agrees. The contracting officer ordinarily shall make calculations as future contracts are awarded and, within 3 months after their award, modify the instant contract to provide the contractor's share of savings. For future contract savings calculated under the optional lump-sum method, the sharing base is an estimate of the number of items that the contracting office will purchase for delivery during the sharing period. In deciding whether or not to use the more convenient lump-sum method for an individual VECP, the contracting officer shall consider—

(i) The accuracy with which the number of items to be delivered during the sharing period can be estimated and the probability of actual production of the projected quantity;

(ii) The availability of funds for a lump-sum payment; and

(iii) The administrative expense of amending the instant contract as future contracts are awarded.

(b) Construction contracts. Sharing on construction contracts applies only to savings on the instant contract and to collateral savings. The Government's share of savings is determined by subtracting Government costs from instant contract savings and multiplying the result by (1) 45 percent for fixedprice contracts; or (2) 75 percent for cost-reimbursement contracts. Value engineering sharing does not apply to incentive construction contracts.

[48 FR 42443, Sept. 19, 1983, as amended at 54
FR 5057, Jan. 31, 1989; 55 FR 3887, Feb. 5, 1990;
59 FR 11387, Mar. 10, 1994. Redesignated and amended at 64 FR 51847, 51848, Sept. 24, 1999]

#### 48.104–3 Sharing collateral savings.

(a) The Government shares collateral savings with the contractor, unless the head of the contracting activity has determined that the cost of calculating and tracking collateral savings will exceed the benefits to be derived (see 48.201(e)).

(b) The contractor's share of collateral savings may range from 20 to 100 percent of the estimated savings to be realized during a typical year of use but must not exceed the greater of—

(1) The contract's firm-fixed-price, target price, target cost, or estimated cost, at the time the VECP is accepted; or

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(2) \$100,000.

(c) The contracting officer must determine the sharing rate for each VECP.

(d) In determining collateral savings, the contracting officer must consider any degradation of performance, service life, or capability.

[64 FR 51848, Sept. 24, 1999]

## 48.104–4 Sharing alternative—no-cost settlement method.

In selecting an appropriate mechanism for incorporating a VECP into a contract, the contracting officer shall analyze the different approaches available to determine which one would be in the Government's best interest. Contracting officers should balance the administrative costs of negotiating a settlement against the anticipated savings. A no-cost settlement may be used if, in the contracting officer's judgment, reliance on other VECP approaches likely would not be more cost-effective, and the no-cost settlement would provide adequate consideration to the Government. Under this method of settlement, the contractor would keep all of the savings on the instant contract, and all savings on its concurrent contracts only. The Government would keep all savings resulting from concurrent contracts placed with other sources, savings from all future contracts, and all collateral savings. Use of this method must be by mutual agreement of both parties for individual VECPs.

[63 FR 34079, June 22, 1998. Redesignated at 64 FR 51847, Sept. 24, 1999]

#### 48.105 Relationship to other incentives.

Contractors should be offered the fullest possible range of motivation, yet the benefits of an accepted VECP should not be rewarded both as value engineering shares and under performance, design-to-cost, or similar incentives of the contract. To that end, when performance, design-to-cost, or similar targets are set and incentivized, the targets of such incentives affected by the VECP are not to be adjusted because of the acceptance of the VECP. Only those benefits of an accepted VECP not rewardable under

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other incentives are rewarded under a value engineering clause.

 $[48\ {\rm FR}\ 42443,\ {\rm Sept.}\ 19,\ 1983,\ {\rm as}\ {\rm amended}\ {\rm at}\ 54\ {\rm FR}\ 5057,\ {\rm Jan.}\ 31,\ 1989]$ 

### Subpart 48.2—Contract Clauses

# 48.201 Clauses for supply or service contracts.

(a) General. The contracting officer shall insert a value engineering clause in solicitations and contracts when the contract amount is expected to be \$100,000 or more, except as specified in subparagraphs (1) through (5) and in paragraph (f) below. A value engineering clause may be included in contracts of lesser value if the contracting officer sees a potential for significant savings. Unless the chief of the contracting office authorizes its inclusion, the contracting officer shall not include a value engineering clause in solicitations and contracts—

(1) For research and development other than full-scale development;

(2) For engineering services from notfor-profit or nonprofit organizations;

(3) For personal services (see subpart 37.1);

(4) Providing for product or component improvement, unless the value engineering incentive application is restricted to areas not covered by provisions for product or component improvement;

(5) For commercial products (see part 11) that do not involve packaging specifications or other special requirements or specifications; or

(6) When the agency head has exempted the contract (or a class of contracts) from the requirements of part 48.

(b) Value engineering incentive. To provide a value engineering incentive, the contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.248-1, Value Engineering, in solicitations and contracts except as provided in paragraph (a) above (but see subparagraph (e)(1) below).

(c) Value engineering program requirement. (1) If a mandatory value engineering effort is appropriate (i.e., if the contracting officer considers that substantial savings to the Government may result from a sustained value engineering effort of a specified level), the contracting officer shall use the clause with its Alternate I (but see subparagraph (e)(2) below).

(2) The value engineering program requirement may be specified by the Government in the solicitation or, in the case of negotiated contracting, proposed by the contractor as part of its offer and included as a subject for negotiation. The program requirement shall be shown as a separately priced line item in the contract Schedule.

(d) Value engineering incentive and program requirement. (1) If both a value engineering incentive and a mandatory program requirement are appropriate, the contracting officer shall use the clause with its Alternate II (but see subparagraph (e)(3) below).

(2) The contract shall restrict the value engineering program requirement to well-defined areas of performance designated by line item in the contract Schedule. Alternate II applies a value engineering program to the specified areas and a value engineering incentive to the remaining areas of the contract.

(e) Collateral savings computation not cost-effective. If the head of the contracting activity determines for a contract or class of contracts that the cost of computing and tracking collateral savings will exceed the benefits to be derived, the contracting officer shall use the clause with its—

(1) Alternate III if a value engineering incentive is involved;

(2) Alternate III and Alternate I if a value engineering program requirement is involved; or

(3) Alternate III and Alternate II if *both* an incentive and a program requirement are involved.

(f) Architect-engineering contracts. The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.248–2, Value Engineering— Architect-Engineer, in solicitations and contracts whenever the Government requires and pays for a specific value engineering effort in architect-engineer contracts. The clause at 52.248–1, Value Engineering, shall not be used in solicitations and contracts for architect-engineer services.

(g) Engineering-development solicitations and contracts. For engineering-development solicitations and contracts, and solicitations and contracts containing low-rate-initial-production or