HHS Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan
INTRODUCTION
Influenza viruses have posed a threat to animal and human health
throughout history. Efforts to develop a universal vaccine or antiviral
medications with sustained efficacy are frustrated by influenza viruses'
tendency to mutate. As a result of the influenza viruses' propensity to change,
people may not have immunity against a new influenza strain. A pandemic occurs
when a novel influenza virus spreads within a human population with little or
no preexisting immunity. The extent and severity of a pandemic depend on the
specific characteristics of the virus. In the 20th century, the world witnessed
three human pandemics, each producing clinically apparent illness in
approximately 30 percent of the world's population. It is estimated that
200,000 to 2 million Americans may die during the next severe influenza
pandemic.
Also, a modern pandemic could have a significant and prolonged
disruptive impact on multiple social and economic sectors of a community. A
high rate of absenteeism in workplaces as a result of illness or caring for ill
family members, the imposition of public health interventions (such as school
and business closings) and isolation measures, or fear of infection could
threaten the critical infrastructure of society and result in disruption of
essential services. To mitigate the consequences of a pandemic, comprehensive
preparedness and response planning is imperative by all aspects and members of
a community.
The Current Influenza Pandemic Threat
Although a novel influenza virus could emerge anywhere in the world at
any time, scientists are particularly concerned about the avian influenza
A/(H5N1) that is currently circulating in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and
Europe. Outbreaks of H5N1 have occurred among poultry in Asia since 1997. H5N1
viruses are endemic among birds in Southeast Asia and are spreading to Europe
and Africa via the transport of infected poultry and the migration of wild
birds, the natural reservoir of avian influenza viruses. As of July 2006, H5N1
outbreaks have been reported in more than 54 countries in Asia, Europe, the
Middle East, and Africa. Continued spread is likely. Human H5N1 cases have been
reported. The reported death rate for human cases has been between 50 and 57
percent, although the true number of people exposed to and infected by the H5N1
virus is unknown. Studies investigating the seroconversion, or the presence of
antibodies against H5N1 in serum, are needed to accurately document the
infection rate in humans. While most of the reported cases seem to have
resulted from direct contact with infected poultry, the source of infection has
not been documented in every instance. Of concern are the few instances in
which transmission from person to person may have occurred.
Pandemic Planning Assumptions
As a result of the widespread emergence and spread of the H5N1 virus
among birds, public health experts and Government officials are escalating and
intensifying their pandemic preparedness. Preparedness planning must consider
such factors as the ability of the virus to spread rapidly across communities
and countries, the potential of asymptomatic persons transmitting the virus to
others, and the likelihood of multiple outbreaks occurring simultaneously
throughout the United States and thus limiting the ability of any jurisdiction
to provide assistance and support to other jurisdictions. It must also be
understood that, during a pandemic, enormous demands will be placed on all
health care systems. There will be shortages of medical and diagnostic devices,
and delays in the delivery of vaccines and antivirals. There will be disruption
to national and community infrastructures and services.
Therefore, for the purposes of drafting the HHS Implementation
Plan, the following specific planning assumptions, as outlined in the
White House Homeland Security Council (HSC) Implementation
Plan, have been used:
- An influenza pandemic will most likely originate overseas and not in
the United States.
- Susceptibility to the pandemic influenza virus will be nearly
universal.
- Efficient and sustained person-to-person transmission will signal an
imminent pandemic.
- The clinical disease attack rate will likely be 30 percent or higher.
Illness rates will be highest among school-aged children (about 40 percent) and
decline with age. Among working adults, an average of 20 percent will become
ill during a community outbreak.
- Some persons will become infected, but not develop clinically
significant symptoms. Asymptomatic or minimally symptomatic individuals can
transmit infection and develop immunity to subsequent infection.
- The typical incubation period (interval between infection and onset
of symptoms) for influenza will be approximately 2 days.
- Persons who become infected will shed virus and may transmit
infection as much as a day before the onset of illness. Persons will transmit
infection for at least 2 days after the onset of symptoms. Children will shed
the greatest amount of virus and are likely to pose the greatest risk for
disease transmission.
- On average, each infected person will transmit infection to
approximately two other people.
- Fifty percent of those who become ill will seek outpatient medical
care. With the availability of effective antiviral drugs for treatment, this
proportion could be higher.
- The number of hospitalizations and deaths will depend on the
virulence of the pandemic virus. Two scenarios are presented based on
extrapolation of past pandemic experience (Table 1). HHS
planning utilizes the more severe scenario.
- Risk groups for severe and fatal infection cannot be predicted with
certainty, but will likely include infants, the elderly, pregnant women, and
persons with chronic medical conditions.
- Rates of absenteeism in workplaces will depend on the severity of the
pandemic. In a severe pandemic, absenteeism will reach 40 percent during the
peak weeks of a community outbreak, with lower rates of absenteeism during the
weeks before and after the peak.
- Certain public health measures (closing schools, quarantining
household contacts of infected individuals, sheltering in place ["snow days"])
will increase rates of absenteeism in workplaces.
- In an affected community, a pandemic outbreak will last about 6 to 8
weeks.
- Multiple waves (periods during which community outbreaks occur across
the country) of illness will occur, and each wave could last 23 months.
Historically, the largest waves have occurred in the fall and winter, but the
seasonality of a pandemic cannot be predicted with certainty.
As with other natural disasters, during and after a pandemic,
individuals will require intensive psychosocial support, including substance
abuse and mental health services.
Table 1. Aggregate Number of Episodes of
Illness, Health Care Utilization, and Death During Moderate and Severe Pandemic
Influenza Scenarios*
Characteristic |
Moderate (1958/68-like) |
Severe (1918-like) |
Illness |
90 million (30%) |
90 million (30%) |
Outpatient medical care |
45 million (50%) |
45 million (50%) |
Hospitalization |
865,000 |
9,900,000 |
ICU care |
128,750 |
1,485,000 |
Mechanical ventilation |
64,875 |
745,500 |
Deaths |
209,000 |
1,903,000 |
*Estimates based on extrapolation from past pandemics in the United
States. Note that these estimates do not include the potential impact of
interventions not available during the 20th century pandemics.
World Health Organization Pandemic Phases and U.S.
Federal Government Response Stages
The World Health Organization's (WHO's) published guidance for national
pandemic planning has classified pandemic activities into six phases. These six
phases are characterized by the spread of a novel influenza strain through
animals and humans. Each pandemic phase is associated with a range of
preparedness and response actions. (See Table 2.)
The WHO phases reflect the progression of a pandemic worldwide, rather
than in any one country. For domestic preparedness planning purposes, however,
it is more useful to think in terms of the six U.S. Response Stages that
reflect the immediate and specific threat of a pandemic virus that arises
overseas and may pose a threat to Americans. (See Table 2.)
While the WHO Phases provide a framework for evaluating the global situation,
the U.S. Response Stages facilitate the implementation of domestic disease
containment strategies and activities.
As of October 2006, we are in WHO Phase 3, in the Pandemic Alert Period.
Current efforts of the U.S. Government are directed towards accelerating
preparedness activities prior to WHO Phase 4, then initiating pandemic response
actions at the onset of Phase 4, when epidemiological evidence exists that
increased human-to-human transmission of an influenza virus with
pandemic potential has occurred anywhere in the world.
The U.S. Government objectives, actions, policy decisions, and messaging
considerations on pandemic influenza are identified for each of the U.S.
Government Response Stages and are summarized in the National Strategy
for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan. For the United States, the
overarching goals are to:
- Prevent influenza transmission through consistent adherence to
appropriate infection control practices across health care and community
sectors during all U.S. Government Stages
- Delay the entry of a novel, pandemic influenza virus through the air-
and seaports and land-border crossings of the United States and its trusts and
territories during U.S. Government Stages 13
- Slow transmission within the United States during U.S. Government
Stages 4 and 5 by implementing:
- Non-pharmaceutical disease control methods (e.g., isolation,
quarantine, school closures, and social distancing)
- Pharmaceutical disease control methods (e.g., vaccination,
antiviral medications)
Table 2. WHO Global Pandemic Phases and the
Stages for Federal Government Response*
WHO Phases |
U.S. Response Stages |
Inter-Pandemic Period |
1 |
No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. An
influenza subtype that has caused human infection may be present in animals. If
present in animals, the risk of human disease is considered to be low.
|
0 |
New domestic animal outbreak in at-risk country |
2 |
No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans.
However, a circulating animal influenza virus subtype poses a substantial risk
of human disease. |
Pandemic Alert Period |
3 |
Human infection(s) with a new subtype, but no human-to-human
spread, or at most, rare instances of spread to a close contact. |
0 |
New domestic animal outbreak in at-risk country |
1 |
Suspected human outbreak overseas |
4 |
Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human transmission, but
spread is highly localized, suggesting that the virus is not well adapted to
humans. |
2 |
Confirmed human outbreak overseas |
5 |
Large cluster(s), but human-to-human spread still localized,
suggesting that the virus is becoming increasingly better adapted to humans,
but may not yet be fully transmissible (substantial pandemic risk). |
Pandemic Period |
6 |
Pandemic phase: increased and sustained transmission in general
population. |
3 |
Widespread human outbreak in multiple locations overseas |
4 |
First human case in North America |
5 |
Spread throughout the United States |
6 |
Recovery and preparation for subsequent waves |
*U.S. Government stages 1 through 3 assume that
the emergence of the pandemic strain will occur in another country. If the
initial outbreak happened in the United States, U.S. Government Stage 4, the
U.S. Government's goal would be to slow the spread of infection within the
United States.
U.S. Response Stages 1 through 3 assume that the emergence of the
pandemic strain will occur in another country. If the initial outbreak happened
in the United States (U.S. Government Response Stage 4) the U.S. Government's
goal is to slow the spread of infection within the United States.
Doctrine for HHS Pandemic Influenza Planning and
Response
Because of the current ongoing outbreaks of avian influenza A/(H5N1) in
Asia and the progression from the interpandemic period (the period prior to
human infections) to a pandemic alert (once human infections have occurred),
HHS has accelerated its preparedness planning and activities. In addition to
the characteristics of the pandemic and planning assumptions noted above, the
following principles guide HHS preparedness planning and response
activities:
- Preparedness requires coordination among Federal, State, local, and
tribal governments and private sector partners.
- Sustained human-to-human transmission anywhere in the world (WHO
Phase 6) is the triggering event for a U.S. response.
- When possible and appropriate, basic public health measures will be
employed to reduce person-to-person virus spread and prevent or delay influenza
outbreaks.
- An informed and responsive public is essential for minimizing the
health, social, and economic impact of a pandemic.
- At the start of a pandemic, vaccines, which will initially be in
short supply, will be procured and distributed to State, local, and tribal
health departments for the vaccination of predetermined priority groups.
- Domestic vaccine production capacity sufficient to provide
vaccination for the entire U.S. population is critical.
- Quantities of antiviral drugs sufficient to treat 25 percent of the
U.S. population will be stockpiled.
- Antiviral drugs from public stockpiles will be distributed to
predetermined priority groups.
Priorities for HHS Pandemic Preparedness and Response
Activities
Given the scope of pandemic preparedness and response activities
presented in this Plan, prioritization is necessary. Although specific
conditions and circumstances may dictate a revision of these priorities for
action, the current priorities are:
- Advance international capacity for early warning and response
- Enhance international communication and cooperation
- Build international capacity
- Facilitate rapid response
- Limit the arrival and spread of a pandemic into the United States
- Ensure early warning and situational awareness
- Establish a border and transportation strategy to delay entry
into the United States of a pandemic virus detected overseas
- Establish screening protocols at U.S. ports of entry and
implementation agreements with other countries for screening passengers at
airports and seaports
- Provide clear guidance to all stakeholders
- Ensure effective risk communications including the development
and provision of educational campaigns
- Provide guidance on maximizing surge capacity with available
resources
- Provide comprehensive guidance on community shielding
- Provide clear guidance for the private sector and
institutions
- Accelerate the development of countermeasures
- Develop rapid diagnostics
- Establish stockpiles of pre-pandemic vaccine and antivirals
- Advance technology and production capacity for influenza vaccine
and research into the development of a universal influenza vaccine
- Support research into new and improved antivirals
HHS has aggressively embarked on preparing for a pandemic. Many of the
actions presented in this Plan are a continuation of already-existing
initiatives.
Since a pandemic might not unfold in a completely predictable way,
regular assessments and adjustments to HHS actions and strategies will be made
over time to reflect changing circumstances. HHS will monitor and evaluate its
interventions, and will communicate lessons learned to health care providers,
public health agencies, and others on the effectiveness of clinical and public
health responses. As possible, HHS will assist State, local, and tribal health
agencies in responding to outbreaks by deploying medical personnel, equipment,
and supplies to augment health care capacity in affected areas. HHS will work
with private industry partners and stakeholders to facilitate the production
and distribution of antiviral drugs and pandemic vaccine. HHS will monitor
antiviral drug and pandemic vaccine distribution, effectiveness, and any
serious adverse events.
Summary of HHS Implementation Plan
This document, the HHS Implementation Plan, provides a
roadmap for the Department's pandemic preparedness and response. It outlines
specific steps to implement the actions and expectations assigned to HHS in the
HSC National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation
Plan and identified in the HHS Strategic Plan. (See
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/pandemic-influenza-implementation.html.)
Part I of this HHS Implementation Plan contains eight
chapters on cross-cutting issues covering international activities, domestic
surveillance, public health interventions, the Federal medical response,
vaccines, antiviral drugs, and communications, as well as State, local, and
tribal preparedness. The topic of each chapter is introduced by a discussion of
its importance, key planning assumptions, and HHS roles. Then each chapter
presents HHS implementation steps undertaken to fulfill the HSC directives in
the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. Achievement of
these goals is contingent on the availability of resources.
Part II includes detailed continuity-of-operations plans that ensure
that the essential functions of each HHS operating division are identified and
maintained in the presence of the expected decreased staffing levels during a
pandemic event.
As a roadmap, this HHS Implementation Plan is intended
to facilitate coordination of Department pandemic preparedness and response
programs and activities. It is a planning tool only. This document does not
prescribe every intermediary step, process, or project. Rather it points the
direction to more general steps or actions that the Department might undertake
in its pandemic planning efforts. HHS will continue to review, revise, and
update the HHS Implementation Plan as necessary.
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