# SOCIAL SECURITY 

MEMORANDUM

Date: March 16, 2006
Refer To: TCA
To: Senator Robert Bennett, Vice Chairman
Joint Economic Committee of Congress
From: Stephen C. Goss, Chief Actuary
Alice H. Wade, Deputy Chief Actuary
Subject: Estimated Financial Effects of a Proposal to Restore Sustainable Solvency for the Social Security Program --INFORMATION

This memorandum presents estimates for the plan discussed with Tom Miller and Jeff Schlagenhauf of the staff for the Joint Economic Committee. The plan would provide for progressive indexing of scheduled Old-Age and Survivor's Insurance (OASI) benefits, accelerate the increase in the normal retirement age to 67, provide for a life-expectancy adjustment (longevity indexing) for OASI benefits, and provide for transfers from the General Fund of the Treasury when needed to maintain a contingency trust fund reserve.

All estimates are based on the intermediate assumptions of the 2005 Trustees Report and reflect our understanding of your intent for this proposal. This plan would eliminate the long-range OASDI actuarial deficit, which is estimated at 1.92 percent of taxable payroll under current law, leaving the OASDI program in actuarial balance for the long-range 75year projection period. In addition, the OASDI program would meet the criteria for sustainable solvency under these assumptions because the projected assets in the OASDI Trust Funds would be projected to be stable as a percentage of annual program cost at the end of the period. Thus, the program would be expected to be solvent for the foreseeable future under this proposal.

## Plan Specifications

Provision 1. Progressive Indexing of OASI Benefits
The Progressive Indexing PIA Formula
Under this provision, basic benefits for OASI beneficiaries above the $30^{\text {th }}$ percentile of career-average earners would be modified in the law to provide for slower growth in
benefits across succeeding cohorts of retirees starting in 2012. The largest reductions would be for workers with steady maximum taxable earnings. For these maximum earners reductions would be equivalent to the effect of full CPI-indexing of starting benefits, as included in Model 2 from the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security of 2001. Reductions in starting benefit levels would be smaller for earners with lower careeraverage earnings. This progressive indexing provision is modeled after the provision developed for Robert Pozen in 2003, but differs in that it would not reduce benefits for disabled worker beneficiaries or for young survivor beneficiaries.

To accomplish progressive indexing, the PIA formula would be modified in four steps as detailed below.

1. Step 1: Establish a new bend point at the $30^{\text {th }}$ percentile: A new PIA bend point would be established for those newly eligible in 2012. The new bend point would be set at the level of:

- The current-law first bend point plus
- 28.6 percent of the difference between the current-law first and second bend points.
This level has been determined by the Office of the Chief Actuary to be at about the $30^{\text {th }}$ percentile of average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) for workers becoming entitled for retired worker benefits in the years 2001 through 2003. In addition, the specified new bend point is expected to be at about the $30^{\text {th }}$ percentile of career-average earnings for retired workers newly entitled in 2012 based on projections under the intermediate assumptions of the 2005 Trustees Report. This level is equivalent to about $\$ 20,000$ annual earnings in 2005. The new bend point would be wage indexed in the future, as is done for the other bend points in current law.

2. Step 2: Compute PIA for "maximum" earner two ways: The PIA would be computed two ways for each of the cohorts of theoretical "maximum" earners retiring at 62 in 2012 and later. The "maximum" earner who retirees at age 62 in 2012 is defined as a worker with a career-average earnings level (AIME) equal to the OASDI taxable maximum amount for 2010. This level of AIME would be wage indexed for subsequent cohorts of theoretical "maximum" earners. The first PIA calculation would be as in current law, and would be referred to as the wageindexed PIA. The second calculation would be computed with each of the three marginal PIA factors ( 90,32 , and 15 ) being reduced successively by the annual real increase in the national average wage index (AWI). This would be referred to as the CPI-indexed PIA. The annual real increase in the AWI would be calculated as:

- The ratio of the CPI-W (the index level) for the second year prior to benefit eligibility to the CPI-W for 2009, divided by
- The ratio of the AWI for the second year prior to the year of benefit eligibility to the AWI for 2009.

3. Step 3: Calculate the PIA for $30^{\text {th }}$ percentile worker: Calculate the PIA for cohorts of workers becoming newly eligible for retirement benefits in 2012 and later and having an AIME equal to the level of the applicable new bend point.
4. Step 4: Determine the upper two PIA formula factors: For the actual progressive indexed PIA formula, the marginal PIA factors that apply above the new bend point would be reduced at the rate needed so that the PIA computed for the theoretical "maximum" earner would be equal to the CPI-indexed PIA for those newly eligible in 2012 and later. The PIA factors (90 and 32) that apply below the new bend point would be unaffected. For each worker attaining age 62 in 2012 and later, the formula factors above the new bend point ( 32 and 15 ) would be multiplied by an amount equal to:

- The difference between the CPI-indexed PIA for the theoretical maximum earner retiring at 62 in the year and the PIA for the worker with an AIME equal to the new bend point, divided by
- The difference between the wage-indexed PIA for the theoretical maximum earner and the PIA for the worker with an AIME equal to the new bend point.


## Benefits Not Subject to Full Progressive Indexing

As stated above, the progressive indexed PIA applies for OASI benefits that are subject to reduction for early-age entitlement: retired worker, aged spouse and aged widow(er) benefits. Benefits payable to young survivors (children and spouses under NRA with a child in care) would be based on the current wage-indexed PIA. All benefits payable from the DI Trust Fund would also be based on the current law wage-indexed PIA formula.

However, upon attainment of the normal retirement age (NRA), disabled worker beneficiaries are converted to retired worker status and are thereafter paid benefits from the OASI Trust Fund. Under this proposal, disabled worker beneficiaries would become subject to a proportional application of the progressive indexed PIA at the time of conversion to retired worker status (or at entitlement to any retired worker benefit if recovered from disability before NRA or for survivor benefits if deceased before NRA). In such cases, the proportion of years between attainment of age 22 (or 2006 if later) and the attainment of 62 (or age at death if earlier) for which the worker was entitled to disabled worker benefits would be determined ( Prop $_{\text {DIS }}$ ). The PIA payable to a worker upon conversion to retired worker status (or at entitlement to any retired worker benefit if recovered from disability before NRA or for survivor benefits if deceased before NRA) would be computed as:

- The product of Prop ${ }_{\text {DIS }}$ and the PIA that had been payable from the DI program (with continued COLAs) plus
- The product of (1-Prop ${ }_{\text {DIS }}$ ) and the PIA that would be payable to a retiree of the same age with full progressive indexing and an AIME equal to that for the worker with the benefit computation years reduced by the years of disabled worker entitlement between ages 22 and 62 .
This resulting proportional "weighted average" benefit would, however, be limited in cases where the beneficiary is entitled to disabled worker benefits up to conversion to
retired worker status at NRA. In this case, the PIA would be set no higher than the PIA provided before conversion, and then increased by appropriate COLAs.


## Stopping and Restarting Progressive Indexing

Under the complete proposal, it is expected that sustainable solvency will be achieved (solvency through 75 years and a stable or rising ratio of trust fund assets to annual program cost at the end of the period). Under the plan, if projections under the intermediate assumptions for the OASDI program in any future Trustees Report indicate that sustainable solvency is projected and that no transfers from the General Fund of the Treasury are expected to be needed within the next 75 years, then the incremental effects of progressive indexing may be suspended for the succeeding year. The determination of whether to suspend progressive indexing for the following year will be in the affirmative if the OASDI program would still be projected to meet sustainable solvency under the intermediate assumptions of the Trustees Report.

This stabilizing provision may cause the incremental effects of progressive indexing to be added only intermittently after some time in the future. If progressive indexing is suspended in a year, then the potential incremental effects for that year will not be applied in any future year. That is, if the progressive indexing is restarted in any future year, the effect of CPI-indexing the PIA for the theoretical maximum earner in the formulas above will be omitted for the suspension period.

## Provision 2. Start Increase for NRA to 67 in 2012

Under current law, the normal retirement age (NRA) is scheduled to increase by 2 months per year for those attaining retirement eligibility age (62) in years 2017 through 2022, reaching the ultimate NRA of 67 for those reaching age 62 in 2022 and later. This provision would move the transition 5 years earlier, increasing the NRA by 2 months per year for those attaining retirement eligibility age (62) in years 2012 through 2017, reaching the ultimate NRA of 67 for those reaching age 62 in 2017 and later.

## Provision 3. Indexing OASI Benefits for Increases in Life Expectancy

For OASI beneficiaries becoming eligible for aged OASI benefits (as described for progressive indexing above) in 2018 and later, the PIA marginal factors (90, 32, and the modified 32 and 15 from progressive indexing) would all be multiplied by the ratio of:

- Life expectancy at 67 (ultimate NRA) for 2013
to
- Life expectancy at 67 (ultimate NRA) for the $4^{\text {th }}$ year prior to the year of benefit eligibility.
Unisex life expectancies would be computed using the best available data by the Office of the Chief Actuary of the Social Security Administration. Life expectancies would be
based on period life tables for these years so that final, complete actual data would be available for the calculations. Life expectancies projected under the intermediate assumptions of the 2005 Trustees Report result in an expected average annual reduction in the PIA benefit level under this provision of about 0.3 percent.

While benefits payable from the Disability Insurance Trust Fund would not be affected by the longevity indexing, such benefits would be affected on a proportional basis (as described above for progressive indexing) starting at conversion to retired worker status at NRA (or at entitlement to any retired worker benefit, or at death for aged survivor benefits, if earlier).

## Provision 4. Provide Transfers from the General Fund of the Treasury as Needed

If in any future year the assets of the combined OASDI Trust Funds during the following year are projected to fall below a level equal to 100 percent of the cost of the program in the ensuing year, then transfers from the General Fund of the Treasury will be made in sufficient amount and timing to prevent the trust funds from falling below 100 percent of the annual program cost.

## Assumptions

All estimates for this proposal provided in this memorandum and in the attached tables reflect the intermediate assumptions and projections from the 2005 Trustees Report

## Results

## OASDI Trust Fund and Unified Budget Effects

Tables 1 through 1d provide detailed estimates for the expected effects of the complete plan on OASDI financial status and on the unified budget. Table 2 provides OASDI financial status assuming enactment of all but provision 4, thus omitting general fund transfers. Finally, table 3 provides OASDI financial status assuming enactment of only provision 1, progressive indexing of the PIA formula for OASI benefits.

Table 1 indicates that the complete plan would be expected to result in solvency for the OASDI program through the next 75 years. The actuarial deficit is projected to be entirely eliminated. Moreover, the trust fund assets level shown as a ratio to annual program cost (trust fund ratio, or TFR) is projected to be stable at the end of the 75-year period. Thus, the plan would meet the criteria for sustainable solvency under the intermediate assumptions of the 2005 Trustees Report.

Table 1 also indicates that general fund transfers are expected to be needed starting 2046 and lasting through about 2080, in order to maintain a 100 TFR. After 2080, however, additional transfers are not expected to be necessary. The TFR is projected to be stable
through 2080 at a level of 100 percent of annual program cost. In addition, table 1 indicates that annual program cash-flow balances (annual balance) are projected to be improving (getting to be smaller negatives) and are approaching positive annual balances. It is anticipated that before annual balances reach a positive level, the TFR will again start rising, within a few years after 2080. At that point, the incremental effects of progressive indexing (see description above) would be suspended as long as additional general fund transfers are not projected to be needed. If the TFR were to at some point to continue rising even with the continued suspension of progressive indexing, then the program would be somewhat over financed with the specified tax rates.

On the other hand, if the program at any point would not be adequately financed with the application of provisions 1 through 3 of this plan, then provision 4 would provide a failsafe in the form of general fund transfers as needed to maintain a 100 percent TFR.

Table 1 indicates that the OASDI actuarial deficit of 1.92 percent of payroll would be eliminated under the proposal. The effect on the actuarial deficit of the provisions affecting benefits alone (provisions 1 through 3) would be an improvement (reduction) in the actuarial deficit by 1.64 percent of taxable payroll, or more than enough to eliminate the OASI program actuarial deficit of 1.60 percent of payroll projected under current law.

Table 1a provides an analysis of the general fund transfers to the trust funds under the plan, as well as projected levels of OASDI Trust Fund assets. Columns 1 through 3 provide the estimated amounts of general fund transfers to the trust funds for years 2046 through 2080, expressed in constant 2005 dollars, in present value as of January 1, 2005, and as a percentage of annual OASDI taxable payroll. The total amount of transfers in present value through 2079 (the end of the 75-year valuation period) is shown as $\$ 627$ billion at the bottom of column 1. Column 4 provides the cumulative total amount of these transfers through the end of each year (with interest), in constant 2005 dollars.

The projected OASDI Trust Fund assets under the proposal are shown in column 5 of Table 1a. For the purpose of comparison, the projected OASDI Trust Fund assets are also shown for a theoretical Social Security program with borrowing authority in two separate ways. The theoretical trust fund assets are shown without any general fund transfers in column 7. In addition, the theoretical trust fund assets are shown with the inclusion of general fund transfers for solvency under the proposal in column 8. The projected level of GDP in constant 2005 dollars is shown in column 6 as an additional point of reference.

Tables 1 b and 1bc provide estimated effects on the federal government unified budget deficit due to enacting the proposal. These estimates indicate the change from the unified budget projections that would be made under current law (under the standard budget conventions). It should be noted that these estimates are based on the Trustees assumptions and thus are not directly comparable with those made by OMB and CBO under their own assumptions. Annual unified budget cash flow would be improved for years 2012 and later due to the substantial and increasing reductions in benefit obligations under the OASDI program.. The total debt held by the public is reduced to an increasing
degree through 2080. Annual unified budget balances are also improved for all years after 2011.

Table 1c provides estimates of the annual cash flow from the trust funds to the General Fund of the Treasury. Under the proposal, the cash flow to the general fund is unchanged through 2011. After 2011, cash flow to the general fund improves to an increasing degree as the benefit reductions grow. For the period 2005 through 2079 as a whole, the net cash flow from the OASDI Trust Funds to the general fund is increased from a negative $\$ 5.7$ trillion in present value under current law modified to provide general fund transfers for solvency to negative $\$ 2.1$ trillion under the proposal.

Table 1d illustrates the effects of the components of the proposal on the annual OASDI Trust Fund levels, and on the projected unfunded obligations through each year after trust fund assets are projected to be exhausted. The estimated OASDI unfunded obligation for the long-range period of $\$ 4.0$ trillion in present value under current law is eliminated by a net reduction in benefits of $\$ 3.6$ trillion and general revenue transfers of $\$ 0.6$ trillion, in present value. The resulting positive trust fund balance at the end of 2079 is estimated at $\$ 0.2$ trillion under the proposal.

Table 2 provides the projected OASDI Trust Fund status for the plan, but excluding the transfers from the General Fund of the Treasury. Without the transfers, the OASDI Trust Fund exhaustion date would be extended from 2041 until 2056, and the actuarial deficit would be improved by 1.64 percent of taxable payroll, leaving an actuarial deficit of 0.28 percent of payroll. As stated earlier, the reduction in the actuarial deficit excluding the general fund transfers would be greater than the actuarial deficit for the OASI program alone under current law.

Table 3 provides projected OASDI Trust Fund status reflecting only provision 1, progressive indexing of the PIA formula. For this provision alone, the OASDI Trust Fund exhaustion date would be extended from 2041 until 2048, and the actuarial deficit would be improved by 1.21 percent of taxable payroll, leaving an actuarial deficit of 0.71 percent of payroll.

## Estimated Effects on Benefit Levels

Table B1 provides projected levels of retired worker benefits for retirement at age 65 for several theoretical worker examples. Benefit levels at age 65 are presented in constant 2005 dollars (discounted for CPI increase back to 2005). Theoretical workers are presented with scaled low, medium, and high career earnings levels, as well as for a career steady maximum earner (earnings at or above the OASDI taxable maximum each year). These four hypothetical workers represent about the 28, 58, 85 and 100 percentiles of the distribution of career earnings levels for recent retired workers. See Actuarial Note 2004.3 at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/NOTES/ran3/an2004-3.pdf for details on the nature of these worker examples.

Benefit levels are shown only for retired worker beneficiaries. Percentage reductions in benefits would be similar for other affected benefits. Comparison is provided to both present-law scheduled and present-law payable benefits. Comparison to present-law payable benefits is particularly appropriate for this proposal, as the means to achieving solvency for the OASDI program is almost entirely reductions in scheduled benefits.


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Table 1 - Bennett Solvency Proposal


Table 1a Proposal General Fund Transfers, OASDI Trust Fund Assets, and Theoretical OASDI Assets


Table 1b Bennett Solvency Proposal - Unified Budget Effect


Based on the Intermediate Assumptions of the 2005 Trustees Report Ultimate Real Trust Fund Interest Rate of 3.0 percent.

Office of the Chief Actuary Social Security Administration March 14, 2006

Table 1b.c Bennett Solvency Proposal - Unified Budget Effect


Table 1c OASDI Cash Flow to General Fund of the Treasury--- Proposal vs. Theoretical OASDI


| Year | Present Law OASDI <br> Trust Fund Assets or if Negative, Unfunded Obligation Through EOY | Basic Changes in OASDI <br> Cash Flow <br> (2) <br> (Billions | General Fund Transfers <br> \$, Present Value | Total Change Through EOY ${ }^{1}$ (-2005) | Proposal OASDI Trust Fund Assets/ Unfunded Obligation Through EOY $\begin{equation*} (5)=(1)+(4) \tag{3} \end{equation*}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2006 | 1,835.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,835.2 |
| 2007 | 1,917.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,917.1 |
| 2008 | 1,998.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,998.4 |
| 2009 | 2,072.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,072.5 |
| 2010 | 2,141.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,141.5 |
| 2011 | 2,204.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,204.9 |
| 2012 | 2,258.4 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 2,258.7 |
| 2013 | 2,300.8 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 1.2 | 2,301.9 |
| 2014 | 2,331.0 | 1.9 | 0.0 | 3.1 | 2,334.1 |
| 2015 | 2,349.7 | 3.4 | 0.0 | 6.5 | 2,356.2 |
| 2016 | 2,356.4 | 5.5 | 0.0 | 11.9 | 2,368.3 |
| 2017 | 2,350.7 | 7.8 | 0.0 | 19.7 | 2,370.5 |
| 2018 | 2,333.1 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 29.7 | 2,362.8 |
| 2019 | 2,303.8 | 12.2 | 0.0 | 41.8 | 2,345.7 |
| 2020 | 2,262.7 | 14.3 | 0.0 | 56.1 | 2,318.9 |
| 2021 | 2,210.4 | 16.2 | 0.0 | 72.3 | 2,282.8 |
| 2022 | 2,147.5 | 17.6 | 0.0 | 89.9 | 2,237.4 |
| 2023 | 2,074.6 | 19.0 | 0.0 | 109.0 | 2,183.5 |
| 2024 | 1,992.1 | 20.6 | 0.0 | 129.5 | 2,121.6 |
| 2025 | 1,900.6 | 22.2 | 0.0 | 151.7 | 2,052.3 |
| 2026 | 1,800.6 | 23.8 | 0.0 | 175.5 | 1,976.1 |
| 2027 | 1,693.2 | 25.5 | 0.0 | 201.1 | 1,894.2 |
| 2028 | 1,579.5 | 27.4 | 0.0 | 228.5 | 1,808.0 |
| 2029 | 1,460.7 | 29.3 | 0.0 | 257.8 | 1,718.5 |
| 2030 | 1,337.6 | 31.4 | 0.0 | 289.1 | 1,626.7 |
| 2031 | 1,210.7 | 33.7 | 0.0 | 322.8 | 1,533.5 |
| 2032 | 1,080.9 | 36.0 | 0.0 | 358.8 | 1,439.8 |
| 2033 | 949.4 | 38.3 | 0.0 | 397.1 | 1,346.5 |
| 2034 | 817.0 | 40.5 | 0.0 | 437.6 | 1,254.7 |
| 2035 | 684.5 | 42.6 | 0.0 | 480.2 | 1,164.8 |
| 2036 | 552.4 | 44.7 | 0.0 | 524.9 | 1,077.3 |
| 2037 | 421.0 | 46.7 | 0.0 | 571.7 | 992.7 |
| 2038 | 291.1 | 48.6 | 0.0 | 620.3 | 911.4 |
| 2039 | 162.9 | 50.4 | 0.0 | 670.7 | 833.5 |
| 2040 | 36.6 | 52.0 | 0.0 | 722.7 | 759.3 |
| 2041 | -87.9 | 53.6 | 0.0 | 776.3 | 688.4 |
| 2042 | -210.7 | 55.1 | 0.0 | 831.5 | 620.8 |
| 2043 | -331.6 | 56.6 | 0.0 | 888.1 | 556.5 |
| 2044 | -450.7 | 58.1 | 0.0 | 946.2 | 495.5 |
| 2045 | -568.1 | 59.5 | 0.0 | 1,005.7 | 437.6 |
| 2046 | -684.0 | 61.0 | 26.9 | 1,093.6 | 409.7 |
| 2047 | -798.4 | 62.4 | 45.0 | 1,201.1 | 402.7 |
| 2048 | -911.3 | 63.7 | 41.7 | 1,306.5 | 395.2 |
| 2049 | -1,022.9 | 65.1 | 38.5 | 1,410.1 | 387.2 |
| 2050 | -1,133.2 | 66.4 | 35.3 | 1,511.8 | 378.5 |
| 2051 | -1,242.5 | 67.7 | 32.3 | 1,611.7 | 369.2 |
| 2052 | -1,350.9 | 68.9 | 31.7 | 1,712.4 | 361.5 |
| 2053 | -1,458.4 | 70.1 | 31.2 | 1,813.7 | 355.3 |
| 2054 | -1,565.1 | 71.3 | 28.3 | 1,913.4 | 348.3 |
| 2055 | -1,671.0 | 72.4 | 25.6 | 2,011.4 | 340.3 |
| 2056 | -1,776.3 | 73.5 | 25.1 | 2,110.0 | 333.7 |
| 2057 | -1,881.0 | 74.6 | 22.5 | 2,207.0 | 326.1 |
| 2058 | -1,985.0 | 75.5 | 22.1 | 2,304.7 | 319.7 |
| 2059 | -2,088.4 | 76.4 | 21.7 | 2,402.8 | 314.5 |
| 2060 | -2,191.0 | 77.2 | 19.2 | 2,499.3 | 308.2 |
| 2061 | -2,293.1 | 77.9 | 18.9 | 2,596.1 | 303.0 |
| 2062 | -2,394.6 | 78.7 | 16.5 | 2,691.3 | 296.8 |
| 2063 | -2,495.5 | 79.3 | 16.3 | 2,786.9 | 291.4 |
| 2064 | -2,596.0 | 79.9 | 14.0 | 2,880.9 | 284.9 |
| 2065 | -2,695.9 | 80.5 | 13.8 | 2,975.1 | 279.2 |
| 2066 | -2,795.2 | 80.9 | 13.5 | 3,069.6 | 274.4 |
| 2067 | -2,893.9 | 81.4 | 11.4 | 3,162.3 | 268.5 |
| 2068 | -2,991.9 | 81.8 | 11.2 | 3,255.3 | 263.4 |
| 2069 | -3,089.3 | 82.1 | 11.0 | 3,348.4 | 259.2 |
| 2070 | -3,185.8 | 82.4 | 9.0 | 3,439.9 | 254.0 |
| 2071 | -3,281.6 | 82.5 | 7.1 | 3,529.5 | 248.0 |
| 2072 | -3,376.5 | 82.7 | 7.0 | 3,619.2 | 242.7 |
| 2073 | -3,470.6 | 82.8 | 6.9 | 3,708.9 | 238.3 |
| 2074 | -3,563.7 | 82.8 | 5.1 | 3,796.8 | 233.1 |
| 2075 | -3,656.1 | 82.9 | 5.0 | 3,884.7 | 228.6 |
| 2076 | -3,747.6 | 82.9 | 4.9 | 3,972.4 | 224.9 |
| 2077 | -3,838.2 | 82.8 | 3.2 | 4,058.5 | 220.3 |
| 2078 | -3,928.0 | 82.8 | 3.2 | 4,144.4 | 216.4 |
| 2079 | -4,017.0 | 82.7 | 1.6 | 4,228.6 | 211.6 |
| tal 2005-2079 |  | 01 | 627.0 |  |  |

Total 2005-2079

Based on the Intermediate Assumptions of the 2005 Trustees Report
Ultimate Real Trust Fund Interest Rate of 3.0 percent
${ }^{1}$ Total change through the year is the accumulation of changes in columns 2 and 3

Table 2 Bennett Solvency Proposal: Without General Fund Transfers for Solvency


Table 3 Bennett Proposal: Progressive Indexing of OASI Benefits Provision Only


Table B1. Projected Retired Worker Benefits at Age 65 under Bennett Plan for OASDI Sustainable Solvency
For retired worker retiring at age 65 in indicated years at indicated career-average earnings levels

| Year <br> Attain | Present Law Benefit |  | Proposal Benefit Percentage Reduction |  |  |  | Proposal Scheduled Benefit |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Payable | Progressive | NRA 67 | Life |  | Benefit | Percent of Pre | sent Law |
|  | Scheduled | at 65 | PIA | start | Expectancy |  | Amount | Scheduled | Payable |
| Age 65 | (constant 2005\$) |  | Indexing | $\underline{2012}$ | Indexing | Total |  | (constant 2005\$) |  |
| Scaled Low Earner |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2016 | 799 | 799 | 0.0 | 2.2 | 0.0 | 2.2 | 782 | 98 | 98 |
| 2026 | 825 | 825 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 808 | 98 | 98 |
| 2036 | 916 | 916 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 869 | 95 | 95 |
| 2046 | 1,022 | 758 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.1 | 8.1 | 940 | 92 | 124 |
| 2056 | 1,139 | 829 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.7 | 10.7 | 1,017 | 89 | 123 |
| 2075 | 1,396 | 963 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 15.0 | 15.0 | 1,186 | 85 | 123 |
| Scaled Medium Earner |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2016 | 1,318 | 1,318 | 1.3 | 2.2 | 0.0 | 3.5 | 1,272 | 97 | 97 |
| 2026 | 1,359 | 1,359 | 6.9 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 8.7 | 1,240 | 91 | 91 |
| 2036 | 1,510 | 1,510 | 12.0 | 0.0 | 5.2 | 16.6 | 1,259 | 83 | 83 |
| 2046 | 1,684 | 1,248 | 16.8 | 0.0 | 8.1 | 23.5 | 1,288 | 76 | 103 |
| 2056 | 1,877 | 1,366 | 21.0 | 0.0 | 10.7 | 29.5 | 1,324 | 71 | 97 |
| 2075 | 2,300 | 1,586 | 27.9 | 0.0 | 15.0 | 38.7 | 1,410 | 61 | 89 |
| Scaled High Earner |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2016 | 1,747 | 1,747 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 0.0 | 4.1 | 1,675 | 96 | 96 |
| 2026 | 1,802 | 1,802 | 10.3 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 12.1 | 1,584 | 88 | 88 |
| 2036 | 2,002 | 2,002 | 18.0 | 0.0 | 5.2 | 22.3 | 1,556 | 78 | 78 |
| 2046 | 2,233 | 1,655 | 25.2 | 0.0 | 8.1 | 31.2 | 1,536 | 69 | 93 |
| 2056 | 2,489 | 1,812 | 31.5 | 0.0 | 10.7 | 38.9 | 1,521 | 61 | 84 |
| 2075 | 3,049 | 2,103 | 41.8 | 0.0 | 15.0 | 50.5 | 1,508 | 49 | 72 |
| Steady Maximum Earner |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2016 | 2,118 | 2,118 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 0.0 | 4.5 | 2,023 | 96 | 96 |
| 2026 | 2,201 | 2,201 | 12.2 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 13.9 | 1,894 | 86 | 86 |
| 2036 | 2,449 | 2,449 | 21.3 | 0.0 | 5.2 | 25.4 | 1,828 | 75 | 75 |
| 2046 | 2,728 | 2,022 | 29.7 | 0.0 | 8.1 | 35.4 | 1,763 | 65 | 87 |
| 2056 | 3,037 | 2,211 | 37.2 | 0.0 | 10.7 | 44.0 | 1,702 | 56 | 77 |
| 2075 | 3,721 | 2,567 | 49.3 | 0.0 | 15.0 | 56.9 | 1,603 | 43 | 62 |

Scaled low, medium and high earners have career-average earnings levels equivalent to $\$ 16,470, \$ 36,600$, and $\$ 58,560$ in 2005. These scaled earners represent the 28,58 , and 85 percentile of newly entitled retired workers.
The steady maximum earner is assumed to have earnings at the taxable maximum (\$90,000 in 2005) starting at age 22.
All estimates based on the intermediate assumptions of the 2005 Trustees Report.

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[^0]:    Office of the Chief Actuary
    Social Security Administration
    March 14, 2006

