U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
09/27/2000 - 09/28/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37384 37385 37386
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37384 |
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| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/27/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:15[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 09/27/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:23[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC KELSEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/27/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN KINNEMAN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM SIGNAL WITH ALL CONTROL RODS ALREADY INSERTED |
| |
| "While in Cold Shutdown conditions, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced a |
| Reactor Scram initiated by Low water level. All rods were fully inserted at |
| the time of the initiation and all required safety functions operated as |
| required. The cause of the low water level condition was due to a level |
| transient experienced while placing the Reactor Water Cleanup System in |
| service. The lowest indicated water level was 133 inches above top of active |
| fuel. Emergency Operating Procedures and Special Operating Procedures were |
| implemented and reactor water level was returned to the normal cold shutdown |
| level of 149 inches above top of active fuel. There were no adverse effects |
| on Reactor Plant Systems." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37385 |
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| FACILITY: DRESDEN REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/27/2000|
| UNIT: [] [] [3] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:04[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 09/27/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:45[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GRANT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/27/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRENT CLAYTON R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
| | |
|3 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
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EVENT TEXT
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| INCORRECT TAP SETTING DISCOVERED |
| |
| During the Division II UV Test, it was discovered the tap setting on the |
| overvoltage coil on the undervoltage relay (127-2-B-34) on Bus 34 was |
| incorrectly set at 0.2 amps versus 2 amps. The failure of this relay causes |
| a failure to re-energize Bus 34 from Bus 34-1 after a Loss of Off-Site Power |
| (LOOP) occurs requiring the Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to |
| supply power to the bus. The failure to re-energize Bus 34 prevents |
| starting the 3C & 3D Containment Cooling Water Pumps. |
| |
| Based on the events discovered during D3R16 Division II UV Test, it is |
| suspected the ability of this relay to perform its design function has been |
| lost since 02/12/99 during D3R15. Surveillance testing during the fuel cycle |
| would not have identified this deficiency due to paralleling the Unit 3 EDG |
| with off-site power. In this configuration the relay in question is not |
| challenged. |
| |
| With the failure of this relay and a Design Basis Accident ,Loss Of Off-Site |
| Power with a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOOP/LOCA) and a single active |
| failure of the 2/3 EDG (or Div I CCSW Loop Inoperable) a loss of containment |
| cooling function would occur. |
| |
| Work Package Instruction used on 02/12/99 to set the tap setting specified |
| 0.2 amps instead of the correct value of 2 amps. All other Unit 3 Buses |
| have the correct tap setting for the overvoltage coil on the undervoltage |
| relay. Investigation into root cause is in progress. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37386 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: COOK REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/28/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:23[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:21[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE CHERBA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/28/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRENT CLAYTON R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v) OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| ELECTRICAL BUS OUTAGE WILL AFFECT TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM |
| |
| "This event notification is for planned maintenance on Cook Unit 1's |
| electrical buses that remove power from a portion of the TSC ventilation |
| system. Contingencies are established to restore power to the TSC |
| ventilation fan (if needed) to support Emergency Plan execution. The fan |
| that will be unavailable boosts airflow through the TSC ventilation charcoal |
| clean-up filter subsystem. Ventilation flow will still pass through this |
| filter without the booster fan, but TSC pressure will not be boosted to |
| limit infiltration. Use of this fan is dependent on radiological conditions, |
| if radiological conditions warrant its use, and it is not available, the TSC |
| will relocate to the Unit 2 Control Room in accordance with plant |
| procedures. Reporting this event is consistent with NUREG-1022, Rev 1 |
| criteria for reporting loss of ERFs. |
| |
| "No adverse consequences are expected from this outage. The TSC ventilation |
| booster fan is expected to be unavailable for 48 hours, starting at 0121 |
| hours on 9-28-2000. Contingencies have been planned to restore power to the |
| booster fan in 8 to 10 hours if needed. Follow-up notification will be made |
| when the TSC is again fully available. The NRC Senior Site Resident |
| Inspector has been informed of this planned evolution." |
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