

**December 2006**  
**Gulf of Alaska Rationalization**  
**Statement of Purpose and Need and Overview of Alternative Structures**

This paper is intended to assist the Council and the public with the process of developing alternatives to rationalization the Gulf of Alaska groundfish fisheries. The paper briefly describes the process used by the Council to date to develop rationalization alternatives. The paper then sets out the Council's problem statement, which is intended to outline the Council's purpose for undertaking this management change. Brief descriptions of the different alternative structures developed by the Council to date are included. Lastly, the paper identifies some of the elements and options that are currently under consideration for inclusion in the different alternatives. These elements and options are specifically set out in "Gulf Rationalization Alternatives" (April 2006), "Gulf of Alaska Rationalization Community Provisions" (December 12, 2005), and "Bycatch Reduction Alternatives for Salmon and Crab Species" (December 2004), which are attached and should be consulted for assessing specific provisions.

## **Process used to develop alternatives**

At its April 2003 meeting, the Council adopted a problem statement and motion preliminarily defining alternatives for the rationalization of the Gulf of Alaska groundfish fisheries. Since that meeting, the Council has undertaken a process of refining the alternatives to meet the objectives identified in the problem statement. In addition, the Council took public testimony at its June 2006 meeting in Kodiak, which should be considered in the further development of alternatives.

To facilitate appropriate management of Gulf fisheries, the Council has developed separate alternative structures for the different sectors – catcher processors, trawl catcher vessels, pot catcher vessels, longline catcher vessels, and jig vessels. In selecting options to refine the alternatives to advance for analysis, the Council should also assess the range of alternatives that are created. Each alternative should meet the Council's purpose and need statement, should be feasible, and should be distinguishable from each other alternative. The Council should therefore consider using its selection of options to distinguish the alternatives from each other, but only to the extent that maintains the integrity of each alternative under the problem statement. Since the alternatives as defined to date are distinct, the Council may select the same option for each of the alternatives, if that option best satisfies the objectives of the purpose and need statement.

## **Statement of Purpose and Need**

The statement of purpose and need is an integral part of the process of developing alternatives for analysis and selection of a preferred alternative. The purpose and need statement is intended to briefly and comprehensively identify the specific objectives of the proposed action and the broader underlying social needs that are to be addressed. by the proposed action. Through this statement, the range of alternatives can be limited to those that reasonably and practicably address the cited purposes and needs.

To guide the identification of a rationalization program for the Gulf of Alaska groundfish fisheries, the Council has developed the following purpose and need statement:

*The Council is proposing a new management regime that rationalizes groundfish fisheries in the Gulf of Alaska west of 140 degrees longitude and rockfish bycatch east of 140 degrees longitude. A rationalization program includes policies and management measures that may increase the economic efficiency of GOA groundfish fisheries by providing economic incentives to reduce excessive capital investment. These management measures would apply to those species, or groups of species identified by the Council as benefiting from additional economic incentives that*

may be provided by rationalization. This rationalization program would not modify the hook-and-line sablefish fishery currently prosecuted under the IFQ Program, except for management of associated groundfish bycatch.

*The purpose of the proposed action is to create a management program that improves conservation, reduces bycatch, and provides greater economic stability for harvesters, processors, and communities. A rationalization program could allow harvesters and processors to manage their operations in a more economically efficient manner. Rationalization of GOA fisheries should eliminate the derby-style race for fish by allocating privileges and providing economic incentives to consolidate operations and improve operational efficiencies of remaining operators. Because rationalization programs can have significant impacts on fishing dependent communities, this program should address community impacts and seek to provide economic stability or create economic opportunity in fishery dependent communities.*

*Rationalizing GOA fisheries may improve stock conservation by creating incentives to eliminate wasteful fishing practices, improve management practices, and provide mechanisms to control and reduce bycatch and gear conflicts. Rationalization programs may also reduce the incentive to fish during unsafe conditions.*

*Management of GOA groundfish has grown increasingly complicated due to impositions of measures to protect Steller sea lions, increased participation by fishermen displaced from other fisheries such as Alaska salmon fisheries and the requirements to reduce bycatch and address Essential Fish Habitat requirements under the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA). These changes in the fisheries are frustrating management of the resource, raising attendant conservation concerns. These events are also having significant, and at times, severe adverse social and economic impacts on harvesters, processors, crew, and communities dependent on GOA fisheries. Some of the attendant problems include:*

- 1. reduced economic viability of the harvesters, processors, and GOA communities*
- 2. high bycatch,*
- 3. decreased safety,*
- 4. reduced product value and utilization,*
- 5. jeopardy to community stability and their historic reliance on groundfish fishing and processing,*
- 6. limited ability of the fishery harvesters and processors to respond to changes in the ecosystem*
- 7. limited ability to adapt to MSA requirements to minimize bycatch and protect habitat,*
- 8. limited ability to adapt to changes to other applicable law (i.e., Endangered Species Act).*

*All of these factors have made achieving the goals of the National Standards in the MSA difficult and encourage reevaluation of the status quo management of the GOA groundfish fisheries. The management tools in the current GOA groundfish FMP do not provide managers with the ability to improve the economic efficiency of the fishery and effectively solve the excess harvesting capacity and resource allocation problems in the GOA groundfish fisheries. The Council has determined that some form of rationalization program is warranted.*

## **The Alternative Structures**

The alternative structures for each of these sectors are summarized below in separate tables, along with a brief narrative overview of each alternative.

## Catcher processor alternatives

The two catcher processor rationalization alternatives are outlined in Table 1.

**Table 1. Modified Gulf of Alaska groundfish rationalization alternatives – catcher processors**

	<b>Alternative 2</b>	<b>Alternative 3</b>
<b>Program type</b>	IFQ/cooperative	Sector allocation and cooperatives
<b>Long term share allocations</b>	Shares allocated to individuals by gear type	Sector allocation with harvest histories allocated to individuals in cooperatives
<b>Sector definition</b>	All catcher processors	CP trawl, CP longline, CP pot
<b>Annual allocations</b>	individual or cooperative	cooperatives or limited access
<b>Processor Provisions</b>	CP Provisions (no processor provisions)	CP Provisions (no processor provisions)
<b>Fishing opportunity for non-members of cooperatives</b>	IFQs with option for PSC reduction	limited access with option for PSC reduction

**Alternative 1** (not shown in the table) is the **status quo**, under which the LLP and limited access fishing would be maintained.

**Alternative 2** would create a **cooperative/IFQ** program, under which individuals would be allocated shares, by gear type. Share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives, including cooperatives among holders of shares for different gear, although limits on transfers of shares between gear types could be applied. Share holders that choose not to join cooperatives would receive their allocations as individual quota, with a possible reduction in their PSC allocations.

Under **Alternative 3**, a **cooperative/limited access** program, individuals would be credited with their qualifying catch history, and allocations would be made to the three different catcher processor sectors: the trawl sector, the longline sector, and the pot sector. Holders of qualified history would be eligible to join a cooperative within their sector, and the cooperative would receive annual harvest allocations based on the history of its members. Holders of qualified history that choose not to join a cooperative would be permitted to fish in a limited access fishery that will receive an aggregate allocation based on the qualified histories of sector members that choose not to join a cooperative. The PSC allocation to the limited access fishery could be reduced.

## Trawl catcher vessel alternatives

Table 2 outlines the Council’s four rationalization alternatives for the trawl catcher vessel sector.

**Table 2. Modified Gulf of Alaska groundfish rationalization alternatives – trawl catcher vessels**

	Alternative T2A	Alternative T2B	Alternative T2C	Alternative T3
<b>Program type</b>	IFQ/cooperative with license limitation for processors	IFQ/cooperative with license limitation for processors and harvest share/processor linkage	IFQ/cooperative with processor allocation	Sector allocation and cooperatives with processor associations
<b>Long term share allocations</b>	Shares allocated to individuals	Shares allocated to individuals	Shares allocated to individuals	Sector allocation with harvest histories allocated to individuals in cooperatives
<b>Sector definition</b>	trawl CV	trawl CV	trawl CV	trawl CV
<b>Annual allocations</b>	individual or cooperative	individual or cooperative	individual or cooperative	cooperatives or limited access
<b>Processor Provisions</b>	50 - 100 percent of annual allocations required to be delivered to licensed processors	50 - 100 percent of annual allocations required to be delivered to linked processors and and share reduction penalty to change processor linkage	allocation of 10 - 30 percent of harvest shares to qualified processors	processor association with negotiated terms
<b>Fishing opportunity for non-members of cooperatives</b>	IFQs subject to processor license limitation delivery requirement (with option for PSC reduction)	IFQs subject to processor linkage delivery requirement (with option for PSC reduction)	IFQs	limited access with option for PSC reductions

**Alternative 1** (not shown in the table) is the **status quo**, which would continue the LLP and limited access fishing.

**Alternative T2A** would create a **co-op/IFQ with processor limited entry** program, under which individuals would be allocated harvesting shares. A percentage (50-100 percent) of each harvester’s allocation would be required to be delivered to a processor holding a limited entry license. Processor licensing would be based on historic processing. Share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives to manage their members’ allocations. Share holders that choose not to join a cooperative would receive their allocations as individual quota with a possible reduction in their PSC allocations.

**Alternative T2B** would create a **co-op/IFQ with processor linkages** program. As with Alternative T2A, individuals would be allocated harvesting shares, and processors would receive limited entry licenses. Additionally, the program would create a system of harvester/processor linkages. These linkages would require the share holder to deliver a specific percentage (50-100 percent) of landings to the processor to which the share holder is linked, as determined by the share holder’s landings history. To change the processor with which a holder’s shares are linked, a share reduction penalty would apply. Share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives to manage their allocations. Share holders that choose not to join a cooperative would receive individual allocations (which would be subject to the processor linkage), but may, as a result, be subject to a reduction in their PSC allocations.

**Alternative T2C** would create a **co-op/IFQ with allocations of harvest shares to processors**. Under this alternative, individuals would be allocated harvesting shares, however a portion of the harvest share pool (between 10 and 30 percent) would be allocated to processors based on their processing history. Share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives, with non-cooperative members receiving individual allocations.

**Alternative T3** is a **co-op/limited access program with processor linkages**. The alternative creates a history-based cooperative program, under which cooperatives would receive annual harvest allocations based on the qualified histories of their members. Cooperatives would be required to be associated with a processor, but the details of that relationship (including the terms for ending the relationship) would be determined by negotiations among the cooperative members and the processor. Initially, each holder of qualified history would be eligible to join a cooperative associated with the processor to which the holder delivered the most pounds during a specified time period. Holders of qualified history that choose not to join a cooperative would be permitted to fish in a limited access fishery that would receive an aggregate allocation based on the histories of non-members of cooperatives. The allocation of PSC to the limited access fishery could be reduced.

### **Pot gear catcher vessel alternatives**

Table 3 outlines the Council’s alternatives for the pot catcher vessel sector (with the exception of the status quo alternative). The Council has specified 7 alternatives that would apply to all or a portion of the fixed gear sector. In general, these alternatives follow a structure similar to applicable to the trawl catcher vessel sector, with the exception of three additional alternatives that would apply to “low producing” pot catcher vessels.

**Table 3. Modified Gulf of Alaska groundfish rationalization alternatives – pot gear catcher vessels**

	<b>Alternative P2L</b>	<b>Alternative P2HA</b>	<b>Alternative P2HB</b>	<b>Alternative P2C</b>	<b>Alternative P3L1</b>	<b>Alternative P3L2</b>	<b>Alternative P3</b>
<b>Program type</b>	IFQ	IFQ/cooperative with license limitation for processors	IFQ/cooperative with license limitation for processors and processor linkage	IFQ/cooperative with processor allocation	Sector allocation with limited access	Sector allocation and cooperatives	Sector allocation and cooperatives with processor associations
<b>Long term share allocations</b>	Shares allocated to individuals	Shares allocated to individuals	Shares allocated to individuals	Shares allocated to individuals	Sector allocation	Sector allocation with harvest histories allocated to individuals in cooperatives	Sector allocation with harvest histories allocated to individuals in cooperatives
<b>Sector definition</b>	low producing pot gear CV	high producing pot gear CV	high producing pot gear CV	pot gear CV	low producing pot gear CV	low producing pot gear CV	pot CV or high producing pot gear CV
<b>Annual allocations</b>	individual or cooperative	individual or cooperative	individual or cooperative	individual or cooperative	limited access	cooperatives or limited access	cooperatives or limited access
<b>Processor Provisions</b>	no processor provisions	50 - 100 percent of annual allocations required to be delivered to licensed processors	50 - 100 percent of annual allocations required to be delivered to linked processors and and share reduction penalty to change processor linkage	allocation of 10 - 30 percent of the harvest share pool to processors	no processor provisions	no processor provisions	processor association with negotiated terms
<b>Fishing opportunity for non-members of cooperatives</b>	IFQs	IFQs subject to processor license limitation delivery requirement	IFQs subject to processor linkage delivery requirement	IFQs	limited access	limited access	limited access

**Alternative 1** is the **status quo** (not shown in the table), which would continue the LLP limited access fishery.

**Alternative P2L** would create a **co-op/IFQ** program that would apply to only the “low producing” members of the pot catcher vessel sector. These would be participants that receive allocations either below the average, or below the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile, of pot catcher vessel allocations. Individuals would be allocated harvesting shares, and share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives to coordinate harvest activities. Share holders who choose not to join a cooperative would receive individual allocations.

**Alternative P2HA** would a **co-op/IFQ with processor limited entry** program similar to Alternative T2A for the trawl catcher vessel sector. This alternative would apply only to the “high producing” members of the pot catcher vessel sector, i.e, those participants that receive allocations either at or above the average, or at or above the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile, of pot catcher vessel allocations. Individuals would be allocated harvesting shares, and a percentage (50-100 percent) of each harvester’s allocation would be required to be delivered to a processor holding a limited entry license. Processor licensing would be based on historic processing. Share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives to manage their members’ allocations. Share holders that choose not to join a cooperative would receive their allocations as individual quota.<sup>1</sup>

**Alternative P2HB** would create a **co-op/IFQ with processor linkages** program similar to Alternative T2B for trawl catcher vessels, and applying to the “high producing” members of the pot catcher vessel sector. Individuals would be allocated harvesting shares, and processors would receive limited entry licenses. Additionally, the program would also create a system of harvester/processor linkages. These linkages would require the share holder to deliver a specific percentage (50-100 percent) of landings to the processor to which the share holder is linked, as determined by the share holder’s landings history. To change the processor with which a holder’s shares are linked, a share reduction penalty would apply. Share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives to manage their allocations. Share holders that choose not to join a cooperative would receive individual allocations (which would be subject to the processor linkage).

**Alternative P2C** would create a **co-op/IFQ with allocations of harvest shares to processors** program similar to Alternative T2C for trawl catcher vessels. Under this alternative, individuals would be allocated harvesting shares, however a portion of the harvest share pool (between 10 and 30 percent) would be allocated to processors based on their processing history. Share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives, with non-cooperative members receiving individual allocations.

**Alternative P3L1** would create a **limited access** fishery for the “low producing” pot catcher vessel sector (similar to the current LLP limited access fishery). The only difference between the current LLP management and this alternative would be the exclusive sector allocation to pot catcher vessels. Currently, the seasonal inshore TACs are shared with all trawl and non-trawl vessels.

**Alternative P3L2** would create a **co-op/limited access program** with no processor provisions for the “low producing” pot catcher vessel sector. The alternative creates a history-based cooperative program, under which cooperatives would receive annual harvest allocations based on the qualified histories of their members. Cooperatives could deliver their catch to any processor without limitation. Each holder of qualified history would be eligible to join any cooperative. Holders of qualified history that choose not to join a cooperative would be permitted to fish in a limited access fishery that would receive an aggregate allocation based on the histories of non-members of cooperatives.

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<sup>1</sup> The pot sector is not subject to halibut PSC limits, so the halibut PSC reduction penalty is not applicable to this sector.

**Alternative P3** would create a **co-op/limited access program with processor linkages** program similar to Alternative T3 for trawl catcher vessels. The alternative creates a history-based cooperative program, under which cooperatives would receive annual harvest allocations based on the qualified histories of their members. Cooperatives would be required to be associated with a processor, but the details of that relationship would be determined by negotiations among the cooperative members and the processor. Initially, each holder of qualified history would be eligible to join a cooperative associated with the processor to which the holder delivered the most pounds during a specified time period. Holders of qualified history that choose not to join a cooperative would be permitted to fish in a limited access fishery that would receive an aggregate allocation based on the histories of non-members of cooperatives.

### ***Hook-and-line catcher vessel alternatives***

Table 4 outlines the Council’s alternatives for the hook-and-line catcher vessel sector. The Council has specified 6 alternatives that would apply to all or a portion of the hook-and-line gear sector. The structure of alternatives is identical to those specified for the pot sector, and in general, is similar to that of the trawl catcher vessel sectors, with the exception of an alternative that would create an IFQ program for “low producing” hook-and-line catcher vessels.

**Table 4. Modified Gulf of Alaska groundfish rationalization alternatives – hook-and-line catcher vessels**

	Alternative L2L	Alternative L2HA	Alternative L2HB	Alternative L2C	Alternative L3L1	Alternative L3L2	Alternative L3
<b>Program type</b>	IFQ	IFQ/cooperative with license limitation for processors	IFQ/cooperative with license limitation for processors and processor linkage	IFQ/cooperative with processor allocation	Sector allocation with limited access	Sector allocation and cooperatives	Sector allocation and cooperatives with processor associations
<b>Long term share allocations</b>	Shares allocated to individuals	Shares allocated to individuals	Shares allocated to individuals	Shares allocated to individuals	Sector allocation	Sector allocation with harvest histories allocated to individuals in cooperatives	Sector allocation with harvest histories allocated to individuals in cooperatives
<b>Sector definition</b>	low producing longline gear CV	high producing longline gear CV	high producing longline gear CV	longline gear CV	low producing longline gear CV	low producing longline gear CV	longline gear CV or high producing longline CV
<b>Annual allocations</b>	individual or cooperative	individual or cooperative	individual or cooperative	individual or cooperative	limited access	cooperatives or limited access	cooperatives or limited access
<b>Processor Provisions</b>	no processor provisions	50 - 100 percent of annual allocations required to be delivered to licensed processors	50 - 100 percent of annual allocations required to be delivered to linked processors and share reduction penalty to change processor linkage	allocation of 10 - 30 percent of the harvest share pool to processors	no processor provisions	no processor provisions	processor association with negotiated terms
<b>Fishing opportunity for non-members of cooperatives</b>	IFQs	IFQs subject to processor license limitation delivery requirement (with option for PSC reduction)	IFQs subject to processor linkage delivery requirement (with option for PSC reduction)	IFQs	limited access	limited access with option for PSC reductions	limited access with option for PSC reductions

**Alternative 1** is the **status quo** (not shown in the table), which would continue the LLP and limited access fishery.

**Alternative L2 Low** would create a **co-op/IFQ** program that would apply to only the “low producing” members of the hook-and-line catcher vessel sector, similar to Alternative P2 Low for the pot catcher vessel sector. These would be participants that receive allocations either below the average, or below the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile, of hook-and-line catcher vessel allocations. Individuals would be allocated harvesting shares, and share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives to coordinate harvest activities. Share

holders who choose not to join a cooperative would receive individual allocations, with no penalty to their PSC allocation.

**Alternative L2A High** would be a **co-op/IFQ with processor limited entry** program similar to Alternatives T2A and P2A High for the trawl and pot catcher vessel sectors. This alternative would apply only to the “high producing” members of the hook-and-line catcher vessel sector, i.e, those participants that receive allocations either at or above the average, or at or above the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile, of hook-and-line catcher vessel allocations. Individuals would be allocated harvesting shares, and a percentage (50-100%) of each harvester’s allocation would be required to be delivered to a processor holding a limited entry license. Processor licensing would be based on historic processing. Share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives to manage their members’ allocations. Share holders that choose not to join a cooperative would receive their allocations as individual quota with a possible reduction in their PSC allocations.

**Alternative L2B High** would create a **co-op/IFQ with processor linkages** program similar to Alternatives T2B and P2B High for trawl and pot catcher vessels, and applying to the “high producing” members of the hook-and-line catcher vessel sector. Individuals would be allocated harvesting shares, and processors would receive limited entry licenses. Additionally, the program would also create a system of harvester/processor linkages. These linkages would require the share holder to deliver a specific percentage (50-100%) of landings to the processor to which the share holder is linked, as determined by the share holder’s landings history. To change the processor with which a holder’s shares are linked, a share reduction penalty would apply. Share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives to manage their allocations. Share holders that choose not to join a cooperative would receive individual allocations (which would be subject to the processor linkage), but may, as a result, be subject to a reduction in their PSC allocations.

**Alternative L2C** would create a **co-op/IFQ with allocations of harvest shares to processors** program similar to Alternatives T2C and P2C for trawl and pot catcher vessels. Under this alternative, individuals would be allocated harvesting shares, however a portion of the harvest share pool (between 10 and 30 percent) would be allocated to processors based on their processing history. Share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives, with non-cooperative members receiving individual allocations.

**Alternative L3L1** would create a **limited access** fishery for the “low producing” longline catcher vessel sector (similar to the current LLP limited access fishery (and Alternative P3L1 for pot catcher vessels)). The only difference between the current LLP management and this alternative would be the exclusive sector allocation to longline catcher vessels. Currently, the seasonal inshore TACs are shared with all trawl and non-trawl vessels.

**Alternative L3L2** would create a **co-op/limited access program** with no processor provisions (similar to Alternative P3L2 for pot catcher vessels) for “low producing” longline catcher vessels. The alternative creates a history-based cooperative program, under which cooperatives would receive annual harvest allocations based on the qualified histories of their members. Cooperatives could deliver their catch to any processor without limitation. Each holder of qualified history would be eligible to join any cooperative. Holders of qualified history that choose not to join a cooperative would be permitted to fish in a limited access fishery that would receive an aggregate allocation based on the histories of non-members of cooperatives. The allocation of PSC to the limited access fishery could be reduced.

**Alternative L3** would create a **co-op/limited access program with processor linkages** program similar to Alternatives T3 and P3 for trawl and pot catcher vessels. The alternative creates a history-based cooperative program, under which cooperatives would receive annual harvest allocations based on the qualified histories of their members. Cooperatives would be required to be associated with a processor,



but the details of that relationship would be determined by negotiations among the cooperative members and the processor. Initially, each holder of qualified history would be eligible to join a cooperative associated with the processor to which the holder delivered the most pounds during a specified time period. Holders of qualified history that choose not to join a cooperative would be permitted to fish in a limited access fishery that would receive an aggregate allocation based on the histories of non-members of cooperatives. The allocation of PSC to the limited access fishery could be reduced.

### ***Jig vessel alternatives***

Table 5 outlines the Council’s alternatives for the jig sector.

**Table 5. Modified Gulf of Alaska groundfish rationalization alternatives – jig vessels**

	<b>Alternative J2</b>	<b>Alternative J3A</b>	<b>Alternative J3B</b>
<b>Program type</b>	Sector allocation with open access	Sector allocation with limited access	Sector allocation and cooperatives
<b>Long term share allocations</b>	Sector allocation	Sector allocation	Sector allocation with harvest histories allocated to individuals in cooperatives
<b>Sector definition</b>	jig CV	jig CV	jig CV
<b>Annual allocations</b>	sector allocation	sector allocation	cooperatives only
<b>Processor Provisions</b>	no processor provisions	no processor provisions	<i>processor association with negotiated terms</i>
<b>Fishing opportunity for non-members of cooperatives</b>	no cooperative allocations	no cooperative allocations	limited access with option for PSC reductions

**Alternative 1** is the **status quo** (not shown in the table), which would continue the LLP and limited access fishery. Under the current LLP program, vessels that are less than 26’ LOA are exempt from the LLP requirement.

Under **Alternative J2**, an **open access program**, the jig catcher vessel sector would receive a specified sector allocation of Pacific cod, which would be prosecuted as an open access fishery. This alternative differs from the status quo in two respects. First, the jig catcher vessel sector would receive an exclusive allocation under this alternative. Second, the fishery would be prosecuted as an open access fishery (rather than a limited access fishery).

Under **Alternative J3A**, a **limited access program**, the jig sector would receive a specified sector allocation of Pacific cod, which would be prosecuted as a limited access fishery. The Council motion does not currently specify eligibility criteria for the limited access fishery. This alternative could differ from the status quo in two respects. First, the jig catcher vessel sector would receive an exclusive allocation. Second, entry criteria for the fishery could differ from the current LLP license requirement.

**Alternative J3B**, a **cooperative/limited access program**, has been identified but not developed for the jig sector. The Alternative 3 structure generally creates a history-based cooperative program, under which cooperatives would receive annual harvest allocations based on the qualified histories of their members. Depending on the structure developed, cooperatives could be required to be associated with a processor, with the details of that relationship would be determined by negotiations among the cooperative members

and the processor. If cooperative/processor associations are included in the alternative, each holder of qualified history would be eligible to join a cooperative associated with the processor to which the holder delivered the most pounds during a specified time period. Holders of qualified history that choose not to join a cooperative would be permitted to fish in a limited access fishery that would receive an aggregate allocation based on the histories of non-members of cooperatives. The allocation of PSC to the limited access fishery could be reduced.

### ***Alternatives in Need of Further Definition***

The Council developed specific provisions to define the alternatives outlined above over the course of several meetings. In addition, the Council also indicated a willingness to consider broadening the scope of alternatives to include alternatives containing some of the following provisions:

- Limited duration harvesting quota shares
  - Duration of initially allocated shares of variable lengths
  - Expiration/reissuance of shares on staggered, cyclical basis
- Processor linkages that expire on a graduated basis over a limited number of years
- Community linkages, rather than processor linkages, for single- processor communities or regions
- Subalternatives for formation and dissolution of processor linkages:
  - Linkage based on the processor to whom the harvester delivered the most groundfish poundage (all species combined)
  - Linkage based on the processor to whom the harvester delivered the most poundage by species (Pacific cod, pollock, other species possibly at different processors)
  - Linkage based on recent groundfish deliveries of any amount, above a minimum threshold (harvester's choice of processor)
- No processor linkages

The Council could choose to further define specific provisions of one or more of these alternatives at this time.

### **Elements and Options under Consideration**

The Council motion has constructed alternatives using specific elements and options in order to meet the stated need and purpose of this action. The following is a summary of the some of the provisions under consideration for inclusion in one or more alternative:

- Apply to all GOA management areas except for Southeast Outside (some changes in rockfish incidental catch management would affect Southeast Outside fisheries) (G-1, SEO-1, and SEO-2)
- Apply to all groundfish fisheries in GOA except IFQ sablefish (some changes in rockfish incidental catch management would affect halibut and sablefish IFQ fisheries) (G-1, G-2, IFQ-1, IFQ-2, IFQ-3, IFQ-4)
- For each gear type, allocate select primary (i.e., directed) and secondary (i.e., non-directed) groundfish species (G-2)
- Allocate shares based on individual catch history of primary species, during identified qualifying years (G-8, G-9, and G-10)
- Allocate secondary species based on fleet incidental catch rates (G-11)
- Allocate a prohibited species catch allowance for halibut (G-12)

- Establish a portion of the TAC to be allocated to fisheries inside of 3 nm, that will be subject to State management (G-3)
- Establish an entry level fishery for non-trawl catcher vessels (G-2)
- Establish parameters for incentive fisheries for groundfish species that are currently underutilized (G-24)
- Establish sideboards to limit participants in the GOA rationalized fisheries to their aggregate historical participation in other Alaska fisheries (G-25)
- Establish regional landings requirements (G-22)
- Include communities quota purchase or community allocation provisions (Community provisions motion)
- Include skipper and/or crew allocations or license limitation (Skipper and crew provisions and G-23)
- Additional reductions of salmon and crab bycatch (Salmon and crab bycatch motion)
- Include share transferability (G-14, G-15, G-16, G-17, G-18)
- Include leasing limits (T-1; P-1; L-1)
- Include owner-on-board requirement for the longline sector (L-2)
- Establish excessive share caps for individuals, vessel use, vertical integration, cooperatives (T-2, T-3, T-4, T-5; P-2, P-3, P-4, P-5; L-3, L-4, L-5, L-6)