Protecting People and the EnvironmentUNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
March 19, 1991
Information Notice No. 91-20: ELECTRICAL WIRE INSULATION DEGRADATION
CAUSED FAILURE IN A SAFETY-RELATED MOTOR
CONTROL CENTER
Addressees:
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose:
This information notice is intended to alert addressees to potential
problems resulting from degradation of dielectric polyvinyl chloride (PVC)
machine tool wire insulation used in Class 1E and non-Class 1E motor control
center (MCC) equipment wiring. It is expected that recipients will review
the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions,
as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained
in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no
specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances:
On January 4, 1991, during a refueling outage at the H. B. Robinson Steam
Electric Plant, Unit 2, the "B" feedwater motor-operated isolation valve
failed to close during surveillance testing. The licensee investigated the
incident and identified a clear, hardened coating on one of the contactors
in one of the compartments in the associated Class 1E (safety-related) motor
control center (MCC). During further investigation, the licensee identified
a green "liquescent" substance coming out of the wires that connect the
associated MCC electrical breaker to its forward and reverse contactors and
that was hardening on the contactors (see Attachment 1).
The licensee inspected 110 other compartments in four Class 1E 480 and
208 volt (V) MCCs and in numerous balance-of-plant MCCs. The same type
dielectric machine tool wire was used in these compartments and various
amounts of the green liquescent substance were present on the wires.
A similar event had occurred at H. B. Robinson a week earlier when the
isolation valve for a containment fan cooler return line radiation monitor
failed to operate.
9103130037
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IN 91-20
March 19, 1991
Page 2 of 3
The licensee determined that the same type of dielectric machine tool wire
was used in this MCC as was used in that for the "B" feedwater isolation
valve. There was also a green liquescent substance on the forward and
reverse contactors located in the associated MCC compartment. The licensee
now believes that this green liquescent substance caused the failure of the
isolation valve for the containment fan cooler return line radiation
monitor.
Discussion:
The H. B. Robinson licensee performed a laboratory analysis and identified
the green liquescent substance as a "vegetable oil plasticizer," which is
present in the composition of the cable's PVC insulation. The analysis
indicated that the green liquescent substance is a conductor in liquid form,
but when dried, may either be a conductor or an insulator, depending on the
amounts of copper oxide salts present. In addition, the color of the
substance can vary depending on the amount of copper oxide salts present.
In 1988, a similar event occurred at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating
Station, Unit 1 (SONGS1), when the Southern California Edison Company (the
licensee) was performing maintenance (i.e., cleaning) on several wires
attached to the 480/120V control trans-formers, located in a Class 1E MCC.
The licensee stated that after performing routine cleaning of the electrical
wires with isopropyl alcohol, they found a green substance seeping from the
wires attached to the primary side of the control transformer. Subsequent
investigation later identified that of approximately 96 compartments
inspected, 31 showed evidence of this green substance. This MCC contained
both Class 1E and non-Class 1E equipment.
The SONGS1 licensee found that a black and green sticky gel was present on
the entire length of the wire inside the wire's insulation and identified it
as an interaction between the corrosion products formed on the surface of
the copper wire and the chlorine leaching from the wire's PVC insulation.
The licensee stated that the sticky consistency of the material was a result
of a slight depolymerization of the inner surface of the insulation and that
moisture from the environment had been transported, by capillary action,
into the wire strand bundles. The licensee suspected that an electro-
chemical reaction contributed to the insulation degradation, which may have
been accelerated by the high voltage differential across the control
transformer. The licensee described the wire as a dielectric 600V machine
tool wire (AWG #14).
The H. B. Robinson licensee identified the wire used between the MCC breaker
and the contactors as a dielectric (insulated) PVC machine tool wire (AWG
#12) with a temperature rating of 105ø C. The cable is black in color, and
the specific manufacturer has not been identified to date. Westinghouse
(the manufacturer of the MCCs) has stated that this wire was procured in the
1962-65 time frame and records pertaining to this wire do not exist. It is
possible that several different vendors may have manufactured similar wire
and that this wire was not limited to any particular components (i.e., MCCs)
or for use by any particular nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) vendor. The
H. B. Robinson licensee has replaced all affected Class 1E MCC wiring with
wiring identified as "Surprenant Wire and Cable CSA Type CL-1251 XLPE 600V,
125ø C."
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IN 91-20
March 19, 1991
Page 3 of 3
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact: John Thompson, NRR
(301) 492-1171
Attachments:
1. Diagram of A Typical MCC Compartment
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
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