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U.S. Policy Toward LibyaI appreciate the invitation to speak to you on current U.S. policy toward Libya and welcome the opportunity to address a topic of interest to many members. We have achieved significant success in meeting long-established goals, but this is a continuing story whose ending is as yet unclear.U.S. policy and policy goals vis-a-vis Libya have remained consistent through three Administrations. Our goals have been to end Libyan support for terrorism, prevent Tripoli's ability to obtain weapons of mass destruction, and contain Qadhafi's regional ambitions. Since Lockerbie, we have added additional aims, including bringing the persons responsible to justice. I would like to discuss current developments in the context of U.S. policy goals and unilateral and multilateral efforts on behalf of these goals, and consider what remains to be done. Prior to the Qadhafi regime, we enjoyed a generally warm relationship with the Libyans and pursued policies centered on our interests in operations at Wheelus Air Force Base with its 4,600 Americans the considerable U.S. oil interests, and other key issues. After Qadhafi's 1969 coup, the relationship quickly soured. Concerns about Libya's foreign policies came to dominate our policymaking. Chief among these concerns are state sponsorship of terrorism, support for groups violently opposed to Israel and the Peace Process, preventing of Tripoli's efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction, and unhelpful activities in neighboring African states. Since that time, the U.S. policy agenda toward Libya has been focused on these concerns. Although our commercial relationship with Libya flourished throughout the 1970s, the political relationship deteriorated, marked by confrontation and by intermittent reconciliation attempts on both sides. In the 1980s, we ended the longstanding commercial relationship and rejected any possibility of reconciliation so long as Libya pursued its policies of concern. We imposed sanctions piece-by-piece in response to Libyan support for terrorism, beginning with the disapproval of all further military sales to Libya and the designation of Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979. We ultimately imposed comprehensive sanctions on all commercial and financial transactions with Libya under an executive order in 1986. The unilateral sanctions regime against Libya has remained one of the most comprehensive. Also, in 1986, we identified Libya as responsible for the La Belle Disco bombing, and in retaliation bombed select military and terrorist-related targets in Tripoli and Benghazi. Our judgment on Libyan responsibility for the bombing was recently given additional credibility by new testimony in the Berlin trial of the La Belle bombing suspects. In the wake of the La Belle bombing, our European allies finally began to coordinate efforts against Libya. The EU resolved to reduce Libyan diplomatic presence abroad, embargo arms sales to Libya, and encourage policy and security cooperation against Libyan support for terrorism. We obtained UN Security Council support against Libya for its sponsorship of terrorism following evidence of Libyan involvement in the tragic 1988 Pan Am 103 and 1989 UTA 772 bombings. In 1992 and 1993, the Security Council passed a series of resolutions calling on Libya to surrender the suspects, accept responsibility for the actions of its officials, pay appropriate compensation, disclose all it knew of the crime and cooperate with the criminal investigation, cease all forms of terrorist action and assistance to terrorist groups, and prove its renunciation of terrorism by concrete actions. The Security Council imposed civil aviation, financial, and diplomatic sanctions against Libya. Carefully targeted, UN sanctions against Libya were for many years one of the most successful multilateral sanctions regimes. Rigorously observed sanctions succeeded in isolating Libya and limiting its access to dollars and other hard currencies for almost a decade. However, 2 years ago, support for the international sanctions began to fade. Deliberate violations by some states were increasing. We found little support to upgrade or even maintain the international sanctions. For 10 years, the United States made every effort to bring the perpetrators of the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103 to justice. Libya's surrender of the Pan Am 103 suspects came as a result of our intensive efforts to bring them to trial. Beginning in the fall of 1997, along with the British and the Dutch, we developed a detailed plan for a trial before a Scottish court seated in the Netherlands. After we unveiled the plan in August 1998, the UN Security Council unanimously endorsed the initiative and again urged Libya to surrender the suspects. International opinion welcomed this proposal, Libya finally turned over the suspects, under the terms we had laid out. The U.S. engaged in no negotiations and placed no restrictions on the prosecutors' freedom to follow the evidence. The Scottish trial in the Netherlands will be a genuine criminal proceeding, conforming with the rules and traditions of Scottish jurisprudence, and the prosecution will follow the evidence wherever it leads. Since the Libyan suspects' surrender, they have awaited trial in a Scottish jail in the Netherlands. The trial began yesterday and is expected to take some time. Over time, faced with UN and U.S. sanctions, as well as the attendant political isolation, Libya has reduced its support for terrorism and sought to distance itself from terrorist groups. As reported in Patterns of Global Terrorism for the last 2 years, Libya has not been implicated in any international terrorist act for several years and has taken important steps. Libya has expelled the Abu Nidal Organization, uprooting its infrastructure and seeking to eliminate any ANO presence in Libya. It has cooperated with other intelligence services in the region to deport remaining ANO members from Libya. Ironically, the ANO has publicly threatened terrorist retaliation against Libya. In addition to withdrawing its support from Palestinian groups that oppose the peace process, Libya has thrown its support to Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority. The Libyan Government has told all Palestinians that the Palestinian Authority is the only address for their concerns. Given Libya's status as one of the original Arab radical states, this support for the Palestinian Authority represents an historic policy shift toward peace that we should all welcome. In the last year, Libya has imposed visa restrictions to limit the ability of terrorists to enter its territory as a haven. Libya has also cooperated with Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen against terrorist groups. In the context of the Arab League Interior Ministers' agreement to cooperate on counterterrorism, we have seen the extradition of a number of suspected terrorists between Libya and Jordan and Libya and Yemen. While we recognize positive steps Libya has taken, a number of issues remain on which Libya must act. One key question is what else remains for Libya to do on terrorism to show that the break is permanent and not just opportunistic. Libya should comply with the UN Security Council Resolutions, including payment of appropriate compensation, acceptance of responsibility for the actions of its officials, renunciation of and an end to support for terrorism, and cooperation with the Pan Am 103 investigation and trial. In October 1999, Libya allowed the Scottish investigators to travel to Libya and obtain access to requested witnesses and documents. We will insist that any similar, future requests be granted and that Libyan witnesses be able to testify in The Netherlands unimpeded. Such Libyan cooperation is an explicit UN Security Council requirement before UN sanctions are lifted. It is also a concrete way for Libya to demonstrate that it has changed its policy, not just its rhetoric, on terrorism. We want to see Libya sever all remaining ties with and support for terrorist groups. That would include terminating all contacts, travel on Libyan soil, and financial assistance. We also seek clear and concrete Libyan support for the peace process, including the underlying principles of the Madrid process. Such steps would be a concrete, definitive way for Libya to demonstrate its abandonment of violent opposition to the peace process and cessation of its support for opponents of peace. In this regard, we are closely watching Libya's talks with the EU and possible participation with Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the Barcelona Process. Looking to the future, we would like Libya to join and comply with certain international antiterrorism conventions, which it has indicated a willingness to do. We remain concerned about Libyan programs to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile delivery systems. British authorities at London's Gatwick Airport recently intercepted Scud missile parts interdicted at Gatwick bound for Libya. We seek to prevent Libya's efforts to acquire WMD and delivery systems and encourage other countries to do the same. Multilateral efforts to contain these Libyan programs have, thus far, achieved substantial success. We would like to see Libya join the Chemical Weapons Convention and comply with the CWC and the Biological Weapons Convention. These actions would signal its seriousness of purpose and be an important, concrete step toward more responsible behavior. Libya's recent record on intervention outside its borders is less clear and requires close attention. Libya continues to be deeply engaged in Africa, including Sierra Leone, Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Sudan. We want to see it play a constructive role. For example, Libya has joined with Egypt to push for a negotiated resolution of the longstanding conflict in Sudan. We support the mediation efforts led by East African states under the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, because its Declaration of Principles spells out the key issues which must be resolved for achievement of a just, lasting settlement. At same time, we have stepped up effort to cooperate with Egypt in the search for peace, as a single, unified process stands the best chance of achieving a settlement in Sudan. However, given the long history of dangerous intervention by Libya outside its borders as well as more recent reports of providing arms throughout the region, we will continue to take steps to ensure that Libya seeks to resolve, rather than aggravate, regional conflicts. There has been intense press speculation and some Congressional interest about possible changes to travel-related restrictions for Libya. In March, the Secretary authorized a consular trip to Libya for the specific, limited purpose of assessing whether there continues to be an "imminent danger" to U.S. travelers. An "imminent danger" was the factual, legal basis for imposing a restriction on the use of an U.S. passport for travel to, in, or through Libya in 1981. Based on all reports, we believed it was appropriate to assess the situation on the ground for ourselves. The Department is still reviewing the trip findings as well as other relevant information, including reports from European diplomats, our Protecting Power, and travelers to Libya. Speculation about the outcome of this review would be premature; however, knowing of your interest in the matter, we will continue to stay in close contact with you on this issue. On our key concerns--terrorism, opposition to Middle East peace, and regional intervention--Libya no longer poses the threat it once did. On WMD and missiles, our efforts to impede Libya's programs have had substantial success. That said, we must continue to watch Libya closely and will maintain pressure until all of these concerns are fully addressed. Our goal continues to be to deter Libyan policies of concern. An improved bilateral relationship is not, in itself, an end. We will oppose lifting UN sanctions against Libya until we are satisfied that Libya has met all the relevant UN Security Council requirements. The provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act regarding investment in Libya's petroleum sector will continue to be considered until, as the statute prescribes, the President has determined and certified to Congress that the UNSCR requirements have been met. Also until that time, we expect to maintain core unilateral economic sanctions prohibiting U.S.-Libyan business. Again I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to appear in front of the Subcommittee on these important issues, and would welcome the opportunity to address any specific questions you might have. [end of document] Remarks Index | Near Eastern Affairs | Department of State | Secretary of State |
