Headquarters Daily Report
JANUARY 17, 2001
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REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT
ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED
HEADQUARTERS X
REGION I X
REGION II X
REGION III X
REGION IV X
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 17, 2001
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
MR Number: H-01-0001
Westinghouse Date: 01/17/01
Subject: Westinghouse - Reactor Protection for Rod Withdrawal from
Subcritical in Lower Modes
Discussion:
Westinghouse identified an issue in Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter,
NSAL-00-016, regarding the protection functions assumed for the safety
analysis of the Uncontrolled Rod Control Cluster Assembly Bank Withdrawal
from a Low Power or Subcritical Condition event. The information below is
drawn from that document. The safety analysis contained in most Final
Safety Analysis Reports uses the power range neutron flux - low setpoint
trip function as the primary protection for a rod withdrawal event. This
analysis credits the power range trip function for operation in Modes 1
and 2; further, it implicitly credits the source range trip function for
providing similar protection during operation in Modes 3, 4, and 5.
In the Final Safety Analysis Report, it is assumed that the Mode 3, 4,
and 5 rod withdrawal events are bounded by the Mode 2 analysis, based
upon implicitly crediting the source range reactor trip function. A rod
withdrawal transient could occur in these lower modes if the trip
breakers were closed. However, the safety analysis should only credit
reactor trip functions that meet the requirements of IEEE 279-1971,
including seismic qualification. Since the source range trip function is
not usually time response tested or seismically qualified, the assumption
that the Mode 2 rod withdrawal analysis bounds the lower modes of
operation may be unwarranted.
To address this issue, some utilities have changed the power range
neutron flux - low setpoint function to be operable in Mode 3 in addition
to Modes 1 and 2. Unfortunately, this solution does not account for the
possibilities of a rod withdrawal event during Modes 4 or 5. Also, the
power range setpoint may not be operable for much of Mode 3. Westinghouse
states that if the plant were in Mode 3 at a temperature significantly
below the no-load temperature, the power range neutron flux - low
setpoint would be incorrectly calibrated due to shielding caused by the
lower temperature water in the down comer.
In assessing the safety significance of this issue, Westinghouse
concludes that there is "...no major reduction in the degree of
protection provided..." Even though the source range trip function is not
periodically time response tested, Westinghouse states that the source
range trip time for the Mode 3, 4, or 5 rod withdrawal event, assuming
degraded source range channels, would be less than 1.0 second. They also
assert that it is very unlikely that a seismic event would occur
concurrently with an energized rod control system well below the no load
temperature in Modes 3, 4, or 5.
As a corrective action, Westinghouse proposes two options. The first
option is to seismically qualify and time response test the source range
reactor trip function. Westinghouse goes on to note that a risk informed
approach might eliminate the need for seismic qualification. The second
HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JANUARY 17, 2001
MR Number: H-01-0001 (cont.)
option is to revise the plant procedures. One possible procedure revision
would be to prevent RCCA withdrawal capability until the system Tavg is
above the minimum temperature for criticality and the power range trip
function is operable. A second procedure revision option would be to
increase reactor coolant system boron concentration to a level where the
reactor would remain subcritical with "all-rods-out."
Contact: Sean Peters, NRR
301-415-3469
E-mail: sep@nrc.gov
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REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JANUARY 17, 2001
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
New York Power Authority MR Number: 1-01-0002
Indian Point 3 Date: 01/17/01
Buchanan,New York
Dockets: 50-286
PWR/W-4-LP
Subject: RE-ORGANIZATION OF INDIAN POINT 3 PLANT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
Discussion:
Effective January 15, 2001 the IP3 site organizational structure was
changed as follows: (1) the plant manager position is now the General
Manager of Plant Operations (F. Dacimo) who reports directly to the Vice
President of Operations - IP3 (R. Barrett); (2) all former General
Manager positions reporting to the Plant Manager have been eliminated.
Now reporting directly to the General Manager of Plant Operations are the
Managers of Operations (P. Rubin), Maintenance (A. Vitale), Health
Physics/Chemistry (D. Mayer), and Planning and Scheduling (R. Cavalieri).
The manager of the newly created department of Projects (J. Russell) also
reports to the General Manager of Plant Operations; (3) The Plant
Licensing (K. Peters) and Corrective Action/Assessment (D. Landeche)
managers now report to the newly created Director of Safety Assurance
(J. Comiotes), who in turn reports directly to the Vice President of
Operations - IP3. The Training Manager (J. Wheeler) now reports directly
to the Vice President of Operations - IP3. The site Director of
Engineering (J. DeRoy), the Manager of Human Resources (D. Birnbaum), and
the Manager of Communications (J. Steets) now report indirectly to the
Vice President of Operations - IP3. These changes were implemented to
bring IP3 organizational structure in line with the current Entergy
model.
Regional Action:
None.
Contact: Robert Summers (610)337-5282
Peter Drysdale (914)739-8565
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REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 JANUARY 17, 2001
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
Tennessee Valley Authority MR Number: 2-01-0001
Browns Ferry 1 2 3 Date: 01/17/01
Decatur,Alabama
Dockets: 50-259,50-260,50-296
BWR/GE-4,BWR/GE-4,BWR/GE-4
Subject: TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NUCLEAR (TVAN) ANNOUNCES MANAGEMENT
CHANGES
Discussion:
On January 12, 2001, Chief Nuclear Officer, John Scalice announced that
John Herron, the Browns Ferry Site Vice President, was resigning to
accept a position as Site Vice President with Entergy's Waterford 3
facility in Louisiana. Mr Herron's resignation is effective January 19,
2001.
Until a replacement for Mr. Herron is selected, Karl Singer, Senior Vice
President, Nuclear Operations who once served as the Browns Ferry Site
Vice President, will oversee activities at the site.
Regional Action:
None.
Contact: Paul Fredrickson (404)562-4530
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