Combating
Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction with Nonproliferation Programs:
Non-Proliferation Assistance Coordination Act of
2001
Testimony of Vann H. Van Diepen
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Before the
Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation & Federal Services
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
Chairman Akaka, Senator
Cochran, Members of the Committee:
I am very pleased to be here in response to your
invitation to Under Secretary Bolton to discuss
nonproliferation assistance programs and
coordination. I agree with the points made
by participants in the November 14 hearings you
hosted about the urgency and complexity of the
environment in which we operate. While the
Cold War weapons legacy still must be addressed,
these threats are not new to us. The Cold
War has been over for more than a decade and we
have moved beyond "post Cold War" to
new relationships and strategic frameworks with
Russia and other countries in the region.
The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons and the missiles capable of
delivering them, is now a central security threat
facing the United States, our allies, and our
friends. Where once we faced thousands of
nuclear weapons under centralized command of a
great rival power, September 11 and the
biological attacks since have shown how much more
diverse and less predictable the threat has
become. In this new world, it is not just
the Soviet legacy that demands our attention, but
many avenues from which rogue countries and
terrorists and their supporters may choose when
seeking to advance their attack capabilities.
The programs that we use to counter this threat
originated in 1992 under the first Bush
Administration. They have served us well.
The programs and the agencies that manage them
have also responded and evolved as they gained
experience and as circumstances changed. The
hallmark of something that was well crafted is
that it can be adapted without losing its
essential characteristics. I believe that
our nonproliferation programs meet that test.
I would like to address each of the five
questions you posed:
State Department Nonproliferation
Programs
The State Department has direct responsibility
for several nonproliferation programs directed at
or relevant to the countries of the former Soviet
Union. More broadly, we provide foreign
policy guidance and diplomatic support for the
programs of other agencies, and participate
actively in the review, approval, coordination,
and implementation of other programs concerning
nonproliferation and former Soviet weapons of
mass destruction or advanced conventional weapons
materials, facilities, technologies, or expertise.
Weapons Materials and Technologies
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the absence of
any system of controls over the export of
technology and materials needed in WMD and
missile programs posed an immediate threat.
The new countries lacked laws, expertise, and
technical resources to implement controls. At
first our export control assistance program
concentrated on establishing and improving export
control systems in the new independent states of
the former Soviet Union that inherited nuclear
weapons related facilities and materials, and in
eastern Europe. The early focus of the program
was to establish basic legal and regulatory
frameworks and licensing and enforcement
processes in countries that supply key
technologies.
As funding increased and the program matured, the
focus has expanded to working with the neighbors
of potential supply countries as well as with key
transshipment states -- countries through which
WMD materials and technologies are likely to
transit, while continuing to support the
development of more robust systems in the
supplier states, including providing advanced
imaging and detection equipment. This program has
grown from less than $5 million per year in the
mid-1990s to the President's request for $39
million for this fiscal year ($17 million from
NADR; $22 million from FREEDOM Support Act/NIS
account).
The State Department chairs an inter-agency
working group on export control assistance, which
directs and coordinates the work of the various U.S.
agencies that implement these programs in over 25
countries worldwide. These efforts are also
coordinated with the international narcotics and
law enforcement programs which also provide
assistance to customs and border guard agencies
of other countries.
Weapons Expertise
Among our earliest concerns was addressing the
threat posed by the thousands of Soviet weapons
scientists who no longer would be supported after
the Soviet Union's demise. With continued
economic flux in Russia and elsewhere in the
region and aggressive pursuit of this expertise
by countries like Iran, this effort continues to
be a high priority. The international
science and technology centers began their work
in Moscow in 1994, and in Kiev in 1995. The
original focus of these centers was to stem the
threat of "brain drain" of
underemployed and unemployed weapons scientists
and engineers to WMD programs in other countries.
As the science center programs matured, the focus
has shifted to emphasize redirecting scientists
toward sustainable careers in peaceful,
transparent, civilian endeavors in their home
countries, be these commercial ventures or
continuing scientific contributions to areas of
international and global interest. The
program started with Russia and Ukraine and now
embraces communities in nations of
particular interest to the United States
war in Afghanistan: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, the
Kyrgyz Republic, Armenia, and Georgia. Other
key regional states -- Tajikistan, Azerbaijan,
and Moldova -- are in the process of joining one
of the science centers. Belarus also
participates in the program, but currently
receives no U.S. assistance.[AMH1]
For the past four years, the State Department has
been an active participant in the USG interagency
effort to redirect former Soviet biological
weapons scientists. Through this program,
the U.S. has been given increased access and
transparency at a number of the key civilian
facilities in the former BW program. In
addition to providing incentives for these
individuals to refrain from cooperation with
terrorist groups or states harboring them, our
redirection efforts also pay additional dividends
by focusing these scientists' considerable
expertise on areas of critical public health
needs, such as HIV/AIDS, multi-drug resistant
tuberculosis, and a number of plant and animal
diseases. The solid collaborative research
basis that we have developed through this effort
will be a springboard for expanded work that will
respond to the Bush-Putin initiative to counter
bioterrorism.
Utility Infielder
The Nonproliferation & Disarmament Fund
created to permit a rapid response to
unanticipated requirements or opportunities
is a flexible, responsive nonproliferation
tool. The NDF undertakes a broad spectrum
of special tasks to assist U.S. nonproliferation
efforts in this region and around the world.
For example, the NDF played a key role in Project
Sapphire in 1994, during which we removed more
than 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium
from Kazakhstan to ensure that this material was
properly protected and properly disposed of.
Of particular relevance to the request of this
committee is NDF's work on Tracker a stand-alone
software package that permits a country to use
modern computer tools to track export licensing
and enforcement matters from application
throughout the process, among central government
agencies, and with the export control personnel
at ports and border posts. This system is
now deployed in 8 countries, with further
applications in process.
In addition to our budgetary and oversight
responsibility for the programs above, State
leads the diplomatic efforts for a number of
nonproliferation programs, some of which are
funded by other agencies. These include the
Plutonium Disposition Agreement signed last year,
the 1997 Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement,
U.S. support of the IAEA in safeguarding nuclear
materials worldwide, and coordinating efforts to
prevent nuclear smuggling.
Another priority is making sure that our friends
and allies are shouldering their fair share of
the burden for these nonproliferation efforts.
The State Department plays a leading role in
identifying needs and encouraging assistance from
other countries for a variety of nonproliferation
efforts. It is important to build a
community committed to paying more than lip
service and we are not shy about letting our
allies know when we think they should be
providing more resources.
Funding and Coordination
On your question concerning how these programs
are funded and how they are coordinated, the
Department of State leadership takes its
responsibility for nonproliferation programs very
seriously and works hard to make sure that those
programs continue to enjoy strong support both
within the Executive Branch and with Congress.
All U.S. policy, implementation, and oversight of
nonproliferation assistance to the states of the
former Soviet Union is coordinated at senior
levels by the Proliferation Strategy Policy
Coordinating Committee. This Committee, or
PCC, is chaired by a National Security Council
senior director and includes assistant secretary
level representatives from State, Defense,
Energy, and other concerned agencies, including
the State Department's Coordinator for U.S.
Assistance to Europe and Eurasia.
This NSC-led Committee works to ensure that
individual assistance programs are coordinated
within and across agencies, and that they serve
Administration nonproliferation and threat
reduction priorities as effectively as possible.
The Committee has also been charged to develop a
strategic plan to guide near- and farther-term
nonproliferation and threat reduction cooperation
with Russia and Eurasia.
In addition, there are standing working level
groups responsible for day-to-day coordination of
the export control, science and technology
centers and biotechnology redirection programs.
These working groups not only ensure close policy
coordination among the programs, they also ensure
effective integration so that the programs
compliment, not compete, with each other in
addressing U.S. nonproliferation objectives.
The work of these groups feeds directly into the
senior level committee.
This structure works well and substantially
addresses what is proposed in the
Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of
2001. As noted in several of the statements
from your November 14 hearing, despite the number
and complexity of nonproliferation assistance
programs, effective implementation and senior
level coordination already exist.
All State Department nonproliferation programs
are funded out of Foreign Operations
appropriations. In past years many of these
programs were funded in whole or part from the
FREEDOM Support Act account. With Congress'
help, we are consolidating program funding
in the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account,
and our intent is to complete that process with
fiscal year 03 appropriations. This will
provide for more integrated financial and policy
oversight.
Future Plans
As you know, President Bush directed that a
rigorous review be conducted of all U.S.
nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance
to Russia and the countries of the former Soviet
Union. That review is now in its final
stages
Without prejudging the White House's final
decision, we expect State Department's
nonproliferation assistance programs will
continue to play a critical role in combating the
proliferation of WMD. In the post September
11 world, we believe that stemming the flow of
weapons of mass destruction materials,
technologies and expertise worldwide has to be
among our highest national priorities and our
programs must address that challenge. We
also must remain flexible and look at how the
programs we have developed and the lessons we
have learned can be applied to new opportunities
and situations.
Coordination with Private Sector &
Non-Governmental Efforts
The private sector and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) play several important roles.
First, in our efforts to redirect former weapons
scientists to peaceful civilian scientific and
commercial research, it has long been part of our
strategy to engage the private sector. It
was never our intent to support these scientists
indefinitely, and U.S. industry can be a key
partner in helping scientists and their
institutes make a permanent transition to
peaceful pursuits. The science and
technology centers industry partners
program now attracts over $20 million annually in
corporate funding. Industry partners take
advantage of the science centers' administrative
and oversight mechanisms, and tax and customs
exemptions, to fund applied research using the
talents of the former weapon scientists and the
companys R&D funds.
This arrangement is a win-win situation. The
U.S. industry partner develops technology at
costs lower than possible in the West and the
former weapon scientists gain industry partners
and an avenue to commercialize and profit from
the results of their efforts. Partnerships
with industry allow the U.S. government to
leverage its funds with the industry partner
funds to achieve U.S. nonproliferation
objectives; and recipient countries like Russia
ultimately receive economic benefit from the
industry-scientist partnership.
Also, when we deal in the world of export
controls, we are looking at buyers and sellers.
U.S. companies have a great deal of experience in
implementing export control regulations
internally, know the ins and outs of licensing
systems, and have a great deal of knowledge to
share with countries and companies that are new
to this world. U.S. companies play an
important role in our effort to inform and
educate.
A number of think tanks and private foundations
actively support nonproliferation dialogue and
projects. During the past year, a new
opportunity for public-private nonproliferation
partnership emerged with the establishment of Ted
Turner's Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). This
is still a new organization, but NTI's management
and board of directors, which includes several
members of Congress, have consulted actively with
the Administration on their program and have made
a commitment to coordinate their activities with
us. We do not believe that NTI should
replace appropriate government nonproliferation
functions, but we are open to exploring
appropriate ways that our activities can work
synergistically.
Non-Proliferation Assistance Coordination
Act of 2001
I think it is clear from what I have said about
the nature of our interagency coordination
process that the Bush Administration fully shares
the objectives that led Senator Hagel and the
other sponsors of S. 673 to offer this
legislation. I believe that this hearing
and a close examination of how we are
coordinating policy and implementation of these
programs today will provide clear evidence that
we already are doing what Congress would have us
do in this regard. S. 673 is not needed, as
the Bush Administration has already acted and
taken the kinds of steps this legislation calls
for. Furthermore, such legislation could
intrude on the President's prerogatives and
responsibilities.
We look forward to working with you and other
committees, and to keeping you fully informed on
how we conduct these programs of U.S.
nonproliferation assistance to the states of the
former Soviet Union, how we work with other
concerned governments to increase their
contributions and ensure that our respective
assistance is complementary and not duplicative,
and how we seek to work with private sector
donors of assistance in these areas.
|