

1 [Slide.]

2 I am going to put some overheads up but I think I  
3 will probably save you three minutes of time because,  
4 kindly, most of the presenters earlier did talk about the  
5 GeneLabs blot and I think the blot has been used, certainly,  
6 in other parts of the world as well as in the U.S. So I am  
7 not going to go into detail on the performance of the  
8 product but just give you an overview of some of the issues  
9 that we have faced.

10 [Slide.]

11 Just to reiterate, the product is available in the  
12 United States for research use only. The labeling has been  
13 approved both by CDRH and CBER as a research-use-only  
14 product and is offered as such. We do sell this product, as  
15 Dr. Busch pointed out, widely throughout Europe. It is  
16 approved by the French Agence de Medicament as well as the  
17 Portuguese Inframed. We sell the product additionally in  
18 Latin America and it is registered in various parts of Asia  
19 as well.

20 [Slide.]

21 We have faced two major issues hindering the  
22 submission of a license application. Both of these were  
23 pointed out earlier so I will just go briefly through. We  
24 certainly value the importance of having a research-use-only  
25 product used the way it is designated to be used.

1           One of the problems we had in 1997 when the  
2 product was first held and relabeled is the length of time it  
3 took to go through that process. There was a disconnect, we  
4 felt, between CBER and the local compliance office. It  
5 actually took six months to go through the relabeling effort  
6 and cost us significantly both in the relabeling process and  
7 in the loss of revenues. So that was an issue that we  
8 worked through but that did cause a significant delay for  
9 us.

10           [Slide.]

11           And then, as already pointed out, the economic  
12 feasibility is questionable. I was very pleased to hear the  
13 presentations just now by Susan and Patricia and I am sure  
14 you will be hearing from us next week. But, because of the  
15 population, and going through internally the development  
16 costs that would be needed to meet the current regulatory  
17 criteria, the potential revenue just doesn't justify the  
18 expense.

19           [Slide.]

20           We have considered options internally. Some of  
21 these were just mentioned. The orphan products grants I  
22 think is something we do want to pursue at this point.  
23 Individual investigator INDs have been discussed but we  
24 haven't taken any of these to the agency as of yet.

25           [Slide.]

1           Then, last, again as has been discussed earlier  
2 today, we would like to have assistance. We do realize and  
3 we believe that there is diagnostic significance and benefit  
4 to both the laboratory and the patient in having  
5 supplemental tests approved. So we would like to see more  
6 public awareness or contribution and commitment towards some  
7 of these additional sources of funding.

8           Thank you.

9           DR. HOLLINGER: Thank you, Birgit.

10           The next speaker was to be Dr. Bentley Moyer, but  
11 I think Dr. William Andrews is going to speak in his behalf  
12 for Chiron.

13           DR. ANDREWS: Hi. My name is Dr. Bill Andrews and  
14 I am currently a development scientist in the Blood Testing  
15 Division at Chiron Corporation. I would to thank the  
16 committee for the opportunity to provide a statement  
17 regarding the availability of the supplemental tests for the  
18 detection of anti-HTLV I, II.

19           Several years ago, Chiron Corporation, through its  
20 joint business with Ortho Clinical Diagnostics, began  
21 development of the supplemental test for the detection of  
22 anti-HTLV I, II. This test, which is based upon Chiron's  
23 RIBA strip immunoblot assay technology utilizes both  
24 recombinant antigens and synthetic peptides encoded by the  
25 specific strains of HTLV I and HTLV viruses.

1           Our early development data indicated that the  
2 performance of the tests could provide accurate and  
3 meaningful results to blood bankers and clinicians in the  
4 counseling of donors and patients who are repeatedly  
5 reactive by an anti-HTLV I, II screening test. However,  
6 further development of this RIBA EIA test for HTLV I, II as  
7 well as an automated system for completing RIBA SIA tests  
8 was halted due to our limited resources and the concurrent  
9 need to complete development and bring to market our  
10 supplemental test to serve a greater public-health need,  
11 that is HCV.

12           While it is now possible to turn our attention to  
13 developing new products that fulfill other public-health  
14 concerns, we are obligated as a business to understand both  
15 the scientific and economic feasibility of fully developing  
16 a product which meets the requirements of the healthcare  
17 community and the FDA.

18           With respect to our anti-HTLV I, II supplemental  
19 tests in development, a recent collaborative study with Dr.  
20 Michael Busch of the Blood Centers of the Pacific and Dr.  
21 Sue Stramer of the American Red Cross has indicated that the  
22 specificity of the test is a significant improvement over a  
23 current means of supplemental testing such as secondary EIA,  
24 IFA or research western blots.

25           Even so, we believe that further development of

1 the test may be required to fully meet the needs of the  
2 blood banking and healthcare communities. Our difficulty  
3 has been to further justify any continuing product  
4 development or licensing efforts through the allocation of  
5 resources given two very significant factors.

6 First, the anticipated need for such a product in  
7 terms of numbers of tests required per year at an expected  
8 cost per test is such that our costs for product develop in  
9 clinical study would not likely be fully recouped within a  
10 reasonable time period.

11 Associated with this is the lengthy and arduous  
12 regulatory approval process. While we believe that the  
13 regulatory requirements, themselves, are, in principle,  
14 appropriate for blood-screening products, the reality of  
15 this process is such that it adds a significant additional  
16 cost to the development of the product.

17 Unfortunately, the combination of a low  
18 anticipated market need and a lengthy regulatory approval  
19 process has put Chiron in the position of making a difficult  
20 decision moving forward. As it stands today, the Chiron  
21 Ortho joint business is capable of fulfilling this public-  
22 health need.

23 However, the above-mentioned factors effectively  
24 preclude us from moving forward into an environment of both  
25 greater public health and business needs. In spite of this,

1 Chiron would be willing to have further discussions with the  
2 FDA in order to understand and further evaluate any creative  
3 pathways for streamlining the regulatory approval process.

4           Furthermore, in consideration of the circumstances  
5 surrounding the need for supplemental anti-HTLV I, II tests,  
6 we believe that it would be important for some federal  
7 funding to be made available to help offset the costs of  
8 product development and clinical study similar to what has  
9 been done with the development of nucleic-acid tests for  
10 blood screening through the grants from the National Heart,  
11 Lung and Blood Institute.

12           Assuming that a suitable product could be made  
13 available, Chiron believes that it would also be appropriate  
14 to grant some extent of market exclusivity following FDA  
15 approval of the supplemental anti-HTLV I, II product through  
16 a program such as or similar to the Orphan Drug Act.

17           Through these mechanisms, we believe that there  
18 may be a sufficient incentive for potential manufacturers to  
19 pursue the complete development and FDA approval of a  
20 supplemental anti-HTLV I, II test and, thus, fulfil the  
21 identified public-health need.

22           Thank you.

23           DR. HOLLINGER: Thank you.

24           The next speaker is Dr. Tony DeMarco from Abbott  
25 Laboratories.

1 DR. DEMARCO: Good afternoon. I am going to  
2 actually talk about more of a follow up to Dr. Sue Stramer's  
3 presentation on the dual EIA algorithm.

4 [Slide.]

5 Consistent with the two EIA testing algorithm  
6 presented by Dr. Stramer, we would like to present data  
7 obtained using the two-test algorithm that utilizes the  
8 Abbott PRISM HTLV I, HTLV II test following its approval in  
9 the United States and the currently licensed HTLV I, HTLV II  
10 EIA.

11 [Slide.]

12 A description of these two tests is shown on this  
13 slide. The Abbott PRISM HTLV I, HTLV II test is a viral-  
14 lysate-based direct chemiluminescent immunoassay with a  
15 repeat-reactive rate from U.S. clinical trials of  
16 0.07 percent. The Abbott HTLV I, HTLV II EIA is an indirect  
17 enzyme immunoassay with a repeat-reactive rate of  
18 0.16 percent from reporting sites in the United States, year  
19 to date 1999.

20 We believe that these tests fulfil the criteria  
21 established for different tests as defined in the recent FDA  
22 guidance document for HTLV testing.

23 [Slide.]

24 The evaluation of this two-test algorithm is  
25 performed by testing approximately 2200 random donor blood

1 specimens at four geographically distinct testing sites  
2 around the United States and one site in Canada. Specimens  
3 that were repeat-reactive by the PRISM HTLV I, II test were  
4 tested by the Abbott HTLV I, II EIA and, according to the  
5 algorithm, concordant reactive specimens were evaluated by  
6 western blot.

7           The results of the testing algorithm are shown on  
8 the next slide.

9           [Slide.]

10           In this evaluation, there were sixteen specimens  
11 or 0.07 percent of the total number of donors tested that  
12 were repeatedly reactive by the Abbott PRISM HTLV I assay.  
13 Twelve of those specimens were nonreactive in the HTLV I EIA  
14 test and no further testing would be required according to  
15 the algorithm.

16           Four of the specimens, or 25 percent, or  
17 0.02 percent of the overall number, were repeat-reactive by  
18 the Abbott HTLV I EIA and those went on for further western  
19 blot testing. Two of those were negative and two were  
20 indeterminate.

21           Although the data are not shown here, the reverse  
22 algorithm was also evaluated where we tested the same set of  
23 specimens by the EIA first followed by the PRISM HTLV test.  
24 In that case, all of the discordant specimens--that is, the  
25 specimens that were repeat-reactive on either of the tests



1 were evaluated by western blot and by the RIPA. None of  
2 those samples were found to be positive.

3           Because there were no true positive specimens  
4 among this set of donors, we evaluated a large set of  
5 previously identified positive specimens using this  
6 algorithm.

7           [Slide.]

8           In this study, we took 601 specimens that were  
9 identified previously to be positive for HTLV I or HTLV II.  
10 It was actually approximately an even mix of the two types.  
11 100 percent of the specimens were repeat-reactive by the  
12 PRISM test and by the EIA test. Of course, all were  
13 positive upon western blot testing.

14           [Slide.]

15           In summary, the PRISM HTLV I, HTLV II test shows  
16 high specificity at 99.93 percent. When used in conjunction  
17 with the Abbott HTLV I, HTLV II EIA as a second screening  
18 test, only 0.02 percent of donor specimens would require  
19 testing by western blot.

20           This dual-test strategy, employing the PRISM and  
21 the EIA test, will reduce the overall number of samples  
22 requiring western blot, thereby reducing the number of  
23 samples with indeterminate results.

24           So, in conclusion, the data are similar to those  
25 presented by Dr. Stramer except that the number of specimens

1 requiring supplemental testing is expected to be lower with  
2 the introduction of the PRISM HTLV test.

3 Thank you.

4 DR. HOLLINGER: Thank you.

5 The final person who asked to speak today is Dr.  
6 Busch who is going to talk from the AABB viewpoint.

7 DR. BUSCH: Let me just go to the bottom line  
8 here. I think you were all distributed the statement which  
9 basically Steve Kleinman developed and walks through all the  
10 issues we have heard today.

11 Just to go to kind of the bottom line, I think the  
12 unavailability of appropriate confirmatory tests has not only  
13 precluded appropriate donor notification but it has also  
14 hindered epidemiologic surveillance of HTLV in the donor  
15 base. The AABB encourages FDA to consider the following  
16 options.

17 First, to encourage manufacturers to improve the  
18 specificity of FDA-licensed screening tests. The downside  
19 of that, as you have just heard, is these alternative EIA  
20 strategies and better specific tests leads to an even  
21 smaller market for the supplementals, so it is even more  
22 problematic issue around bringing the confirmatory tests  
23 forward; license screening tests that improve specificity as  
24 compared to those available today; encourage manufacturers  
25 to develop supplemental test strategies such as those used

1 in their clinical trials for FDA approval; continue to allow  
2 the use of alternative supplemental testing strategies such  
3 as the dual EIA testing algorithm; and provide regulatory  
4 pathways that both encourage manufacturers to develop  
5 supplemental-test kits for use under IND and then provide  
6 streamlined mechanisms for their widespread availability to  
7 the marketplace.

8 This must include simplified approaches to  
9 clinical trials, systems validation and FDA licensure  
10 mechanisms. If FDA considers that issues of donor reentry  
11 or consignee notification would interfere with the  
12 development of a streamlined approval mechanism, then we  
13 recommend that FDA consider using such mechanisms to approve  
14 the use of supplemental-test results for donor counseling  
15 and not for regulated manufacturing function.

16 DR. HOLLINGER: Thank you, Michael.

17 **Committee Discussion**

18 DR. HOLLINGER: I am going to open this up for  
19 committee discussion at this time. I am going to close the  
20 public hearing. Any discussion from the committee? Any  
21 issues.

22 I have some difficulties with these assays. What  
23 is often done is an EIA or a regular test is done. You get  
24 some repeat-reactives. Then, the non-reactives, you sort of  
25 ignore as if the gold standard has been the EIA test. Then

1 you go down this group over here and you find that some are  
2 positive and some are negative, and so on.

3           Really, I guess if you are setting something up  
4 like this, you would want all positive western blot. If you  
5 say the western blot or RIBA or whatever the assay is, any  
6 of the strip assays and so on, if they are the gold standard  
7 of what is a true positive assay, you would think that you  
8 would start with those and then go and look and see how the  
9 regular tests come out, because this idea, often, of using a  
10 couple of different EIA tests saying, "Well, one is good and  
11 the other one is maybe not so good. Which one are we going  
12 to count on? Which one is going to be our gold standard?"

13           Can somebody go over this with me, help me to  
14 understand this a little bit?

15           DR. BUSCH: I think you are referring mostly to  
16 this concept of trying to use an alternative EIA strategy.  
17 Indeed, I think Sue Stramer remarked on that with first  
18 showing that the two EIAs seemed to be head-to-head  
19 sensitivewise. So if you took two positives that were kind  
20 of borderline reactive on your screening test and then you  
21 tested them with the alternative licensed HTLV test, they  
22 were reactive on that test, too.

23           But then she actually started to use it and, in  
24 fact, was uncomfortable doing further testing on the  
25 discordant EIA nonreactives out of concern that if some of

1 those were found to be positive, and suspect that many of  
2 them might be false positive because of the supplemental  
3 test, that it would be a regulatory problem.

4           So it is for that reason that the study should  
5 describe we actually did, as an unlinked study, and we did  
6 take on to confirmatory testing both the RIBA and the  
7 western blots, even the samples that were alternative EIA  
8 nonreactive to ask that question of was this alternative EIA  
9 actually missing some true infections.

10           What we found was a handful of false positives on  
11 some of these supplemental tests but we further took them on  
12 to IFA and RIPA and the new GeneLabs antigen and showed that  
13 they were false positives. So those are the kinds of  
14 studies that do need to be done but they have to be done  
15 with caution because there are regulatory implications in  
16 the donor setting.

17           But I am convinced, at this point, that the  
18 alternative EIA strategies are sensitive meaning that the  
19 true infections are being sorted into the dual reactive  
20 group. In the donor setting, only about 20 percent of those  
21 dual reactives are real. And that is why we need, beyond  
22 that, a supplemental--

23           DR. HOLLINGER: I guess that is what I wanted  
24 somebody to--I guess, again, maybe, Sue, you can straighten  
25 it out for me again. Let's just take the two that are

1 positive, the ones that are concordant, and what their  
2 response is on the strip assays and so on and then the ones  
3 that are discordant with either one, in either direction,  
4 and what theirs were on the strip assays, how they came out  
5 in terms of positives and negatives.

6           Were there positives in some of the groups that  
7 were discordant?

8           DR. STRAMER: Yes.

9           DR. HOLLINGER: And were there positives in the  
10 ones--and what are the percentage of positives in the ones  
11 that were concordant?

12           DR. STRAMER: For concordance, what I showed is  
13 about 24 percent whether it was from the 7 million donors  
14 that I showed or the smaller study we did with blood  
15 systems. It was pretty consistent between 10 and 25 percent  
16 of concordant EIA repeat-reactives were western blot or  
17 RIBA-positive.

18           So whether we use the recombinant immunoblot or  
19 western blot, between 10 and 25 percent confirmed positive  
20 which we believe is still an overinflated number. So, if  
21 you look at the discordant category, the only ones that we  
22 did further supplemental testing were for the 200 BSL  
23 samples and the 128 Red Cross samples.

24           For the samples on supplemental testing that were  
25 discordant from BSL, there were 150 samples. Of those 150

1 samples, none--zero--were RIBA-positive, were Chiron RIBA-  
2 positive. None. So all of the discordants were either  
3 negative or indeterminate, and indeterminate is something  
4 that you would expect. So, zero out of 200.

5 For the Red Cross part of that equation, there  
6 were 128 samples. 93 were discordant. Of those 93--that  
7 is, reactive only by one EIA and not another--three, we  
8 found as RIBA-positive. When we found those as RIBA-  
9 positive, I called Mike and I said, "Why did you get me  
10 involved in this stuff?"

11 And Mike says, "Well, maybe they are true  
12 positives." And I said--I won't repeat what I said. I  
13 said, "We need to investigate these further." So then, what  
14 we did, is we know that p21--first of all, we did a western  
15 blot on them. On western blot, they all showed incredibly  
16 strong p21e reactivity which is what drives the positivity  
17 even on the RIBA test.

18 So we knew that there was something in common,  
19 which was p21e. Because p21e has historically been  
20 associated with false positivity, that is why we tested it  
21 then on the GD21 which is the GeneLabs construct that has  
22 eliminated this area of p21e that has been associated with  
23 false positivity.

24 So all three samples we found to be GD21-negative.  
25 Because I was still concerned that p21e is not the only

1 criteria we should use, we further sent them to what I still  
2 consider the gold standard for HTLV which is  
3 radioimmunoprecipitation assay. The only person on the  
4 planet that I know who still does this testing is California  
5 State.

6 So we sent them to Janice Diggs at California  
7 State and she did a viral lysate HTLV I and HTLV II  
8 immunofluorescence assay and also did RIPA. And they were  
9 negative on those.

10 So all we had, basically, was isolated p21e  
11 reactivity in the discordant EIA-reactive samples. Really,  
12 if you look at the donor demographics of these individuals,  
13 these are normal, routine blood donors who have absolutely  
14 no risk of HTLV. In fact, most of our confirmed positives  
15 fall in that category as well. So even if I showed  
16 prevalence of 10 per 100,000, if I go further back into the  
17 Red Cross history, that is really where Mike started.

18 Mike started showing the Red Cross data where, in  
19 the beginning, when HTLV tests were first licensed, we used  
20 two supplemental tests, either western blot or RIPA, and  
21 then we substituted the western blot for a single p21e test  
22 which is also used in combination with RIPA. HTLV is a very  
23 difficult agent to get a good supplemental test for.

24 There just has not been--well, it is the same  
25 thing. There hasn't been good development and



1 commercialization of that.

2 So I hope I answered your question.

3 DR. HOLLINGER: I appreciate it.

4 DR. NELSON: Have all of these assays been  
5 evaluated in populations that have higher prevalence and  
6 that is known, like Japanese populations for HTLV I or the  
7 Indian--the places where HTLV II is endemic? Is anything  
8 known about the population where the rate of true infections  
9 is higher, all of these assays? How do they perform there?

10 DR. BUSCH: The published papers that there are on  
11 each of these tests have looked at large numbers of endemic  
12 pedigreed, PCR-pedigreed, infected people from all these  
13 different geographic settings. So they seem to have very  
14 good sensitivity, to my read.

15 DR. HOLLINGER: I think something has come out  
16 here from some of the people who have spoken is this idea of  
17 what is available from the government standpoint in terms of  
18 funds. I think that is an important issue that has been  
19 brought here and, hopefully, they will be utilized.

20 Anyone else have any comments? I am not sure,  
21 Jay, other than to get this issue out in the open, what you  
22 want from the group here.

23 DR. EPSTEIN: We have been frustrated for some  
24 time, really since 1988, about the lack of development of  
25 commercial supplemental tests for HTLV I and now HTLV II.

1 We wanted to bring forward our best thinking on the  
2 dimensions of the problem trying to illuminate what the  
3 apparent obstacles are and what the apparent remedies might  
4 be.

5 We are really just looking to A, make this public  
6 and B, to see if there are any additional suggestions from  
7 the committee members. My own view of the situation is that  
8 the remedy that is needed is really economic. FDA  
9 historically does not deal directly in that area. I think  
10 what is needed is to find a way to subsidize the tests under  
11 GMP manufacturing.

12 One dimension that really didn't come out today--a  
13 lot was said about the cost of trials, but that is a one-  
14 time, up-front cost. It gets amortized over a period of  
15 years. The real problem is that the GMP manufacturing can't  
16 be paid for by the sales. So the question is how do you  
17 subsidize continued manufacturing under GMP.

18 I don't know the full answer but, to my way of  
19 thinking, one possible answer is to figure out a way for  
20 screening to subsidize supplemental testing. There are many  
21 ways that one could try to do that whether those would be  
22 fund transfers from organizations, surcharges at the blood  
23 unit, vertical integration of screening companies.

24 You can think of ideas, but the bottom line is  
25 that the money lies in screening but there is a need for

1 confirmation. The demand lies with the blood community.  
2 There should be a way to figure out how to link these things  
3 up.

4           The other thing that I would say is that FDA can  
5 show flexibility in terms of the trial requirements based on  
6 what data we can accept for review. What I am hearing is  
7 that there is lots of clinical data. It just hasn't been  
8 gathered under INDs. That doesn't preclude the agency from  
9 examining it if it does meet standards; in other words, if  
10 the human subjects of investigation were treated in  
11 accordance with Helsinki accords, if there are evaluable  
12 records, if the product can be shown to have been consistent  
13 during the course of the trial, et cetera, et cetera, et  
14 cetera.

15           So one shouldn't assume that because the data that  
16 exists weren't already obtained under IND or they were  
17 foreign data that we can't look at those data. We  
18 potentially can but it still has to meet U.S. standards. So  
19 I think there is a set of issues and I think it is very  
20 encouraging that there is continued development in the  
21 industry. We just have to figure out a way for the products  
22 to be developed under U.S. law.

23           DR. NELSON: Could the FDA somehow require that a  
24 screening instrument go beyond the purpose of just excluding  
25 potentially high-risk donors to the point of not only

1 excluding them but also notifying them of their health  
2 status, therefore requiring some sort of a supplemental  
3 evaluation of a positive screening test.

4 In other words, the approval would not be only the  
5 initial screening test but some sort of a process that would  
6 affectively deal with the potential false positives in that  
7 screening.

8 DR. EPSTEIN: Again, we took that approach in the  
9 mid-80's. We were successful initially with the HIV test in  
10 that the companies offering the EIAs offered in-house  
11 testing services for supplemental testing. The quality of  
12 those tests was highly variable and there was a lot of  
13 criticism over false-positive results and false-negative  
14 results of those tests that had not been evaluated as  
15 rigorously as the screen.

16 We then attempted to do the same thing in the  
17 arena of HTLV but we were heavily criticized for holding up  
18 HTLV screening. So we allowed them to go their own way,  
19 partly with this result. And then, also, as you see, there  
20 is the problem that when we have taken the compliance  
21 posture on unapproved tests being marketed that were  
22 approved for research-use-only and then were commercialized  
23 for clinical use, the market then dried up.

24 So the problem is that we need to figure out a way  
25 for companies to play by the rules. But we can continue to

1 encourage the companies that have screening tests to provide  
2 supplemental-test services. I am not sure that the best  
3 mechanism is FDA regulation. I think the consumers should  
4 demand it.

5           If they didn't sign contracts with test-kit  
6 providers of the screening tests unless they offered  
7 supplemental testing, this environment would change. I  
8 think that there is a lot of power in that kind of market  
9 leverage. It doesn't mean that the screening-test  
10 manufacturers have to manufacturer it. They could create  
11 business partnerships with other manufacturers that know how  
12 to manufacturer it.

13           So I just think that all the possible options  
14 haven't been exercised and that not everything needs an FDA  
15 regulatory solution.

16           DR. HOLLINGER: When you have something like an  
17 orphan drug or something like this where you finally license  
18 to one company and you sort of prevent, basically,  
19 competition from others so that they can actually get a toe  
20 hold--if you have several companies there, then that creates  
21 a little problem, particularly if you are looking at this  
22 where I think the last one I saw was you take 20,000 and you  
23 get 16 positives, so that would be what, out of 2 million?  
24 It was be 1600 positives, and so that would be maybe 8,000  
25 positives maybe out of the blood supply.

1           If you have to separate that out into four or five  
2 different companies, it is going to be tough. It seems to  
3 me that if you are going to do this, then you are going to  
4 almost have to do, like the orphan drugs sometimes. You  
5 say, "We are going to license this to one company." And  
6 that's it, to me if you are going to have anything that is  
7 commercially feasible.

8           Or the government is going to have to make their  
9 own test which is something you haven't gotten into. But  
10 for something like this, that would be the other thing, that  
11 the government do this.

12           Any other thoughts?

13           DR. FITZPATRICK: Since Organon is not here and  
14 Abbott is, I just had one question since, obviously, Organon  
15 and Abbott won't qualify for an SBIR or an STTR, are you  
16 partnering or involved in providing research money to a  
17 small company to develop a partnership for this to help  
18 offset it?

19           MR. KLAMRZYNSKI: Matt Klamrzynski from Abbott.  
20 We continually have collaborations with firms but to give  
21 you any specifics right now, no; we don't have any.

22           DR. HOLLINGER: But that is a possibility, I  
23 suspect. Wouldn't it be?

24           MR. KLAMRZYNSKI: Yes. It would be a good way to  
25 work, a large company work with a small company, get the

1 SBIR money and provide them their expertise in helping  
2 develop the assay.

3 DR. STRAMER: Just to address some of Dr.  
4 Epstein's comments. Having been with industry now in the  
5 blood banks, kind of you do see both sides of the equation.  
6 I have called all of the companies. It has been very  
7 impossible to tie these to contracts because neither large  
8 manufacturer doesn't have supplemental assays for all  
9 markers. Some may have for one, and some may have for the  
10 other, so it is very difficult to get a full plate of  
11 exactly what you need.

12 The companies are moot as far as answering the  
13 questions. Whether the companies partner with small  
14 companies to provide, as the comment was just made,  
15 additional incentive, well, we at the screening test wanted  
16 partner either with RIBA or with Innogenetics--we have tried  
17 that route as well. It has not been successful.

18 So then, as Mike said, in the AABB comment, well,  
19 now we think maybe if do partner INDs like we do for NAT, we  
20 can take some of these small companies and show them that  
21 the FDA obstacles are not insurmountable and, with good  
22 data, we can get the job done.

23 So we are trying, now, to pursue the dual IND  
24 strategies. But all the small companies are so fearful of  
25 what manufacturing costs they have to do, the cost of

1 clinical trials, and what happens if we get a false negative  
2 in our clinical trials? So what I have responded to them  
3 is, so you put it in your labeling. That is what you have  
4 got. And then, "Buyer beware."

5 We just have to deal with it from that. At least  
6 something would be available. But there is a tremendous  
7 amount of inertia because of the fear that is involved in  
8 moving forward. I don't really know what that is there, but  
9 it is.

10 DR. HOLLINGER: Any other comments? You can see  
11 that this is, obviously, Jay, a real problem, as she has  
12 just spoken to, the fact that the small companies are  
13 concerned about not being able to make it. A large company  
14 could probably do it and write it off, possibly write it off  
15 on these small areas of things like this. You buy things in  
16 the supermarket that are writeoffs--with small stuff like  
17 this.

18 A lot of money is made in other parts of their  
19 products and one has to consider that, too. Sometimes, you  
20 have to step up to the plate, do the right thing.

21 DR. OHENE-FREMPONG: What is the precedent for the  
22 CDC establishing a test that may not be available  
23 commercially but which could serve blood banks, in this  
24 case.

25 DR. HOLLINGER: Sort of as a reference lab?



1 DR. OHENE-FREMPONG: Like a reference lab.

2 DR. HOLLINGER: With that small number, it could  
3 be like a reference lab.

4 DR. KHABBAZ: I really have no comment. There are  
5 a number of other examples of areas of orphan diagnostics  
6 and orphan vaccines and others that we struggle with. There  
7 are no easy answers.

8 DR. HOLLINGER: You don't have an answer.

9 DR. KHABBAZ: No.

10 DR. NELSON: They do for parasitic diseases. That  
11 has been one area--or unusual diseases.

12 DR. KHABBAZ: But they are rare. You are talking  
13 about--we heard the screen results and we heard the numbers.  
14 This is larger than any other disease or agents that we have  
15 offered reference to. There is no precedence, given the  
16 numbers and the size of this, for offering reference  
17 confirmatory--

18 DR. HOLLINGER: If there are no further comments,  
19 then I am going to close the meeting at this time. The next  
20 meeting of the BPAC is September 16 and 17. We will let you  
21 know where it is going to be.


22 [Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the meeting was  
23 adjourned.]

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**C E R T I F I C A T E**

I, **ALICE TOIGO**, the Official Court Reporter for Miller Reporting Company, Inc., hereby certify that I recorded the foregoing proceedings; that the proceedings have been reduced to typewriting by me, or under my direction and that the foregoing transcript is a correct and accurate record of the proceedings to the best of my knowledge, ability and belief.

  
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ALICE TOIGO :