Subpart 3.3—Reports of Suspected Antitrust Violations

3.301 General.

- (a) Practices that eliminate competition or restrain trade usually lead to excessive prices and may warrant criminal, civil, or administrative action against the participants. Examples of anticompetitive practices are collusive bidding, follow-the-leader pricing, rotated low bids, collusive price estimating systems, and sharing of the business.
- (b) Contracting personnel are an important potential source of investigative leads for antitrust enforcement and should therefore be sensitive to indications of unlawful behavior by offerors and contractors. Agency personnel shall report, in accordance with agency regulations, evidence of suspected antitrust violations in acquisitions for possible referral to (1) the Attorney General under 3.303 and (2) the agency office responsible for contractor debarment and suspension under subpart 9.4.

[48 FR 42108, Sept. 19, 1983, as amended at 50 FR 1727, Jan. 11, 1985; 50 FR 52429, Dec. 23, 1985]

3.302 Definitions.

As used in this subpart—

Identical bids means bids for the same line item that are determined to be identical as to unit price or total line item amount, with or without the application of evaluation factors (e.g., discount or transportation cost).

Line item means an item of supply or service, specified in a solicitation, that the offeror must separately price.

[49 FR 12974, Mar. 30, 1984, as amended at 66 FR 2127, Jan. 10, 2001; 67 FR 13055, Mar. 20, 2002]

3.303 Reporting suspected antitrust violations.

- (a) Agencies are required by 41 U.S.C. 253b(i) and 10 U.S.C. 2305(b)(9) to report to the Attorney General any bids or proposals that evidence a violation of the antitrust laws. These reports are in addition to those required by subpart q 4
- (b) The antitrust laws are intended to ensure that markets operate competi-

- tively. Any agreement or mutual understanding among competing firms that restrains the natural operation of market forces is suspect. Paragraph (c) below identifies behavior patterns that are often associated with antitrust violations. Activities meeting the descriptions in paragraph (c) are not necessarily improper, but they are sufficiently questionable to warrant notifying the appropriate authorities, in accordance with agency procedures.
- (c) Practices or events that may evidence violations of the antitrust laws include—
- (1) The existence of an *industry price* list or price agreement to which contractors refer in formulating their offers;
- (2) A sudden change from competitive bidding to identical bidding;
- (3) Simultaneous price increases or follow-the-leader pricing;
- (4) Rotation of bids or proposals, so that each competitor takes a turn in sequence as low bidder, or so that certain competitors bid low only on some sizes of contracts and high on other sizes:
- (5) Division of the market, so that certain competitors bid low only for contracts let by certain agencies, or for contracts in certain geographical areas, or on certain products, and bid high on all other jobs;
- (6) Establishment by competitors of a collusive price estimating system;
- (7) The filing of a joint bid by two or more competitors when at least one of the competitors has sufficient technical capability and productive capacity for contract performance;
- (8) Any incidents suggesting direct collusion among competitors, such as the appearance of identical calculation or spelling errors in two or more competitive offers or the submission by one firm of offers for other firms; and
- (9) Assertions by the employees, former employees, or competitors of offerors, that an agreement to restrain trade exists.
- (d) Identical bids shall be reported under this section if the agency has some reason to believe that the bids resulted from collusion.

3.400

- (e) For offers from foreign contractors for contracts to be performed outside the United States, contracting officers may refer suspected collusive offers to the authorities of the foreign government concerned for appropriate action.
- (f) Agency reports shall be addressed to the Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530, Attention: Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, and shall include—
- (1) A brief statement describing the suspected practice and the reason for the suspicion; and
- (2) The name, address, and telephone number of an individual in the agency who can be contacted for further information.
- (g) Questions concerning this reporting requirement may be communicated by telephone directly to the Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division.

[48 FR 42108, Sept. 19, 1983, as amended at 49 FR 12974, Mar. 30, 1984; 50 FR 1727, Jan. 11, 1985; 50 FR 52429, Dec. 23, 1985; 55 FR 25526, June 21, 1990; 65 FR 36030, June 6, 2000]

Subpart 3.4—Contingent Fees

3.400 Scope of subpart.

This subpart prescribes policies and procedures that restrict contingent fee arrangements for soliciting or obtaining Government contracts to those permitted by 10 U.S.C. 2306(b) and 41 U.S.C. 254(a).

3.401 Definitions.

As used in this subpart—

Bona fide agency, means an established commercial or selling agency, maintained by a contractor for the purpose of securing business, that neither exerts nor proposes to exert improper influence to solicit or obtain Government contracts nor holds itself out as being able to obtain any Government contract or contracts through improper influence.

Bona fide employee, means a person, employed by a contractor and subject to the contractor's supervision and control as to time, place, and manner of performance, who neither exerts nor proposes to exert improper influence to solicit or obtain Government contracts nor holds out as being able to obtain

any Government contract or contracts through improper influence.

Contingent fee, means any commission, percentage, brokerage, or other fee that is contingent upon the success that a person or concern has in securing a Government contract.

Improper influence, means any influence that induces or tends to induce a Government employee or officer to give consideration or to act regarding a Government contract on any basis other than the merits of the matter.

 $[48\ {\rm FR}\ 42108,\ {\rm Sept.}\ 19,\ 1983,\ {\rm as\ amended}\ {\rm at}\ 66\ {\rm FR}\ 2127,\ {\rm Jan.}\ 10,\ 2001]$

3.402 Statutory requirements.

Contractors' arrangements to pay contingent fees for soliciting or obtaining Government contracts have long been considered contrary to public policy because such arrangements may lead to attempted or actual exercise of improper influence. In 10 U.S.C. 2306(b) and 41 U.S.C. 254(a), Congress affirmed this public policy but permitted certain exceptions. These statutes—

- (a) Require in every negotiated contract a warranty by the contractor against contingent fees;
- (b) Permit, as an exception to the warranty, contingent fee arrangements between contractors and bona fide employees or bona fide agencies; and
- (c) Provide that, for breach or violation of the warranty by the contractor, the Government may annul the contract without liability or deduct from the contract price or consideration, or otherwise recover, the full amount of the contingent fee.

3.403 Applicability.

This subpart applies to all contracts. Statutory requirements for negotiated contracts are, as a matter of policy, extended to sealed bid contracts.

[48 FR 42108, Sept. 19, 1983, as amended at 50 FR 1727, Jan. 11, 1985; 50 FR 52429, Dec. 23, 1985]

3.404 Contract clause.

The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.203-5, Covenant Against Contingent Fees, in all solicitations and contracts exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold, other