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> EA-98-325
EA-98-325 - Millstone 1, 2, & 3 (Northeast
Nuclear Energy Company)
April 6, 1999
EA 98-325
Mr. Bruce Kenyon
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
Post Office Box 128
Waterford, Connecticut 06385
SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION
(Office
of Investigations Reports 1-96-002, 1-96-007, and 1-97-007)
Dear Mr. Kenyon
This refers to the subject investigations conducted by the NRC Office
of Investigations (OI) at Northeast Nuclear Energy Company's (Northeast
or Licensee) Millstone Station and to the Report of Review conducted by
the Millstone Independent Review Team which was recently appointed and
directed by the Commission to independently review and make recommendations
on these OI cases. The referenced OI investigations were initiated in
1996 and 1997 to investigate allegations that various employees and supervisors
at Millstone Station had been subject to retaliation for engaging in protected
activities. Following the issuance of the OI reports and an "Event Inquiry"
by the NRC Office of Inspector General, the Commission appointed a Millstone
Independent Review Team (Independent Review Team) to conduct an independent
review of, and make recommendations on, the OI investigations. The Independent
Review Team completed its assessment work and provided its report and
recommendations to the Commission on March 12, 1999.
The Commission has concluded that discrimination occurred based on the
results of the investigations in OI Case No.1-96-002 involving two supervisors
demoted as a result of a 1993 reorganization and in OI Case No.1-97-007
involving a supervisor who was terminated in 1995. A Notice of Violation
(Notice) for the violations associated with these investigations is provided
in Enclosure 1. The specific violations contained in this Notice are discussed
below. As to OI Case No.1-96-007 involving three employees terminated
as a result of a 1996 workforce reduction program, the NRC has determined
that insufficient evidence was found to conclude that discrimination occurred.
OI Case No.1-96-002
With regard to OI Case No.1-96-002, the Independent Review Team found
that protected activities were contributing factors in the demotion and
removal from supervisory activities of a Supervisor in the Performance
Engineering group and a Supervisor in the Engineering Mechanics group
in a reorganization of Millstone's nuclear engineering functions in November
1993. A summary of the NRC's conclusions in OI Case No.1-96-002 is provided
in Enclosure 2.
1. Supervisor in the Performance Engineering group -- The Supervisor
in the Performance Engineering group engaged in protected activities with
regard to CU-29 check valve operability issues and his active support
of another Millstone employee who had raised safety concerns about spent
fuel off-loading practices at Millstone. The investigatory record produced
in OI Case No. 1-96-002 and the Independent Review Team's detailed review
led the Commission to the conclusion that the Performance Engineering
group Supervisor's protected activities were a contributing factor in
his demotion and that the demotion was, thus, discrimination which is
prohibited by 10 CFR 50.7. This violation is item A. in the enclosed Notice.
2. Supervisor in the Engineering Mechanics group - The Supervisor
in the Engineering Mechanics group engaged in protected activities with
regard to the safety-related motor-operated valve program, turbine-building
secondary closed cooling water (TBSCCW) heat exchanger issues, and reactor
coolant pump maintenance problems at Millstone. The investigatory record
produced in OI Case No. 1-96-002 and the Independent Review Team's detailed
review led the Commission to the conclusion that the Engineering Mechanics
group Supervisor's protected activities were a contributing factor in
removing from his responsibility the motor operated valve program and
the TBSCCW heat exchanger issue, and in his demotion and thus, the removal
of responsibilities and the demotion were discrimination which is prohibited
by 10 CFR 50.7. This violation is described as item B. in the enclosed
Notice.
OI Case No. 1-97-007
With regard to OI Case No. 1-97-007, the Independent Review Team found
that protected activity was a contributing factor in the dismissal of
a Supervisor, Electrical Engineering, in the Engineering Services Department
at Millstone Unit 2 in August 1995. A summary of the NRC's conclusions
in OI Case No. 1-97-007 is provided in Enclosure 3.(1)
The Supervisor, Electrical Engineering, in the Engineering Services Department
engaged in protected activities when he reported to higher-level management
and the Millstone Nuclear Safety Concerns Program that his immediate superior
- the Manager of Nuclear Design Engineering - had threatened him and another
employee with dismissal if work on an Engineered Safeguards Actuation
System modification to which his electrical engineering group had been
assigned was not completed before the scheduled conclusion of a Millstone
Unit 2 refueling outage. The investigatory record produced in OI Case
No. 1-97-007 and the Independent Review Team's detailed review lead the
Commission to the conclusion that the Electrical Engineering Supervisor's
protected activity was a contributing factor in his dismissal and that
the dismissal was, thus, discrimination which is prohibited by 10 CFR
50.7. This violation is item C. in the enclosed Notice.
The three violations described in the enclosed Notice involved actions
by plant management. Violation A. involves actions by a former Millstone
Vice President for Nuclear Engineering Services. Violation B. involves
actions by the former Millstone Vice President for Nuclear Engineering
Services and two former Directors of the Engineering Department. Violation
C. involves actions by a former Director of Nuclear Engineering and a
former Manager of Nuclear Design Engineering. The Commission considers
such violations to be of very significant regulatory concern. Retaliatory
personnel actions are very serious matters and will not be tolerated by
the NRC. Accordingly, the three violations have each been evaluated as
a Severity Level II violation in accordance with Supplement VII, B.4 of
the General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions,
NUREG-1600, Rev.1, 63 FR 26630, 26652 (May 13, 1998).
Under the NRC's Enforcement Policy, a civil penalty is normally considered
for Severity Level II violations. However, the NRC recognizes that subsequent
to the actions that are the subject of these violations, the NRC issued
an Order Requiring Independent Third Party Oversight of Northeast Nuclear
Energy Company's Implementation of Resolution of Millstone Station Employees'
Safety Concerns (October 24, 1996). The Order mandated independent oversight
and substantial corrective action with regard to employee concerns, past
discrimination and a safety conscious work environment at the Millstone
site. In response to that Order, the licensee retained an independent
consultant approved by the NRC to review and assess the Millstone Station
employee safety concerns problems and to oversee the licensee's resolution
of those problems. In January 1999, the Commission held a public meeting
to assess the results of the Licensee's work under the October 1996 Order.
Following that meeting, the Commission determined that the Licensee had
made progress in addressing the problems that prompted the Order sufficient
to warrant closing of the Order. In recognition of the fact that the Licensee
has taken substantial actions to address and correct the general and widespread
employee concerns and discrimination problems that existed at the time
of the violations discussed herein, the Commission has authorized the
staff to exercise discretion pursuant to the Special Circumstances provisions
of Section VII.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy and to refrain from issuing
a civil penalty in this case. But for those broad corrective actions,
a substantial civil penalty would have been issued.
Nevertheless, given the high level of the management involved in these
violations, the Commission has directed the issuance of the above described
Notice of Violation for the three violations of 10 CFR 50.7. The issuance
of the Notice is intended to make clear that there must not be a repetition
of discrimination on the part of Northeast and its managers. In that regard,
your efforts to maintain a safety-conscious work environment must continue.
The need for such action is reinforced by the relatively recent discrimination
matter in 1997 that was the subject of the March 9, 1999 civil penalty
action ( EA 97-46).
Although the NRC has information on your general corrective actions with
regard to your overall employee concerns and discrimination problems,
it does not have information on specific corrective actions taken or planned
with regard to the specific violations discussed herein. Consequently,
you are required to respond to this letter and the enclosed Notice within
30 days of the date of this letter. You should follow the instructions
specified in the enclosed Notice in preparing your response. In your response,
you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions
you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this
notice, the NRC will determine whether further NRC action is necessary
to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.
A copy of the Independent Review Team's report with Attachment 5, and
a March 31, 1999, memorandum of clarification from the Review Team is
provided in Enclosure 4.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790, a copy of this letter and your response
will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
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Sincerely,
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/signed/
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Hubert J. Miller
Regional Administrator |
Docket Nos. 50-245; 50-336; 50-423
License Nos. DPR-21; DPR-65; NPF-49
Enclosures:
(1) Notice of Violation
(2) SUMMARY - OI CASE NO. 1-96-002
(3) SUMMARY - OI CASE NO. 1-97-007
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ENCLOSURE 1
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NOTICE OF VIOLATION
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Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
Millstone Units 1,2,3 |
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Docket Nos. 50-245; 50-336; 50-423
License Nos. DPR-21; DPR-65; NPF-49
EA 98-325
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During NRC investigations conducted by the NRC Office of Investigations
(OI) in OI Case Nos. 1-96-002 and 1-97-007, violations of NRC requirements
were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and
Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, Rev. 1, the violations
are listed below:
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10 CFR 50.7 prohibits, in part, discrimination by a
Commission licensee against an employee for engaging in certain protected
activities. Discrimination includes discharge, demotion or other actions
relating to the compensation, terms, conditions and privileges of
employment. Protected activities are described in Section 211 of the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and in general are
related to the administration or enforcement of a requirement imposed
under the Atomic Energy Act or the Energy Reorganization Act. Protected
activities include, but are not limited to, reporting of safety concerns
by an employee to his employer.
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A. |
Contrary to the above the Licensee discriminated against a Supervisor
in the Performance Engineering group at the Millstone station due
to his involvement in protected activities. Specifically, in November
1993, the Licensee's Vice President for Nuclear Engineering Services
removed from supervisory activities and demoted the Supervisor in
the Performance Engineering group, at least in part, because the Supervisor
had raised concerns about CU-29 check valve operability and had actively
supported another Millstone employee who had raised safety concerns
about spent fuel off-loading practices at Millstone.
This is a Severity Level II violation (Supplement VII). (01012)
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B. |
Contrary to the above the Licensee discriminated against a Supervisor
in the Engineering Mechanics group at the Millstone Station due to
his involvement in protected activities. Specifically, the Director
of the Engineering Department removed the responsibility of the Supervisor
in the Engineering Mechanics group for the motor operated valve program
in 1991 and the turbine-building secondary closed cooling water (TBSCCW)
heat exchanger issues in 1992, and in November 1993, the Licensee's
Vice President for Nuclear Engineering Services, supported by the
then Director of the Engineering Department, removed from supervisory
activities and demoted the Supervisor in the Engineering Mechanics
group, at least in part, because the Supervisor had raised concerns
about the safety-related motor-operated valve program, TBSCCW heat
exchanger issues and reactor coolant pump maintenance matters. (02012)
This is a Severity Level II violation (Supplement VII).
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C. |
Contrary to the above the Licensee discriminated against a Supervisor
in the Engineering Services Department at the Millstone Station due
to his involvement in protected activities. Specifically, in August
1995, the Licensee's Director of Nuclear Engineering and the Manager
of Nuclear Design Engineering recommended and obtained the dismissal
of the Supervisor in the Engineering Services Department, at least
in part, because the Supervisor had reported to higher management
and the Millstone Safety Concerns Program threats and concerns about
the timing of completion of modifications to the Engineered Safeguards
Actuation System. (03012)
This is a Severity Level II violation (Supplement VII).
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Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Northeast Nuclear Energy
Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation
to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,
Washington, DC 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region
I and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the
subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting
this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked
as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation:
(1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing
the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been
taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be
taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance
will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed
correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required
response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified
in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as
to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why
such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause
is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy
of your response, with the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office
of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001.
Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR),
to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary,
or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without
redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary
to provide an acceptable response, please provide a bracketed copy of
your response that identifies the information that should be protected
and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If
you request withholding of such material, you must specifically
identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld
and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain
why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b)
to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial
information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable
response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
Dated this _6th_ day of April, 1999.
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ENCLOSURE 2
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SUMMARY - OI CASE NO. 1-96-002
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OI Case No. 1-96-002 involves two Northeast Utilities
(NU) supervisors -- a Supervisor in the Performance Engineering group
and a Supervisor in the Engineering Mechanics group -- who were demoted
in the course of a reorganization of NU's nuclear engineering functions
at the Millstone facility in November 1993.
Prior to the demotions to the positions of senior engineer and principal
engineer respectively, each of the former supervisors engaged in a variety
of protected activities. In particular, the Supervisor in the Performance
Engineering group engaged in protected activities with regard to CU-29
check valve operability issues and active support for another employee
who had raised safety concerns about spent fuel off-loading practices
at Millstone. Similarly, the Supervisor in the Engineering Mechanics group
engaged in protected activities with regard to the safety-related motor-operated
valve (MOVs) program, turbine-building secondary closed cooling water
heat exchanger issues, and reactor coolant pump maintenance problems at
Millstone. The OI investigative record establishes that the cognizant
managers of the former supervisors were aware of the former supervisors'
protected activities.
Following the announcement of the reorganization of NU's nuclear engineering
functions, NU's Vice President for Nuclear Engineering Services, with
input from, among others, the Director of the Engineering Department,
directed the implementation of a number of personnel actions to effect
the reorganization, including the demotion and removal from supervisory
responsibilities of the Supervisor in the Performance Engineering group
and the Supervisor in the Engineering Mechanics group. Previously, a former
Director of the Engineering Department removed the responsibility for
the motor operated valve program and turbine-building secondary closed
cooling water heat exchanger issues from the Supervisor in the Engineering
Mechanics group.
In concluding that discrimination occurred with regard to the Supervisor
in the Performance Engineering group, NRC's considerations included: 1)
the reasons for the demotion appear to be pretextual given his previous
high performance ratings in the areas that NU claimed it sought in a supervisor
such as customer orientation, interpersonal skills, and teamwork; 2) the
person selected to replace him had limited prior experience as a supervisor
and was the only new supervisor not interviewed by NU's outside personnel
consultant; and 3) he was denied a spot recognition award that had been
recommended because the Vice President for Nuclear Engineering Services
thought that the Supervisor would not appreciate the award.
In concluding that discrimination occurred with regard to the Supervisor
in the Engineering Mechanics group, NRC's considerations included: 1)
he had his responsibility for substantive activities removed after expressing
views which were contrary to other managers; 2) the reasons for the demotion
appear to be pretextual given his previous high performance ratings in
the areas that NU claimed it sought in a supervisor such as customer orientation,
interpersonal skills, and teamwork and his experience at the Millstone
site; 3) his second level supervisor was visibly upset, about a month
before the demotion, with a memorandum that the Engineering Mechanics
group Supervisor had written questioning how a heat exchanger issue had
been handled; and 4) he had raised questions about how the Motor Operated
Valve program was being handled shortly before the demotion decision.
Overall both of these Supervisors were strong technical performers with
good performance appraisals who had raised substantive issues in opposition
to management's positions. The "chilled" environment at the Millstone
site during this time period and the subjective nature of the selection
process were also considered.
In sum, the OI investigative record establishes that the Supervisors'
participation in protected activities were contributing factors in their
demotion and removal from supervisory positions and in the removal of
substantive responsibilities from the Supervisor in the Engineering Mechanics
group.
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ENCLOSURE 3
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SUMMARY - OI CASE NO. 1-97-007
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OI Case No. 1-97-007 involves a Supervisor, Electrical Engineering, in
the Engineering Services Department at Millstone Unit 2 whose employment
was terminated in August 1995. The assigned justification for the Supervisor's
termination was that his performance as a supervisor was unsatisfactory
and, under a newly-formulated accountability policy, dismissal rather
than demotion was warranted.
Prior to his dismissal, the supervisor engaged in protected activities
when he reported in November 1994, to higher-level management and the
Millstone Nuclear Safety Concerns Program that his immediate superior
-- the Manager of Nuclear Design Engineering -- had threatened him and
another employee with dismissal if work on an Engineered Safeguards Actuation
System modification to which his electrical engineering group had been
assigned were not completed before the scheduled conclusion of the 1994
Millstone Unit 2 refueling outage. The OI investigative record establishes
that the cognizant managers of the supervisor, including his immediate
superior who made the threat, were aware of the supervisor's protected
activity.
Following the supervisor's protected activity, his performance assessment
for the first time, since becoming a supervisor in the early 1980s, indicated
he needed improvement in monitoring and controlling work progress. In
addition, the supervisor was held accountable for the failures of a senior
engineer, who was acting for him, during a July 1995 Anticipated Transient
Without Scram (ATWS) testing problem occurring while the supervisor was
on leave. Even though the Manager of Nuclear Design Engineering had approved
the selection of the senior engineer in the acting position and this engineer
was thereafter assigned supervisory responsibilities, the Director of
Nuclear Engineering, with input from the Manager of Nuclear Design Engineering,
recommended that the supervisor be dismissed because of the July 1995
issue. By letter dated August 2, 1995, the supervisor was informed that,
as of that date, his employment with Northeast Utilities was being terminated
"due to performance deficiencies and poor supervisory judgement" (which
were not specified or otherwise documented). (The supervisor termination
was reversed by an internal Northeast grievance committee on the basis
that the termination was not in accordance with Northeast's policies because
the supervisor was not given an opportunity to improve his performance.)
In sum, the OI investigative record establishes that the supervisor's
participation in protected activities was a contributing factor in his
dismissal.
1. Northeast was previously informed in a letter
from W.D. Lanning, NRC, to Mr. M.L. Bowling, dated August 26, 1998, that
NRC staff had concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to conclude
that discrimination had occurred in this case. The Commission has reopened
this case and, after reevaluation, has concluded, as noted above, that
discrimination occurred.
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