### April 2, 2002

- MEMORANDUM TO: Richard P. Correia, Chief, Section 2 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management, NRR
- FROM: Kahtan N. Jabbour, Sr. Project Manager, Section 2/**RA**/ Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management, NRR
- SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY REGARDING THE INSPECTION OF THE REACTOR VESSEL HEAD AT TURKEY POINT PLANT, UNIT 4

On March 22, 2002, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff held a telephone conference call with the staff of Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) to discuss the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head inspection planned during the forthcoming refueling outage at Turkey Point Unit 4. The unit was shut down on March 23, 2002, a few days after Bulletin 2002-01, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity," was issued. The participants in the telecon are listed in the enclosure.

A summary of the call and the licensee's plans are provided below:

Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 are classified as moderate susceptibility plants per the guidance of EPRI MRP-44, Part 2, and NRC Inspection Manual TI 2515/145, Appendix A. The licensee's inspection plan will cover the two areas of concern: (1) the top of the vessel head, and (2) the penetrations at the top of the vessel head.

The licensee will perform a 100 percent bare metal inspection and will clean the head of any boric acid deposits found during the inspection. The inspection will be a qualified visual examination (as defined in NRC Bulletin 2001-01).

The licensee is not expecting to find any boric acid deposits on the vessel head because they previously had been inspecting for leaks and repairing them. In 1987, there was a conoseal leak at Unit 4; and in 2001, there was a mechanical seal leak of the control rod drive mechanism housing vent .

In response to an NRC staff comment regarding the recently discovered RPV head degradation found at Davis Besse, the licensee's staff stated that, at that time, they did not have detailed information about Davis Besse's situation. Also, the degradation rates at Davis Besse have not yet been determined.

### R. Correia

The licensee's staff stated that they are using the guidance in NUREG/CR 6245, "Assessment of Pressurized Water Reactor Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle Cracking," published October 1994.

In addition, the NRC staff stated that the susceptibility ranking developed by the industry to address vessel head penetration cracking (as discussed in NRC Bulletin 2001-01) only involved susceptibility to the development of circumferential cracks. The NRC staff indicated that the findings at Davis Besse (as discussed in NRC Bulletin 2002-01) may be the result of an axial through-wall crack in a nozzle and that information related to the rate of degradation (i.e., formation of the cavity) was still under investigation. The NRC staff raised these issues to make sure the licensee had considered them in their inspection plans because a visual inspection will only indicate whether a nozzle has a through-wall flaw and does not provide information on whether a nozzle has a near through-wall flaw.

At the end of the conference call, the NRC staff stated that this telecon will be summarized, and the summary will be placed in the docket file and on the web.

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**Enclosure: Telecon Participants** 

R. Correia

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/RA byK.Jabbour/

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\* See previous concurrence

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### Participants in the Telephone Conference Call

#### Between NRC and FPL

# Reactor Vessel Head Inspection

## Turkey Point Unit 4

## March 22, 2002

NRC staff

FPL/Turkey Point:

Kahtan Jabbour Allen Hiser Steven Bloom Kenneth Karwoski Rogerio Reyes Andy Zielonka Craig Mowrey Olga Hanek John Manso

# FPL/Juno Beach:

Steve Collard Scott Boggs