Protecting People and the EnvironmentUNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
December 21, 1993
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 93-99: UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY AND THERMAL OVERLOAD
SETPOINT PROBLEMS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
plants.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to alert addressees to continuing discoveries of undervoltage relay and
thermal overload setpoints that are set too low. It is expected that
recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However,
suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
Background
In August 1976, the NRC wrote generic letters to all LWR licensees regarding
the need for licensees to evaluate any generic implications of several events
at the Millstone site involving episodes of sustained degraded grid voltage.
On June 2, 1977, as part of multiplant action MPA-23, the staff stated its
position that all licensees must have a second level of undervoltage
protection with a time delay. (During degraded grid voltage episodes,
undervoltage relays and thermal overload protective relays protect the safety
equipment.) In a generic letter dated August 8, 1979, the NRC requested all
licensees to determine the capability of the offsite power system to operate
all required loads within their voltage ratings under all conditions within
their design basis. The licensees reviewed their undervoltage relay setpoints
on each of these occasions. In 1981, the NRC issued Branch Technical
Position, Power System Branch-1, "Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution
System Voltages," which discussed, among other things, the addition of a
second undervoltage relay with an associated time delay. Between 1981 and
1992, the NRC issued two information notices, in which it discussed
undervoltage relay setpoints and other concerns:
1. IN 84-02, "Operating a Nuclear Power Plant at Voltage
Levels Lower than Analyzed," issued January 10, 1984.
2. IN 91-29, "Deficiencies Identified During Electrical Distribution
System Functional Inspections," issued April 15, 1991.
9312150073.
IN 93-99
December 21, 1993
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3. IN 91-29, Supplement 1, "Deficiencies Identified During
Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspections," issued
September 14, 1992.
In addition, recognizing that certain degraded grid voltage problems resulted
from inadequate control over the design process, on September 12, 1988, the
NRC issued Generic Letter 88-15, entitled, "Electric Power Systems -
Inadequate Control Over Design Processes."
Description of Circumstances
Since 1989, the NRC has performed electrical distribution system functional
inspections at nuclear power plants. The NRC has found design weaknesses in
several electrical distribution system areas including undervoltage relay
setpoints for degraded grid voltage. These are addressed in IN 91-29 and in
IN 91-29, Supplement 1. From May 1990 to January 1993, over 30 licensees
wrote to the NRC about inadequate setpoints. Licensees found that the
undervoltage relay setpoints were set so low that safety equipment would not
have been protected if degraded grid voltage had occurred. Three licensees
discovered deficiencies in which the thermal overload protective relay
setpoints were set too low.
Discussion
In the last few years, licensees began extensive efforts to improve the
adequacy and completeness of the set of design bases, design analyses, and
final design output documents that define the design of their facilities. The
licensees began these initiatives primarily because, during inspections such
as safety system functional inspections and safety system outage modification
inspections, the NRC consistently found that some licensees have made plant
modifications which have affected the functionality of safety systems without
making the appropriate setpoint change. The NRC inspection findings prompted
many licensees to review and reconstitute their design bases.
These reviews and the generic communication documents discussed above prompted
licensees to submit technical specification changes for undervoltage relay
setpoints that were discovered to be incorrect after the problem was created
for one of several reasons shown (see Attachment 1). Attachment 1 was
developed from 50.72 reports as a representative summary of the types and
number of problems encountered. Subsequent LERs may provide additional
information. Of the reports where the cause could be determined based on the
event report, design error was the predominant cause of the problem.
Licensees have generally found setpoint problems when the setpoints were
examined as a result of a special inspection or design basis reconstitution..
IN 93-99
December 21, 1993
Page 3 of 3
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
/S/'D BY BKGRIMES
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: C. Morris, NRR
(301) 504-2778
Attachments:
1. Representative List of Undervoltage
Relay Setpoint Revisions 1988-1993
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
.
Attachment 1
IN 93-99
December 21, 1993
Page 1 of 2
Representative List of Undervoltage Relay Set Point Revision Notifications and
Technical Specification Change Proposals for 1988-1993
Event Notification Licensee Event Notification Date Class
Number
11374 Pilgrim 1 January 30, 1988 1
14043 Pilgrim 1 November 18, 1988 5
00000 Pilgrim 1 June 30, 1988 1
14780 Cooper 1 February 17, 1989 5
16540 Crystal River 3 September 8, 1989 1
17121 Robinson 2 November 16, 1989 1
18322 Oconee 1, 2 and 3 April 24, 1990 5
18466 McGuire 1 and 2 May 14, 1990 1
18892 St. Lucie 2 July 14, 1990 2
19023 Haddam Neck 1 August 2, 1990 5
20021 Calvert Cliff 1 and 2 December 6, 1990 1
20435 Ft. Calhoun February 12, 1991 1
20503 Kewaunee 1 February 20, 1991 5
20542 Salem 2 February 27, 1991 2
21691 Dresden 2 and 3 August 23, 1991 5
22281 Dresden 2 November 20, 1991 1
22498 Zion 1 and 2 December 19, 1991 5
22580 Indian Point 3 January 9, 1992 5
22658 Dresden 3 January 22, 1992 5
22847 (TOL) Washington Nuclear 2 February 19, 1992 5
22918 Washington Nuclear 2 March 1, 1992 1
23148 Vermont Yankee April 1, 1992 4
23191 Quad Cities 1 and 2 April 7, 1992 5
23338 LaSalle 1 and 2 April 27, 1992 1
23365 LaSalle 2 April 29, 1992 1
23385 Crystal River 3 May 1, 1992 5
23439 (TOL) Grand Gulf May 11, 1992 3
23452 Comanche Peak 2 May 13, 1992 1
23576 Crystal River 3 June 4, 1992 1
23784 Zion 1 and 2 July 2, 1992 5
23932 Byron 1 and 2 July 24, 1992 1
00000 Callaway July 23, 1992 1
24229 Crystal River 3 September 14, 1992 1
24384 Dresden 2 and 3 October 6, 1992 5
*TOL = Thermal Overload.
Attachment 1
IN 93-99
December 21, 1993
Page 2 of 2
Event Notification Licensee Event Notification Date Class
Number
00000 Prairie Island 1 & 2 November 6, 1992 1
00000 St. Lucie 1 November 30, 1992 1
24757 Maine Yankee December 15, 1992 5
00000 Diablo Canyon 1 and 2 December 22, 1992 1
24845 Point Beach 1 and 2 January 7, 1993 1
25248 (TOL) Pilgrim March 29, 1993 5
25362 South Texas April 6, 1993 5
Events Notification Number-00000 Licensees whose undervoltage relay setpoint
notifications to the NRC were reported by LERs, licensee letter, etc., and
event notification numbers if any, were not known.
Class Definitions:
1. Undervoltage Relay setpoints were found to be incorrect because of
design errors.
2. Undervoltage Relay setpoints, as found, were not the same as required by
the technical specification.
3. Safety load circuit breaker thermal overloads or other trip setpoints
were too low because of design errors.
4. Safety load circuit breaker thermal overload, or other trip setpoints,
as found, were not the same as required by the technical specification.
5. Membership in one of the preceding four classes could not be definitely
established because of incomplete information in the event notification.
.
