TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE
AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES
The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and
Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the INF (Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces) Treaty, requires destruction of the Parties' ground-launched
ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers,
their launchers and associated support structures and support equipment
within three years after the Treaty enters into force.
In the mid-1970s the Soviet Union achieved rough strategic parity
with the United States. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union began replacing
older intermediate-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with a new intermediate-range
missile, the SS-20, bringing about what was perceived as a qualitative
and quantitative change in the European security situation. The SS-20 was
mobile, accurate, and capable of being concealed and rapidly redeployed.
It carried three independently targetable warheads, as distinguished from
the single warheads carried by its predecessors. The SS-20s 5,000 kilometer
range permitted it to cover targets in Western Europe, North Africa, the
Middle East, and, from bases in the eastern Soviet Union, most of Asia,
Southeast Asia, and Alaska.
In late 1977, NATOs Nuclear Planning Group ordered a study of
the Alliances long-term INF modernization needs, consistent with the doctrine
of flexible response. In the spring of 1979, NATO established the Special
Consultative Group to formulate guiding principles for future arms control
efforts involving INF. That summer, NATO produced the Integrated Decision
Document, which set forth the basic aims of the Alliances INF policy. It
called for complementary programs of force modernization and arms control.
On November 12, 1979, the NATO ministers unanimously adopted a
"dual track" strategy to counter Soviet SS-20 deployments. One track called
for arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet
Union to reduce INF forces to the lowest possible level; the second track
called for deployment in Western Europe, beginning in December 1983, of
464 single-warhead U.S. ground-launched cruise (GLCM) missiles and 108
Pershing II ballistic missiles.
Initially the Soviet Union refused to engage in preliminary talks,
unless NATO revoked its deployment decision; however, by July 1980, the
Soviet position changed, and preliminary discussions began in Geneva in
the fall of 1980.
The U.S. approach to the negotiations, developed through extensive
consultations within NATO, required that any INF agreement must: (1) provide
for equality both in limits and rights between the United States and the
Soviet Union; (2) be strictly bilateral and thus exclude British and French
systems; (3) limit systems on a global basis; (4) not adversely affect
NATOs conventional defense capability; and (5) be effectively verifiable.
Agreement to begin formal talks was reached on September 23, 1981.
On November 18, President Reagan announced a negotiating proposal in which
the United States would agree to eliminate its Pershing IIs and GLCMs if
the Soviet Union would dismantle all of its SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-5s. This
proposal became known as the "zero-zero offer."
At the beginning of the talks, the Soviet Union opposed the deployment
of any U.S. INF missiles in Europe and proposed a ceiling of 300 "medium-range"
missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft for both sides, with British and
French nuclear forces counting toward the ceiling for the West.
During the first two years of the talks, which ended with a Soviet
walkout on November 23, 1983, the United States continued to emphasize
its preference for the "zero option" even while introducing the concept
of an interim agreement based on equally low numbers of INF systems.
During 1984 there were no INF negotiations. U.S. deployments were
carried out as planned in the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the
United Kingdom, while preparations for deployment continued in Belgium.
In January 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrey Gromyko agreed to separate but parallel negotiations on
INF, strategic arms (START), and defense and space issues as part of a
new bilateral forum called the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST). The United
States and the Soviet Union agreed that all questions regarding these three
areas would be considered in their interrelationship. Negotiations would
be conducted by a single delegation from each side, divided into three
groups -- one for defense and space, one for START, and one for INF. Formal
talks resumed in March 1985 in all three areas.
In the fall of 1985, the Soviet Union hinted at the possibility
of an INF agreement independent of START or defense and space issues. As
U.S. GLCM deployments continued, the Soviet Union outlined an interim INF
agreement that would permit some U.S. GLCMs in Europe, but which would
permit SS-20 warheads equal to the sum of all warheads on U.S., British,
and French systems combined. The Soviets also offered to freeze INF systems
in Asia -- contingent on U.S. acceptance of their proposals and provided
the Asian strategic situation did not change.
In November of 1985, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev
met in Geneva, where they issued a joint statement calling for an "interim
accord on intermediate-range nuclear forces." At the end of 1985, the United
States proposed a limit of 140 launchers in Europe for both sides and proportionate
reductions in Asia while emphasizing collateral constraints on shorter-range
missiles, since these systems can cover the same targets as longer-range
systems.
On January 15, 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev announced a Soviet
proposal for a three-stage program to ban nuclear weapons by the year 2000,
which included elimination of all U.S. and Soviet INF missiles in Europe.
In late February 1986, the United States proposed a limit of 140
INF launchers in Europe and concurrent proportionate reductions in Asia.
This proposal also called for both sides to reduce their INF missile launchers
remaining in Europe and Asia by an additional 50 percent in 1988 and, finally,
to eliminate all INF weapons by the end of 1989. There would be no constraints
on British and French nuclear forces. Moreover, as of the end of 1987,
shorter-range missiles would be limited equally either to current Soviet
levels existing on January 1, 1982, or to a lower level. The United States
also presented an outline for comprehensive verification.
A series of high-level discussions took place in August and September
1986 followed by a meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986, where the sides agreed
to equal global ceilings of systems capable of carrying 100 INF missile
warheads, none of which would be deployed in Europe. The Soviet Union also
proposed a freeze on shorter-range missile deployments and agreed in principle
to intrusive on-site verification.
Several months later, on February 28, 1987, the Soviet Union announced
that it was prepared to reach a separate INF agreement. On March 4, 1987,
the United States tabled a draft INF Treaty text, which reflected the agreement
reached at Reykjavik, and submitted a comprehensive verification regime.
In April the Soviet Union presented its own draft Treaty, and by July,
it had agreed in principle to some of the provisions in the U.S. comprehensive
verification regime, including data exchange, on-site observation of elimination,
and on-site inspection of INF missile inventories and facilities. In a
major shift, however, the Soviet side proposed the inclusion of U.S.-owned
warheads on the West German Pershing IA missile systems. The United States
responded by restating that the INF negotiations were bilateral, covering
only U.S. and Soviet missiles, and could not involve third-country systems
or affect existing patterns of cooperation.
During April meetings with Secretary Shultz in Moscow, General
Secretary Gorbachev proposed the possible elimination of U.S. and Soviet
shorter-range missiles. At the June 1987 meeting of the North Atlantic
Council, NATO foreign ministers announced support for the global elimination
of all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems.
On June 15, President Reagan proposed the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet
shorter-range missile systems.
On July 22, 1987, General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to a "double
global zero" Treaty to eliminate intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.
On August 26, 1987, Chancellor Kohl announced the Federal Republic of
Germany would dismantle its 72 Pershing IA missiles and not replace them
with more modern weapons if the United States and the Soviet Union scrapped
all of their INF missiles as foreseen in the emerging Treaty. This was
a unilateral declaration by the FRG and is not part of the INF Treaty,
which is a bilateral U.S.-Soviet agreement.
In September, the two sides reached agreement in principle to complete
the Treaty before the end of the year. On December 8, 1987, the Treaty
was signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at a summit
meeting in Washington. At the time of its signature, the Treaty's verification
regime was the most detailed and stringent in the history of nuclear arms
control, designed both to eliminate all declared INF systems entirely within
three years of the Treaty's entry into force and to ensure compliance with
the total ban on possession and use of these missiles.
The Treaty the United States and the Soviet Union signed at Washington
on December 8 includes the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data,1
the Protocol on Inspections, and the Protocol on Elimination. Because of
concerns raised by the Senate during the ratification hearings, and because
of issues that arose during technical consultations between the United
States and the Soviet Union during the spring of 1988, this package was
augmented by three exchanges of diplomatic notes (one on May 12, 1988 and
two on May 21, 1988) and an agreed minute signed May 12, 1988. The Senate
resolution of ratification required the President, prior to exchanging
instruments of ratification, to obtain Soviet agreement that the four documents
"are of the same force and effect as the provisions of the Treaty." This
was done through an exchange of notes on May 28, 1988. The Treaty entered
into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification in Moscow on
June 1, 1988.
The May 12 and May 28 exchanges of notes, as well as the May 12
agreed minute, are included herein following the texts of the Treaty, the
MOU and the Protocols. The May 21 exchange of notes, which corrected errors
in the site diagrams and Treaty text, are not included, but the textual
corrections are listed following the text of the Treaty, MOU and protocols.
Article XIII established the Special Verification Commission (SVC).
The SVC serves as a forum for discussing and resolving implementation and
compliance issues, for considering additional procedures to improve the
viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, and for determining the characteristics
and methods of use of inspection equipment as anticipated by Section VI
of the Protocol on Inspection. The sides resolved many of those issues
during the first SVC session and agreed to utilize the agreements reached
until such time as a document embodying them was signed by the two sides.
During the third session of the SVC (December 1988), the sides
signed an Agreed Statement on inspection procedures at the continuous monitoring
inspection site at Votkinsk and a Memorandum of Understanding on operating
procedures for the SVC.
To confirm the declared inventory of INF systems throughout the
three-year elimination period and for ten years thereafter, the INF Treaty
established various types of on-site inspections, among these are, baseline
inspections, to confirm the initial data update; closeout inspections of
facilities and missile operation bases at which INF activity ceased; short-notice
(quota) inspections of declared and formerly declared facilities, and elimination
inspections to confirm elimination of INF systems in accordance with agreed
procedures. In addition the United States also received the right to monitor,
on a continuous basis for up to 13 years, the access (or portals) to any
Soviet facility manufacturing a ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM),
not covered under the INF Treaty, which has a stage outwardly similar to
a stage of a GLBM limited by the Treaty. The Soviets received a similar
right to monitor the U.S. facility that previously produced the Pershing
rocket motor.
The U.S. On-Site Inspection (OSIA) was established January 15,
1988, inter alia, to coordinate and implement the inspection provisions
of the Treaty. Baseline inspections were conducted in 1988 by U.S. and
Soviet inspectors to verify the data provided by the United States and
Soviet Union on the number and locations of their respective INF systems
and facilities.
In late April and early May 1991, the United States eliminated
its last ground-launched cruise missile and ground-launched ballistic missile
covered under the INF Treaty. The last declared Soviet SS-20 was eliminated
on May 11, 1991. A total of 2,692 missiles was eliminated after the Treaty's
entry-into-force.
Following the December 25, 1991, dissolution of the Soviet Union,
the United States sought to secure continuation of full implementation
of the INF Treaty regime and to multilateralize the INF Treaty with twelve
former Soviet republics which the United States considers INF Treaty successors.2
Of the twelve successor states, six -- Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan -- have inspectable INF facilities on their territory.
Of these six, four -- Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine -- are active
participants in the process of implementing the Treaty. With the agreement
of the other Parties, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, each with only one inspectable
site on its territory, while participants, have assumed a less active role,
foregoing attendance at sessions of the SVC and participation in inspections.
The multilateralizing of what was previously a bilateral U.S.-Soviet
INF Treaty required establishing agreements between the United States and
the governments of the relevant Soviet successor states on numerous issues.
In the SVC and through diplomatic contacts with the actively participating
successor states, the United States worked to secure agreements to ensure
continuation of the viability of the Treaty regime and to assure the exercise
by the United States of its rights under the Treaty. Among the tasks undertaken
were: arrangements for the settlement of costs connected with implementation
activities in the new, multilateral Treaty context; the establishment of
new points of entry (POE's) in Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine through
which to conduct inspections of the former INF facilities in those countries;
and the establishment of communications links between the United States
and those countries for transmission of various Treaty-related notifications.
Other issues that have been discussed in the SVC include multilateral operating
procedures for the SVC's concurrent continuous monitoring under the START
I and INF Treaties, and inspection procedures for new missiles exiting
from the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Russia.
__________________________
1 A comprehensive data exchange took place at the time
the Treaty was signed. This MOU included the numbers and locations of all
Treaty-limited items, as well as their technical characteristics. All categories
of data in the MOU are updated at six-month intervals for the duration
of the Treaty.
2 The United States did not consider the Baltic states
to be successors, since it had never recognized the legality of their incorporation
into the Soviet Union. |