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Home > Electronic Reading Room > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events
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> 2005
> February 28
Event Notification Report for February 28, 2005
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
02/25/2005 - 02/28/2005
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 41429 |
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: PSI, INC.
Region: 4
City: HARLINGEN State: TX
County:
License #: L04944
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: D. RAY JISHA
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
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Notification Date: 02/22/2005
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/2005
Event Time: 17:35 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
CNSNS MEXICO (FAX)
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Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE - LOST TROXLER THIN LAYER DENSITY GAGE
The following was received from the state via e-mail:
"On Saturday, 02/19/2005, 1430 CST, the licensee's representative received notification that a technician had lost a Troxler Model 4640-B, Thin layer Density Gauge, S/N 1880. The device contains a double encapsulated source of 10mCi of Cs-137 that was last leak tested on 12/09/04. The source rod handle was padlocked and key was removed according to the technician. The shipping/transport case was lost in the Brownsville, TX area where it was being used at a temporary jobsite.
"Per company protocol and as discussed during loss notification to TX DSHS, a $500.00 'no-questions-asked' reward for the recovery of the device to be issued to area media outlets."
Texas Incident No: I-8213
* * * UPDATE FROM R. JISHA TO J. KNOKE AT 12:41 EST ON 2/23/05 * * *
"The gauge was apparently lost off the back of a pick-up truck at a job site in the vicinity of FR511 and EXPWY. 77 an incorporated area northwest of Brownsville proper. Since the gauge was not secured in the case which was secured to the vehicle, it was not lost but presumably the device had bounced off the truck on a rough section of road. Multiple attempts were made to retrace the route but none were successful in recovering the device. The manufacture (Troxler) has been notified."
Notified R4DO (D. Powers) and NMSS (S. Moore) and CNSNS Mexico via fax. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 41431 |
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: WALMART
Region: 4
City: TUCSON State: AZ
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
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Notification Date: 02/22/2005
Notification Time: 16:22 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2005
Event Time: 08:50 [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
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Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE - GENERAL LICENSE - LOST AND DAMAGED TRITIUM SIGNS
The following information was provided by the State of Arizona via facsimile:
"At approximately 8:50 AM, February 21, 2005, the Agency received notice from AZ DPS advising that 9 Tritium Exit signs were missing. In addition, three signs were located in the store (under construction). A forth sign was damaged in the store. The [damaged] sign was not glowing as the other three. This information was supplied by the Tucson Police Department to AZ DPS who advised the Agency. The Tucson Fire Department was also at the site and they indicated they thought the sources were removed between Friday night and Monday morning. The building does not have doors or windows, but is otherwise closed.
"Since the facility is under construction, who is the responsible party is a portion of the investigation. The signs have not been reported as transferred into the State. The devices were made by Isolite and contain 11.5 Curies of Tritium each. As much as 103.5 Curies of tritium may be missing in addition to the 11.5 [Curies] in the broken exit sign. Tucson Police report # 0502210205 applies to this event.
"Due to the potential contamination of persons a press release may be made.
"The Agency continues to investigate this event. The US FBI will be notified of this event."
Arizona Report #: 05-02 |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 41442 |
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RICHARD MEYERS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
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Notification Date: 02/25/2005
Notification Time: 04:42 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2005
Event Time: 18:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
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Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
POTENTIAL BREACH OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DURING SEISMIC EVENT.
The licensee provided the following information:
"This event notification is being made to report an event that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident IAW 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The potential for creation of an actual hole through Secondary Containment (SC) via the Plant Service Water (TSW) system high point reactor building auto vents (TSW-AV-1A and TSW-AV-1 B) exists if a seismic event occurs and the Seismic Category 2 TSW loop-seal piping outside of Secondary Containment is breached (e.g., because of a pipe break) and has drained.
"Neither of the above conditions presently exists. However, a Secondary Containment breach could occur as a result of a single passive failure (i.e., pipe break in the TSW loop-seal piping described above). TSW-AV-1A and TSW-AV-1B are designed to open automatically when neither TSW system pump is operating to break the vacuum condition that would otherwise exist in the piping. When TSW-AV-1A and TSW-AV-1B are open in vacuum breaker mode, the resultant hole size into the TSW system piping would exceed the allowable Secondary Containment cumulative hole size [ of 32 square inches total], if the loop seal were also breached as described above. Due to this condition Secondary Containment was declared INOPERABLE at 1800 PST 2/24/05. As a compensatory measure to prevent exceeding the allowable Secondary Containment cumulative hole size, one of the two TSW reactor building auto vents (TSW-AV-1B) was isolated by closure of a manual valve (TSW-V-55B). This action was completed at 1828 PST 2/24/05 and the Secondary Containment was declared OPERABLE. One TSW auto vent is sufficient to perform the vacuum breaker function."
This condition was found by the licensee's System Engineer. The extent of condition and long term corrective action is under review by licensee.
Licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Other Nuclear Material |
Event Number: 41443 |
Rep Org: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Licensee: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Region: 1
City: Durham State: NC
County:
License #: 03-23853-01VA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GARY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
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Notification Date: 02/25/2005
Notification Time: 12:18 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2005
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
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Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
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Event Text
MEDICAL EVENT
The following information was provide by the licensee via facsimile:
"[The Department of Veteran Affairs National Health Physics Program called] per 10 CFR 35.3045 to notify [the NRC] of a possible medical event at the VA Medical Center, Durham, North Carolina, a permittee under the VA license. This event was discovered on February 25, 2005.
On February 24, 2005, a permanent-implant prostate brachytherapy procedure was performed at the medical center. 84 Iodine-125 seeds were implanted in the patient. These seeds had around 400 microcuries per seed. A number of seeds were mistakenly placed in fatty tissue, outside of the intended area of treatment.
Based on a preliminary evaluation, a possible medical event occurred since the dose to the prostate was possibly more than 20 percent less than that prescribed and a dose to tissue other than the treatment site is possibly more than 50 rem and greater than 50% of the prescribed dose.
The authorized user notified the patient and will notify the referring physician within 24-hours of discovery.
The National Health Physics Program intends to conduct a reactive inspection next week. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 41444 |
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY CAMPBELL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
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Notification Date: 02/26/2005
Notification Time: 00:59 [ET]
Event Date: 02/15/2005
Event Time: 20:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/26/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
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Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
POSSIBLE FAILURE TO MEET DESIGN BASIS REQUIREMENTS OF POSITIVE PRESSURE IN THE CONTROL TOWER ENVELOPE FOLLOWING A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT.
The licensee provided the following information:
"During operator rounds it was discovered that a double door for the control tower habitability envelope was propped open [from painting earlier in the day]. This condition would have resulted in not meeting the design basis requirements of maintaining a positive pressure inside the control tower envelope following a design basis accident. The doors were immediately closed."
"An issue report was generated and a prompt investigation was commenced in accordance with station policies."
The NRC resident Inspector was notified. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 41445 |
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT PACE
HQ OPS Officer: JANELLE BATTISTE
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Notification Date: 02/26/2005
Notification Time: 20:08 [ET]
Event Date: 02/26/2005
Event Time: 15:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/26/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
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Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
N |
0 |
Cold Shutdown |
0 |
Refueling |
Event Text
DEGRADED CONDITION OF REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY WELD
"IRE-003-469 identified flaws (one circumferential and two axial indications) on 2-DR-2007 weld of hot leg drain line. Engineering has evaluated the flaws using the procedures of ASME Code Section XI, IWB-3600. Although the circumferential flaw was found to be acceptable in accordance with ASME section XI, IWB-3600, the calculated growth rates of the postulated axial flaws are large and do not meet the ASME Section XI Code requirements per NUREG 1022, Rev. 2 sect. 3.2.4 (degraded or unanalyzed condition). 'Any event or condition resulting in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.' Currently a repair plan is being developed. "
The licensee indicated that they will not be able to enter mode (4) until the repair is completed (using weld overlay as the repair method) and an inspection of the repair is conducted.
The licensee will perform a design engineering evaluation of extent of condition to determine the impact of this on the operating unit (Unit 1).
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
See similar event #41448 |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 41446 |
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: RICH LOWERY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
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Notification Date: 02/27/2005
Notification Time: 01:26 [ET]
Event Date: 02/26/2005
Event Time: 21:34 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
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Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
A/R |
Y |
12 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Standby |
Event Text
PLANT HAD A REACTOR TRIP FROM 16.1% POWER DUE TO A LOSS OF TURBINE LOAD SIGNAL
The following information, in addition to the phone report, was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip from 16.1% Reactor Power on a Loss of Turbine Load during a scheduled plant shutdown for a refueling outage.
"The turbine generator was tripped offline at 2101 per refueling outage schedule. A feedwater transient occurred [cause being investigated] during turbine testing, resulting in power rising rapidly from 12.6% to 16.1% . At which point the reactor tripped on loss of load due to being greater than 15% power with all turbine stop valves closed.
"All plant equipment functioned as designed. A Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cooldown resulted due to a feedwater transient. Main Feedwater was isolated, which terminated the cooldown. Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) was established with the diesel driven auxiliary feed pump. Emergency Boration was manually initiated due to the RCS cooldown and secured after shutdown margin verification. Plant is currently stable in mode 3.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for an event that resulted in an event that resulted in an unplanned RPS actuation while the reactor was critical."
All rods fully inserted, no ECCS actuation and no relief valves lifted. Steam generators are being used for heat sink.
The NRC resident Inspector was notified |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 41447 |
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JACK GADZALA
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
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Notification Date: 02/27/2005
Notification Time: 16:29 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2005
Event Time: 11:58 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
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Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
99 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO LOSS OF DC BATTERY CHARGERS
The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile:
"A Technical Specification (TS)-required plant shutdown was initiated on Point Beach Unit 2 at 11:58 a.m. CST on February 27, 2005. The initiation of the unit shutdown was required by TS 3.8.4, Condition 13, due to the Completion Time of TS 3.8.4 Condition A not being met. Both units were operating at 100% power prior to the event.
"At 09:48 CST, offsite transmission network line 151 was lost. The associated electrical transient resulted in the loss of all four required battery chargers. This condition resulted in TS 3.8.4 not being met; however, no associated Actions are provided in TS 3.8.4 for the Condition of four inoperable DC power subsystems, requiring entry of both operating units into TS LCO 3.0.3. LCO 3.0.3 specifies that action be initiated within 1 hour to shut down both units. Three of the four required battery chargers were subsequently restored to operable status by 10:00 a.m. CST. As a result, LCO 3.0.3 was exited prior to initiation of power reduction on either unit. During the 12 minutes while less than 3 battery chargers were available, the associated station DC loads were being provided by the station batteries. The DC battery drain during this time was minimal and the DC electrical subsystems remained within their analyzed condition.
"At 10:00 a.m. CST, the only remaining inoperable battery charger was swing battery charger D09. D09 had been powering the D02 electrical subsystem at the time due to previously ongoing maintenance on normal battery charger D08.
"The continued unavailability of D09 resulted in TS 3.8.4 not being met for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 due to D02 electrical power subsystem becoming inoperable, Required Action 3.8.4 A.1 directs restoring the electrical power subsystem to operable status with a Completion Time of 2 hours. At 11:48 a.m. CST, Required Actions 3.8.4 B.1 and B.2 were entered for both units due to the Completion Time of TS 3.8.4 Condition A not being met. This Required Action directs that the units be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 5 in 36 hours. Plant operators planned an orderly sequential shutdown of both units and initiated the process by beginning a shutdown of Unit 2 at 11:58 a.m. CST. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i).
"At 12:02 p.m. CST, battery charger D09 and electrical subsystem D02 were restored to operable status. This resulted in TS 3.8.4 being met and Conditions 3.8.4 A and B were exited. Reactor power on Unit 2 had only been reduced to approximately 99% power at that time. No shutdown was initiated on Unit 1, which remained at 100% power.
"The power reduction on Unit 2 continued in accordance with normal plant procedures governing loss of offsite transmission network line 151. Plant procedures specify a reduction to less than 50% power as a precautionary measure associated with a potential for grid instability under certain postulated conditions.
"Both reactors continue to operate in a safe and stable manner."
The licensee stated that the loss of offsite power line 151 (345KV) was due to an insulator problem on a high voltage tower about 7 miles from the plant. The estimated repair and restoration time for line 151 is approximately 2100 CST tonight.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 41448 |
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT PACE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
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Notification Date: 02/27/2005
Notification Time: 20:23 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2005
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2005
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
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Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
CYNTHIA CARPENTER (NRR)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
N |
0 |
Refueling |
0 |
Refueling |
Event Text
DEGRADED CONDITION OF REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY WELD
The licensee provided the following information, via facsimile, about its ongoing Alloy 600 inspection:
"IRE-003-574 has identified an axial flaw on line 2-LD-2004-1, 22A cold leg letdown nozzle. Engineering has evaluated the flaws using the procedures of ASME Code Section XI, IWB-3600. The calculated growth rates of the postulated axial flaws are large and do not meet the ASME Section XI Code requirements. This is reportable per NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, Sect. 3.2.4 (degraded or unanalyzed condition). 'Any event or condition resulting in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being serious degraded.' Unit two is in Mode 6 for refueling and a repair plan is currently being developed."
The discovery of this flaw will likely result in the expansion of the inspection scope. Generic concerns for both units have not yet been fully developed by the licensee.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
See similar event #41445 |
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