

...y of meeting the performance require-
ment. Both flexibility and enforceability
can be obtained.

5. Reduce the range of variability in materials
and assembly methods so that the results
are more predictable. This variability not
only requires unnecessarily high and wasteful
safety factors, but insures that un-
known hazards will exist when new tech-
nology such as very high speeds, welded
rail, high center of gravity cars, and rapid
deceleration rates are introduced. (See
Safety Board report of accident at Crete,
Nebraska, p. 43.)

- 2. That the proposed standards considered to
be incompatible with other proposed stand-
ards or with other components of the rail-
road system, as indicated in this report, be
revised to eliminate the areas of in-
compatibility. R-71-27
- 3. That the proposed standards that are
indicated in this report to require revision
for increased flexibility in alternatives be so
revised. R-71-28
- 4. That the proposed standards provide for
either a detailed inspection which assures
the detection of specific noncompliant
defects and a chain of responsibility for
such compliance, or provide for the
ultimate responsibility of the track owner,
irrespective of inspection. R-71-29
- 5. That the proposed standards be revised to
include definitions and specification
references as required. R-71-30
- 6. That the proposed standards be revised to
narrow and make more specific the quali-
fications and limits of action of the so-
called "qualified persons". R-71-31
- 7. That the proposed standards adequately
control vegetation to assure that approach-
ing trains can be seen from vehicles stopped
at highway-rail grade crossings. R-71-32
- 8. That the proposed standards include
controls to promote a lessening eventuality
of rail failure. R-71-33

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations made below are
consistent with Recommendation 1 of the
Safety Board, made to FRA in its report of the
accident at Crete, Nebraska, February 18, 1969.

The National Transportation Safety Board
recommends to the Federal Railroad Adminis-
tration:

That those proposed standards, considered
to be indefinite, nonobjective, and there-
fore, unenforceable be corrected to render
them definite and objective, and that if this
cannot be done at this time, a follow-up
project to accomplish this purpose be
undertaken. R-71-26

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD:

/s/ JOHN H. REED
Chairman

/s/ OSCAR M. LAUREL
Member

/s/ LOUIS M. THAYER
Member

/s/ ISABEL A. BURGESS
Member

August 26, 1971

Francis H. McAdams, Member, was absent, not voting.