I want to thank the Committee for inviting the Masters, Mates & Pilots (MM&P) to present our views concerning the implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) in the maritime sector.  Our organization represents Ship’s Masters and Licensed Deck Officers and Engineers working aboard U.S.-flag commercial vessels operating in the international and domestic trades, and on the inland waterways; and on civilian-crewed ships in the government fleet.  The MM&P also represents harbor pilots. 

            The MM&P and, in fact, all the American seafaring and longshore unions, have a vital interest in maritime security and the administration of the maritime security regime.  The members of our maritime labor organizations will be directly affected by any breach of maritime security.  Many of the members of the MM&P also serve as Ship Security Officers and are responsible for the implementation of the U.S. Maritime Security Regulations and the International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities (ISPS Code).

            Our comments are from the perspective of mariners who are continually in transit between different terminals, ports, states and countries for long periods as they work and live aboard their vessels.  Accordingly, and in order to do their jobs efficiently and effectively, these maritime workers need consistency between national and international identity credentials, and uniformity with respect to the administration of access control.

Once fully implemented across all sectors of the transportation industry, the TWIC program will affect millions of American workers.  In fact, many of our concerns are shared by other transportation workers, such as longshoremen, truck drivers, rail crews, ship service personnel and others whose employment is not limited to a single facility or port.

            Seafaring and longshore workers want secure ports and vessels.  We should be and we want to be treated as allies in the war against terror and not as the enemy.  Our members would be among the first affected by a terrorist attack directed at or using our nation’s maritime transportation system.  Therefore, we understand that access control procedures, including identification cards, can be important tools in the effort to prevent terrorist acts against our maritime transportation system.  We support initiatives to identify and bar from working in security-sensitive transportation jobs individuals who clearly pose a security risk.

            The stated goals of the TWIC program are to improve the security of our transportation systems, ensure the flow of commerce, and preserve the rights of workers; workers who are essential participants in the supply chain and in its security.  We believe very strongly that in order to achieve these objectives, the process of applying for and receiving a TWIC must be efficient and must not result in unnecessary burdens upon workers.  TWIC cards will be used in a marine environment covering a vast and diverse maritime workplace and the program must not only account for and reflect this reality, but must be adaptable to a wide variety of circumstances.  Unfortunately, we are concerned that in too many areas this is not currently the case.

            We have no doubt of the need for a “biometric transportation security card” as mandated by Congress in section 70105 of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA of 2002).  Early on we saw the benefits of a single, national security system based on a comprehensive security record check that could be used in a uniform system by a mobile workforce employed across many terminals, ports and states.  Therefore, we support a system based upon background checks to ensure that transportation workers do not pose a “terrorism security risk” to the United States.  However, our support was predicated on the belief that such a system would be a national system that would become the standard for all maritime workers throughout the country and would prevent a proliferation of local systems that would all require their own background checks and fees.  This unfortunately is not the case today. In the absence of federal preemption, the program is permitting local requirements to overlay the TWIC standards for access control.

            It should be clear that this situation is inconsistent with the goals of the TWIC program and unnecessarily burdens transportation workers who, by the nature of their work, require access to secure areas throughout a port, a state, the nation, or even internationally.  Terrorism and the prevention of terrorism are national, not local, concerns and the standards and system put in place to address these national concerns should take precedence over all others and not be left to the vagaries of each individual facility, port, city or state.

            We anticipated and have urged that the TWIC program should take advantage of proven biometric technology by using standards developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).  ICAO is the United Nations organization that regulates international air transport.  The ICAO standards are simple, efficient, widely used and recognized worldwide.

            In addition, the ICAO standards form the basis for secure identity documents recently adopted by the International Labor Organization in Convention 185 (ILO C185), Seafarer Identity Documents (SID).  They also form the basis for the machine readable travel document control systems used by the US for electronic passports that monitor access of foreign travelers to the US.  It seems to us the ICAO standards are the logical choice for a biometric security card that could be used in an interoperable system that could include both our national cards and the international cards that will be carried by the crews of foreign ships; a population of seafaring workers employed aboard the foreign flag ships that carry 95% of America’s export and import trade in and out of America’s ports.  Also, foreign port workers on US flag ships while working cargo or undergoing repairs in foreign ports are expected to carry ICAO-compatible identity cards.

            Because our TWIC system will not be interoperable with international standards the vast majority of ships and crews in US deep water ports will not be covered under TWIC-based access control systems.  In other words, US ships working cargo in a US port with US labor will have to comply with United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) security provisions while a competing foreign ship with a foreign crew at the same terminal will be exempt – a situation we can begin to rectify by requiring that the TWIC system use the readily available ICAO standards.

            It is disappointing to us that the very clear provisions regarding security cards in the MTSA of 2002 have still not been fully implemented in 2007.  We attribute this to a number of factors.

            First, ownership of the program has been split.  Responsibility for the design of the card lies with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) while the Coast Guard is responsible for implementation of access control programs using the TWIC.

            Second, rather than accepting the proven ICAO standard, the TSA has adopted a design standard that is technologically sophisticated but overly complex and with a functionality that is, in most cases, far beyond that needed to comply with the MTSA of 2002.

            Third, the card design standard and required supporting equipment is unproven in the maritime environment.  Many individuals and organizations experienced in maritime transportation believe that the complex access control regime it is intended to support is both unnecessary and impractical throughout much of the maritime workplace.

            Many have also raised objections over the approach taken by the TSA but, from our perspective, the agenda seems to be dictated by the concerns of the card manufacturers and contractors rather than by those of the affected population in the maritime industry who will be covered by the program.  The result is a very complex and expensive program that we are concerned will cause major disruptions in the maritime transportation system if implemented as proposed.  The cost for all this will have been borne by the workers in the system.

            In May 2006, the Coast Guard issued a proposal for a security regime governing access control using the full functionality of the proposed card.  That proposal met strenuous objections from the maritime industry which highlighted the proposed card’s impracticality. It appeared that the initial proposal was driven by a desire on the part of the Coast Guard to utilize the full alleged functionality of the TSA-designed card across the entire maritime sector regardless of any risk-based assessment of the threat of terrorism in the various sectors of a very diverse industry.  As an example, vessels would be required to have onboard card readers interconnected via satellite communications to a central server maintained by the TSA to monitor use of the TWIC card. The impracticality of applying such a system to thousands of small inland towing vessels or offshore supply vessels, or even large ocean-going ships, should be self evident.  While the initial Coast Guard proposed access control provisions have been withdrawn, they remain the subject of a future rulemaking that, as far as we know, still has the objective of utilizing the full functionality of the TWIC card across the entire maritime sector in a one-size-fits-all approach to security.

            Security systems need to differentiate between high risk operations and low to no risk operations.  Security regimes and controls must be scalable to the risk.  For instance, a high profile cruise ship and a terminal handling thousands of passengers is in a very different risk category or tier than an inland towing vessel with a 5 person crew or a ship and terminal handling crushed rock or iron ore.

            Since transportation workers will be required to carry a TWIC, it follows that many of the card holders will travel between states, ports, and facilities. If the TWIC regulations allow each state, port, or facility to develop its own unique access control system that does not conform to a uniform national standard then the TWIC program will impose tremendous costs upon the industry and its workforce but provide no real value in terms of ensuring the free flow of commerce.  The imposition of numerous inconsistent local requirements will require transportation workers to file numerous applications, undergo numerous background checks and pay the fees associated with all of the perhaps dozens of identity cards workers would have to carry.  We are also concerned about delays in the various systems that would possibly deprive workers of employment while they wait for their cards.

            Such a system clearly places an unreasonable burden on workers and on interstate and foreign commerce.  We strongly believe there is an urgent need for federal laws and regulations governing the TWIC to preempt any state or local requirements for such workers.

            In the MTSA of 2002, Congress mandated that those who could be a “terrorism security risk” to the United Stated should be denied a security card.  We agree with that standard and recognize that TSA has made some modifications to its original list of disqualifying crimes. We remain concerned that some of the broad descriptions of disqualifying offenses go beyond this standard.  As this program is implemented over the next few months and years, we hope that TSA will indeed focus on preventing those that are genuine security risks from holding a TWIC and exercise appropriate discretion to not deny employment opportunities to those workers who may have simply made a mistake years ago.

 

Need for an adequate ALJ program

            We are pleased that Congress has established a requirement for a review process before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for individuals denied a TWIC.  It is our understanding that the present intent is to use the ALJ’s within the Coast Guard system.  We recognize the merits of having Coast Guard ALJ’s conduct the reviews, but we have concerns as to the adequacy of the number of ALJ’s within the present Coast Guard system to handle the caseload that may be generated. If the Coast Guard is not able to process reviews in a timely manner it will have a substantial impact on the ability of workers who may have been wrongly denied a TWIC, to earn a living and support their families.

            Currently, the Coast Guard’s ALJ system handles a caseload generated by approximately 200,000 credentialed mariners.  It has been estimated that the initial surge into the TWIC program will cover approximately 850,000 workers.  It is imperative that a sufficient number of ALJ’s are in place to handle a vastly increased caseload.

 

            We continue to oppose the concept that workers must pay the costs for the TWIC program.  The security threat assessments and the background checks mandated by the final rule are considered necessary to enhance the security of our nation’s ports and are part of the overall effort to fight terrorist elements.

          Security threats against ports and ships are actually aimed at governments and the public they represent, not the individual worker.  Reducing security threats aimed at destabilizing our political and social institutions by terrorizing the public is primarily a role of the government.  The general public is the principle beneficiary of maintaining a secure maritime transportation system and a secure global supply chain.  Therefore, while we understand and appreciate the fact that some employers are paying these costs, the federal government should fund this program.

 

            As transportation labor has consistently stated, maintaining the privacy and confidentiality of the information collected and generated by the TWIC process is crucial.  Toward this end and at our request, Section 70105(e) of the MTSA of 2002 includes a specific mandate that “information obtained by the Attorney General or the Secretary under this section may not be made available to the public, including the individual’s employer.  We do appreciate TSA and the Coast Guard’s stated intent to fully abide by these privacy protections, but continued vigilance will be needed to ensure that sensitive information collected in the field, especially at so-called mobile enrollment centers, is adequately protected.

            We also have concerns over discussions at the agency level toward allowing facilities to use the TWIC card for local applications.  The idea is to store additional information beyond what is required by the MTSA of 2002.  Such local applications might include employment records, training records, medical records, or other information of a sensitive nature and would defeat the national character of the system.

            As a matter of privacy protection we strongly believe that the information on the TWIC should be limited to only that necessary for the federal government to comply with the security functions specified in the MTSA of 2002.

            We thank you, again, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to present our comments on the implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential.  We stand ready to work with you and your Committee and other concerned and affected parties to achieve a safer and more secure maritime transportation network.