

...ing checklist during the final approach and the first officer, who was flying the aircraft, was devoting his attention to an attempt to establish visual contact with the runway in low visibility. These activities resulted in an improperly executed VOR/DME approach during which the aircraft descended below the minimum descent altitude before the crew acquired visual contact with the runway environment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Board finds that altitude alerting equipment now installed on air carrier aircraft is not used as a ground proximity warning device which has been previously recommended and, therefore, the Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

- 1. Develop a ground proximity warning system for use in the approach and landing phases of operation which will warn flightcrews of excessive rates of descent,

unwanted/inadvertent descent below Minimum Descent Altitudes, or descent through Decision Height. It would be desirable if the equipment now installed could meet this need; and

- 2. Develop and implement appropriate operational procedures to provide this type of warning to flightcrews for use during the approach and landing phase of flight.

The Board also recommends that the FAA:

- 3. Complete the necessary action to commission the ILS equipment at Gulfport since it has been installed for approximately 1 year.

As a result of this investigation, the Board recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration take steps to preclude future issuance of approach charts prior to commissioning of the pertinent navigational equipment. The FAA replied that they were examining several ways to improve the correlation of the procedural effective date with the facility commissioning date. (See Attachment 3.)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD:

/s/ JOHN H. REED
Chairman

/s/ OSCAR M. LAUREL
Member

/s/ LOUIS M. THAYER
Member

/s/ ISABEL A. BURGESS
Member

Francis H. McAdams, Member, was absent, not voting.

AA-71-14