Summary

With few exceptions, independent contractors do not inspect or license the Energy Department's (DOE) vast complex of research and nuclear facilities. Instead, DOE relies on its own staff to ensure the safety of these facilities. GAO has long criticized DOE for weaknesses in self-regulation. DOE's position on the external regulation of safety is unclear. Five years ago, DOE's leadership made a commitment to the external regulation of worker safety. DOE announced that it would phase out self regulation over a 10-year period, starting with legislation by 1998 to authorize external regulation. In late 1997, however, DOE launched a two-year pilot program to simulate regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at six to 10 of DOE's nuclear sites. At the end of this pilot, DOE and NRC will jointly decide if external regulation is warranted. DOE's decision to conduct pilots represents a shift from its earlier strong endorsement of external regulation of all its facilities. DOE's uncertain position has both NRC and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration concerned about the agency's commitment to external regulation. Although DOE's pilot will provide useful insights, the information collected will not reflect the size and complexity of DOE's vast nuclear complex and thus will not yield the data needed to address many critical issues on external regulation. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Department of Energy: Clear Strategy on External Regulation Needed for Worker and Nuclear Facility Safety, by Victor S. Rezendes, Director of Energy, Resources, and Science Issues, before the Subcommittee on Basic Research and the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, House Committee on Science. GAO/T-RCED-98-205, May 21 (eight pages).

GAO noted that: (1) DOE's position on the external regulation of safety is unclear; (2) five years ago, DOE's leadership made a commitment to subject worker safety in its multibillion-dollar nuclear research and defense network to external regulation; (3) to achieve this goal, DOE endorsed recommendations to phase out its self-regulation practices over a 10-year period, starting with legislation by 1998 to authorize external regulation; (4) in late 1997, however, DOE embarked on a 2-year pilot program to simulate regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at 6 to 10 of DOE's nuclear sites; (5) at the end of this pilot, DOE and NRC will jointly decide if external regulation by NRC is warranted; (6) DOE's decision to conduct pilots represents a shift from its former strong endorsement to externally regulate all of its facilities; (7) DOE's uncertain position has both NRC and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) concerned about the Department's commitment to external regulation; (8) although DOE's pilot will provide useful insights, the information collected will not represent the size and the complexity of DOE's vast nuclear complex and thus will not yield the practical data needed to address many critical issues on external regulation; (9) for example, NRC estimates that it could regulate the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in California--the site of DOE's first pilot--for about one-fifth of one staff person per year; (10) this estimate, however, does not represent the cost of regulating the vast majority of DOE's nuclear facilities, nor will much of the information obtained from the other two pilot sites be representative; (11) the three sites in the pilot program contain no nuclear reactors, weapons plants, or heavily contaminated facilities, even though these kinds of facilities were the reason for seeking external regulation in the first place and defense and environmental cleanup sites constitute 80 percent of the Department's complex; and (12) moreover, DOE is not integrating OSHA with NRC in its pilots; instead, each regulatory agency is proceeding under a separate strategy without the benefit of collaborating to better understand jurisdictional overlaps.