Release of the 2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Good morning and thank you for joining us today for the release of the annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, or “INCSR” as we commonly refer to it in the Department. The INCSR is the State Department’s annual report to Congress and the American public on how foreign governments have met their international narcotics control commitments established under international law.

This year marks the 25^th anniversary of the first such report issued by the Bureau. To mark this milestone, I would like to take a moment to discuss some of the more significant improvements regarding international drug control cooperation over this two-and-a-half decade period.

One of the more significant advancements that we have seen was the passage of the 1998 UN Convention Against Illegal Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The Convention, generally speaking, requires governments to take legal measures to outlaw and punish all forms of illicit drug production, trafficking, and drug money laundering, to control chemicals that can be used to process illegal drugs, and to cooperate internationally with each other to achieve these goals.

The Convention marked the first time that an international treaty set down obligations to combat closely related crimes such as money laundering, precursor chemical trafficking, and drug-inspired corruption, and to promote law enforcement tools such as extradition, asset seizure, and mutual legal assistance. These principles have become the cornerstone for international cooperation in law enforcement over the past two decades. They have inspired and been expanded by subsequent instruments including the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the UN Convention against Corruption.

Other important international and regional counter-drug efforts include the creation of the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission in 1986, and the formation of the Group of 8’s Financial Action Task Force in 1989. The latter focuses on money laundering and, more recently, terrorist financing. These organizations focus on concrete steps to implement UN and regional anti-drug and anti-crime conventions, they encourage buy-in by member states and others, and they improve transnational cooperation.

Perhaps more importantly, over the last quarter century we have witnessed a significant change in the attitudes of foreign governments towards cooperation against the threat of the international drug trade. Twenty-five years ago, drug trafficking was perceived as largely a problem for “consumer” states in North America and Europe driven by their own demand for drugs. Today, there's a clear understanding that no country or society is immune from the social, economic, and even political damage that is caused by international drug trafficking and the organized crime that it can fuel.

The two-volume INCSR report provides a comprehensive assessment of the worldwide illegal drug and transnational crime situation. I would like to take this opportunity to give you a snapshot of where we are in our efforts to support this undertaking.

A major step forward to fight narcotics and organized crime is the Merida Initiative, a cooperative security partnership between the United States, Mexico, and Central America. We estimate that over 530 metric tons of cocaine are smuggled from South America to the United States each year, with more than 90 percent passing through Mexico. Mexico's also a major supplier of heroin, methamphetamine and marijuana destined for U.S. markets, and Mexican drug trafficking organizations now control many of the drug distribution networks within the United States.

President Calderon of Mexico has taken decisive action to fight drug trafficking and criminal organizations that affect both sides of our shared border. The Presidents of Central America have also recognized the need to address common threats regionally. In response, the President has asked Congress to fund a new security cooperation initiative with Mexico and the countries of Central America to combat the threats of organized -- excuse me -- the threats of drug trafficking and transnational crime in Mexico and Central America. The initiative would focus on drug interdiction, anti-corruption efforts, anti-gang programs, improved policing, and criminal justice reform.

While Colombia leads the world in coca cultivation and is the source of 90 percent of the cocaine entering the United States, it's made notable progress in combating the drug traffickers and narcoterrorists that only recently posed serious threats to the stability of that country. We've employed a comprehensive, regional approach focused on eradication, interdiction, alternative development, extradition, and judicial reform. Last year, with U.S. assistance, Colombia eliminated a record-breaking 153,000 hectares of coca through aerial eradication and another 66,000 through manual eradication. Colombia has begun to take responsibility for some key programs, and we will continue to work closely with the Government of Colombia on transferring additional operational and financial control for counternarcotics and rule of law programs.

We remain concerned about recently increased coca cultivation in Bolivia and Peru. Coca grower associations seek to link coca cultivation to issues of cultural identity and national pride and sometimes oppose eradication efforts. Traffickers exploit these unions for their own benefit.

A new and burgeoning concern is the rapid growth of cocaine trafficking to Europe from Latin America through transit states in West Africa. The international community is seized with drug trafficking through Western Africa and is working with governments there in developing capacity to address this issue. It's an issue that deserves greater attention, especially from the European states that are the markets for these products.

The opium trade in Afghanistan poses serious challenges. In 2007, Afghanistan grew 93 percent of the world’s opium poppy. Poppy production soared in the southern provinces where the insurgency is strong. There's incontrovertible evidence that the Taliban use drug trafficking proceeds to fund insurgent activities; the counter-narcotics/counter-insurgency nexus is both real and growing. At the same time, poppy cultivation has declined in the poorer, but more secure, northern and central provinces, 13 of which were poppy-free in 2007. We believe the lesson's clear: where security exists, our counter-narcotics strategy is gaining traction through more effective public information campaigns, the better establishment of governance and delivery of services, and the empowerment of local leaders, such as the governor of Balkh, and this year, the governor of Nangarhar. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime recently released its annual winter assessment survey of Afghan opium cultivation for the coming spring season, and it predicts that “opium cultivation in Afghanistan is likely to decrease slightly in 2008.” Such a reversal would be a welcome development after years of double-digit growth, but continued intensive effort will be required for many years to reduce the huge amount of cultivation, particularly in the South.

In addition to country-by-country sections in this report, there's also a section that describes global efforts to prevent drug criminals from obtaining the precursor chemicals that they use to produce illegal drugs. This chapter includes highlights on efforts to tighten control over chemicals needed to process cocaine and heroin from raw plant materials, as well as the chemicals used to produce synthetic drugs, particularly methamphetamine. A majority of the methamphetamine consumed in the United States continues to originate from Mexico, but Mexico’s President Calderon has taken some unprecedented steps to limit the availability of the chemicals that could be illegally diverted to produce methamphetamine, including a bold decision in September 2007, when the Government of Mexico determined it would no longer issue licenses to import these chemicals, or any products containing them, for any reason.

The INCSR also includes a separate volume devoted to money laundering and terrorist financing. The report details the efforts of countries to construct, enhance and implement strong anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes. The money laundering volume -- sometimes referred to as Volume II -- has expanded beyond the scope of drug-related money laundering to include all money laundering, regardless of the source of the criminal proceeds.

Volume II also discusses terrorist financing and the measures countries have taken to counter it. Cooperation to share information and freeze assets of suspected terrorists appears to have increased as the world becomes more cognizant of terrorist financing activities and methods and how we can counter them.

We continue to make progress in combating transnational crime and drugs, but the job remains unfinished. We cannot afford to cede any of the ground gained over the past 25 years since the first report was issued. The success of this effort depends on much more than what the United States can do on its own; success is dependent upon the cooperation and commitment of our partners in our worldwide drug control effort. As this report clearly indicates, there's no substitute for political will in achieving success. Our partners, working with us, must continue to demonstrate the necessary political will to defend their national interests from drug corruption by reforming and strengthening their political, legislative, judicial, law enforcement and financial institutions. They must take the often difficult step of standing up to politically influential lobbies that view illegal drug crops as cultural patrimony, and they sometimes must arrest highly influential corrupt officials that threaten the integrity of their governing institutions. As we have in the past, the United States will provide strong support to those governments that demonstrate real commitment to confronting these very difficult challenges.

Thank you for listening to that statement, my apologizes for its length, and I'll be glad to take your questions.

QUESTION: Sir, I would like to ask you: how do you think the drug trafficking organizations are taking advantage of the weak regulations in Mexico to launder money? How these can be affecting the Mexico Government, et cetera?

And on the other hand, I would like to know why the U.S. judges the efforts from all the countries in the anti-narcotics struggle, but do not mention anything about the production within the U.S. or measures to reduce the consumption in these – that is the most important market of drugs in the world.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Okay. I’ll do your last question first cause I think we should dispose of that. This is – it would – we would be somewhat conflicted out of assessing ourselves, I believe. It would not be as credible. There would be a self-interest involved. And what the legislation asks us to do is to assess our cooperation with other countries, so that’s the focus of this report.

On the question of what we do here at home, we have a substantial program, both in terms of law enforcement and in demand reduction. At the federal level, it is approximately $4.5 billion every year and significant sums are also spent at the local and state level as well. So this is not a problem that we see that is only looked at abroad, but it’s not a problem that we can solve without working with our international partners as well.

With respect to the question of monies in Mexico, the Mexican authorities have taken some extraordinary steps over the last several – the last couple of years, even further back than that, working with us on addressing this issue. As you may be aware yourself, the largest bulk cash seizure in history took place last year in Mexico, more than $200 million, and that would not have been possible in the past, I don’t think, without the kind of cooperative relationship that we have generated working with one another on this issue.

So I think we’re working well with Mexico, but as I mentioned in my statement, there is much more that could be done and I think is in our self-interest to do and that’s the real genesis of the initiative that’s come to be called Merida Initiative to provide greater capacity, greater training, institutional support by the United States for Mexico and our Central American partners. It’s a $1.4 billion program over three years.

We have engaged extensively with the Congress in support of this program, but the final decisions have not yet been made by the Congress as to what shape this program will eventually have and the level of funding that will be provided. We remain hopeful and we believe it’s a program that’s very much in the self-interest of the United States, Mexico, and our Central American partners.

MR. GALLEGOS: Sylvie.

QUESTION: You said that – you spoke about the growth of cocaine trafficking to Europe from Latin America.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: I did.

QUESTION: And you said that this issue deserves greater attention from the European countries. What would you expect them to do? What they don’t do enough?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Well, I think it’s important to reflect that this is a change and a further development in the marketing of this product, significantly out of Venezuela and then vectored east to Africa and then north into continental Europe, particularly in Iberia and in the UK. This is a growing problem and I – several of our European partners are working more closely with us and are more focused on this issue than they have been in the past, but because of the size of the issue, the threat that it has to the stability of particularly several smaller countries in West Africa, the potential threat to stability, I think it is – it’s incumbent upon all of us working on this to see if there are greater resources that could be brought to bear here.

I don’t have a specific prescription this morning to say that, you know, we want A, B and C, but I think there is more that can be done and I think it’s definitely in the self-interest of our European allies and partners to focus more directly on this issue. We do have cooperative relationships in the Caribbean, particularly with states in Europe that have post-colonial ties there, particularly the Netherlands, the UK, France. But I think that because of the growth of this threat, there’s even more that can be done.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. GALLEGOS: Here in the center.

QUESTION: Yeah. I have two questions, if I may. One on Bolivia and Peru that you expressed concern there. I wonder if you could spell it out a little bit, especially since Evo Morales was a coca leader and has supported use – legitimate uses of coca, whether you think that is counterproductive? And the other issue also a follow up on this issue of Europe. In the last report I remember that you single out Spain as the main transit country of cocaine into Europe. And I – you know, with this idea about, you know, the drugs coming from West Africa, I wonder if you could comment on the role of Spain and whether you think they should be doing more to prevent the transit of drugs there?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Okay. On Bolivia, we are concerned about the articulation of a policy which would increase the “illicit” cultivation of coca. We believe that the policy as it’s been articulated to me, is not consistent with Bolivia’s obligations under international law. And we have an ongoing conversation with the authorities in Bolivia to seek to address this. We also have a cooperative program with Bolivia where we’re continuing to work on areas where we can, including a significant eradication program.

With respect to Spain, I am not – I don’t know myself whether I would characterize it as the main gateway. I think certainly the Iberian Peninsula as a whole for geographic reasons, if no other, is the most likely entre peaux for most of the product which is coming out of West Africa into continental Europe. So I would surmise that that’s likely to have remained the same this year. We think we all can do more. I don’t fault the Government of Spain or the Government of Portugal for that matter, for not doing – not being focused on this problem. But I think the problem is getting worse and significantly because of the inadequacy of the cooperation and even the lack of cooperation from the authorities in Venezuela. And so it’s incumbent upon us for our own – you know, the protection of our own public to see how we could work more closely together and work more effectively on this problem as we look into the future.

QUESTION: A follow-up on Mexico. The report is positive in terms of what the Government of Mexico is doing or doing last year. The Calderon administration has been criticized by the DEA here in the U.S. in terms of the narco violencia. That’s violence that’s occurring in some states of Mexico, especially in the border area with the United States. And the picture in Mexico, you can see the reality, it’s completely different what you’re reporting – saying they are killing people every day, you know, drugs coming to the United States. It seems to me that you want to send a message to Congress that everything is fine in Mexico and --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Quite the contrary.

QUESTION: Really?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: We’re trying to send a message to Congress that we need to work together because the problem is significant, but that we have a partner who has demonstrated political will to work with us. So that’s – I mean, if – that’s the way you read the report --

QUESTION: Well, but I mean, if they say everything is fine in Mexico --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: If everything were fine in Mexico, we wouldn’t have a significant proposal before the Congress to work with the Mexican authorities to counter the problem. There is significant violence. There is a significant marketing of drugs into the United States. As I said in my statement, several – most of the narcotics organizations – organized crime organizations that are – they’re marketing this product in the United States -- are now Mexican (inaudible). This is a big problem. On the other hand, we have a partner that has made clear that it wants to work with the United States. President Calderon has made some real steps that were tough for him to make in order to confront organized crime within his country. And we want to work with the Government of Mexico because we think we can make significantly more progress by working together and we actually think we face a common threat here.

QUESTION: In other words, are you saying that people have been killed in Mexico every day is because Calderon’s Administration is doing progress?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: No. I’m – the reason people have been killed in Mexico every day is because organized crime narcotics traffickers are killing them. And that is a problem that we have to work on together because it is a problem that we share. And I think that the fact that the Mexican authorities are taking this problem on and confronting it as a positive sign and it’s one where working together we can look to a future, which is more peaceful and also doesn’t threaten the Mexican public as well as ours with a significant narcotics threat.

MR. GALLEGOS: Okay, over here.

QUESTION: Yes, about Laos, your report points to two trends, one of which is a potential increase in poppy cultivation because of, apparently, underfunded alternative development programs; and then there is apparently an upswing in methamphetamine use and trafficking. First of all, who should be funding those ADPs and what can the Lao Government itself do about each of those trends, do you think?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Well, I’m not -- I don’t want to tell you something that I don’t know, and the methamphetamine, how you would go about dealing with it, I’m not prepared to respond to. I’ll ask one of my colleagues to get back to you on that.

On the question of alternative development funding, there are a variety of sources that could work this. We’ve been a traditional source of alternative development funding, but there are other cooperative states that are in -- that are donors as well in Asia and in Europe who could also be a participant in this. So there are -- we’re not the only potential source, nor are we the most likely recipient of any heroin or other product which might be a result of our failure to come forward with these programs.

On methamphetamine, I would speculate that a significant part of that is sourced in Burma, which is the largest producer of methamphetamine pills in the world. So the lack of cooperation that we have from Burma is -- threatens not just its own public but also the countries of

Southeast Asia, including Laos. But we’ll get back to you on the question that you raise.

MR. GALLEGOS: Charlie, did you have something?

QUESTION: I just wanted to follow up again on Mexico.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Please.

QUESTION: When you talk about decisive leadership, bold action, and then at the same time talk about this enormous influx of drugs through Mexico to the United States, what is the contradiction? What is that bold leadership failing to do -- that decisive leadership, bold action?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: I don’t see that decisive leadership and bold action is failing to do anything. I think that Mexico is confronted with an extraordinary challenge in the level of organized crime that it faces from the drug trade. And the fact that they are looking at it and seizing it and trying to confront it is a positive sign. But it’s -- this is not something that happens in one 28-minute Hollywood segment. It will happen over a lengthy period of time. And if it’s not confronted, it will go very bad for both us and for Mexico. And so the fact that the Government of Mexico is willing to work this is, to us, a very positive sign because it gives us some hope for the future and I think it gives the Mexican people even more hope.

QUESTION: Yes, thank you. With respect to North Korea, it seems to me that according to this report the drug trafficking at the state level has sharply dropped, but at the same time you take more of the counterfeit cigarette trafficking. And do you have any specific concern on North Korea’s drug trafficking and (inaudible) of cigarette trafficking?

At the same time, I would like to ask your -- you mentioned that China and North Korea tried to discourage (inaudible) law enforcement efforts. And could you comment on that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: I’m not sure what your last question is. Could you --

QUESTION: Last question is both China and North Korea tried to discourage drug trafficking through law enforcement efforts and information campaigns on both sides of the border, this according to the report?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: I’m still not quite understanding you.

QUESTION: Yes, could you comment on that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Yeah, I --

QUESTION: (Inaudible) discouraging of --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Let me start with the first two, and one of my colleagues is going to hand me the report so I can read what you’re referring to. I’m just not quite hearing you. It’s my hearing; it’s not what you’re saying.

On anything having to do with North Korea, because of the nature of the society, it is difficult for us to accurately assess. So what we’re telling you on the drug trafficking issue is what we’ve been able to observe and infer based on what happens offshore. And while several years ago, we observed and inferred from significant seizures that there was drug trafficking going on, we have not observed that in the recent past. It does not mean that it's not happening; it just means that based on the observations that we have been able to make -- not in North Korea because we're not there -- that we don't see continuing evidence. Absence of evidence is not anything more than absence of evidence. So that's the --

On the counterfeiting issue, is just making -- memorializing what has been made clear in the past by Treasury and other authorities in the United States. There's not a new story there, if you will, today.

QUESTION: Excuse me. Do you believe North Korea still involved in money laundering?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Well, we don't have evidence that it -- that this has gone away. We're telling you what we were able to observe over the course of the past year. And so this is a restatement of what has already been released and what you already know about the North Korean activities in the past. This report covers the calendar year 2007.

QUESTION: (Inaudible), but according to this report, just released, North Korea -- still they continue to be engaging in counterfeiting and other illegal activities through a number of front companies. And if that's true, what is the U.S. response?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: I'm looking for what you're quoting here, I'm sorry.

QUESTION: Page 293, money laundering, the section on North Korea.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Can I have the other one? Let's do another question. I'll come back to you.

QUESTION: Okay, thank you.

MR. GALLEGOS: Right here.

QUESTION: On Mexico. Mr. Shannon has said that Mexico's democracy faces a threat to stability because of the drug cartels.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: I would never contradict Mr. Shannon.

QUESTION: And that's one of the reasons that you are promoting the Merida Initiative. Is the Congress sharing your sense of urgency? And what exactly are you telling Congress about what would be the consequences for Mexico and the U.S. if Merida is not passed?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Well, we have -- both Tom and I have testified extensively before the Congress on a -- before our authorizing committees on this -- the question of the Merida Initiative, making clear the Administration's position and what we think can be accomplished by working cooperatively and providing these kinds of resources.

I'm not going to predict failure for you. I think that we make a compelling case, and I'm looking forward to working with the Congress. But ultimately, they will make that determination. And so we will be explaining the Administration's proposal. We'll be articulating as clearly as we can. We'll be seeking to secure the appropriations based on the proposal that we've made. The hearings before -- potential hearings before the appropriations committees have not taken place yet, so there's more conversations to take place with the Hill on this question. But we do believe that this is an appropriate response to the political will shown by the Mexican Government as well as the threat that we face for -- from organized crime and narcotics trafficking from Mexico and Central America.

QUESTION: Has Congress given you any timeframe for passage?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: The initial portion of this is proposed in the supplemental and the -- we don't have, you know, a fixed point on this. We have also on the Hill at the same time the FY '09 normal budget proposal. So more or less, two-thirds of the Merida Initiative appropriation sits before the Congress right now. Hearings will take place presumably some time in the spring. But it's up to Congress to determine that timetable.

MR. GALLEGOS: Let's go all the way to the back here.

QUESTION: Assistant Secretary, can you tell us a little -- can you expand a little bit more on your comments and the report's comments on Venezuela. You obviously faulted Venezuela for lack of action or insufficient action in terms of the shipments to Europe. Here in the report, you say that -- you talk about Venezuela failing to meet its obligations under the last three years. You talk about a permissive and corrupt environment in Venezuela.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Well stated, thank you.

QUESTION: How concerned are you? Does this put -- is this a question of turning a blind eye? Is it a question of collusion? Are there any cases really of interdiction in Venezuela worth mentioning? Or is this a country that if it goes on the way it's headed is on the way to becoming a narco state?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Well, I don't want to draw those kind of conclusions that you'd like for me to. What I would say is, going back to the statement that we made back in September, that there is no real cooperation provided by Venezuela with us on the counterdrug issue. When we observe the trafficking from Venezuela, both north into North America and the United States and Canada as well as to Europe, we don’t see significant measures or any – even any real measures taken to counter that. And that’s of obvious great concern to us. It’s of great concern to the countries in the Caribbean, which are the intermediate stops for significant parts of this transit, and we’re troubled by that.

I don’t have a prescription for you about how we can deal with it except to work with our partners who are willing to work with us, and I would count all of the neighbors in the region as well as our European partners to contain this threat to our security. And that’s something that I think we’re going to have to work on with partners outside of Venezuela, given the lack of cooperation that we do have with Venezuela at this time. We remain open to working with Venezuela on this issue, but we have thus far not had a willing partner.

MR. GALLEGOS: Let’s keep it in the back.

David.

QUESTION: Could you take on a similar question about Burma, degree of their government’s commitment, cooperation on the drug issue?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: We’re – we are concerned about Burma. The distinction I’d draw about Burma is that the activities or failure to act of Venezuela due to its geographic location and the product through – that is smuggled through it, it’s a more immediate and direct threat to the United States. But we do not have a cooperative relationship with Burma either. And as I mentioned earlier, it is the largest source of methamphetamine pills on the planet and we don’t see any real measures being taken or certainly, any effective measures to counter that.

MR. GALLEGOS: Up here.

QUESTION: The report on money laundering says that your request to Mexico for the seizure, forfeiture, and repatriation of criminal assets have rarely met with success. Can you refer to any specific case or what do you think the Mexican Government can do to respond more effectively in this matter?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Well, we’re working with the Government of Mexico on this issue. It will be – it’s something we’re working on now, but it will be enlarged, if we’re successful, the Merida Initiative in terms of laws and regulations that will allow us to expand the asset forfeiture efforts. So I think that we have a willing partner here, but we have more work to do in the legal framework if we’re really going to be successful.

QUESTION: But in the case of (inaudible), I understand there was a huge cooperation of the intelligence U.S. agencies.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Absolutely.

QUESTION: And in this case, do you believe the amount of money needed to be shared between both countries that work in investigations?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: I’ve not heard anyone make that assertion, and so I think that we think that the money seized have been used for an appropriate purpose and at the decision of the Government of Mexico, significantly on demand reduction in Mexico, which, in addition to the organized crime threat and the transit to the United States also faces a narcotics threat to its own population.

QUESTION: But in the future, these amount of money seized after cooperation with both countries you think can be shared?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: I don’t -- let me get back to you on that. I don’t want to make a statement and then have to contradict it 30 seconds after I leave the lectern.

QUESTION: Okay, thanks.

MR. GALLEGOS: Let’s go to the back one more time.

QUESTION: Mr. Johnson, you said Afghanistan in the last year produced 92 percent of the world opium. What’s your -- what’s the strategy toward Afghanistan in order to eradicate the poppy’s cultivation while a lot of farmers, they complain there is no international market for their agriculture products and they cannot live on -- except poppy’s cultivation.

And another question, Mr. Karzai said that in those areas that is under Afghanistan Government control, there is no poppy’s cultivation. The poppy’s cultivation is high in those areas that’s under the NATO forces’ control. What do you make of that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Under the?

QUESTION: The NATO forces.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: I disagree with that statement. What we see in Afghanistan is indeed where 93 percent of the world’s opium poppy is grown, but it’s grown now based on the successful efforts that we and the Government of Afghanistan have had over the last couple of years largely in the southwest of the country, in Helmand and Nangarhar -- excuse me, Helmand and Kandahar -- in areas which are contested by the Taliban and where indeed there are operations by NATO forces in order to confront the Taliban. But I disagree strongly with the statement that there are areas where there are NATO control and there are areas where the Afghan Government control. Where NATO is operating as part of ISAF, it’s in order to establish the control of the Afghan authorities, and so we’re working closely with the Afghans and with the Afghan National Army in that effort.

QUESTION: And regard the farmers, is there any strategy --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Yes, thank you. I’m sorry, I didn’t mean to skip that question. We have an extensive program for alternative development and supported development in Afghanistan. In the areas which tend to be the poorest, places where there is control, those alternative development programs have been quite effective. It’s, in fact, in the more prosperous areas in the southwest where poppy is now being grown most extensively, in areas which look a whole lot more like agribusiness than they do like a small farmer. So I think that the notion that this is a small, poor farmer problem is, in fact, an erroneous one. It is a large farmer, a more wealthy farmer and corrupt official problem. And the areas where the small farmers tend to predominate are ones where we have indeed been more effective.

In terms of specific for international markets, a number of the development programs we have had over the last several years are easily fungible, if you will, to support growing any crop. And the program of rehabilitation of the irrigation system in the Southwest, which was originally established by the United States in the 50s and 60s, is also being used to irrigate the poppy crop. And the road network that we’ve established also has – can have that effect.

So it’s not solely alternative development that’s going to help us out here. We’ve got to have a comprehensive program, which we are working very hard to implement, which includes a multipronged approach. And we’re working more now on those types of alternative development programs where there is less chance of diversion or fungibility, things like providing support for refrigeration so that crops can be grown and then shipped into the Southern Gulf, where there are markets – cash markets for Afghan crops. So this is something we’re working quite hard on, but it’s something that’s going to require some time as well.

MR. GALLEGOS: We’ve got time for a couple more. Why don’t I go to the middle here and then we’ll let Paul wrap it up.

QUESTION: Yes, on Central America, you have addressed the need to address common threats regionally. However, in the Merida Initiative, the region is getting roughly $10 million besides 500 million that Mexico is getting. Do you think that amount is enough to make a significant impact on counternarcotics in the five countries?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: I think your math is a little off. Based on what the proposals are on the Hill right now and the combined supplemental and in the FY ’09 proposal, there is $150 million proposed for Central America. It’s a significant amount of money. It, I think, can be used effectively to work on this problem and, perhaps as importantly, to foster cooperation among the countries of Central America on this problem.

One of the issues that we face is the bad guys don’t respect borders. And so the traditional way of confronting this issue where you go right up to your border and then you stop is not going to be effective. We have to work with the countries of Central America and this initiative will allow us to do so to help create cooperative efforts and cooperative assets in the region to confront the trafficking out of South America, through Central America into Mexico.

QUESTION: In Guatemala, do you think the government has made enough efforts to clean up the – especially the law enforcement officers that were highly infiltrated with drug trafficking?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Well, I won’t confirm the premise of your question. I met with the new President of Guatemala when I was there about a month ago, was impressed with his political commitment to change. But I think one of the things that we can do through the Merida Initiative, based on some of the models we’re developing in Mexico, is help work on vetted units and even vetting the entire law enforcement establishment in order to provide a greater degree of accountability as well as a greater degree of trust to the public that they’re not going to be shaken down by their own police officers.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. GALLEGOS: Paul, let’s wrap it up.

QUESTION: Well, you discussed Afghanistan just now and you talked about it – not a small farmer, but agro-business, corrupt official and that touched on the question I had in mind – was you get the sense when you see anecdotal reports and media reports that there’s a sense of – there is a degree of impunity. You can walk around the streets of Kabul and the fabulously new – the fabulous new homes are those of drug barons. It’s common knowledge. My question is --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: It’s a common assertion, anyway.

QUESTION: It’s an assertion.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Yeah.

QUESTION: Let’s say is it a common – it’s among Afghanis, they – that’s what they’ll say. Anyway, the – you did – in the case of Mexico, you highlighted the political will, you complimented the political will even though the situation isn’t perfect. Do you see that same sense of political will or is there a concern that there’s -- you know, important drug barons, politically allied important drug barons can get away with business that ones that support the radicals maybe cannot – the terrorists cannot?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: There’s several points I would make on that. First of all, in terms of the arrests of significant figures, there are four individuals who were under various stages of law enforcement process within the United States who have been arrested for activities in Afghanistan that are actual crimes in the United States because of their effect here.

We are working also with the Afghan authorities to help establish the organs of a judicial system and a police system which will help address this problem. We have extensive DEA operations on the ground. My bureau has a number of programs to help foster a more – a stronger law enforcement and judicial system and even a penal system in Afghanistan, but I think there’s a huge distinction between Mexico, which is a strong state even though it faces a difficult problem, and Afghanistan, which is in the process of trying to recover from more than, you know, two and a half decades of war. And the -- as the -- one of the questioners made -- pointed out earlier, the control of Afghan authorities over their entire territory is not yet established. So they face a much different problem, and so the effect of the political will exercised is going to be different in those two countries. No government faces the same problem in the --

QUESTION: So you see will; you just don’t have the capacity that --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: I see that there is a different set of issues that Afghanistan faces. We see governors who are active in the governor-led eradication programs, particularly in the north and in the east that have been quite effective. But there’s a great deal of variegation in this political will, particularly at the local level, and in some places it could be quite a bit stronger. And that’s one of the issues we’re working on.

MR. GALLEGOS: All right. I want to thank you all.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHNSON: Thank you.

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