July 11, 2002

MEMORANDUM TO:	Jacob I. Zimmerman, Acting Chief, Section 2 Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatio	
FROM:	Victor Nerses, Sr. Project Manager, Section 2 Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation	/RA/
SUBJECT:	MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 3 OF JUNE 26, 2002, CONFERENCE CALL REGARDI RESPONSE TO NRC BULLETIN 2002-01 (TAC NO.	(MP3), SUMMARY NG THE MB4556)

On June 26, 2002, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff conducted a conference call with Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) representatives to discuss their 15-day response dated April 2, 2002, to NRC Bulletin 2002-01, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity," for MP3. Attachment 1 is a summary of the discussion regarding the DNC response and the list of participants.

Based on the discussion, DNC will provide additional information by submitting a supplemental response within 30 days.

Docket No. 50-423

Attachment: As stated

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FROM:	Victor Nerses, Sr. Project Manager, Section 2 Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation	/RA/
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## NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF CONFERENCE CALL

## WITH DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC (DNC)

## JUNE 26, 2002

<u>NRC/NRR</u>					
S.	Bloom				
Α.	Lee				
V.	Nerses				

<u>DNC</u> R. Joshi H. Beman M. Stark R. Schonberg

DNC's 15-day response to Bulletin 2002-01 stated that Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 (MP3) had one leak that could have resulted in boric acid reaching the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head. DNC was requested to discuss whether or not there was any evidence that the boric acid did, in fact, reach the RPV head. Also, DNC was requested to discuss the magnitude of the leak and the amount of boric acid deposits that were found on the insulation.

DNC stated that in the early 1990s a conoseal weld developed a minor boric acid leak. The leak was detected on-line and was cleaned and clamped during the next refueling outage. DNC stated that the records did not indicate whether there was any evidence that the boric acid did, in fact, reach the RPV head nor did they indicate the magnitude of the leak and the amount of boric acid deposits. However, individuals that were involved in the discovery of the leak described the leakage as very small.

DNC was requested to clarify whether or not the bare metal visual inspection for MP3 will include 100% of the vessel head penetrations (and the corresponding surface area of the RPV head).

DNC stated that their intention is to do 100% visual inspection using a "remote crawler" and to do a boroscope for penetrations on the perimeter of the RPV head, and any inaccessible areas.