[Federal Register: November 22, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 226)]
[Notices]
[Page 70467-70468]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr22no02-122]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-286, License Nos. DPR-5, DPR-26,
and DPR-64]
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Notice of Issuance of
Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, has issued a Director's Decision with regard to a petition
dated November 8, 2001, filed by Riverkeeper, Inc., et al., hereinafter
referred to as the ``Petitioners.'' The petition was supplemented on
December 20, 2001. The petition concerns the operation of the Indian
Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3 (IP1, 2, and 3).
The petition requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC): (1) Order the licensee to suspend operations, revoke the
operating license, or adopt other measures resulting in a temporary
shutdown of IP2 and 3; (2) order the licensee to conduct a full review
of the facility's vulnerabilities, security measures, and evacuation
plans; (3) require the licensee to provide information documenting the
existing and readily attainable security measures which protect the IP
facility against land, water, and airborne terrorist attacks; (4)
immediately modify the IP2 and 3 operating licenses to mandate certain
specified security measures sufficient to protect the facility; and (5)
order the revision of the licensee's emergency response plan and
Westchester County's radiological emergency response plan (RERP) to
account for possible terrorist attacks and prepare a comprehensive
response to multiple, simultaneous attacks in the region, which could
impair the efficient
[[Page 70468]]
evacuation of the area. In addition, the Petitioners requested that the
NRC take prompt action to permanently retire the facility if, after
conducting a full review of the facility's vulnerabilities, security
measures, and evacuation plans, the NRC finds that the IP facility
cannot be adequately protected against terrorist threats. Further,
separately from the above issues, the Petitioners requested that the
NRC order the licensee to undertake the immediate conversion of the
current water-cooled spent fuel storage system to a dry-cask system.
As the basis for the November 8, 2001, request, the Petitioners
stated that: (1) The IP facility is a plausible target of future
terrorist actions, (2) actual threats against nuclear power plants have
been documented, (3) IP is currently vulnerable to a catastrophic
terrorist attack, (4) a terrorist attack on IP2 and 3 would have
significant public health, environmental, and economic impacts, and (5)
the Westchester County's RERP is inadequate because it is based on
erroneous assumptions.
The NRC sent a copy of the proposed Director's Decision to the
Petitioners and to the licensee for comment on May 16, 2002. The
Petitioners responded with comments on August 9, 2002, and the licensee
had no comments. The Petitioners' comments and the NRC staff's response
to them are included with the Director's Decision.
The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has
determined that the request to order the licensee to suspend
operations, revoke the operating license, or adopt other measures
resulting in a temporary shutdown of IP2 and 3, be denied. The reasons
for this decision, along with the reasons for decisions regarding the
remaining Petitioners' requests, are explained in the Director's
Decision pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 (DD 02-06), the complete text of
which is available in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management
System (ADAMS) for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room,
located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor),
Rockville, Maryland, and from the NRC Web site (http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm.html).
As stated in its letter to the Petitioners on December 20, 2001,
the NRC has, in effect, partially granted the Petitioners' request for
an immediate security upgrade at IP2 and 3. On September 11, 2001, the
NRC took action to enhance security at all nuclear facilities,
including IP2 and 3. Immediately after the attacks, the NRC advised all
nuclear power plants to go to the highest level of security, which they
promptly did. These facilities have remained at a heightened security
level since that time. The NRC continues to work with other Federal
agencies and is monitoring relevant information it receives on security
matters at nuclear facilities. The NRC is prepared to make immediate
adjustments as necessary to ensure adequate protection of the public.
The NRC issued Orders on February 25, 2002, to all commercial
nuclear power plants to implement interim compensatory security
measures for the current threat environment. Some of the requirements
made mandatory by the Orders formalized the security measures that NRC
licensees had taken in response to advisories issued by the NRC in the
aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. The Orders also
imposed additional security enhancements, which have emerged based on
the NRC's assessment of the current threat environment and its ongoing
security review. The requirements will remain in effect until the NRC
determines that the level of threat has diminished, or that other
security changes are needed. The specific actions are sensitive, but
include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities,
additional security posts, installation of additional physical
barriers, vehicle checks at greater stand-off distances, enhanced
coordination with law enforcement and military authorities and more
restrictive site access controls for all personnel. Regarding the
Petitioners' request for specific information about the security
measures, the NRC's policy is to not release safeguards information to
the public. Thus, this request is denied.
The NRC in its February 25, 2002, Orders also directed licensees to
evaluate and address potential vulnerabilities to maintain or restore
cooling to the core, containment, and spent fuel pool and to develop
specific guidance and strategies to respond to an event that damages
large areas of the plant due to explosions or fires. These strategies
are intended to help licensees to identify and utilize any remaining
onsite or offsite equipment and capabilities. If NRC's ongoing security
review recommends any other security measures, the NRC will take
appropriate action.
The NRC denies the Petitioners' request to mandate certain security
measures, as specified by the Petitioners, for the protection of the
facility, such as a system to defend a no-fly zone. The NRC considers
that the collective measures taken since September 11, 2001, provide
adequate protection of public health and safety.
The NRC finds that the existing emergency response plans are
flexible enough to respond to a wide variety of adverse conditions,
including a terrorist attack. The NRC advisories and the Orders issued
since September 11, 2001, directed licensees to take specific actions
deemed appropriate to ensure continued improvements to existing
emergency response plans. The Petitioners' concern that the emergency
plans do not contemplate multiple attacks on the infrastructure is
alleviated by the fact that the emergency plans are intended to be
broad and flexible enough to respond to a wide spectrum of events.
Thus, the Petitioners' request that the onsite and offsite emergency
plans be revised to account for possible terrorist attacks has been, in
part, granted.
The NRC finds that the current spent fuel storage system and the
security provisions at IP adequately protect the spent fuel. Thus, the
Petitioners' request to order the installation of a dry-cask storage
facility is denied. However, the licensee has stated its intention to
add such a facility.
A copy of the Director's Decision will be filed with the Secretary
of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206 of the Commission's regulations. As provided for by this
regulation, the Director's Decision will constitute the final action of
the Commission 25 days after the date of the decision, unless the
Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Director's
Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day of November, 2002.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 02-29738 Filed 11-21-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P