1 On April 17, 1996, the
Secretary of Labor delegated authority to issue final agency decisions under, inter alia,
the Surface Transportation Assistance Act and the implementing regulations, 29 C.F.R. Part
1978,
to the newly created Administrative Review Board. Secretary's Order 2-96 (Apr. 17, 1996), 61
Fed. Reg. 19978 (May 3, 1996). Secretary's Order 2-96 contains a comprehensive list of the
statutes, executive order, and regulations under which the ARB now issues final agency
decisions. 61 Fed. Reg. 19982.
2 The joint
stipulation signed by the parties that is referred to in the Board's Final Decision and Order
provides:
1)Complainant shall waive reinstatement; 2)The amount of Complainant's back pay shall be
$21,930.32; 3)The amount of Complainant's pre-judgment interest shall be $2,246.35; 4)The
amount of Complainant's compensatory damages shall be $4,231.50; 5)The amount of attorneys'
fees for services rendered by Complainant's counsel before the Department of Labor shall be
$9,150.00; 6)The amount of costs for matters adjudicated before the Department of Labor shall
be $181.00; 7)A hearing on damages, attorneys' fees and costs is not necessary, based on the
foregoing stipulations; 8)If the Secretary of Labor's decision is reversed on appeal and all
appellate remedies have been exhausted, the foregoing stipulations will have no force or effect;
9)The parties make no stipulations or representations beyond the foregoing stipulations.
3 There is
currently no controlling precedent in the Second Circuit regarding the question of whether the
Secretary of Labor may award attorney's fees to a prevailing whistleblower complainant for
services rendered before a United States Court of Appeals. Relevant pronouncements by the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, in Blackburn v. Reich,
79 F.3d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1996) and DeFord v. Secretary of Labor, 715 F.2d 231,
232-33 (6th Cir. 1983), are in conflict. See Delcore v. W.J. Barney Corp., Case No.
96-161, ARB
Order, Oct. 31, 1996.
4 The
regulations at 29 C.F.R. Part 1978 govern the adjudication of Section 405 complaints within the
Department of Labor. 29 C.F.R. § 1978.100(b)(1996). Those regulations, as well as the
regulations governing hearings before Department of Labor Administrative Law Judges, 29
C.F.R.
Part 18, which are referenced in Section 1978.106(a), are silent in regard to the procedure
applicable to a motion such as that filed by Brink's. But see 29 C.F.R. § 1978.115
Special circumstances; waiver of rules. When the pertinent statute and implementing
regulations are silent in regard to a procedural issue, we look to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for guidance in reaching a result that will be fair to the parties and serve the
purpose of the statute. See, e.g., Timmons v. Mattingly Testing Servs., Case No.
95-ERA-40, ARB Dec., June 21, 1996, slip op. at 2-3 (citing Nolder v. Kaiser Engineers,
Inc., Case
No. 84-ERA-5, Sec. Dec., June 28, 1985, slip op. at 5-6); Spearman v. Roadway Express,
Inc.,
Case No. 92-STA-1, Sec. Order, Oct. 27, 1992, slip op. at 1-2. This approach is consistent
with Section 18.1(a), which provides for resort to the Federal Rules as persuasive authority. 29
C.F.R. § 18.1(a).
5 Section 405 of
the STAA creates a private right of action for complainants. Martin v. Yellow Freight
System,
Inc., 793 F.Supp. 461, 465-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)(citing, inter alia, Brock v. Roadway
Express,
Inc., 481 U.S. at 258-59). The statutory scheme under the STAA thus contrasts with,
e.g., the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.,
which
is also administered by the Department of Labor. Compare Reich v. Contractors Welding of
Western N.Y., Inc., 996 F.2d 1409 (2d Cir. 1993)(ordering OSHA Commission to vacate
decision
following withdrawal of citation by Secretary and approval by appellate court of settlement
between Secretary and employer respondent) with Martin, 793 F.Supp. at 465-68.