Based upon the above, the Complainant sought reinstatement (together with an order that he not be subject to harassment), back pay, compensatory damages, and attorney fees.
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In a response to the Show Cause Order, Respondent ATK asserts that the Complainant was suspended on May 30, 2003 and terminated on June 4, 2003 for inappropriate use of the Internet. Respondent asserts that OSHA and the West Virginia Environmental Protection Agency inspected the ATK facility and, following a review of records relating to the autoclaves about which Complainant complained, found ATK's procedures and inspections to be in compliance.
For purposes of this Decision and Order, I will accept the facts as alleged by Complainant, with the pertinent dates corrected. In this regard, the complaint is inconsistent on its face, in that it alleges protected activity occurring in November 2002 leading to retaliatory action in May and June 2002. As Complainant has not responded to the clarification provided by the Respondent, I will accept the Respondent's assertion that the alleged adverse employment actions occurred in May and June of 2003.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section 806 of the Act, Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded Companies Who Provide Evidence of Fraud, amended title 18 of the United States Code by adding a new section 1514A, Civil action to protect against retaliation in fraud cases. Subsection (a) of the new section provided whistleblower protection for employees of publicly traded companies and provided that no such company or its officers, employees, contractors, subcontractors, or agents "may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment" because the employee engaged in certain lawful acts:
(1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of section 1341 [fraud and swindles], 1342 [fraud by wire, radio, or television], 1344 [bank fraud], or 1348 [securities fraud], any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders, when the information or assistance is provided to or the investigation is conducted by—
(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency;
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; or
(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct); or
(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist in a proceeding filed or about to be filed (with any knowledge of the employer) relating to an alleged violation of section 1341, 1342, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.
Paragraph (b) specifies how an enforcement action may be brought by such an aggrieved employee and paragraph (c) provides
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for remedies. Under paragraph (b)(2)(D):
(D) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. – An [enforcement] action . . . shall be commenced not later than 90 days after the date on which the violation occurs.
Complaints filed with the Secretary of Labor are to be governed by the rules and procedures set forth in 42 U.S.C. §42121(b) [the employee protection provisions of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, also known as "AIR 21."] 18 U.S.C. §1514A(b)(2)(A).
Kinser v. Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 2003-AIR-7 (ALJ, Feb. 9, 2004). The authorities that Judge Jansen relied upon in Kinser to define "frivolous"relate to the appellate rule addressing sanctions for frivolous appeals (Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure) and the statute relating to dismissals of frivolous in forma pauperis petitions as a sanction (28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)). Applying the AIR 21 provision to the case before him (following a formal hearing at which the complainant was represented by counsel), Judge Jansen found that, even though the complainant had been unable to prove that his protected activities were a contributing factor in the adverse employment actions, the claim was not necessarily meritless; therefore, no attorney's fees were awarded. Id. Similarly, in Peck v. Safe Air International, Inc., ARB No. 02-028, ALJ No. 2001-AIR-3 (ARB Jan. 30, 2004), the Administrative Review Board declined to award attorney fees under AIR21 when the administrative law judge found that the pro se complainant had maintained a firm and sincere belief that he had been the victim of retaliatory termination, even though he did not prevail following a hearing on the merits.
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Rule 38, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, allows the imposition of sanctions if a party or attorney files an appeal, petition or motion "that is frivolous or interposed for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay." In Reliance Insurance Co. v. Sweeney Corp., 792 F.2d 1137, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit explained that "[a]n appeal is considered frivolous when its disposition is ‘obvious,' and the legal arguments are ‘wholly without merit.'" In Reliance, the appellant's counsel submitted a conclusory opposition to a summary judgment motion without stating supporting grounds at the district court level. On appeal, counsel submitted a six-page appellate brief and failed to advance supporting facts or theories either in the brief or at oral argument. In addition, appellant and its counsel did not respond to a show cause order, asking them to show cause why they should not be sanctioned. Based upon the appellant's unwillingness to surrender coupled with an even greater unwillingness to develop its legal arguments, the D.C. Circuit assessed attorney fees as a sanction against both appellant and its counsel.
1 The whistleblower provisions appear at title VII of the Act, which is designated as the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002.
2 The complaint bears a stamped date which is partially obscured. In view of the uncertainty as to date of receipt, a filing date of October 8, 2003 will be accepted for purposes of this Decision and Order.
3 In its March 4, 2004 response, the Respondent clarified that the termination actually took place a year later, on June 4, 2003 (following a May 30, 2003 suspension) and asserted that Complainant received written confirmation of termination via certified mail on June 5, 2003. This matter is discussed further below.
5 The interim regulations appear at 68 Fed. Reg. 31859 (May 28, 2003), and they are also accessible on the Office of Administrative Law Judges website, www.oalj.dol.gov. The Act is also reproduced on the website.
6 Regulations under both AIR 21 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act also authorize the Administrative Review Board to assess attorney's fees under the same circumstances and to the same extent. 29 C.F.R. §1979.110(e); 29 C.F.R. §1980.110(e).
7 The title VII provision addressed in Christiansburg allows attorney fees to be awarded to a prevailing party and does not include a frivolousness requirement.
8 In 1996, the section was amended to provide for dismissal upon the additional ground of failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Pub. L. 104-134 §101, 110 Stat. 1321-73 (Apr. 26, 1996).