[Federal Register: November 24, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 226)]
[Notices]
[Page 68364-68369]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr24no04-80]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
[Report No. AUC-04-59-A; (Auction No. 59); DA 04-3198]
Multiple Address Systems Spectrum Auction; Reserve Prices or
Minimum Opening Bids and Other Auction Procedures
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Notice.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This document announces the auction of 4,226 Multiple Address
Systems (MAS) licenses in the Fixed Microwave Services from the 928/959
and 932/941 MHz bands scheduled to commence on April 26, 2005 (Auction
No. 59). This document also seeks comment on reserve prices or minimum
opening bids and other auction procedures for Auction No. 59.
DATES: Comments are due on or before December 2, 2004, and reply
comments are due on or before December 9, 2004.
ADDRESSES: Comments and reply comments must be sent by electronic mail
to the following address: auction59@fcc.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For legal questions: Howard Davenport,
Auctions and Spectrum Access Division (202) 418-0660. For general
auction questions: Roy Knowles or Barbara Sibert (717) 338-2888. For
service rule questions, contact the Public Safety and Critical
Infrastructure Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, as
follows: John Evanoff, (202) 418-0680; or Joan Howery, (717) 338-2646.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Public
Notice released on November 15, 2004. The complete text of the Auction
No. 59 Comment Public Notice, including attachments and of related
Commission documents is available for public inspection and copying
during regular business hours at the FCC Reference Information Center,
Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554.
The Auction No. 59 Comment Public Notice and related Commission
documents may also be purchased from the Commission's duplicating
contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc. (``BCPI''), Portals II, 445
12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC, 20554, telephone 202-
488-5300, facsimile 202-488-5563, or you may contact BCPI at its Web
site: http://www.BCPIWEB.com When ordering documents from BCPI, please
provide the appropriate FCC document number (for example, FCC 00-313
for the C/F Block Sixth Report and Order). The Auction No. 59 Comment
Public Notice and related documents are also available on the Internet
at the Commission's Web site: http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/59/.
I. General Information
1. By the Auction No. 59 Public Notice, the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau (``Bureau'') announces the auction of 4,226
Multiple Address Systems (``MAS'') licenses in the Fixed Microwave
Services from the 928/959 and 932/941 MHz bands to commence on April
26, 2005 (Auction No. 59). In Auction No. 59, licenses will be offered
in each of the 176 geographic areas known as Economic Areas (EAs),
where available. These geographic areas encompass the United States,
Guam and the Northern Marianas Islands, Puerto Rico and the United
States Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Gulf of Mexico. Due to
the large number of licenses in Auction No. 59, the complete list of
licenses available for this auction will be provided in electronic
format
[[Page 68365]]
only, available as Attachment A of Auction No. 59 Comment Public
Notice.
2. The following table contains the MAS block/frequency bands
cross-reference list for Auction No. 59:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Frequency bands\*\
Block (MHz) Total bandwidth\**\ Pairing Geographic area type
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AA.................. 928.85625 / 959.85625... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AB.................. 928.86875 / 959.86875... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AC.................. 928.88125 / 959.88125... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AD.................. 928.89375 / 959.89375... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AE.................. 928.90625 / 959.90625... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AF.................. 928.91875 / 959.91875... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AG.................. 928.93125 / 959.93125... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AH.................. 928.94375 / 959.94375... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AI.................. 928.95625 / 959.95625... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AJ.................. 928.96875 / 959.96875... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AK.................. 928.98125 / 959.98125... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AL.................. 928.99375 / 959.99375... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AM.................. 932.00625 / 941.00625... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AN.................. 932.01875 / 941.01875... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AO.................. 932.03125 / 941.03125... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AP.................. 932.04375 / 941.04375... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AQ.................. 932.05625 / 941.05625... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AR.................. 932.06875 / 941.06875... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AS.................. 932.08125 / 941.08125... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AT.................. 932.09375 / 941.09375... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AU.................. 932.15625 / 941.15625... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AV.................. 932.16875 / 941.16875... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AW.................. 932.18125 / 941.18125... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AX.................. 932.19375 / 941.19375... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AY.................. 932.20625 / 941.20625... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
AZ.................. 932.21875 / 941.21875... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
BA.................. 932.23125 / 941.23125... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
BB.................. 932.24375 / 941.24375... 25 kHz............. 2 x 12.5 kHz...... EA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\*\ The individual frequencies listed in this chart are the center frequencies of each frequency pair in the
block to be auctioned. See 47 CFR 101.147(b)(3), (4). Each block consists of two channels of equal bandwidth.
For example, in Block AA, 928.85625 and 959.85625 are the center frequencies and each frequency pair is
comprised of two 12.5 kHz wide channels. Therefore, the two channels in Block AA are 928.8500-928.8625 MHz and
959.8500-959.8625 MHz.
\**\ ``Total Bandwidth'' represents the total bandwidth for the block, which is the combination of each channel
in the pair.
Note: For Auction No. 59, licenses are not available in every block listed in the above table in every market.
The complete list of licenses available for Auction No. 59 will be provided in electronic format only,
available as Attachment A to the Auction No. 59 Comment Public Notice.
3. The Communications Act requires the Commission to ``ensure that,
in the scheduling of any competitive bidding under this subsection, an
adequate period is allowed * * * before issuance of bidding rules, to
permit notice and comment on proposed auction procedures. * * *''
Consistent with the provisions of the Communications Act and to ensure
that potential bidders have adequate time to familiarize themselves
with the specific rules that will govern the day-to-day conduct of an
auction, the Commission directed the Bureau, under its existing
delegated authority, to seek comment on a variety of auction-specific
procedures prior to the start of each auction. The Bureau therefore
seeks comment on the following issues relating to Auction No. 59.
II. Auction Structure
A. Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction Design
4. The Bureau proposes to award all licenses included in Auction
No. 59 in a simultaneous multiple-round auction. As described further
below, this methodology offers every license for bid at the same time
with successive bidding rounds in which bidders may place bids. The
Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
B. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility
5. The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine
an appropriate upfront payment for each license being auctioned, taking
into account such factors as the population in each geographic license
area and the value of similar spectrum. As described further below, the
upfront payment is a refundable deposit made by each bidder to
establish eligibility to bid on licenses. Upfront payments related to
the specific spectrum subject to auction protect against frivolous or
insincere bidding and provide the Commission with a source of funds
from which to collect payments owed at the close of the auction. With
these guidelines in mind for Auction No. 59, we propose to calculate
upfront payments on a license-by-license basis using the following
formula:
$0.00000375 * kHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000
per license.
6. Accordingly, in Attachment A of the Auction No. 59 Comment
Public Notice we list all licenses included in Auction No. 59 and the
proposed upfront payment for each license. Attachment A of the Auction
No. 59 Comment Public Notice is available in electronic format. The
Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
7. The Bureau further proposes that the amount of the upfront
payment submitted by a bidder will determine the maximum number of
bidding units on which a bidder may place bids. This limit is a
bidder's initial eligibility. Each license is assigned a specific
number of bidding units equal to the upfront payment listed in
Attachment A of the Auction No. 59 Comment Public Notice, on a bidding
unit per dollar basis. This number does not change as prices rise
during the auction. A bidder's upfront payment is not attributed to
specific
[[Page 68366]]
licenses. Rather, a bidder may place bids on any combination of
licenses as long as the total number of bidding units associated with
those licenses does not exceed its current eligibility. Eligibility
cannot be increased during the auction. Thus, in calculating its
upfront payment amount, an applicant must determine the maximum number
of bidding units it may wish to bid on (or hold high bids on) in any
single round, and submit an upfront payment covering that number of
bidding units. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
C. Activity Rules
8. In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively on a
percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each round of
the auction rather than waiting until the end to participate. A bidder
that does not satisfy the activity rule will either lose bidding
eligibility in the next round or must use an activity rule waiver (if
any remain).
9. The Bureau proposes to divide the auction into two stages, each
characterized by an increased activity requirement. The auction will
start in Stage One. The Bureau proposes that the auction generally will
advance from Stage One to Stage Two when the auction activity level, as
measured by the percentage of bidding units receiving new high bids, is
approximately twenty percent or below for three consecutive rounds of
bidding. However, the Bureau further proposes that it retains the
discretion to change stages unilaterally by announcement during the
auction. In exercising this discretion, the Bureau will consider a
variety of measures of bidder activity, including, but not limited to,
the auction activity level, the percentage of licenses (as measured in
bidding units) on which there are new bids, the number of new bids, and
the percentage increase in revenue. The Bureau seeks comment on these
proposals.
10. For Auction No. 59, we propose the following activity
requirements:
Stage One: In each round of the first stage of the auction, a
bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility is required to be
active on licenses representing at least 80 percent of its current
bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain the requisite activity level
will result in a reduction in the bidder's bidding eligibility in the
next round of bidding (unless an activity rule waiver is used). During
Stage One, reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by
multiplying the current round activity by five-fourths (5/4).
Stage Two: In each round of the second stage, a bidder desiring to
maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on 95 percent
of its current bidding eligibility. In this final stage, reduced
eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the
current round activity by twenty-nineteenths (20/19).
11. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals. Commenters that
believe these activity rules should be modified should explain their
reasoning and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach.
Commenters are advised to support their claims with analyses and
suggested alternative activity rules.
D. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility
12. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's current
bidding eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round
being below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies
to an entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity
rule waivers can be either proactive or automatic and are principally a
mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of auction
eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent them from
placing a bid in a particular round.
Note: Once a proactive waiver is submitted, that waiver cannot
be unsubmitted, even if the round has not yet closed.
13. The FCC Automated Auction System assumes that bidders with
insufficient activity would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if
available) rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system
will automatically apply a waiver (known as an ``automatic waiver'') at
the end of any bidding period where a bidder's activity level is below
the minimum required unless: (i) there are no activity rule waivers
available; or (ii) the bidder overrides the automatic application of a
waiver by reducing eligibility, thereby meeting the minimum
requirements.
Note: If a bidder has no waivers remaining and does not satisfy
the required activity level, its current eligibility will be
permanently reduced, possibly eliminating the bidder from the
auction.
14. A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its
bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the
bidder must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism
during the bidding period by using the ``reduce eligibility'' function
in the bidding system. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is
permanently reduced to bring the bidder into compliance with the
activity rules as described above. Once eligibility has been reduced, a
bidder will not be permitted to regain its lost bidding eligibility.
15. A bidder may proactively use an activity rule waiver as a means
to keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder submits a
proactive waiver (using the proactive waiver function in the bidding
system) during a bidding period in which no bids or withdrawals are
submitted, the auction will remain open and the bidder's eligibility
will be preserved. An automatic waiver invoked in a round in which
there are no new valid bids or withdrawals will not keep the auction
open.
16. The Bureau proposes that each bidder in Auction No. 59 be
provided with three activity rule waivers that may be used at the
bidder's discretion during the course of the auction as set forth
above. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
E. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation
17. For Auction No. 59, the Bureau proposes that, by public notice
or by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend,
or cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical
obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding
activity, or administrative or weather necessity, or for any other
reason that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive
bidding. In such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect
to resume the auction starting from the beginning of the current round,
resume the auction starting from some previous round, or cancel the
auction in its entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to
delay or suspend the auction. The Bureau emphasizes that exercise of
this authority is solely within the discretion of the Bureau, and its
use is not intended to be a substitute for situations in which bidders
may wish to apply their activity rule waivers. The Bureau seeks comment
on this proposal.
III. Bidding Procedures
A. Round Structure
18. The Commission will conduct Auction No. 59 over the Internet.
Alternatively, telephonic bidding will also be available. The toll free
telephone number through which telephonic bidding may be accessed will
be announced in a later public notice. The FCC Wide Area Network will
no longer be available as a contingency plan.
[[Page 68367]]
19. The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public
notice to be released at least one week before the start of the
auction, and will be included in the registration mailings. The
simultaneous multiple-round format will consist of sequential bidding
rounds, each followed by the release of round results. Details
regarding the location and format of round results will be included in
the same public notice.
20. The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in
order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the
bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding
strategies. The Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for
the bidding rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds per day,
depending upon the bidding activity level and other factors. The Bureau
seeks comment on this proposal.
B. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid
21. The Communications Act calls upon the Commission to prescribe
methods for establishing a reasonable reserve price or a minimum
opening bid when FCC licenses are subject to auction, unless the
Commission determines that a reserve price or minimum opening bid is
not in the public interest. Consistent with this mandate, the
Commission has directed the Bureau to seek comment on the use of a
minimum opening bid and/or reserve price prior to the start of each
auction.
22. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below
which an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can
be either published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid, on the other
hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction
below which no bids are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate
the competitive bidding process. Also, the auctioneer often has the
discretion to lower the minimum opening bid amount later in the
auction. It is also possible for the minimum opening bid and the
reserve price to be the same amount.
23. In light of the Communications Act's requirements, the Bureau
proposes to establish minimum opening bids for Auction No. 59. The
Bureau believes a minimum opening bid, which has been used in other
auctions, is an effective bidding tool.
24. Specifically, for Auction No. 59, the Commission proposes the
following license-by-license formula for calculating minimum opening
bids:
$0.00000375 * kHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000
per license.
25. The specific minimum opening bid for each license available in
Auction No. 59 is set forth in Attachment A of Auction No. 59 Comment
Public Notice. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
26. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bids will
result in substantial numbers of ``unwon'' licenses, or are not
reasonable amounts, or should instead operate as reserve prices, they
should explain why this is so, and comment on the desirability of an
alternative approach. Commenters are advised to support their claims
with valuation analyses and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening
bid levels or formulas. In establishing the minimum opening bids, the
Bureau particularly seeks comment on such factors as the amount of
spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the availability of
technology to provide service, the size of the geographic service
areas, issues of interference with other spectrum bands and any other
relevant factors that could reasonably have an impact on valuation of
these MAS licenses. The Bureau also seeks comment on whether,
consistent with the Communications Act, the public interest would be
served by having no minimum opening bid or reserve price.
C. Minimum Acceptable Bids and Bid Increments
27. In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on a
given license in any of nine different amounts. The FCC Automated
Auction System interface will list the nine acceptable bid amounts for
each license. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum
acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum opening
bid. In the rounds after a bid is placed on a license, the minimum
acceptable bid for that license will be equal to the standing high bid
plus the defined increment.
28. Once there is a standing high bid on a license, the FCC
Automated Auction System will calculate a minimum acceptable bid for
that license for the following round, as described below. The
difference between the minimum acceptable bid and the standing high bid
for each license will define the bid increment. The nine acceptable bid
amounts for each license consist of the minimum acceptable bid (the
standing high bid plus one bid increment) and additional amounts
calculated using multiple bid increments (i.e., the second bid amount
equals the standing high bid plus two times the bid increment, the
third bid amount equals the standing high bid plus three times the bid
increment, etc.).
29. For Auction No. 59, the Bureau proposes to use a 10 percent bid
increment. This means that the minimum acceptable bid for a license
will be approximately 10 percent greater than the previous standing
high bid received on the license. The minimum acceptable bid amount
will be calculated by multiplying the standing high bid times one plus
the increment percentage `` i.e., (standing high bid) * (1.10). The
Commission will round the result using our standard rounding procedures
for minimum acceptable bid calculations: results above $10,000 are
rounded to the nearest $1,000; results below $10,000 but above $1,000
are rounded to the nearest $100; and results below $1,000 are rounded
to the nearest $10.
30. As stated above, until a bid has been placed on a license, the
minimum acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum
opening bid. The additional bid amounts are calculated using the
difference between the minimum opening bid times one plus the minimum
percentage increment, rounded as described above, and the minimum
opening bid. That is, I = (minimum opening bid)(1 + N){rounded{time} -
(minimum opening bid). Therefore, when N equals 0.1, the first
additional bid amount will be approximately ten percent higher than the
minimum opening bid; the second, twenty percent; the third, thirty
percent; etc.
31. In the case of a license for which the standing high bid has
been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid will equal the second
highest bid received for the license. The additional bid amounts are
calculated using the difference between the second highest bid times
one plus the minimum percentage increment, rounded, and the second
highest bid.
32. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum
acceptable bids and bid increments if it determines that circumstances
so dictate. The Bureau will do so by announcement in the Automated
Auction System. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.
D. High Bids
33. At the end of a bidding round, a high bid for each license will
be determined based on the highest gross bid amount received for the
license. In the event of identical high bids on a license in a given
round (i.e., tied bids), we propose to use a random number generator to
select a single high bid from among the tied bids. If the auction were
[[Page 68368]]
to end with no higher bids being placed for that license, the winning
bidder would be the one that placed the selected high bid. However, the
remaining bidders, as well as the high bidder, can submit higher bids
in subsequent rounds. If any bids are received on the license in a
subsequent round, the high bid again will be determined by the highest
gross bid amount received for the license. The Bureau seeks comment on
this proposal.
34. A high bid will remain the high bid until there is a higher bid
on the same license at the close of a subsequent round. A high bid from
a previous round is sometimes referred to as a ``standing high bid.''
Bidders are reminded that standing high bids count towards bidding
activity.
E. Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal
35. For Auction No. 59, the Bureau proposes the following bid
removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding
period, a bidder has the option of removing any bid placed in that
round. By removing selected bids in the bidding system, a bidder may
effectively ``unsubmit'' any bid placed within that round. A bidder
removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to a withdrawal
payment. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid.
36. A high bidder may withdraw its standing high bids from previous
rounds using the withdraw function in the bidding system. A high bidder
that withdraws its standing high bid from a previous round is subject
to the bid withdrawal payment provisions of the Commission rules. The
Bureau seeks comment on these bid removal and bid withdrawal
procedures.
37. In the Part 1 Third Report and Order, 63 FR 770, January 7,
1998, the Commission explained that allowing bid withdrawals
facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses and the pursuit of
efficient backup strategies as information becomes available during the
course of an auction. The Commission noted, however, that, in some
instances, bidders may seek to withdraw bids for improper reasons. The
Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in managing the auction, to limit
the number of withdrawals to prevent any bidding abuses. The Commission
stated that the Bureau should assertively exercise its discretion,
consider limiting the number of rounds in which bidders may withdraw
bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a particular market if the
Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing the Commission's bid withdrawal
procedures.
38. Applying this reasoning, the Bureau proposes to limit each
bidder in Auction No. 59 to withdrawing standing high bids in no more
than two rounds during the course of the auction. To permit a bidder to
withdraw bids in more than two rounds would likely encourage insincere
bidding or the use of withdrawals for anti-competitive purposes. The
two rounds in which withdrawals are utilized will be at the bidder's
discretion; withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance with the
Commission's rules. There is no limit on the number of standing high
bids that may be withdrawn in either of the rounds in which withdrawals
are utilized. Withdrawals will remain subject to the bid withdrawal
payment provisions specified in the Commission's rules. The Bureau
seeks comment on this proposal.
F. Stopping Rule
39. The Bureau has discretion to establish stopping rules before or
during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the auction within
a reasonable time. For Auction No. 59, the Bureau proposes to employ a
simultaneous stopping rule approach. A simultaneous stopping rule means
that all licenses remain available for bidding until bidding closes
simultaneously on all licenses.
40. Bidding will close simultaneously on all licenses after the
first round in which no new bids, proactive waivers, or withdrawals are
received. Thus, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding will
remain open on all licenses until bidding stops on every license.
41. However, the Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to
exercise any of the following options during Auction No. 59:
i. Utilize a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule.
The modified stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses
after the first round in which no bidder submits a proactive waiver,
withdrawal, or a new bid on any license on which it is not the standing
high bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing
a new bid on a license for which it is the standing high bidder would
not keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule. The Bureau
further seeks comment on whether this modified stopping rule should be
used at any time or only in stage two of the auction.
ii. Keep the auction open even if no new bids or proactive waivers
are submitted and no previous high bids are withdrawn. In this event,
the effect will be the same as if a bidder had submitted a proactive
waiver. The activity rule, therefore, will apply as usual and a bidder
with insufficient activity will either lose bidding eligibility or use
a remaining activity rule waiver.
iii. Declare that the auction will end after a specified number of
additional rounds (``special stopping rule''). If the Bureau invokes
this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified final
round(s) only for licenses on which the high bid increased in at least
one of a specified preceding number of rounds.
42. The Bureau proposes to exercise these options only in certain
circumstances, for example, where the auction is proceeding very
slowly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears likely
that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of time.
Before exercising these options, the Bureau is likely to attempt to
increase the pace of the auction by, for example, increasing the number
of bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the minimum
bid increments for the limited number of licenses where there is still
a high level of bidding activity. The Bureau seeks comment on these
proposals.
IV. Conclusion
43. Comments are due on or before December 2, 2004, and reply
comments are due on or before December 9, 2004. Because of the
disruption of regular mail and other deliveries in Washington, DC, the
Bureau requires that all comments and reply comments be filed
electronically. Comments and reply comments must be sent by electronic
mail to the following address: auction59@fcc.gov. The electronic mail
containing the comments or reply comments must include a subject or
caption referring to Auction No. 59 Comments and the name of the
commenting party. The Bureau requests that parties format any
attachments to electronic mail as Adobe[reg] Acrobat[reg] (pdf) or
Microsoft[reg] Word documents. Copies of comments and reply comments
will be available for public inspection during regular business hours
in the FCC Reference Information Center, Room CY-B402, 445 12th Street,
SW., Washington, DC 20554. In addition, the Bureau requests that
commenters fax a courtesy copy of their comments and reply comments to
the attention of Kathryn Garland at (717) 338-2850.
44. This proceeding has been designated as a ``permit-but-
disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte
rules. Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that
memoranda summarizing the presentations must contain
[[Page 68369]]
summaries of the substance of the presentations and not merely a
listing of the subjects discussed. More than a one or two sentence
description of the views and arguments presented is generally required.
Other rules pertaining to oral and written ex parte presentations in
permit-but-disclose proceedings are set forth in Sec. 1.1206(b) of the
Commission's rules.
Federal Communications Commission.
Gary D. Michaels,
Deputy Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, WTB.
[FR Doc. 04-26061 Filed 11-23-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P