum threat of 100 volts rms (root-mean-square) per meter electric field strength from 10 KHz to 18 GHz.

a. The threat must be applied to the system elements and their associated wiring harnesses without the benefit of airframe shielding.

b. Demonstration of this level of protection is established through system tests and analysis.

2. A threat external to the airframe of the field strengths identified in the table below for the frequency ranges indicated. Both peak and average field strength components from the table are to be demonstrated.

Frequency	Field strength (volts per meter)	
	Peak	Average
10 kHz–100 kHz 100 kHz–500 kHz 500 kHz–2 MHz 2 MHz–30 MHz 30 MHz–70 MHz	50 50 50 100 50	50 50 50 100 50

Frequency	Field strength (volts per meter)	
	Peak	Average
70 MHz–100 MHz	50	50
100 MHz-200 MHz	100	100
200 MHz-400 MHz	100	100
400 MHz-700 MHz	700	50
700 MHz-1 GHz	700	100
1 GHz–2 GHz	2000	200
2GHz–4 GHz	3000	200
4 GHz–6 GHz	3000	200
6 GHz–8 GHz	1000	200
8 GHz–12 GHz	3000	300
12 GHz-18 GHz	2000	200
18 GHz-40 GHz	600	200

The field strengths are expressed in terms of peak of the root-mean-square (rms) over the complete modulation period.

The threat levels identified above are the result of an FAA review of existing studies on the subject of HIRF, in light of the ongoing work of the Electromagnetic Effects Harmonization Working Group of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee.

Applicability: As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation Model G–1159, G–1159A, and G–1159B series airplanes. Should Business Jet Technologies apply at a later date for a supplemental type certificate to modify any other model included on Type Certificate No. A12EA to incorporate the same or similar novel or unusual design feature, these special conditions would apply to that model as well as under the provisions of § 21.101.

#### Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on the Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation Model G–1159, G–1159A, and G–1159B series airplanes. It is not a rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the airplane.

The substance of the special conditions for these airplanes has been subjected to the notice and comment procedure in several prior instances and has been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. Because a delay would significantly affect the certification of the airplane, which is imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special conditions immediately. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment described above.

#### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

• The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

#### **The Special Conditions**

■ Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the supplemental type certification basis for the Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation Model G–1159, G–1159A, and G–1159B series airplanes modified by Business Jet Technologies:

1. Protection From Unwanted Effects of High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF). Each electrical and electronic system that performs critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operation and operational capability of these systems to perform critical functions are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to high intensity radiated fields.

2. For the purpose of these special conditions, the following definition applies:

*Critical Functions:* Functions whose failure would contribute to or cause a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 18, 2004.

#### Kalene C. Yanamura,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 04–23861 Filed 10–25–04; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

#### **DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

#### **Federal Aviation Administration**

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2004-18033; Directorate Identifier 2004-CE-16-AD; Amendment 39-13828; AD 2004-21-08]

#### RIN 2120-AA64

#### Airworthiness Directives; Cessna Aircraft Company Models 190, 195 (L– 126A,B,C), 195A, and 195B Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. **ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Models 190, 195 (L–126A,B,C), 195A,

and 195B airplanes that are equipped with certain inboard aileron hinge brackets. This AD requires you to repetitively inspect the affected inboard aileron hinge brackets for cracks or corrosion and replace them if found cracked or corroded. Replacement with aluminum brackets would terminate the need for the repetitive inspections. This AD results from several reports of cracks and corrosion found on the magnesium aileron hinge brackets. Magnesium is known to be susceptible to corrosion. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct corrosion damage to the inboard aileron hinge brackets. Such damage could result in the brackets cracking across the bearing boss and could lead to the aileron separating from the airplane with consequent reduced or loss of control of the airplane. **DATES:** This AD becomes effective on November 30, 2004.

As of November 30, 2004, the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulation.

**ADDRESSES:** To get the service information identified in this AD, contact Cessna Aircraft Company, Product Support P.O. Box 7706, Wichita, Kansas 67277; telephone: (316) 517–5800; facsimile: (316) 942–9006. To review this service information, go to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, go to: http:// www.archives.gov/federal\_register/ code\_of\_federal\_regulations/ ibr\_locations.html or call (202) 741– 6030.

To view the AD docket, go to the Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590– 0001 or on the Internet at *http:// dms.dot.gov.* The docket number is FAA–2004–18033; Directorate Identifier 2004–CE–16–AD.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary

D. Park, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209; telephone: (316) 946–4123; facsimile: (316) 946–4107.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### Discussion

What events have caused this AD? The FAA has received several reports of cracks and corrosion on part number (P/ N) 0322709 and P/N 0322709–1 inboard aileron hinge brackets on Cessna Models 190, 195 (L–126A,B,C), 195A, and 195B airplanes. These inboard aileron hinge brackets are constructed of magnesium, which is highly susceptible to corrosion.

When corrosion starts to develop, the inboard aileron hinge brackets could crack across the bearing boss.

What is the potential impact if FAA took no action? Cracked or corroded inboard aileron hinge brackets, if not detected and corrected, could result in the ailerons separating from the airplane with consequent reduced or loss of control of the airplane.

Has FAA taken any action to this *point?* We issued a proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an AD that would apply to all Cessna Models 190, 195 (L-126A,B,C), 195A, and 195B airplanes. This proposal was published in the Federal Register as a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on July 15, 2004 (69 FR 42358). The NPRM proposed to require you to repetitively inspect the affected inboard aileron hinge brackets for cracks or corrosion and replace them if found cracked or corroded. Replacement with aluminum brackets would terminate the need for the repetitive inspections.

Accomplishment of the proposed inspections would be following Cessna Single Engine Service Bulletin SEB04– 1, dated April 26, 2004.

#### Comments

Was the public invited to comment? We provided the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal and FAA's response to each comment:

#### Comment Issue No. 1: Allow for Replacement of Inboard Aileron Hinge Brackets Other Than Cessna Inboard Aileron Hinge Brackets

What is the commenter's concern? Several commenters point out that the NPRM is confusing. They state that the NPRM preamble states that you must replace any inboard aileron hinge bracket made from magnesium with one made from aluminum. However, the actual AD portion of the NPRM refers to replacing with inboard aileron hinge brackets as specified in Cessna Single Engine Service Bulletin SEB04–1, dated April 26, 2004. The commenters believe that this could be confusing in the field as to whether you can install non-Cessna parts.

Some of these commenters wanted FAA to list the parts that were approved for installation, including Cessna parts, supplemental type certificate (STC) parts, and parts manufacturer approval (PMA) parts.

What is FAA's response to the concern? The FAA agrees that the

NPRM is confusing. The intent was to allow installation of any FAA-approved inboard aileron hinge bracket that is made from aluminum as terminating action for the repetitive inspections. We will rewrite this portion of the AD to ensure that the intent is communicated correctly.

However, listing all approved replacement inboard aileron hinge brackets in the AD is a tedious task and one that could become burdensome if others wanted the list updated at a later time. Therefore, we are not including a list of FAA-approved replacement parts. We will include information that states that FAA-approved replacement parts may be Cessna parts, STC parts, or PMA parts, etc.

The final rule reflects the change in wording to ensure the understanding that you may install non-Cessna parts.

#### Comment Issue No. 2: Refer to the Model 195 Airplanes as Model 195 (L– 126A,B,C) Airplanes

What is the commenter's concern? One commenter recommends that FAA change reference to the Model 195 airplanes in the applicability to Model 195 (L–126A,B,C) airplanes. This would coincide with Type Certificate Data Sheet A–790, Revision 36, dated March 31, 2003.

What is FAA's response to the concern? The FAA agrees and will change the final rule AD accordingly.

#### Conclusion

What is FAA's final determination on this issue? We have carefully reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed except for the changes discussed above and minor editorial corrections. We have determined that these changes and minor corrections:

- —Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM for correcting the unsafe condition; and
- —Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM.

#### **Docket Information**

Where can I go to view the docket information? You may view the AD docket that contains information relating to this subject in person at the DMS Docket Offices between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. (eastern standard time), Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Docket Office (telephone 1–800– 647–5227) is located on the plaza level of the Department of Transportation NASSIF Building at the street address stated in **ADDRESSES.** You may also view the AD docket on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov.

# Changes to 14 CFR Part 39—Effect on the AD

How does the revision to 14 CFR part 39 affect this AD? On July 10, 2002, the FAA published a new version of 14 CFR part 39 (67 FR 47997, July 22, 2002), which governs the FAA's AD system. This regulation now includes material that relates to altered products, special flight permits, and alternative methods of compliance. This material previously was included in each individual AD. Since this material is included in 14 CFR part 39, we will not include it in future AD actions.

#### **Costs of Compliance**

How many airplanes does this AD impact? We estimate that this AD affects 1,180 airplanes in the U.S. registry.

What is the cost impact of this AD on owners/operators of the affected airplanes? We estimate the following costs to do this proposed inspection:

Labor cost	Parts cost	Total cost per air- plane	Total cost on U.S. operators
1 workhour $\times$ \$65 per hour = \$65	No special parts necessary for inspec- tion.	\$65	1,180 airplanes × \$65 = \$76,700.

We estimate the following costs to do any necessary replacements that would be required based on the results of this proposed inspection. We have no way of determining the number of airplanes that may need this replacement:

Labor cost	Parts cost	Total cost per air- plane
6 workhours $\times$ \$65 per hour = \$390	\$2,954	\$3,344

#### **Regulatory Findings**

Will this AD impact various entities? We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

Will this AD involve a significant rule or regulatory action? For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

1. Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866;

2. Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and

3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary by sending a request to us at the address listed under **ADDRESSES**. Include "Docket No. FAA–2004–18033; Directorate Identifier 2004–CE–16–AD'' in your request.

#### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

#### Adoption of the Amendment

■ Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

#### PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

#### §39.13 [Amended]

■ 2. FAA amends § 39.13 by adding a new AD to read as follows:

2004–21–08 Cessna Aircraft Company: Amendment 39–13828; Docket No. FAA–2004–18033; Directorate Identifier 2004–CE–16–AD.

#### When Does This AD Become Effective?

(a) This AD becomes effective on November 30, 2004.

What Other ADs Are Affected by This Action?

(b) None.

#### What Airplanes Are Affected by This AD?

(c) This AD affects Models 190, 195 (L– 126A, B, C), 195A, and 195B airplanes, all serial numbers, that are:

(1) certificated in any category; and

(2) equipped with at least one part number (P/N) 0322709 or P/N 0322709–1 inboard aileron hinge bracket.

### What Is the Unsafe Condition Presented in This AD?

(d) This AD is the result of several reports of cracks and corrosion found on the magnesium aileron hinge brackets. Magnesium is known to be susceptible to corrosion. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct corrosion damage to the inboard aileron hinge brackets. Such damage could result in the brackets cracking across the bearing boss and could lead to the aileron separating from the airplane with consequent reduced or loss of control of the airplane.

#### What Must I Do To Address This Problem?

(e) To address this problem, you must do the following:

Actions	Compliance	Procedures
(1) Inspect each P/N 0322709 and P/N 0322709–1 inboard aileron hinge bracket or any other bracket made from magnesium for cracks or corrosion.		Follow the procedures in Cessna Single En- gine Service Bulletin SEB04–1, dated April 26, 2004.

Actions	Compliance	Procedures
<ul> <li>(2) Replace any cracked or corroded inboard aileron hinge bracket.</li> <li>(i) If replacement is with a bracket made from magnesium, do the 100-hour TIS interval repetitive inspections as required in paragraph (e)(1) of this AD.</li> <li>(ii) If replacement is with an FAA-approved bracket that is made from aluminum, then no further inspections are necessary. These can</li> </ul>	Prior to further flight after any inspection where any cracked or corroded bracket is found. You may terminate the repetitive in- spections required by this AD when all brackets are replaced with FAA-approved brackets that are made with aluminum, as specified in the service information.	Use the procedures included with the FAA-approved replacement and the FAA-approved maintenance manual. This could include Cessna parts, supplemental type certificate (STC) parts, or parts manufacturer approval (PMA) parts, etc.
<ul> <li>be Cessna parts or non-Cessna parts.</li> <li>(3) As terminating action for the repetitive inspections, you may replace all inboard aileron hinge brackets with FAA-approved brackets that are made from aluminum (as specified in paragraph (e)(2)(ii) of this AD) regardless if any corrosion or crack is found.</li> </ul>	You may do this replacement at any time, but you must replace any corroded or cracked bracket prior to further flight after the appli- cable inspection where any corrosion or crack is found.	Use the procedures included with the approved replacement and the FAA-approved maintenance manual. This could include Cessna parts, STC parts, or PMA parts, etc.

## May I Request an Alternative Method of Compliance?

(f) You may request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD by following the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Unless FAA authorizes otherwise, send your request to your principal inspector. The principal inspector may add comments and will send your request to the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, FAA. For information on any already approved alternative methods of compliance, contact Gary D. Park, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209; telephone: (316) 946–4123; facsimile: (316) 946–4107.

#### Does This AD Incorporate Any Material by Reference?

(g) You must do the inspections required by this AD following the instructions in Cessna Single Engine Service Bulletin SEB04–1, dated April 26, 2004. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service bulletin in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. To get a copy of this service information, contact Cessna Aircraft Company, Product Support P.O. Box 7706, Wichita, Kansas 67277; telephone: (316) 517-5800; facsimile: (316) 942-9006. To review copies of this service information, go to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal\_register/ code\_of\_federal\_regulations/ ibr\_locations.html or call (202) 741-6030. To view the AD docket, go to the Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590-001 or on the Internet at http:// dms.dot.gov. The docket number is FAA-2004-18033.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on October 13, 2004.

#### William J. Timberlake,

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 04–23729 Filed 10–25–04; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

#### DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

**Federal Aviation Administration** 

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2003–NM–90–AD; Amendment 39–13804; AD 2004–19–10]

#### RIN 2120-AA64

#### Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737–100, –200, –200C, –300, –400, and –500 Series Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT. **ACTION:** Final rule: correction.

**SUMMARY:** This document corrects a typographical error that appeared in airworthiness directive (AD) 2004-19-10 that was published in the Federal Register on September 27, 2004 (69 FR 57632). The typographical error resulted in the omission of the AD number in one location of the document. This AD is applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for corrosion and cracking of the pivot hinge pins of the horizontal stabilizer, certain follow-on inspections, and replacement of the hinge pins with new or serviceable pins if necessary.

### **DATES:** Effective November 1, 2004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nancy Marsh, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM–120S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056; telephone (425) 917–6440; fax (425) 917–6590.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2004–19– 10, amendment 39–13804, applicable to certain Boeing Model 737–100, –200, –200C, –300, –400, and –500 series airplanes, was published in the **Federal Register** on September 27, 2004 (69 FR 57632). That AD requires repetitive inspections for corrosion and cracking of the pivot hinge pins of the horizontal stabilizer, certain follow-on inspections, and replacement of the hinge pins with new or serviceable pins if necessary.

As published, the AD number is missing in the Product Identification line in the regulatory text of the AD. The correct AD number is 2004–19–10. The AD number is referenced correctly throughout the remainder of the AD.

Since no other part of the regulatory information has been changed, the final rule is not being republished in the **Federal Register**.

The effective date of this AD remains November 1, 2004.

#### §39.13 [Corrected]

■ On page 57634, in the third column, the Product Identification line of AD 2004–19–10 is corrected to read as follows:

\*

**2004–19–10 Boeing:** Amendment 39–13804. Docket 2003–NM–90–AD.

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Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 18, 2004.

#### Kalene C. Yanamura,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 04–23928 Filed 10–25–04; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P