

instruments by his efforts to fly by visual reference to the lights, and he was probably further distracted by the copilot's activities in the cockpit as the latter attempted to solve the communication problem. These diversions coupled with the possibility of an optical illusion, which could have caused the pilot to believe he was higher than he actually was, and the existing wind conditions, resulted in an excessive descent rate which was not detected until it was too late to prevent the accident.

The Board considered the possibility that the corrective lenses required for both pilots might have played a part in the cause of the accident. The captain's glasses were intended to correct a near-vision deficiency only and he was wearing his glasses during the approach. There was nothing in his medical record that indicated a deficiency of distance vision, depth perception, or other vision problems. The copilot was also required to possess corrective lenses for near vision. He was not required to wear them while exercising the privilege of his certificate. The Assistant Eastern Regional Flight Surgeon, FAA, stated that the condition of the copilot's eyes should not have compromised his ability to see the radio frequency displays in the cockpit.

The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was: The failure of the pilot to

recognize the wind shear condition and compensate for it; the lack of crew coordination in that the copilot did not monitor the approach due to a self-induced communications problem and failed to warn the pilot that the aircraft was too low; and the diversion of the pilot's attention from his primary task of completing the approach and landing. These conditions resulted in a mismanaged ILS and landing approach and the continuation of the descent into ground obstructions.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

There are numerous obstructions in the approach area to Runway 4 that intrude into the airspace. Although not a direct causal factor in this accident, their lack of conspicuity may have shortened the warning time available to the crew. Therefore, the Board recommends that:

The FAA, in conjunction with the appropriate local and Federal agencies, initiate a program to remove these obstructions. Pending this removal, these obstructions should be marked and lighted so as to be clearly detectable day and night

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD:

/s/ JOHN H. REED  
Chairman

/s/ OSCAR M. LAUREL  
Member

/s/ FRANCIS H. McADAMS  
Member

/s/ LOUIS M. THAYER  
Member

Isabel A. Burgess, Member, was absent and did not participate in the adoption of this report.