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The need for ensuring quick and reliable communication directly between the heads of
government of nuclear-weapons states first emerged in the context of efforts to reduce the danger
that accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack might trigger a nuclear war. These risks, arising
out of conditions which are novel in history and peculiar to the nuclear-armed missile age, can of
course threaten all countries, directly or indirectly.
The Soviet Union had been the first nation to propose, in 1954, specific safeguards against
surprise attack; it also expressed concern about the danger of accidental war. At Western
initiative, a Conference of Experts on Surprise Attack was held in Geneva in 1958, but recessed
without achieving conclusive results, although it stimulated technical research on the issues
involved.
In its "Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World," presented to the
General Assembly by President Kennedy on September 25, 1961, the United States proposed a
group of measures to reduce the risks of war. These included advance notification of military
movements and maneuvers, observation posts at major transportation centers and air bases, and
additional inspection arrangements. An international commission would be established to study
possible further measures to reduce risks, including "failure of communication."
The United States draft Treaty outline submitted to the ENDC1 on April 18, 1962, added a
proposal for the exchange of military missions to improve communications and understanding. It
also proposed "establishment of rapid and reliable communications" among the heads of government
and with the Secretary General of the United Nations.
The Soviet draft Treaty on general and complete disarmament (March 15, 1962) offered no
provisions covering the risk of war by surprise attack, miscalculation, or accident. On July 16,
however, the Soviet Union introduced amendments to its draft that called for (1) a ban on joint
maneuvers involving the forces of two or more states and advance notification of substantial
military movements, (2) exchange of military missions, and (3) improved communications
between heads of government and with the U.N. Secretary General. These measures were not
separable from the rest of the Soviet program.
The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 compellingly underscored the importance of prompt,
direct communication between heads of state. On December 12 of that year, a U.S. working
paper submitted to the ENDC urged consideration of a number of measures to reduce the risk of
war. These measures, the United States argued, offered opportunities for early agreement and
could be undertaken either as a group or separately. Included was establishment of
communications links between major capitals to ensure rapid and reliable communications in
times of crisis. The working paper suggested that it did not appear either necessary or desirable
to specify in advance all the situations in which a special communications link might be used:
. . . In the view of the United States, such a link should, as a general matter, be
reserved for emergency use; that is to say, for example, that it might be reserved
for communications concerning a military crisis which might appear directly to
threaten the security of either of the states involved and where such developments
were taking place at a rate which appeared to preclude the use of normal
consultative procedures. Effectiveness of the link would not be degraded through
use for other matters.
On June 20, 1963, at Geneva the U.S. and Soviet representatives to the ENDC completed
negotiations and signed the "Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct
Communications Link." The memorandum provided that each government should be responsible
for arrangements for the link on its own territory, including continuous functioning of the link
and prompt delivery of communications to its head of government. An annex set forth the
routing and components of the link and provided for allocation of costs, exchange of equipment,
and other technical matters. The direct communications link would comprise:
(2) a full-time duplex wire telegraph circuit (Washington-London-Copenhagen-Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow); and
(3) a full-time duplex radiotelegraph circuit (Washington-Tangier-Moscow). If the wire circuit should be interrupted, messages would be transmitted by the radio circuit. If
experience showed the need for an additional wire circuit, it might be established by mutual
agreement.
The "Hot Line" agreement, the first bilateral agreement between the United States and the
Soviet Union that gave concrete recognition to the perils implicit in modern nuclear-weapons
systems, was a limited but practical step to bring those perils under rational control.
The communications link has proved its worth since its installation. During the Arab-Israeli
war in 1967, for example, the United States used it to prevent possible misunderstanding of U.S.
fleet movements in the Mediterranean. It was used again during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The
significance of the hot line is further attested by the 1971, 1984 and 1988 agreements to
modernize it. These agreements are discussed in following sections.
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1 Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which met at Geneva from 1962 on. In 1969, with
the addition of new members, the name was changed to Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament (CCD). A yet larger group, the Committee on Disarmament, was established in
1978-79. In 1984 the Committee on Disarmament changed its name to the Conference on
Disarmament.
(1) two terminal points with teletype equipment;