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Event Notification Report for January 15, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/14/2004 - 01/15/2004

** EVENT NUMBERS **

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor	Event Number: 40394
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [ ] [3] [ ] RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 NRC Notified By: DAN FORRY HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY	Notification Date: 12/16/2003 Notification Time: 19:11 [ET] Event Date: 12/16/2003 Event Time: 15:40 [EST] Last Update Date: 01/14/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION	Person (Organization): CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
3	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"During the performance of planned Unit 3 "High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Pump, Valve, Flow and Unit Cooler Functional and In-Service Testing" the HPCI turbine exhaust line drain valve remained open for longer than expected. The test was aborted and troubleshooting was initiated to determine the cause of this unexpected result. The HPCI system is being maintained in an available status but maintained Tech. Spec. inoperable pending additional evaluation."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1408 EST ON 1/14/04 FROM DAVE FOSS TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 12/16/03 at 1540 hours (EN# 40394). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring the Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable when unexpected conditions were found during performance of routine Inservice Testing of HPCI. Specifically, during an Inservice Test of a check valve associated with the leak off collection and transfer subsystem of HPCI, it was noted that additional leak-off inventory was being collected in the HPCI gland seal condenser than what had been noted during other tests. At the time, concern existed as to whether excessive condensate existed on the steam side of HPCI and therefore, HPCI may not be able to perform its safety function. HPCI was considered available, but Technical Specification inoperable.

"Since the initial report, Engineering has determined that HPCI was fully capable of performing its safety function. The additional condensate inventory observed relative to other tests previously performed was due to the results of a revision to the test approved on 1/23/03. This revision re-ordered the sequence of stroking various HPCI related valves. Although this re-sequencing was an overall enhancement to the test quality, it resulted in the potential for additional condensate inventory existing in the leak-off collection and transfer subsystem depending on system conditions. Since the HPCI steam supply valve (MO-14) is now stroked earlier in the test, there resulted a condition where additional leak-off condensation could collect in the leak off collection and transfer subsystem. Appropriate testing and analysis was performed on this subsystem and it was verified that it was operating properly to remove condensate from the steam side of HPCI. The unexpected condition found during the test has been entered into the site-specific corrective action program for resolution (CR 191222). The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction."

Notified R1DO(Holody).

General Information or Other	Event Number: 40439
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM Licensee: SABIA, INC Region: 4 City: SAN DIEGO State: CA County: License #: 6663 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: R. Gregor HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY	Notification Date: 01/13/2004 Notification Time: 06:03 [ET] Event Date: 01/07/2004 Event Time: [PST] Last Update Date: 01/13/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE	Person (Organization): Jeffrey Clark (R4) Roberto Torres (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LACK OF POSTING AND ACCESS RESTRICTIONS TO RADIATION AREA

"During an inspection of the licensee facility by RHB [State] on 1/7/04, a potential radiation problem was indicated by a high neutron radiation level above a shield assembly used to store Cf-252 neutron sources. Directly above the shield, the neutron dose rate was measured as approximately 5 rem/hr using a rem-ball. This area was not controlled as a high radiation area, nor were controls effective at the time of the inspection to preclude unrestricted access to the room. On the roof, directly above the shield assembly, the neutron dose rate was measured as approximately 25 mrem/hr, in an area of approximately 1 square foot. The roof area was not controlled as a restricted area. (Both neutron measurements were made by the licensee because of the lack of neutron survey instrumentation by the RHB inspector.) The licensee was directed to remeasure the neutron dose rate on the roof because it was inconsistent with the room dose rate, to add shielding to reduce the roof dose rates, and to provide high radiation area controls to the room containing the stored neutron sources. The second measurement of the roof dose rate found 250-260 mrem/hr in the highest area (approximately 1 square foot). The licensee representative reported he had incorrectly read the instrument scale during the previous measurement. Polyethylene sheets and a container of hydrogenous material were placed on the top of the shield assembly to act as temporary neutron shielding. This reduced the neutron dose rate directly above the shield assembly to 8-10 mrem/hr, and the roof dose rate to less than 2 mrem/hr. Locks were installed on the doors accessing the laboratory area where the Cf-252 sources are stored.

"The licensee is in the process of constructing a permanent safe storage inside of this shield assembly, with additional shielding to conservatively ensure that individuals in unrestricted areas won't exceed 100 mrem/year dose (and unrestricted area dose rates will be less than 2 mrem in any hour). The shielding design will ensure that the shielding cannot be removed by an unauthorized person and accidentally recreate the high radiation area and unrestricted area dose rate problems. This construction is expected to be completed by 1/15/04.

"The state (RHB) will continue to investigate this matter to evaluate the potential for exposures to personnel as a result of the elevated dose rates and lack of access controls. No personnel overexposures, worker or public, are known to have occurred at this time."

Power Reactor	Event Number: 40442
Facility: HATCH Region: 2 State: GA Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: GARY BRINSON HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON	Notification Date: 01/13/2004 Notification Time: 14:25 [ET] Event Date: 01/13/2004 Event Time: 13:12 [EST] Last Update Date: 01/14/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE	Person (Organization): PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF COMMUNICATION AND EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM

The ENS phones in the control room were discovered inoperable at 1312 EST on 01/13/04. Control room staff then notified EP personnel of a possible problem with the ENS phone lines. EP personnel investigated and determined that the ENS phone system as well as other Federal Telecommunication System lines were not operating on site. Information Resources (IR) is investigating.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 0530 hrs EST ON 1/14/03 FROM LICENSEE TO CROUCH * * *

All FTS phone services have been restored to the plant and tested satisfactorily from the Operations Center to the ENS phone.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 40444
Facility: LIMERICK Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: PETE ORPHANOS HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON	Notification Date: 01/13/2004 Notification Time: 20:19 [ET] Event Date: 01/13/2004 Event Time: 19:21 [EST] Last Update Date: 01/14/2004
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT 10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED	Person (Organization): DANIEL HOLODY (R1) STUART RICHARDS (NRR) SUSAN FRANT (IRO) ED MCDONALD (DHS) TED SULLIVAN (FEMA) HUB MILLER (RA)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO EXPLOSION WITHIN PROTECTED AREA BOUNDARY

Explosion occurred in a non-safety related transformer at 1908 EST 0n 01/13/04. The transformer became deenergized as a result of the explosion. Licensee declared an Unusual Event at 1921 EST on 01/13/04 due to an explosion resulting in visible damage to a non-safety related transformer in the Turbine Enclosure building. There was no fire or injured personnel, and the site did not require any off site assistance. The transformer explosion resulted in the loss of power to some 480 VAC non-safety related loads (most significant was a non-safeguard DC battery charger). The explosion has not severely impacted Unit 1 operations. The transformer has been inspected, and it appears that the explosion was internal to the transformer and due to an electrical malfunction. Security personnel conducted thorough walk downs of all areas and had no concerns.

NRC Management determined that this event did not require entry into the Monitoring Phase of Normal Mode of Incident Response at 2040 on 01/13/04.

The licensee notified the state and local emergency management agencies and notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM PETE ORPHANOS (VIA FACSIMILE) TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 0221 EST ON 1/14/04 * * *

"Notification of reduction in classification status from Unusual Event.

"Failure of non-safeguards electrical supply determined to be due to cable fault. Plant remains stable at 100% power. No additional equipment damage identified. Blocking and repair planning in progress."

The unusual event was terminated by the licensee at 2151 hrs. EST on 1/13/04.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and County authorities. A media press release will be issued in the morning.

Notified DHS (Beal) and FEMA (Caldwell).

General Information or Other	Event Number: 40446
Rep Org: MGP INSTRUMENTS Licensee: MGP INSTRUMENTS Region: 1 City: SMYRNA State: GA County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: DAVID JARROW HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON	Notification Date: 01/14/2004 Notification Time: 12:39 [ET] Event Date: 01/14/2004 Event Time: [EST] Last Update Date: 01/14/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH	Person (Organization): JEFF CLARK (R4) JACK FOSTER (NMSS)

Event Text

10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION FOR DEFECTIVE PARTICULATE RADIATION MONITORS

Eight particulate radiation monitoring local processing units manufactured by MGP Instruments, Part # RMS 9040-S with software application 564J were supplied to SCE San Onofre Units 2 and 3. Manufacturer believes 4 units are installed in the following unit skid locations 3RE-7804, 3RE-7807, 2RE-7804, 2RE-7807 and 4 units were supplied as spares. The defect is a possible underestimation of volumetric activity following an auto filter paper advance. The manufacturer determined that you could have a potential underreporting measurement result if the unit program advanced the filter paper immediately following a step change or rapid release in particulate radiation. The manufacturer will revise the application software to handle both conditions simultaneously and advise SCE San Onofre Units 2 and 3 to manually advance the filter paper based on operating experience until the software application can be modified and installed. Manufacturer will notify SCE San Onofre Units 2 and 3 on 01/14/04.

Fuel Cycle Facility	Event Number: 40447
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 Region: 2 City: PADUCAH State: KY County: McCRACKEN License #: GDP-1 Agreement: Y Docket: 0707001 NRC Notified By: ERIC WALKER HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON	Notification Date: 01/14/2004 Notification Time: 13:53 [ET] Event Date: 01/13/2004 Event Time: 13:00 [CST] Last Update Date: 01/14/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: RESPONSE-BULLETIN	Person (Organization): ROBERT HAAG (R2) ROBERTO TORRES (NMSS)

Event Text

24 HOUR NOTIFICATION FOR BULLETIN 91-01 LOSS OF CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVING WASTE DRUM

"At 1300 on 01/13/04, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a waste drum was not characterized and handled properly as fissile waste. During the investigation of ATRC-03-4095, container RFD# 213439-01, which had been characterized as NCS spacing exempt based on the drum being heterogeneous material, it was identified that this waste drum contained solid uranium deposit material violating NCSA WMO-001. The purpose of this NCSA requirement is to determine if the waste drum requires two independent characterization results. Two independent characterization methods were not utilized for the characterization of this drum.

"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Safety significance of event Is low due to the fact that Nondestructive Assay characterization results of drum contents indicate a total U235 content of less than the safe mass limit for NCS Spacing Exempt waste.

"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD
OCCUR: More than two drums, all exceeding the safe mass limit, spaced less than minimum spacing requirements.

"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): Double contingency is maintained by implementation of two controls on mass.

"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): The material in the drum is in a solid state. Uranium mass is less than 120g U235.

"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Controls relied upon for maintaining double contingency are two Independent measurements to determine the U235 mass of the drum. Since there are two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained since only one measurement was performed. Even though mass control was maintained, double contingency Is based on two controls on mass. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.

"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: Access to the area has been controlled and the drum has been spaced from other fissile material.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR 04-0111; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-003, Responsible Division: Production Support"

Power Reactor	Event Number: 40448
Facility: PILGRIM Region: 1 State: MA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-3 NRC Notified By: MICHAEL McDONNELL HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	Notification Date: 01/14/2004 Notification Time: 15:00 [ET] Event Date: 01/14/2004 Event Time: 10:00 [EST] Last Update Date: 01/14/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE	Person (Organization): DANIEL HOLODY (R1)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

EMERGENCY SIRENS INOPERABLE/DEGRADED DUE TO POTENTIAL AMPLIFIER PROBLEMS

"At 1049 EST on January 14, 2004 the Control Room was notified that 78% (87 out of 112) Emergency Sirens failed a 'Quiet Test.' The Quiet test is a status check between the Emergency Offsite Facility and each individual siren. Further investigation revealed that 53 sirens would not operate as required and 34 were experiencing some degree of degradation. Indications point toward amplifier problems within each affected siren.

"Efforts are ongoing to troubleshoot and repair the effected sirens. Contingency plans are in place for alternate notification.

"The resident inspector has been notified."

This condition was discovered during routine monthly testing. The sirens were upgraded about a year ago using equipment supplied by Federal Signal.