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Event Notification Report for December 4, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/01/2006 - 12/04/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor	Event Number: 42883
Facility: LIMERICK Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: J. E. THOMPSON HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	Notification Date: 10/07/2006 Notification Time: 11:05 [ET] Event Date: 10/07/2006 Event Time: 06:57 [EDT] Last Update Date: 12/04/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION	Person (Organization): PAUL KROHN (R1)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE

"A division 2 Primary Containment Isolation Instrument System component inoperable required the manual isolation of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) outboard Primary Containment Isolation valves (PCIV). This isolation was required by T/S action 3.3.2.b.1.

"This report made pursuant to 10CFR 50,72 (b)(3)(v)(D) for the inability of single train system to mitigate the consequences of an accident."

At approximately midnight on 10/7/06, Control Room Operators received a Div 2 Steam Leak Detection Trouble Alarm. Troubleshooting identified the failure as associated with the GE NUMAC drawer where temperature inputs are processed. The applicable 14-day T/S LCO Action Statement requires completion of repairs within 6 hours or isolation of HPCI 1 hour later. HPCI was isolated at 0657 EDT. There was no I&C work in progress at the time of the failure. Repair parts are available and onsite.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION RECEIVED FROM EDWARD DENNIN TO JOE O'HARA AT 1500 ON 12/04/06 * * *

"This is a retraction of the event notification made on 10/07/06 at 11:05 hours. This event (#42883) was initially reported as a safety system functional failure under the requirement of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable due to a manual closure of the HPCI steam line outboard primary containment isolation valve (PCIV). The PCIV was closed to support the maintenance on an inoperable steam leak detection (SLD) channel and to satisfy the Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.2 Isolation Actuation Instrumentation action statement.

"The event was initiated at 00:06 hours by a trouble alarm due to a 'self test fault' condition on the Division 2 SLD instrument channel. Troubleshooting determined that the instrument channel was inoperable. TS 3.3.2 Action 'b.1' requires the channel to be restored to operable status within 6 hours. Since this action could not be completed Table 3.3.2-1 Action 23 was applicable. Action 23 required the affected system isolation valves to be closed within one hour and the system (HPCI) to be declared inoperable. This action was completed at 06:57 hours.

"Two modules were replaced in the SLD instrument chassis. The instrument channel was tested satisfactorily and returned to service, Unit 2 HPCI was restored to operable status at 23:48 hours.

"The system was removed from service as part of a planned evolution to conduct maintenance in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's Technical Specifications. The system was secured for the purpose of conducting maintenance on an inoperable SLD instrument channel and completing the TS action. The failed instrument did not adversely affect the HPCI system's capability of performing its safety function. HPCI remained capable of automatic initiation until the PCIV was manually closed to support maintenance by completing the TS actions.

"A condition did not exist at the time of discovery that could have prevented the fulfillment of the HPCI safety function."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO(Sykes).

General Information or Other	Event Number: 43015
Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH Licensee: LAS VEGAS VALLEY WATER DISTRICT Region: 4 City: LAS VEGAS State: NV County: License #: 00-11-0196-01 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: WAYNE YATES HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	Notification Date: 11/29/2006 Notification Time: 17:48 [ET] Event Date: 11/29/2006 Event Time: 10:40 [PST] Last Update Date: 12/01/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE	Person (Organization): RUSSELL BYWATER (R4) JOSEPH HOLONICH (NMSS) ILTAB via email ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A LOST TROXLER GAUGE

The following information was provided via fax:

On November 29, 2006, the NV Health Division Radiological Heath Section was notified by the Las Vegas Water District that a portable moisture density gauge, a Troxler Model 3440, S/N 33786, was lost from the bed of a pickup truck at 10:40AM in Las Vegas, NV. When the loss occurred the gauge was sitting on the open tailgate of the service truck, out of the shipping container and not secured. However, the handle was locked. The Troxler Model 3440 gauge contains two (2) radioactive sources; 8 millicuries Cs-137 and 40 millicuries Am-241/Be. Licensee corrective actions include additional training for gauge operators.

NV Event Report ID: NV-06-007

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY NEVADA (VERELLEN) VIA FAX TO KOZAL ON 12/01/06 AT 1409 * * *

The missing gauge was recovered and returned to the licensee intact on 12/01/06.

Notified R4DO (Bywater), NMSS EO (Wastler), and ILTAB via e-mail.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 43016
Facility: INDIAN POINT Region: 1 State: NY Unit: [2] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: BRIAN ROKES HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ	Notification Date: 11/30/2006 Notification Time: 19:00 [ET] Event Date: 11/30/2006 Event Time: 14:45 [EST] Last Update Date: 12/01/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION	Person (Organization): JAMES DWYER (R1)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	N	0	Hot Standby	0	Hot Standby

Event Text

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP AUTOMATIC START

"On November 30, 2006, at approximately 14:45 hours, an Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) System actuation signal was generated as a result of maintenance activities on the 21 Main Boiler Feed Pump (MBFP). Both motor driven AFW pumps were running at the time and were not automatically started due to previously being placed in service to provide feed water flow to the steam generators. The actuation signal isolated the Steam Generator blowdown Containment Isolation Valves. Both MBFPs were isolated and not feeding the steam generators at the time the actuation signal was generated. The plant was in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) for a forced outage and 21 MBFP was in a maintenance / test condition. The automatic actuation occurred due to the reset oil pressure lowering below the trip set point and initiating an automatic actuation signal."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 12/01/06 AT 0151 EST BY MR. TROULET TO MACKINNON * * *

"At 2100 on 11/30/2006, as a result of continuing work activities on the 21 MBFP an AFW System actuation signal was generated. Both motor driven AFW pumps were running at the time and were not automatically started due to previously being placed in service to provide feed water flow to the steam generators. 21 MBFP has been successfully placed in service."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee.

Notified R1DO (James Dwyer).

Power Reactor	Event Number: 43017
Facility: CALLAWAY Region: 4 State: MO Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: GREG BRADLEY HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON	Notification Date: 12/01/2006 Notification Time: 10:03 [ET] Event Date: 12/01/2006 Event Time: 06:30 [CST] Last Update Date: 12/01/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE	Person (Organization): RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF PLANT ACCESS

"At 0630 on 12-1-06, due to worsening road conditions from heavy snowfall, a determination was made that there is a loss of plant access for some individuals and some impairment of evacuation routes. This meets criteria for an Immediate Notification (8 Hour) per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii). There is no impact on plant operation. The weather is improving, road crews are working and access concerns should be alleviated during the day today."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 43018
Facility: CLINTON Region: 3 State: IL Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: BOB CARTER HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON	Notification Date: 12/01/2006 Notification Time: 10:12 [ET] Event Date: 12/01/2006 Event Time: 06:30 [CST] Last Update Date: 12/01/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE	Person (Organization): LAURA KOZAK (R3)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	96	Power Operation	55	Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIRENS

"At approximately 06:30 hours CST on December 1, 2006, it was discovered that greater than 25% of the Clinton Power Station (CPS) offsite sirens were out of service. 31 of 44 sirens are not available due to inclement weather.

"The licensee has notified DeWitt County Sheriff, Illinois Emergency Management Agency and the NRC Resident Inspector."

Power Reactor	Event Number: 43020
Facility: LASALLE Region: 3 State: IL Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5 NRC Notified By: ROCKY HASTY HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ	Notification Date: 12/01/2006 Notification Time: 17:06 [ET] Event Date: 12/01/2006 Event Time: 11:42 [CST] Last Update Date: 12/01/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE	Person (Organization): LAURA KOZAK (R3)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF THIRTEEN EMERGENCY SIRENS

"A loss of power has disabled thirteen of the fifty EP sirens (26%). The sirens were lost at 11:42 CST and have not been restored.

"This meets the threshold of reportability based on the loss of a public notification system.

"Restoration of power is being scheduled to occur as soon as reasonably possible with the current winter weather conditions.

"Both units remain at full power and are unaffected by the loss of power."

The sirens do not have a battery backup.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 43021
Facility: PERRY Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: JIM CASE HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT	Notification Date: 12/03/2006 Notification Time: 15:20 [ET] Event Date: 12/03/2006 Event Time: 08:58 [EST] Last Update Date: 12/03/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION	Person (Organization): LAURA KOZAK (R3)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

ACCIDENT MITIGATION - HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (DIVISION 3) EMERGENCY DIESEL INOPERABLE

"On December 3, 2006, at 0858 hours, control room operators received a Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Carbon Dioxide (CO2) (Fire Protection) system initiation signal. The CO2 system for the Division 3 EDG room was out of service at the time and so no CO2 was released into the room. At 0905 hours, a first responder notified the control room operators that there was no indication of a fire in the Division 3 EDG room. A walkdown of the associated EDG room ventilation system confirmed the ventilation system tripped with the CO2 initiation signal locked in. At 0919 hours, the Division 3 EDG was declared inoperable and Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.8.1 Condition B was entered. The required TS actions were implemented. The Division 3 EDG is available with restoration of the ventilation system using the CO2 Override switch. The CO2 initiation signal is currently locked in, and the Division 3 CO2 Fire Monitoring Panel, with associated equipment has been quarantined for further investigation.

"The Division 3 EDG provides emergency AC electrical power to the High Pressure Core Spray system. This event is being reported as a condition that could have prevented the safety function of structures or systems required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The Resident Inspector has been notified."