AGREED STATEMENTS, COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS, AND
UNILATERAL STATEMENTS REGARDING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OFSTRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS
1. Agreed Statements
The document set forth below was agreed upon and initialed by
the Heads of the Delegations on May 26, 1972 (letter designations added):
AGREED STATEMENTS REGARDING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON
CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
[A]
The Parties understand that land-based ICBM launchers referred to in
the Interim Agreement areunderstood to be launchers for strategic ballistic
missiles capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the
northeastern border of the continental United States and the northwestern border
of the continental USSR.
[B]
The Parties understand that fixed land-based ICBM launchers under
active construction as of the date of signature of the Interim Agreement
may be completed.
[C]
The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and
replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be
significantly increased.
[D]
The Parties understand that during the period of the Interim
Agreement there shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM
or SLBM test and training launchers, or in the number of such launchers
for modern land-based heavy ICBMs. The Parties further understand that
construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be
undertaken only for purposes of testing and training.
[E]
The Parties understand that dismantling or destruction of ICBM
launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 and ballistic missile
launchers on older submarines being replaced by new SLBM launchers on modern
submarines will be initiated at the time of the beginning of sea trials of
a replacement submarine, and will be completed in the shortest possible agreed
period of time. Such dismantling or destruction, and timely notification
thereof, will be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing
Consultative Commission.
2. Common Understandings
Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached
during the negotiations:
A. Increase in ICBM Silo Dimensions
Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 26, 1972:
The Parties agree that the term "significantly increased" means that
an increase will not be greater than 10-15 percent of the present dimensions
of land-based ICBM silo launchers.
Minister Semenov replied that this statement corresponded to the Soviet
understanding.
B. Standing Consultative Commission
Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972:
The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to
initial implementation of the ABM Treaty's Article XIII on the Standing Consultative
Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on
offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement,
See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of the Outbreak of Nuclear War
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
signed Sept. 30, 1971 agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early
in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements
will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under
these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in
session, ad hoc arrangements for any desired consultationsunder these
Articles may be made through diplomatic channels.
Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis, he could
agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.
C. Standstill
On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement:
In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation
is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the
obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the
date of signature of these two documents.
In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972:
The United States agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on
May 6 concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but
we would like to make clear our understanding that this means that, pending
ratification and acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited
by the agreements after they had entered into force. This understanding would
continue to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory of its
intention not to proceed with ratification or approval.
The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.
3. Unilateral Statements
(a) The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the
negotiations by the United States Delegation:
A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement:
The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government
attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic
offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement
on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms.
The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations
should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability
of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also
indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement
of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms.
Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement
of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more
complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years,
U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, itwould constitute
a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The United States does not wishto see
such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish
to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government
attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms.
The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional
consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of
the U.S. position.
B. Land-Mobile ICBM Launchers
The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972:
In connection with the important subject of land-mobile ICBM launchers,
in the interest of concluding the Interim Agreement the U.S. Delegation now withdraws
its proposal that Article Ior an agreed statement explicitly prohibit the deployment of
mobile land-based ICBM launchers. I have been instructed to inform you that, while
agreeing to defer the question of limitation of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers
to the subsequent negotiations on more complete limitations on strategic offensive
arms, the United States would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM
launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement as inconsistent with the
objectives of that Agreement.
C. Covered Facilities
The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972:
I wish to emphasize the importance that the United States attaches to the
provisions of Article V,including in particular their application to fitting out
or berthing submarines.
D. "Heavy" ICBMs
The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972:
The U.S. Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation has not been willing
to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under these circumstances, the
U.S. Delegation believes it necessary to state the following: The United States would
consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest
light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The United States proceeds
on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration.
On May 17, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following unilateral "Statement of
the Soviet Side":
Taking into account that modern ballistic missile submarines are presently
in the possession of not only the United States, but also of its NATO allies, the
Soviet Union agrees that for the period of effectiveness of the Interim Freeze
Agreement the United States and its NATO allies have up to 50 such submarines with
a total of up to 800 ballistic missile launchers thereon (including 41 U.S. submarines
with 656 ballistic missile launchers). However, if during the period of effectiveness
of the Agreement U.S. allies in NATO should increase the number of their modern submarines
to exceed the numbers of submarines they would have operational or under construction
on the date of signature of the Agreement, the Soviet Union will have the right to a
corresponding increase in the number of its submarines. In the opinion of the Soviet
side, the solution of the question of modern ballistic missile submarines provided for
in the Interim Agreement only partially compensates for the strategic imbalance in
the deployment ofthe nuclear-powered missile submarines of the USSR and the United
States. Therefore, the Soviet side believes that this whole question, and above all
the question of liquidating the American missile submarine bases outside the United
States, will be appropriately resolved in the course of follow-on negotiations.
On May 24, Ambassador Smith made the following reply to Minister Semenov:
The United States side has studied the "statement made by the Soviet side"
of May 17 concerning compensation for submarine basing and SLBM submarines belonging
to third countries. The United States does not accept the validity of the considerations
in that statement.
On May 26 Minister Semenov repeated the unilateral statement made on May 17.
Ambassador Smith also repeated the U.S. rejection on May 26.