Headquarters Daily Report
SEPTEMBER 10, 2002
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REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT
ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED
HEADQUARTERS X
REGION I X
REGION II X
REGION III X
REGION IV X
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS SEP. 10, 2002
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
Part 21 Database MR Number: H-02-0064
Engine Systems Date: 09/10/02
Subject: Part 21 - EMD emergency diesel generator air start system
pressure regulating valve may stick open
Discussion:
VENDOR: Engine Systems PT21 FILE NO: m2-18-0
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 07/30/02 ACCESSION NUMBER: ml022190534
SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: RORP, R. Caldwell
Engine Systems, a vendor of EMD emergency diesel generators, concluded
its investigation of a condition with EMD air start systems using Norgren
R18 relieving style air pressure regulating valves. During an engine
start, the sudden high air flow followed by its immediate termination,
causes the internal components of the pressure regulating valve to be
excessively deflected. As a result, the valve sticks open until the air
receiver pressure drops, via its relieving tube, to a value low enough to
allow the valve to close. The vendor learned of this problem from the
Sequoyah and Davis-Besse nuclear power plants.
Contact: R. Caldwell, NRR
301-415-1243
E-mail: rkc1@nrc.gov
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HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 SEPTEMBER 10, 2002
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
Part 21 Database MR Number: H-02-0065
Engine Systems Date: 09/10/02
Subject: Part 21 - Potential bearing cooling oil blockage from loose
flashing material used in manufacture of EMD 645 engine pistons
Discussion:
VENDOR: Engine Systems PT21 FILE NO: m2-19-0
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 08/01/02 ACCESSION NUMBER: ml022200286
SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: RORP, J. Dozier
Engine Systems, a vendor of EMD emergency diesel generators, concluded
its investigation of a condition with EMD 645 engine pistons. Loose
casting flash material applied during the manufacturing process could
block the insert bearing oil passage and cause bearing damage. However,
the manufacturer, EMD, has reported no actual failures because of this
condition in nuclear or commercial applications.
Contact: J. Dozier, NRR
301-415-1014
E-mail: jxd@nrc.gov
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HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 SEPTEMBER 10, 2002
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
Part 21 Database MR Number: H-02-0066
Rockbestos Date: 09/10/02
Subject: Part 21 - Incorrect lacquer applied to electrical cable could
contribute to flame propagation
Discussion:
VENDOR: Rockbestos PT21 FILE NO: m2-20-0
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 08/09/02 ACCESSION NUMBER: ml022260608
SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: RORP, V. Hodge
Rockbestos-Surprenant, a vendor of electrical cables, reported that its
2/C 14 AWG 600V Firewall SR (Silicone Rubber) cable with overall Rockhide
braid failed the vertical tray flame test when subjected to the
requirements described in the standard IEEE-383-1974, Section 2.5.4. The
lacquer applied to the braid was incorrect and could contribute to the
propagation of flame. The vendor states that its initial investigation
indicates that the affected cables are limited to 8 part numbers or
shipments of this cable manufactured from 1999 through July 2002. The
vendor stated that it notified affected purchasers.
Contact: V. Hodge, NRR
301-415-1861
E-mail: cvh@nrc.gov
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HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 SEPTEMBER 10, 2002
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
Part 21 Database MR Number: H-02-0067
General Electric Date: 09/10/02
Subject: Part 21-Inadequate vibratory loads on main steam isolation
valves with one main steam isolation valve out of service
Discussion:
VENDOR: General Electric PT21 FILE NO: m2-21-0
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 08/23/02 ACCESSION NUMBER:
SOURCE DOCUMENT: EN 39148 REVIEWER: RORP, I. Jung
General Electric, boiling water reactor nuclear steam supply system
vendor, reported that its 1988 analysis for Brunswick Units 1 and 2 full
power operation with one main steam isolation valve (MSIV) out of service
did not adequately address the increased flow-induced vibratory loads on
the MSIVs in service. That evaluation used 100 percent flow in the three
active steamlines when it should be 133 percent flow. Absent test data,
the vendor recommends that power be limited to 75 percent while one MSIV
is out of service. The vendor notified the Brunswick licensee and will
notify other affected licensees.
Contact: I. Jung, NRR
301-415-1837
E-mail: ixj@nrc.gov
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