APPENDIX 1: HARNESSING MARKET FORCES
IN AMERICAN FISHERIES SCIENCE POLICY (CASE EXAMPLES)

Increased public support alone will not reverse the fisheries crisis (e.g. Table 5) although it remains a vital component of the long-term solution.  Market forces are necessary to counter unsustainable fishing and its proponents.  One approach is available that has succeeded in other areas, that is, working in partnership with industry to design and implement market-derived incentives for sustainable, well-managed fishing (Sutton, 1998 p. 132).

Perhaps one of the earliest best example of this strategy was the highly successful and rather controversial tuna-dolphin campaign of the early 1990s (see also Joseph, 1994; Jennings, 2004).  Hundreds of thousands of dolphins were being killed in purse seine fisheries for tuna in the eastern Pacific.  Public outrage and consumer power helped provide the political incentive for the US to embargo imports of tuna caught in an unsustainable manner resulting in excessive mortality of dolphins.  Thanks to the successful marketing of dolphin-safe tuna by major seafood distributors, the killing of dolphins in tuna fisheries was quickly reduced, at least for U.S. based consumers.  The goal of that campaign, however, was dolphin protection and not fisheries conservation (Sutton, 1998 p. 132).

To succeed in promulgating market forces in fisheries, the conservation community should forge alliances with progressive members of the seafood industry.  The Marine Stewardship Council is one such joint venture (see later).  The tuna-dolphin experience suggest that finding corporate allies and redirecting market forces in favor of conservation can be quite powerful.  “One thing is certain; where public opinion, industry and the market lead, governments will likely follow “ (Sutton, 1998 p. 132).

Another example is in U.S. North Pacific fisheries where bycatch of prohibited species such as halibut and crab is stringently regulated (see e.g. Witherell, 2004).  Typically every year groundfish and cod fisheries are closed because fisherfolk have caught the regulatory bycatch cap of halibut or crab allotted to a permitted directed species fishery.  Hall et al., (2000 p. 204) states “it is clear that bycatch management will be an integral part of most future ecosystem management schemes.”

Gear innovations are only a partial solution for reducing bycatch of these species. Gear innovations (i.e. conservation engineering), is an approach that has proven effective is area avoidance.  The fishing industry’s ability to establish avoidance of areas with higher incidence of crab and halibut (so called bycatch “hot spots”) was once quite limited.  Traditionally fisherfolk only had access to the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) observer data collected on their vessel and these data were often only collected and available weeks after the bycatch occurred.  The demersal north east Pacific groundfish industry has alleviated that situation with the creation of a voluntary reporting system known as “Sea State.” (see e.g. Groundfish Forum, 2005; Gauvin and Rose, 2004; Haflinger, 2004; Gauvin et. al., 1996).

Haflinger (2004 p. 232) reports that under the Sea State program fisheries-related “observer data are available to Sea State Inc. (Seattle, Washington; as the owner’s agent) on a 24/7 basis via an automated Web site maintained by the North Pacific Groundfish Observer Program.”  Hot spots that are noted, where “bycatch” has been high become a program of “voluntary” area closures.  This may be akin to a rolling industry-based marine protected area.

To get around the data barrier and improve the industry’s ability to avoid bycatch hotspots, in “real time,” Groundfish Forum (an industry member based association) has voluntarily contracted with a third-partly contractor known by the name, Sea State.  Sea State based in Washington State as an independent contractor, receives NMFS data via satellite from participating vessels.  The data are used to generate charts in a geographical information system (GIS) that are transmitted back to vessels.  These charts indicate locales or areas where bycatch is high and the information is updated every 24 hours.  Sea State works under a data release agreement between the industry and NMFS.  Further, Sea State as the contractor provides each participating vessel with a list of vessels and their bycatch rates, which eliminates the excuse that the boat captain didn’t realize his bycatch rates were high.  Transparent knowledge and dissemination creates strong peer pressure that acts as an incentive to reduce bycatch.

The Sea State Program is analogous to a fishery-based ISO 14001 VEMS, works as follows: First, trained observers sample hauls and estimate catch and bycatch.  Second, each vessel electronically transmits its observer data to Sea State that checks the data and performs spatial statistical extrapolations to factor in any hauls that were not sampled.  Third, position-specific data plotted from satellite triangulation global positioning systems (GPS) for each vessel is used to create a chart of vessel-specific bycatch rates that is faxed to participating member vessels within 24 hours.  Fourth, vessels move away from high bycatch areas and exert peer pressure on any vessel that is reluctant to move.

At times, high directed fishery – target total allowable catch (TAC) fishery – catch-rates must be sacrificed to keep bycatch discard rates low.  The industry hopes peer pressure put on those who are not participating in the example voluntary ISO 14000 – oriented Sea State program will influence them to act for the common good of all in the regulatory industry.  Accordingly the goal of the Sea State (bottom trawl) program is to allow the fleet to rapidly respond (both individually and collectively) to high bycatch rates.  In this way, bycatch and/or discards of prohibited species can be minimized and the industry can more effectively stay within its overall legislatively prescribed prohibited species regulatory bycatch caps (Gauvin et al. 1996 p. 79).

Unfortunately, throughout the country NMFS does not have sufficient financial and manpower resources for data processing and transmission of bycatch information in a suitable time frame needed for bycatch avoidance (see: Hill, 2002).  It cannot afford nor provide enough observers either.  Moreover, government rules pertaining to confidentiality allow individual companies to receive only their own fishing data which is neither useful for establishing bycatch trends nor for avoidance.  The contract with Sea State works through a general clearance agreement between participating fishing enterprises, NMFS, and Sea State (Gauvin et al. 1996 p. 80).  “This allows for the calculation of bycatch rates per ton of target catch while providing protection from general dissemination of individual catch data.”  For the identification of bycatch hot spots to be effective, there needs to be identifiable patterns based on spatial and temporal dimensions.  This science-based condition is not often met.

A crucial determinant of success for any voluntary ISO 14000–oriented VEMS program is to obtain a critical mass of the industry to participate.  Further, there must be a legitimate reason why a company would want to participate because “volunteerism normally wanes where there is no tangible reward” (Gauvin et al. 1996 p. 81).  Seymour and Ridley (2005 p. 324) link participation to the existence of “market incentives.”  There is clearly a common benefit to the industry if the program successfully prevents premature closures of fisheries prior to the TAC being taken.  It also augments sustainable development “best practices” (Sainsbury et al., 2000; Sainsbury and Sumalia, 2003)

Some members of the North Pacific bottom trawl fleet believe the only real long-term solution will be a management system of individual accountability wherein an individual organization or enterprise directly affects its own economic performance by its efforts and ability to reduce bycatch (Gauvin et al, 1996).  Adoption of an ISO 14001 VEMS is just such a tool.  This ISO 14000 system might be one where individual vessels have an annual allotment of groundfish bycatch and must stop fishing as soon as that allotment is used up.  Under such a system, companies would have incentives to use their bycatch wisely and lower their rates, to the maximum extent practicable, to extend their fishing time and increase production.  This would be reflected in a transparent third-party VEMS certification document (see, e.g. Figures 2, 3, 6, 16).

Under a system of individual accountability, an organization doing its utmost to reduce bycatch (a requirement of the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996), even at a cost of directed fishery target species catch, would not be affected by a company unwilling to sacrifice target species catch to reduce bycatch.  “A system of individual bycatch quotas would not penalize the good actors while allowing bad actors to gain economically” (Gauvin et al. 1996 p. 82).

Gauvin and Rose (2004, p. 218) report that in the U.S. Pacific northwest “the pollock industry employs voluntary bycatch monitoring and avoidance to rapidly identify salmon ‘hotspots’ and move fishing into lower bycatch areas,” notwithstanding opportunity costs of “forfeiture of areas with high pollock catch rates or fish quality.”

Corollary Discussion:  Industry Initiatives – Voluntary Bycatch Reporting in 2005

The East Coast Pelagic Association (ECPA) of Maine elaborated on some equivalent voluntary ISO 14000-oriented fisheries bycatch reporting.  The ECPA and the herring industry are cooperatively working to develop a voluntary bycatch avoidance program analogous to an ISO 14000-oriented VEMS, primarily to address recent interactions with an extremely large in relative terms, 2003 year class of haddock on Georges Bank.  Some of this 2003 year class of haddock began to be caught as incidental “bycatch” (discards) in the permitted directed herring fishery in 2004.  This led to closure of the fishery (e.g. see also: Gauvin et. al. 1996; Haflinger, 2004).  The new voluntary bycatch avoidance program may be operational as early as July 2005 (Steele, 2005).

In 2004, the Atlantic herring midwater trawl fleet encountered as bycatch/discards a phenomenal 2003 year-class of haddock along the western edge of Georges Bank actually the largest since the 1960’s (Jon Brodziak, NMFS, personal communication)!  Herring midwater trawls are utilized to capture pelagic species successfully in many parts of the world; locally these encounters with haddock groundfish species were an unprecedented event with detrimental repercussions for the commercial fishery.  All retention of groundfish species by herring vessels is prohibited under fishery regulations promulgated by the New England Fishery Management Council (Steele, 2005; but see: Federal Register Vol. 70 (112) pp. 34055-34060, June 13, 2005).  Compliance with these prohibited species regulations are complicated by herring vessel operations that utilize submergible hydraulic pumps, which limit the vessel crews ability to successfully sort bycatch of species of similar size.

There is a need to avoid waste of both target species (herring) and valuable U.S. Atlantic haddock that will eventually recruit to the groundfish fishery if left in the ocean (see also Cho et al., 2005).  The herring industry is pursuing a three-pronged approach to continuing the harvest of a healthy herring resource while minimizing incidental bycatch of haddock.  One approach coincides with gear modification research.  A second is analogous to a voluntary ISO 14000-oriented VEMS bycatch avoidance program.  The third approach involves regulatory change.  This “corollary discussion” is intended to describe a pilot industry project analogous to an ISO 14000-oriented approach under development in cooperation with the Gulf of Maine Research Institute (GMRI) of Portland, Maine, the East Coast Pelagic Association (ECPA) and other members of the herring industry (Steele, 2005).  Avoidance programs have proven successful in other regulated US fisheries and this pilot project seeks to utilize “lessons learned” in successful implementation while taking into accord the difference in resources specific to the U.S. Northeast Continental Shelf LME region (e.g. Gauvin et al., 1996; Haflinger, 2004).  The objectives include the development of a program that will assist the herring industry in minimizing haddock bycatch to the extent practicable.  Another prominent objective is to utilize vessel information voluntarily provided on a tow by tow basis to identify bycatch “hot spots” – during a 24 hour reporting cycle – and compile data on fishing and environmental conditions that may influence bycatch rates, and thus, to avoid those areas.

The 2004 Georges Bank fishing experience had some quite significant economic impacts on herring fisherfolk and shoreside processors.  Some vessels were assessed significant fines for violations of possession of prohibited species (haddock) (Steele, 2005).  Reduced effort on a healthy resource of herring was seen immediately as vessels voluntarily agreed to leave areas of concern, so called “hot spots.”  Several processors experienced severe shortages in product and some plants were shuttered for periods during the directed herring season (Steele, 2005).

Regulatory change is needed to address unintended bycatch of haddock in the fishery, but the process is slow and ponderous in a region that has been focused in recent years on management of overfished species of low abundance and on rebuilding plans.  The success of these rebuilding efforts now requires the need to develop tools to manage abundant species interactions as a part of an ecosystem approach to fisheries management (Pitcher and Pauly, 1998).  This pilot project as described and presented in New England Fishery Management Council documents seeks to explore the utility of a voluntary industry initiative as a part of a co-management ISO 14000-oriented approach to avoid and minimize incidental bycatch and regulatory discards.

According to ECPA personnel, the herring industry feels compelled to take proactive steps to avoid species interactions (as bycatch and discards) while regulatory actions are formulated.  The regulations were still uncertain, as of early June, for the 2005 fishing season on Georges Bank. The herring fishery will have an opportunity to operate should the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) implement a 1,000 lb. haddock incidental bycatch limit as requested for 2005 by the New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC; Steele, 2005), which they did (see Federal Register, Vol. 70 (112) pp. 34055-34060, June 13^th, 2005) while the industry continues its co-management efforts on a more permanent bycatch monitoring program for the fishery.

To meet the objectives of the pilot project, vessels who choose to participate in this voluntary effort will need to report data on a “tow by tow” basis, indicating location, bycatch rates, and other determinate factors.  ECPA hosted a captain and vessel owner meeting in June of 2005 in an effort to reach agreement on the level of information needed to be shared among the participants to meet the objectives of the program.  Discussions also featured confidentiality and use of information reported.  As a part of this analogous ISO 14001 VEMS–oriented effort, vessel owners and captains will be asked to sign an agreement (as a memorandum of understanding) to comply with the terms and conditions of the consensus of the participants.

The Gulf of Maine Research Institute in Portland, Maine (GMRI) has agreed to act as a clearinghouse for information reported by vessels, for compilation of data and the subsequent reporting back to vessels on haddock bycatch rates.  Position-specific data (e.g. latitude and longitude) for each vessel will be used to create a chart of vessel-specific bycatch rates that will be faxed or emailed to participating vessels on a 48-72 hour cycle, this cycle it is hoped would be reduced to daily (see: Gauvin et. al., 1996).

All vessels in the directed herring fishery are currently using a Boatraks vessel monitoring system (VMS) with email capability that will be utilized to facilitate timely reporting of data (Steele, 2005).  The pilot project is currently investigating the use of electronic logbook software to facilitate ease of use for captains while in operation on the sea.

During New England Fishery Management Council herring advisory meetings held in May of 2005, Steele (2005) maintained that under regulations then in effect, vessels must operate with zero retention of haddock.  According to ECPA personnel anticipated regulatory change (at least for the 2005 season) will likely allow for some low levels of retention of haddock and vessels will need to utilize consistent methods to estimate bycatch rates on individual trips.  It is suggested here that an in-place VEMS by the vessels, with third party certification to ISO 14001 protocols will aid in effectuating transitional regulatory change.  As a part of the overall pilot project effort to increase data the NMFS Observer Program will endeavor to provide at-sea observers on 20% of herring trips in 2005 (Steele, 2005).  This pilot project proposes to have fisherfolk employ the same protocols and methodology used by the NMFS Observer Program for at-sea observations to allow data collection comparison.  Both ought to be standardized to international ISO 14001 VEMS protocols.

Fourteen vessels attempted to work in the marine area of concern in 2004.  These vessels are known and definable and have been successful in achieving compliance with industry oriented agreements or memorandums of understanding (MOU) in recent years.  While this project does not anticipate a significant change in vessels operating in the fishery in 2005, the open-access and common property nature of the fishery may complicate full compliance if many choose not to participate in this voluntary approach.  The NEFMC is preparing an amendment to the Atlantic Herring Fishery Management Plan (FMP) that will analyze a limited access program that may be implemented for the fishery in the near future (Steele, 2005).  It is suggested here that those vessels employing an ISO 14000-oriented voluntary environmental management system (VEMS) with third-party certification will find favor with regulators when prospective limited entry “dedicated access privileges” are granted (see, e.g. Hart, 1995).

Herring vessels were unable to operate prior to the total allowable catch (TAC) being taken in some areas of the fishery in 2004 because of unavoidable haddock bycatch.  Limited by regulation, vessel captains where unable to ascertain any correlations in directed herring fishing patterns that could influence overall bycatch rates temporally or spatially.  There is a clear need for collection of information to define the extent of the problem in the fishery (Steele, 2005).  This pilot project to self report seeks to assess fishing data to determine bycatch rates in “real time” and identify any long term or seasonal trends of interactions with the rebuilding haddock resource (see also Gauvin et al., 1996; Haflinger, 2004).

As mentioned earlier, the herring industry will also be looking at gear modifications in 2005 and beyond to minimize incidental bycatch.  That research will utilize available information on fish behavior (haddock/herring) to test modifications for midwater trawls to improve escapement of haddock.  A cooperative research project has partnered the Manomet Center for Conservation Sciences in Plymouth, Massachusetts with, GMRI, NMFS and ECPA to seek funding to fully test modifications to midwater trawls to increase escapement of haddock.  Perhaps congressionally approved Saltonstall Kennedy funds would be quite appropriate for this endeavor (but see Buck, 2004 for his assessment of funding problems with this 50 year old law).

While the goal of some flume tank gear work is to minimize bycatch, the need for active avoidance of areas of high bycatch by the industry is still required by regulation.  The voluntary bycatch reporting pilot project identified in this corollary discussion would allow the industry to experimentally test the effectiveness of a self-regulated process as a part of an adaptive management ISO 14001 VEMS approach, to collect data while minimizing bycatch rates in the directed herring fishery.

In summary, while the data may provide some perspective on the nature and extent of catch and incidental bycatch on vessels using pelagic gear and catching herring, they are not comprehensive enough as yet to draw any specific conclusions about the herring fishery as a whole, nor about any specific individual gear type.  Steele (2005) makes the case that it therefore would be inappropriate to conclude that groundfish bycatch is a problem in the herring fishery, just as it would be inappropriate to conclude that groundfish bycatch is nonexistent in the herring fishery.  Additional ecosystem-oriented information is required to make such conclusions, though, however, year class 2003 haddock appear to be a “problem” for the directed herring fishery. Sinclair et al., (2002 p. 261) stated “heavy fishing on small pelagics such as herring, capelin, sardines and anchovies has resulted in changes in the distribution and abundance of predatory fish…”

Overall, observer data from the herring fishery are not sufficient to uphold a robust statistical analysis to determine groundfish discard/kept ratio at this time (Steele, 2005).  The observer coverage of the herring fishery during the 2004 fishing year was a pilot program, and the adequacy of the temporal and spatial coverage has as yet to be evaluated for regulatory purposes.  Although the basic sampling protocol is well-defined, the effects of individual vessel sorting procedures on sampling also require rigorous evaluation (Steele, 2005).

The Maine Department of Marine Resources/Manomet data probably provide the best perspective on the nature of bycatch in the directed herring fishery.  These data only represent a snapshot however, of the fishery as they were collected in 1997 and 1998.  No similar projects have been undertaken to investigate bycatch in the directed herring fishery since that time.  The project conducted by ME DMR that utilized portside bycatch sampling may be a cost-effective way to obtain a significant amount of information to complement the at-sea observer information (e.g. Bache, 2003).

Bache (2003 p. 103) indicates that “largely through the allocation of catch quotas and access rights “ownership privileges to commercial fisherfolk are perceived to accrue.”  Bache (2003 p. 122) emphasizes that in order to mitigate the bycatch of commercial species different approaches are required, however, “there is no one size fits all solution to bycatch problems.”  Some available tools include the use of market measures and incentive programs, and the voluntary ISO 14001 VEMS approach may be an appropriate tool or mechanism for integrating ecological information into natural resource management policy (see also: Brown and MacLeod, 1996).

While described in other documents at length (see Sherman, 1994, 1995) briefly, the concept of LMEs emerged from an American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) selected symposium in the mid 1980s concerning variability and management of large marine ecosystems (Sherman 1991; Alexander, 1993; Morgan, 1994; Morgan, 1987).  Rosenberg (2003 p. 190) states that the “LME concept is helpful for thinking of the linkages of biological, chemical and physical factors of transboundary coastal ocean areas.  Affecting any one part of the LME can have repercussions throughout the region.  The LME provides a framework for thinking about potential impacts.”  The impacts on fisheries ecosystems including the biological, oceanographic and physical environment that supports commercial and recreational species within a specified management area and other economic activities such as sand and gravel mining, submarine telecommunications links, oil and gas energy development, marine transportation, contaminants disposal, recreational tourism and aquaculture, can occur at the scale of LMEs or may be localized in scope (Rosenberg 2003).  Rosenberg (2003 p. 194) also points out “aquaculture may cause habitat degradation and competitive interactions between farmed and wild fish, which in combination reduce the productivity of the ecosystem and hence fisheries” (see: Dalton, 2005).  This large marine ecosystem (LME) approach or concept may involve integrating stewardship of the ocean’s ecosystem into a workable and adaptive voluntary environmental management system (VEMS) as a part of the socio-economic and governance modules (see Figure 11).  Although a VEMS may take many forms, there are essential ingredients that ought to be included.  A viable VEMS ought to consider the viewpoints of identifiable stakeholders and interested parties to maximize the potential for achieving objectives in gaining maximum sustainable yield from “public trust” resources.  Therefore, effective stewardship ought to be predicated on several principles (von Zharen 1998 pp. 107-108: see Figure 22).

Hanna, (1999 p. 282) emphasizes “moving to ecosystem management requires an explicit consideration of multiple objectives not only for the production of commodity species but also for the protection of species that provide ecosystem services, it also requires a mechanism to overcome difficulties presented by entrenched single-species interests.”  It also requires a central organizing principle, (Juda and Burroughs, 1990) ecosystems are such organizing principles (Hanna, 1999 p. 282). “Improving fishery governance will require that tradeoffs between species be considered within a context of ecosystem portfolios (e.g. Edwards et al., 2005; Edwards, 2005; Edwards et al., 2004; Larkin et al., 2003) with the objective to maximize the sum of commodity and service values over the long term” (Hanna, 1999 p. 283; see Figure 23).

“Incentives could be realigned to provide rewards to both users and managers for behavior that promotes sustainable use, for example, by making the continuation of both rights of access (referred to as “dedicated access privileges: CEQ, 2004) and rights of management contingent on positive contributions and innovation” (Hanna, 1999 p. 283).  It is proffered that the utilization of an ISO 14001 VEMS is just such an innovation.

It may be noteworthy that the second organization in the United States to receive ISO 14001 certification of its voluntary environmental management system was the Acushnet Rubber Company of New Bedford, Massachusetts.  The Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act of 1989 provided the impetus for Acushnet to fulfill ISO 14000 requirements for continuous environmental improvement (Ochsner, 2000).  This example is meant to illustrate that organizations in “fishing communities” have already instituted VEMS applications.

“It must be acknowledged that the initial development and implementation of the (voluntary) environmental management system will take time and money” (Pendleton and Nagy, 2003 p. 62).  To find prospective funding, Buck (2004 p. 1) indicates that the “objective of the Saltonstall-Kennedy (S-K) Act (established in 1954) program is to address the needs of fishing communities in providing economic benefits for rebuilding and maintaining sustainable fisheries, and in dealing with the impacts of conservation and management measures.”  Thus, it is reasoned here that a rejuvenated S-K program could provide pilot funding for fisheries industry-based ISO 14001 VEMS development and partnering (but see Buck, 2004).

In the United States, the EPA strategy in determining the role of voluntary environmental management systems (VEMS) in regulatory programs is to ensure that “voluntary programs will remain the primary way in which the agency promotes and encourages the use of environmental management system’s,” in part, to improve regulatory compliance and obtain continuously improved environmental results (Johnson, 2004 p. 2).  The EPA feels that when regulators focus on performance, certain implementation considerations are warranted.  They believe “(voluntary) environmental management systems generally should not be used to replace performance standards defined by regulatory programs (one example may include the 10 National Standards found in the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996), but can be useful tools for organizations to use to achieve such standards” (Johnson, 2004 p. 4).  The EPA also proffers that nonregulatory VEMS elements are conditions for receiving regulatory benefits (perhaps in the case of fisheries – “dedicated access privileges”).  Voluntary environmental management systems (VEMS) are a multimedia approach whereby an organization can effectively take into account unregulated environmental impacts and regulatory requirements in unison.  A VEMS can also be utilized as an adaptive management policy experiment.

It is quite possible that incorporating a VEMS into a permit could yield better environmental results and public (stakeholder) involvement than traditional permit models.  For exclusive economic zone (EEZ) public trust fishery resources, involving the public through VEMS’s may meet the letter and spirit or intent of required statutory and regulatory permit provisions and may forestall a bevy of lawsuits.  It could also be designed so that confidentiality remains respected and balanced for the permit holder.  It is also prospectively possible that VEMS’s could facilitate the generation and tracking of permitted fisheries “dedicated access privileges” and the subsequent trading programs that result from implementation of individual transferable quotas (ITQ’s).  The “dedicated access privileges” of trading permits and catch within the framework of a VEMS could aid regulators in determining the net environmental and ecosystem-oriented health impacts from trading programs as a result of such “dedicated access privileges.”  The gear makers (hook, net and so forth) could be persuaded as “third parties” suppliers to actively engage in voluntary environmental management system development and continuous environmental performance (sort of like the automotive industry suppliers).  Linking permits or “dedicated access privileges” to high quality VEMS’s and certification could become an important element in the human dimension (see Figures 24, 25) to continuous environmental improvement of sustainable large marine ecosystems (see: Stehr Group, 2005).  If the adaptive management VEMS experiment does not achieve stated goals or is terminated (as a policy orientation approach; see: Gable, 2003, Table 6) by either a participant permittee or a regulator, or by legislation, any deferred requirements may need to be reinstated under a new permit.  In linking permits or “dedicated access privileges” and VEMS’s the monitoring and verification for compliance with key permit terms and conditions can be accomplished at the dock during unloading of catch, through contracted fishery observers, or perhaps through electronic vessel monitoring systems (VMS).  All of which are used in one form or another today.  The fishery resource implications to regulators of substituting VEMS terms and conditions for permit provisions are such that market-based initiatives, which are supported by the present U.S. Administration, will foster humans as integral parts with large marine ecosystem resources and their subsequent sustainable use (see: Sherman, 2005).

Two global organizations announced in February 1996 a “partnership” to create economic incentives for sustainable fishing by establishing an independent non-profit Marine Stewardship Council (MSC).  The world’s largest private, non-profit conservation group, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) sought a new approach to help ensure more effective management of marine fisheries.  It partnered with Anglo-Dutch Unilever Corporation, one of the world’s largest buyers of frozen fish and producer of well-known frozen fish products under such brands as Iglo, Bird’s Eye and Gorton’s, they were interested in long-term fish stock sustainability to ensure a future for its successful fish business.  While these organizations may have different motivations, they possessed a shared objective – “to ensure the long-term viability of global fish populations and the health of the marine ecosystems on which they depend” (Sutton, 1998 p. 133).

The MSC, established in early 1997, is an independent non-profit, non-governmental body.  The MSC continues in developing a broad set of biological, environmental, economic and social principles and criteria for sustainable fishing through worldwide consultations and as Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001 p. 288) proclaim, the MSC initiative is a strategy to mobilize and empower consumers as stakeholders to improve management practices.  According to von Zharen (1999 p. 19) the MSC hosted an open series of regional and national consultations and workshops around the world to “refine and strengthen the principles and agree on a process for international implementation.”  The MSC accredits independent certification firms that apply the criteria, or standards, to individual fisheries.  Products will come from fisheries that are not exhibiting signs of overfishing, and only fisheries meeting these standards will be eligible for certification.  Products made from fish caught in accordance with MSC standards will receive an “on-pack” logo similar in concept to the “dolphin-safe” logo appearing on cans of tuna (see also Teisl et al., 2002; NOAA, 2000 and 2002; Joseph, 1994).  As with a “green seal” certification of products determined to be environmentally sound, the logo would assist organizations and individuals in making environmentally responsible choices.  A label represents that the fish are taken from sustainably managed fisheries. Seafood companies are encouraged to join sustainable buyers’ groups and to make commitments to purchase fish products from certified sources.  This element necessitates, then, a guarantee that an organization has integrated VEMS precepts that supports sustainability and that it will form partnerships whenever possible to encourage sustainable perspectives (von Zharen, 1999 p. 19).  Ultimately, only fisheries meeting specific standards shall be eligible for certification by independent, accredited certifying firms.  Seafood companies will be encouraged to make commitments to purchase fish products from certified sources only.  By analogy products from fisheries certified to ISO 14000 series standards may be marked with a logo on the package.  This would theoretically provide seafood consumers selection of fish products that come from a verifiable sustainable source (Sutton, 1998; see: e.g. Stehr Group, 2005; Gable, 2004 and 2003).

Allison (2001 p. 945) wrote about market incentives for sustainable U.S. fisheries remarking that in 1997, The World Wide Fund for (WWF) and the Unilever Corporation launched the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) to harness market forces and the power of consumer choice in favor of sustainable, well-managed fisheries.  Certification on biological, environmental, economic and social criteria is carried out by independent firms.  Products are marked with an MSC logo or equivalent to allow consumers to select those that come from an acknowledged sustainable source (see also Sutton, 1998 p. 133).

Voluntary market-based measures appear likely to become more readily and widely adopted and could improve the management of export-orientated fisheries in developing countries (and many developed-country fisheries).  They may also have the indirect effect of reducing the negative environmental and socio-economic impacts of competition between ‘industrial’ and ‘artisanal’ fisheries in many LME’s by forcing the larger-scale producers to comply with policies protecting small-scale fishing interests, in order to gain certification (Allison, 2001; p. 946).

The creation of the MSC or equivalent, such as ISO 14020, has the potential to significantly alter fishing practices everywhere in favor of more sustainable, less destructive fisheries.  When Unilever and other major seafood companies make commitments to buy their fish products only from well-managed and MSC-certified fisheries, many in the fishing industry will be compelled to modify their present practices (see e.g. Pauly et al., 2002; Myers and Worm, 2005 and 2003; Raloff, 2005).  Governments, laws, and treaties aside, the market itself will begin to determine the means of fish production.  The costs of environmental protection and the development of sustainable fisheries will thus be distributed through the market chain, rather than falling disproportionately on the shoulders of one or more sectors (Sutton, 1998 p. 133).

Roheim (2003 p. 96) reports that the first fishery certified to Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) standards was in 2000.  She suggests that consumers who purchase eco-labeled fishery products support healthier large marine ecosystems.  It should be noted however, that Hannesson (2004 p. 345) argues that many of the MSC ecosystem management (eco-label) principles have little or nothing to do with increasing the long-term supplies of fish at maximum sustainable yield, and that they are open to interpretation (see also: Mansfield, 2003).

The role of society, through eco-labelling, ethical trade, and NGO lobbying and representation has yet to be felt as a significant governing force though, however, it seems likely to become more important with the prospective transition to rights-based fishing or, “dedicated access privileges” in the USA (see for example, Allison, 2001 p. 947; Sutinen et al., 2000; Sutinen et al., 2005).

For example, Allison (2001 p. 948) reports that small-scale fisherfolks’ representative organizations in India have been successful in capturing the attention of their own government and international donors and NGOs in supporting their interests over those of the ‘industrial’ sector.  This may herald and foster an era of greater emphasis on the socio-economic goals of fishery science and management and a return to ecologically sustainable means of exploitation (McCay, 2004).

Nevertheless, in a conservation partnership, “the MSC sets out broad principles of sustainable fishing and specific standards for individual fisheries.  The purpose of the independent, nonprofit, nongovernmental membership body is to halt global fish population declines by promoting market-based incentives for sustainable fishing modeled on approaches to sustainable forestry.  The MSC creates a new standard for fish products from sustainable sources and spells out specific certifiable standards for individual fisheries” (von Zharen, 1999 p. 18; von Zharen, 1998 p. 94).

Discussion: Voluntary Environmental Management System (VEMS) Certification in an LME Framework

In general terms, the ISO or MSC eco-label simply confirms that the product is what it says it is (see: Stehr Group, 2005; LeBlanc, 2003).  Also certified is the documentation describing the process by which the product came about.  If it were specifically applied to LME fisheries, however, and United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) “Code of Conduct of Responsible Fisheries” voluntary criteria were employed by example, the process could certify and label the sustainability of a fishery an institutional ecological practice (Sproul, 1998b p. 143).  The ISO 14000 series on environmental management includes both organizational evaluation and product/process evaluation practices. These continue to be refined by the ISO TC 207 with the first “new and improved” series designated as ISO 14000:2004 released on November 15^th 2004 (Table 4).  It is important to note that the international eco-labelling protocol is an important aspect of ISO product evaluation that is actively being pursued in many international LME settings (e.g. Stehr Group, 2005).

A coordinated approach throughout LME’s would ensure a more rapid worldwide acceptance of this important initiative to incorporate environmental practice within the fishing industry’s production and services cycle (Sproul, 1998b p. 144).  In addition, it would provide political and economic incentives for conveying transparently that information in a consistent and, concise manner to all stakeholders and consumers.  In the absence of a unified advance, several potentially conflicting fishery certification initiatives will emerge and confuse the public and dilute or destroy the credibility of the practice for all (by analogy for a review see e.g. Joseph, 1994).  The stage is potentially set for such a confrontation in fisheries certification.  Sproul (1998b p. 144) advocates that the existing ISO 14000 protocol and Marine Stewardship Council must coordinate their efforts in this endeavor.  In fisheries certification, multiple standardization schemes such as those occurring in forestry can prove counter-productive, and ought to be avoided (Sproul, 1998b p. 144; see also Swallow and Sedjo, 2000).

Using the dolphin-friendly tuna product to demonstrate that higher prices are not necessary, fish processors and retailers are not expected to charge a premium for sustainably-sourced fish.  The first U.S.-based company to adopt the MSC program illustrates the diversity of participants: Special Expeditions is a tour company who pledged to serve sustainably-caught fish on its cruises (von Zharen, 1998 p. 93).  Therefore, it may seem that a primary requirement among many of a holistic marine species management strategy is VEMS certification (see Figure 15).  The planning process for marine life management also can be enhanced through numerous information-planning tools, such as geographic information systems (GIS) technology, to integrate data from a variety of sources (Zeller et al., 2005).

Often regarded in terms of allocation between competing parts of the fishery sector, trade-offs between species are seen as a political issue in single-species management (Pitcher and Pauly, 1998 p. 325).  Thus, von Zharen (1999 p. 21) remarks that the pace of shifting the approach from single-species management to ecosystem-oriented sustainability must quicken.  To carry out effective and innovative environmental management programs all have a stake in developing the commitment, knowledge, and technology.  Global large marine ecosystem management with a VEMS process is a difficult challenge, one that requires special initiatives, management, and a vision towards global stewardship.  As part of ecosystem-oriented management, all interacting species are included in a multispecies resource evaluation (Pitcher and Pauly, 1998 p. 325).

From a large marine ecosystem (LME) perspective, principles for effective environmental standards can be drawn from existing negotiated voluntary governance mechanisms, such as the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and applied to individual firms involved in fishing or seafood production and export, or to a whole fishery through fisheries associations (Allison, 2001 p. 946).